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ABSTRACT
‘Stein, was (...) a thorough if unconscious Wittgensteinian (...)’ 
Marjorie Perloff, 
Wittgenstein’s Ladder, 
1996, p.98 
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Tine Melzer: Ludwig Wittgenstein & Gertrude Stein – Meeting in Language
The purpose of this study is to show transitions between verbal and visual meaning in ordinary language, based on 
philosophical concepts and conceptual artworks. It offers models for artistic research and collaboration in arts and 
science. Shared experiences in ordinary language are fundamental to this thesis and make it an accessible and trans-
disciplinary study. Language as such, is approached from different practices and disciplines and becomes the central 
object of investigation. 
The research introduces a general set of mechanisms in language, stemming from the Wittgensteinian notion of the 
language-game. The study examines the possibility of a meeting between the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein and the 
writer Gertrude Stein in a linguistic, biographical and poetic sense. The main claim is that Wittgenstein and Stein share 
the understanding of language as a game, which is a fruitful principle for artistic and poetic production. 
Gertrude Stein developed a dimension in her writing which partly succeeds in showing this notion of creating mean-
ing-as-practice and making sense on the ‘edge’ of conventional meaning. In this way she augments Wittgenstein’s idea 
of the language-game and puts it into practice, tests its limits on her own language and on the reader’s habits. The ar-
tistic works represented in this thesis are equally experimental tests of Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-use hypothesis. They 
put his ideas into practice. They extend the research with strategies from the arts, poetry and fiction. 
The methodology of the research is based on Wittgenstein’s notion of meaning as context-dependent use. This concept 
defines the meaning of a word by the way it is used in a specific context. This perspective is then challenged with visual 
artistic work. This hypothesis is tested throughout the research by applying tools and concepts from several practices, 
like computer linguistic tools, collaboration with writers and artists from other fields and autonomous visual and po-
etic work to augment the study of facts. 
Conceptual artworks, often produced in collaboration, function as language experiments, or language-games. The 
Wittgensteinian differentiation between what can be shown and what can be said is examined. The context of the re-
search lies in the practices developed as a conceptual artist in which theoretical research informs artistic practice. This 
thesis, on the border between verbal and visual language, is founded upon antecedent studies in philosophy of language 
and the practice of Fine Arts. Against this background the research focuses on the relationship between word, context 
and meaning: issues of communication, ordinary language, words and their composition, context-based meaning, 
naming visual phenomena, examination of word-and-world-relationships and vocabularies.
Main sources are the major works and biographies of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gertrude Stein, the critical work of Marjo-
rie Perloff, language philosophers concerned with ordinary language and the contrastive corpus linguistic approach.
The results of this research are generated by several interdisciplinary productive methods. Artworks, poetic and 
scientific work,  all of which employ modes of language, and whose their domains overlap. Additionally, the notion of 
meeting acts as model metaphor for the development of a solid trans-disciplinary methodology for research between 
science and the arts. One major result of comparing their ideas on language is reflected in the meeting of the language 
used by Wittgenstein and Stein. Their meeting is materialised in the computer generated Shared Vocabulary, which 
is a list of words which both Wittgenstein and Stein used in their writing. It applies linguistic tools from contrastive 
corpus linguistics to compare their vocabularies (corpora), which offers new methods for investigating the works of the 
philosopher Wittgenstein and writer Stein. 
Generally, this thesis may act as an introduction to language as ideal fundament for interdisciplinary study. The ap-
plication of the principle of the language-game (Wittgenstein) is a significant of displaying possible strategies for artists 
and researchers who work transdisciplinarily. The research results directly inform practice and practitioners from 
other fields, which means that collaboration is central to the research. It implies that language permeates every sort 
of research, art and its discourse. It also suggests that the meaning of words and images depend on their use, which 
extends the Wittgensteinian meaning-as-use hypothesis to visual language. The findings of the research on vocabular-
ies are quite specific, but they overlap with offering simple general mechanisms of the language-game. The consequent 
alliance of the discussion with the language of the everyday makes the research a general contribution to everyone who 
is genuinely interested in language and the arts.  
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PREMISE 
Sometimes we forget that our own presumptions do not apply to everyone. In 
my case, I presume that language must surely be a sapid subject for everyone. 
The praise of language articulated by linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf is, despite the 
controversy over linguistic relativism, still relevant:  
 ‘The problems of achieving mutual understanding, of language barriers, of 
propaganda and advertising, of education, of the technique of managing human 
affairs without undue friction, of an intelligence in human relations that can keep 
pace with the changes brought about by the physical sciences, all run afoul of this 
matter of language and thought. Everyone is naturally interested in questions of 
language although they either do not know it, or know it and think they know all 
about it.’ 
(Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality, 1956, p.82) 
RESEARCH  FRAMEWORK 
This research posits itself in relation to the contemporary discourse on the inter-
actions between the arts and science. Poetry and science are sometimes shown to 
share similar strategies. Artistic creation can augment the study of facts. In this 
context an examination of a possible meeting of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Ger-
trude Stein moves beyond some of the facts. The main hypothesis is, I argue, that 
their lives have materialised in their literal works and so the possibility of their 
meeting lies in language. Within the maelstrom of language lies the coordinates 
for a possible meeting.
 The basis for using Wittgenstein’s texts is the relationship between lan-
guage and the world as we experience it with our senses. In his prominent work 
Philosophical Investigations he proposes examples and states situations in which 
certain words are temporarily occupied by meaning. The meaning of a word is 
specified by its use. The use of a word within a certain context clarifies its mean-
ing. Other positions from the philosophy of language and linguistics introduce 
the issue of word-world-relationships and the role of consciousness therein (i.e. 
p.108 and chapter 7). 
Words and vocabularies are the raw material for this research. Lists of words and 
vocabularies as such are pools of possibilities. Possible meanings are raw words 
without a context. But without the context of a word, its meaning(s) remain 
mere potential (p.131 or chapter 12). The research methodology proposes an 
extreme literalism for artistic production and transdisciplinary research (p.137). 
Other mechanisms from ordinary language use are utilised to reflect on issues of 
potential meaning in language. In the discussion of the shifters and deictic words 
(chapters 12 and 13) it is shown, how words gain meaning within the specificity 
of a context and  how such linguistic uncertainty is key to poetic acts as well as to 
philosophical work (p.154). There, key figures from philosophy support the close 
kinship between scientific and artistic research mechanisms which shows in the 
methodological mechanisms.  
PROMINENT  A IMS 
Wittgenstein aimed at a reconciliation between formal and ordinary language 
practice (p.49/p.288). Stein developed a writing method of creating and sustain-
ing meaning on the edge of conventional ordinary language. A main aim of this 
thesis is to show how the concept of the language-game is put into practice.
Everyday experiences from using ordinary language, such as the use of shifters 
or names, are introduced and exemplified with visual artworks. With the mo-
tive of making general philosophical or linguistic mechanisms accessible, these 
works are often reduced and temporary. 
The aim is also to bring language philosophy into the public realm and to the 
awareness of an art-audience in simple terms. Therefore one main research ques-
tion as an art practicioner concerns issues of language as a network of complex 
structures which can be applied into simple games. Simplicity and complexity 
are unlike siblings but their rivalry is obvious. The majority of the philoso-
phers referenced in this research have attempted to use simple words to write 
preface  
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about complex things. Some of them declared their desire to consciously avoid 
academic jargon and use ordinary language wherever possible. This research is 
aimed at both the academic peer group as well as interested professionals from 
other fields. The language philosopher Rudi Keller professes a similar motive. 
He compares the relationship between simplicity and complexity in texts to the 
performance of an acrobat:
‘My aim was and is to write in a way that the text does no longer show the pains 
of the research. (...) The reader should have the chance to discover the complexity 
behind the simplicity and the seeming lightness.’
Rudi Keller, Sprachwandel, 1994, p.11 (own translation)
The variety of subjects of this research is evident and it may appear problematic 
at first. In order to deal with this complexity I found it useful to approach the 
issue of language from several angles involving everyday experience and transi-
tions to poetic meaning. My principal aim as an artist is is to play language-
games across disciplines in order to expose language by displaying its structural 
facilitation of meaning in both image and text. Verbal and visual language-
games meet and intertwine. The intricate aspects of objectified language are ech-
oed in the complexity of the artworks, which are multidisciplinary, sometimes 
performative, hermetic or utterly simple. Like language, they are based on reflec-
tion and perception and often executed in collaboration with others. Central 
mechanisms to do this as art practicioner are to approach issues of language by 
using our experience with everyday language and everyday objects. 
FORMATIVE  PR INCIPLES  (METHODOLOGY)
The methodology of this research is supported by strategies which rely on 
mechanisms of contrast and comparison. The contrastive method as computer 
linguistic tool creates comparisons of analogies and differences between verbal 
expressions and their transitions to image.
 Another formative principle is an awareness for the difference between 
‘saying’ and ‘showing’. We owe this remarkably simple but crucial differentiation 
to Wittgenstein, who underlined the intricacy of meaning. Today we may argue 
that saying and showing belong to separate cognitive processes. But in Wittgen-
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stein’s work Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1922) this distinction supports his 
idea that what can be shown cannot be said (4.1212). The essential things lie thus 
outside language (p.112 in this thesis). By implementing these thoughts as sim-
plified conceptual art works throughout the thesis, this elementary distinction 
is turned into an intelligible experience for the reader and viewer. The saying/
showing distinction serves as a platform for interlacing the principle of language-
games on the level of both the intellect and the senses. By respecting the saying/
showing distinction and applying it to the methodology of the practice based 
parts, it allows an exploration of the limits between what can be said and what 
can be shown. These limits are a vibrant example of the passage from discursive 
language to poetic language. In the language which is showing, this passage is 
visible in shared strategies of literature and visual art. Poetry and language-
based arts in general may have access to what is there to show by saying it. Verbal 
language in artistic works thus becomes the transmitter between the seemingly 
incompatible mechanisms of saying and showing as formulated by Wittgenstein. 
 This is a key motivation for employing these thoughts for the practice 
based parts of this research, for which methodologies from different disciplines 
are applied to show the mechanisms of language-games. In conceptual artworks 
Wittgenstein’s idea of language-games are enacted – as Stein managed in poetry. 
The artworks project ideas from humanities and literature and revolve around 
possible overlaps between them. These practice-based works are autonomous 
entities and yet they augment and answer back issues of theoretical reflection, 
which is a main mechanism of this research. 
 So the methodology informs multidisciplinary links on the relation-
ships between word, image and context. Some of these mutual relationships we 
may generally call meaning. One key principle is to show that what we call mean-
ing is often the result of a language-game. The term language-game is borrowed 
from Ludwig Wittgenstein and applied to artistic practice and discourse. Game-
like projects and rule-governed work are used to clarify and display the powerful 
tools Wittgenstein offers to artistic practice. Similarly, Gertrude Stein’s literary 
work functions as a catalysor for creative language-based production.
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STRATEGIES  FOR  EXTENDING  RESEARCH 
INTO  PRACTICE :  COLLABORATIVE  METHODOLOGIES  
In this research several ways of interacting between theory and practice are  
introduced, proposed and tested. Concepts from philosophy and tools from 
linguistics are explained and applied to practice-based work, such as interven-
tions in public space and using iconic objects for materializing language-based 
artworks. In many of these interactions, expertise from other fields is needed 
and leads to collaborations beyond the limits of disciplines. Exemplarily of this 
is the collaboration with cognitive scientist Egon W. Stemle who programs and 
facilitates verbal material like large text corpora in many of the artworks in this 
thesis (chapters 26, 27, 29, 33) and suggests new linguistic tools in general. This 
sort of collaboration is programmatic, in the way that contact with scientists and 
researchers from other disciplines requires an awareness of different vocabular-
ies and codes of communication. This requires an often active involvement in the 
necessary acts of dialogue and translation of theoretical concepts into ordinary 
language and image-based metaphors. These transitions can then lead to new 
poetic works, as is explicitly displayed in this research in the works Shared Vo-
cabulary (p.303) and The Complete Dictionary (p.332). 
 Other collaborations, as the one with Sebastian Schultz (chapter 36), 
play with the understanding of existing communication formats as language-
games. The expectations of the audience and the codes by which we articulate, 
judge and relate artistic production is tackled by a semi-staged seminar situation 
which enacted the notion of a simulacrum and detecting meaning. 
 Most visibly, the mechanism of collaboration supports the structure of 
the thesis by collaboration with other practicing artists. Central to the research is 
a set of chapters which use the finding of facts to generate visual works (chapters 
21-25).  This section stands exemplarily for the reciprocal influence between 
theory and practice in practice-based research. Different modes of transition 
have been used by invited artists who examined the facts of a possible meet-
ing between Wittgenstein and Stein to create autonomous contributions. These 
outcomes are at the same time part of the final body of research. This collabora-
tion is also to emphasise the permeability between individual interpretations of 
identical source material (chapter 25). 
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The  source material for these artistic contributions is a commissioned short 
story which used all available facts on a possible meeting between Wittgenstein 
and Stein (chapter 24). This story is a collaborative writing project which ques-
tions the role of the author, the literary voice and genres of literary expression. 
These questions are discussed previously in Fictional Biography (chapter 23) 
which examines the transitions between historic fact and literary fiction. This 
discussion is essential to the methodology of following a scientific procedure 
thoroughly to then augment the facts on its limits to artistic interpretation. This 
method magnifies an important mechanism of how knowledge becomes mate-
rial for a possible extension of facts in artworks.      
 The central section of the research on these transitions between fact and 
fiction, between history and story (chapters 21-25), are constituted by comparing 
the authority of historic facts with (auto)biographical sources. Chapters 21 and 
22 clarify the notions of presence and absence, idols and myths in this context. 
It is core to the rationale of the research that these mechanisms are implemented 
into the thesis itself, because it shows issues of language being a shared activity 
between generations of (often anonymous) participants as introduced early on 
in the thesis with Edward Sapir calling language the ‘most massive and inclusive 
art we know, a mountainous and anonymous work of unconscious generations.’ 
(p.48).  
CONTRIBUTION  TO  KNOWLEDGE 
Image vocabularies and mechanisms of the language-game are compared by 
means of selected literature and art historical landmarks. The saying/showing 
distinction here offers a new starting point for this particular field of visual and 
verbal meaning to following transdisciplinary studies (chapter 9).
The importance of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work in philosophy of language is 
evident. Yet up until today there is little general agreement on the need for a 
re-evaluation of Wittgenstein’s work as a philosopher on ethical issues. Still his 
work is widely considered to represent British analytical philosophy or even 
positivist positions. One contribution to knowledge is the central discussion of 
alternative modes of interpretation which show biographical and cultural influ-
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ences from Wittgenstein’s Viennese roots (chapter 15). This thesis reconciles 
‘ethical’ and ‘logical’ interpretations of Wittgenstein’s work. 
Objects can function as signs and words act as containers for meaning. Objects 
occupy our visual and haptic habitat and so do words. The prominent discussion 
of everyday objects as signs and their iconic qualities in relationship to Wittgen-
stein’s ‘meaning as use’ generated the clause subtext of objects (p.157).
One major interdisciplinary output of this research is the preparation and estab-
lishing of a Shared Vocabulary, which is a procedure of using computer linguis-
tic tools for comparing corpora to produce artistic and poetic works. Though 
familiar to scientific linguistic practice, this tool is now made accessible to the 
art context (p.286 and chapters 26-29). 
A seemingly insignificant contribution to knowledge is the discovery that Stein 
an Wittgenstein share a fascination for detective novels (chapter 37). This reflects 
the primacy of ordinary language in their work and the tendency to take lan-
guage as a game. Similarly they have had both defied to comply with conventions 
of writing according to certain expectations of genres and editors (p.359) which 
exposes once again their kinship in sovereignty.   
 Altogether mechanisms of expectation in language agents and habitu-
ated meaning in language-games are central to this thesis and offered to future 
studies on this topic in philosophy and the arts. 
GUIDEL INES  TO  NAVIGATION 
Language is a complex network of paths or passages, I have chosen to reflect this 
in the thesis by designing it like a maze.
 
‘Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and you know your 
way about; you approach the same place from another side and you no longer 
know your way about.’
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, #203
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In this thesis, many short chapters connect to a large network with several 
possible entrance points. Internal references between central subjects link the 
fragments and in turn, reflect the prismatic nature of language. This structure 
reflects the potentiality of language, its possible meeting points and its elemen-
tary systematic patterns.1
As the body of the text can be treated like a hypertext, it is in principle possible 
to read chapters in random order. If one wishes to get a general impression of the 
research one can get access to it by reading the key chapters, which are marked 
red on the map (p.44-47).  
MAPPING  THE  RESEARCH 
A map offers a basic overview of the way the single chapters structure this thesis. 
Four essential fields act like ‘directions of the wind’ on the map. Two intersect-
ing axes, one stretching between ‘philosophy of language’ and ‘artistic practice’, 
the other between ‘saying’ and ‘showing’ form the field. This map displays a core 
rationale of the research: all elements cover several areas from philosophical to 
artistic practice. Simultaneously it arrays them in a gradient between the two 
oppositional practices ‘saying’ and ‘showing’ in Wittgensteinian philosophy of 
language, which are crucial tools for the conceptual lay-out of this research. 
 The current order of the research is shown by a hand-drawn line con-
necting the chapter-numbers and shows at one glance the crisscross interplay be-
tween the examined fields. A second map is left void for the reader to mark their 
own route of reading or mapping out notes. 
Altogether, this research reflects on the multifariousness of language. One prin-
ciple is to do so by bringing together fields and practices which stand close in or-
dinary language, but far apart in concept or discipline – or vice versa. Always in 
this research, language may show itself amongst all that is said about it. Language 
is a labyrinth, as Wittgenstein proposed. When you enter its maze of pathways, 
you may get lost or loose track, or follow certain ideas for the first time. Many 
things seem familiar when you enter from another direction. At times, I hope, 
one experiences a kinship with the language users we meet, and realise that they 
are us.
Tine Melzer 
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1 Throughout the thesis, internal references are offered in brackets (p.427). This device links 
cross-references between related subjects and helps to navigate through the ‘labyrinth’ of language. 
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“Language is the most massive and inclusive art we know, a mountainous and 
anonymous work of unconscious generations.”         
Edward Sapir, Language (1921)
1. INTRODUCTION
 What is language? This thesis relies on the hypothesis that lan-
guage is a shared practice. Several ideas on language as shared practice will 
be discussed, some of them will be applied to experiments of conceptual 
artworks. These experiments are based on the idea of practice in two ways: 
one is the experience as visual artist and the other is the everyday participa-
tion in ordinary language. Above, the linguist Edward Sapir introduces the 
close relationship between language-practice and art as well as its relevance 
beyond the singular subject, and this provides the backdrop to this thesis.
 What is a meeting? For Ludwig and Gertrude to meet in language 
sounds like a promise. Indeed, this thesis is the attempt to compare Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein on matters of language; in this it reflects 
on possible meeting points. This work tries to match linguistic, biographi-
cal and poetic analogies in their lives and work. These are complex general 
terms. Therefore the possible meeting, both in language and life is explored 
in this thesis in several ways. 
 Firstly a text-based research that investigates the literal, biographi-
cal and poetic framework of relevant similarities between Wittgenstein and 
Stein. Then, the facts have been articulated in the works of art documented 
here; facts were partly extended into the fictional realm. 
 Secondly, in the realm of ‘pure’ language there is an analysis here 
of how the two meet in a Shared Vocabulary (p.301) between their written 
work based on the contrastive approach and what conclusions a linguis-
tic comparison may bring us to. This Shared Vocabulary is literally the list 
which includes all words that two of their major literary works, Stein’s Ten-
der Buttons (1914) Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1922), have 
in common.
Sapir: Language
zone between 
research and 
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In the pursuit of interdisciplinary practice-based elements, major ques-
tions on language are posed and examined: to this end, the thesis consists of 
literature-based research on the key questions, which introduces, informs 
and is reflected in language-based conceptual visual art works. The written 
part is intended as introduction to the field of study as an extension from 
the humanities and philosophy into the world of practitioners and the art 
public. 
 The research enterprise is intended to build a bridge with other 
areas of research on language in philosophy and the arts, and how this is 
manifested in interdisciplinary work. In this sense, highlighting possible 
links between visual and verbal language is more crucial here than an ex-
haustive review of existing interpretations on Wittgenstein’s and Stein’s work 
in general. The perspective of their work created by the act of comparison 
and by extension of their art practice takes precedence over offering a com-
prehensive literature-based overview of their work and its reception.
 One claim is that Wittgenstein aimed at a similar reconciliation be-
tween formal  and ordinary language practice, as we will learn later on; one 
striking example is his fascination for detective novels, which he shared with 
Gertrude Stein (p.371). 
 The initial questions of the artistic work revolve around language; 
this thesis aims to collect and display major findings super-imposed upon 
the afterimage of Wittgenstein and Stein. The research does not provide 
fixed answers to the question of what language essentially is, nor will it give 
recipes for making art out of language. But it hopefully manages to give 
possible points of contact for artistic and poetic work based on key notions 
evident within the work of Wittgenstein and Stein and on elementary issues 
of language philosophy they embraced. In the present research, I engage in a 
Wittgensteinian perspective on meaning as context-dependent use. I wish to 
challenge this perspective with visual artistic work included in this research. 
In contrast, Gertrude Stein developed a dimension in her writing practice 
which partly succeeds in showing a conceptual method of creating meaning 
links between 
visual and verbal 
language
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and making sense on the edge of conventional meaning. 
 In this way one claim is, that Stein augments Wittgenstein’s idea of 
the language-game and puts it into practice, tests its limits both on her own 
language and the habits of language evident within the reader. 
 The codes and conventions we share in language are part of a social 
construction; language behaviour is part of human practice. In the work ex-
ecuted for this particular research on Wittgenstein and Stein, there is com-
forting kinship in their fascination for language. The comparison between 
them is the perfect playground – or alibi – for trespassing in that hybrid 
zone between verbal and visual language, between literal and metaphorical 
meaning. The games which are played are serious. This work is meant to be 
read and viewed, contemplated and exhibited, conceptually and intuitively 
understood. Much of what is said may seem obvious, but some of what is 
obvious has not been written down. One is invited to follow and challenge 
an approach to language and its phenomena that is an album of starting 
points. Ezra Pound words this approach as a test: ‘In all cases one test will 
be, “could this material have been made more efficient in some other me-
dium? “ ’ (Pound, 1934, p.76).
 This work invites research at the intersection of verbal and visual 
language in the tradition of conceptual art and poetry. It also aims to famil-
iarise and popularise language based visual art for an audience from other 
areas. In order to do so, it offers several entrances to the field: 
 Firstly, the text is structured into relatively short chapters and 
marked throughout with relevant key-notions as sub-chapters. The naviga-
tion within the work can be chronological but also directed by the internal 
reference system linking one topic to the other. Repetition and refrain are 
part of the methodology of the work. In thought it is conceptualised rather 
as a text-book: 
“One liberty of the text-book (as a form of writing) is that it permits refrain, 
repetition.” 
(Pound, 1934, p.77)
serious games
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Secondly, the style of writing is deliberately kept accessible and plain; 
wherever possible, it gives preference to ordinary language over specialised 
academic jargon. The work relies on variations of contrastive methods and 
allusions to psychological experiments. Simplicity and economy of means 
should reverberate in the writing. This collection of positions is then put 
to practice and connected to strategies from fields of fine arts and poetry. 
Topics such as ‘the Mystical’ and ‘the Secret’, for instance, are discussed and 
displayed as a deliberate counterpoint between the different operative modes 
of these respective disciplines,  which are related but not identical. Ideally 
the comparisons, shifts and experiments offer new insights into the action 
of language of the everyday, may the news look small and even familiar. One 
aim of this work is to show where patterns of meaning match our habits, and 
to point out the habits we take for natural laws. 
 Thirdly, the relationships between text and image are meant to con-
nect the topics intuitively. The documented works of art by the author are 
not illustrations of the written sections, but they should be regarded as visu-
al chapters adding to the discussion on language at hand. This interlacing of 
theory and practice, discourse and image-making aims to embody aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s notion of a language-game and his distinction between saying 
and showing: the visual works should augment or question certain aspects of 
the written sections. 
 The lay-out of the thesis and artworks is predicated on methodolo-
gies of the practice as an artist who looks at philosophical texts in order 
to realise language-based works. For each conceptual piece, deliberately 
adjusted methodological strategies are employed in order to show shifts and 
drifts of meaning and media. One hypothesis is that art, fiction and poetry 
lie, in this sense, in the prolonged perspective of philosophy. One aim is to 
contribute to the discourse on possible modes for executing research in the 
arts and offering practical strategies to incorporate scientific research into 
artistic practice or works of fiction. 
style of writing
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To give an insight into core phenomena in language via transdisciplinary 
works is given priority over highly specialised issues within the philosophy 
of language. This focus again serves to propel language-based concepts in 
visual art into the awareness and comprehension of a multidisciplinary 
audience. For this reason, some issues of interpretation on the immense 
field of language have been neglected and at times, alternative modes of 
interpretation on Wittgenstein’s work in relationship to Stein’s have been put 
forward – as happened in the discussion of the background of the Viennese 
roots (p.163). The philosophical positions referred to in this research mostly 
regard language from a ‘classic’ 20th century linguistic perspective, rooted in 
anthropological studies and the Linguistic Turn. The discussed material is in 
no way exhaustive, but a selection has been made for reasons of accessibility 
and proximity to the senses and language of the everyday. 
 Similarly, the thesis’ methodology of practice-based display is 
designed to lead to an experience-based research, so a profound historic 
review of conceptual art movements and language-based art in the history 
of art is not included. The major figures are referred to within the main text, 
and relevant sources and references are included in the Bibliography.
“But, among other things, this comparative method produces results that are 
strikingly different from those to be found in single-discipline studies. (…) “ 
(Foucault 1970/2009, preface ) 
2. COMPARISONS  
We compare what we see, we compare what we know with what we can re-
member. Though it is not easy to fully express what it means to compare. We 
can easily find different examples of situations, in which we do it. This can 
be done for all levels of complexity; in terms of colours, for instance, one can 
assume that a colour is associated with a common sight. This basic example 
of colour names will guide us through this research.
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The industrialist, writer and politician Walter Rathenau is popular for his 
catchy sentence: ‘Denken heisst Vergleichen’, to think is to compare (Rath-
enau 1953, p.32).
 Understanding what is meant by comparing a certain feature calls 
for the ability to isolate or heighten certain elements, be it a colour, shape or 
pattern of a certain scene. For the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, such 
quests were essential in his investigation of ordinary language use. We know 
that a major part of his writing is influenced by the hypothesis, that the 
meaning of a word (or sign) is dependent on its use in language. 
‘For a large class of cases–though not for all–in which we employ the word “mean-
ing” it can be defined like this: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. 
And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.” ‘ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #43) 
The significance of a sign is a result of the game we play with it in the inter-
actions of language, the so-called ‘language-game’. 
 Wittgenstein emphasises the aptness of the analogy of language use 
to a game. It is one of the most accentuated terms in his attempt to show 
how language functions: as an activity amongst participants, amongst us, 
the language-players. As was his manner he tried to shed light on indistinct 
terms as ‘essence’ by bringing them closer to daily experiences of ordinary 
language use, Wittgenstein exposed abstract words to our experience of 
ordinary language. In this way, he argued, the lurking danger to speak of 
words and with words that are void of meaning could be minimised. In 
Wittgenstein’s view, many of the philosophical problems of the past resulted 
from improper language-use and determination of technical terms which 
meant nothing (Monk 1990). Yet he was still concerned with the problems 
which were foreshadowed by these metaphysical terms. In order to be able 
to speak about them, or better: in order to be able to examine whether they 
can be spoken about at all, he tried to translate or reposit ‘suspect’ terms 
into more common expressions. At times this method also leads to the 
impression, that there exists a tension between key terms which define each 
other through comparison. In other words: seemingly simple sentences 
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are defined by the varying roles they may play in the context of different 
language situations. This method thus creates an adumbration of words, and 
how they are used in practice. Wittgenstein’s method displays how these 
altered contexts inform elements of another practice, another word, another 
use. An overlap of meanings guarantees a concept of language as practice-
based application rather than a static predefined construction of fixed lexical 
meaning. As is commonly known, we can find this technique of comparison 
in Wittgenstein’s attempt to clarify his concept of language-games. He tries 
to characterise the entirety of what we call games. What is the ‘essence’ of 
a game? As mentioned above, Wittgenstein was very aware of the traps a 
general abstract term delivers. He consciously avoids the misleading gen-
eral term ‘essence’ by replacing it with a more common, experience-based 
expression or household-name. Is there one feature which all games have 
in common? Wittgenstein explains that there is not one essential feature 
which defines a game, but that features overlap (see p.61).  All features, all 
meanings, all practices which can be captured by a word he calls its family-
resemblances. Games have rules and structure, the same way families have 
repeating genetic codes, that structure and define form: ‘build, features, 
colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc, etc overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way. – and I shall say: ‘games’ form a family.’ (Wittgenstein 1953, p.28). The 
philosopher Ray Monk, a recognised biographer of Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
remarks on this triangle between comparison, overlap and meaning and 
quotes from the Blue Book:
‘In the Blue Book Wittgenstein seeks to replace this notion of essence with the 
more flexible idea of family resemblances:
“We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, 
say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general 
term ‘game’ to the various games; (...)” ‘  
(Monk, 1990, p.338) 
1  published posthumously in its entirety as Philosophical Investigations and texts from Nachlass, partly 
obtainable online at http://wittgensteinsource.org
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In order to use words which we can handle, Wittgenstein shows in nearly all 
his later writing1, that it does not take complex words to describe complex 
matter. Thinking and writing about language is – as mentioned earlier – a 
special and sometimes paradoxical enterprise. The examined is the vehicle 
and the vehicle is examined at the same time.
In his examination of the language-game, Wittgenstein sticks to household-
names and “homely” metaphors, as Marjorie Perloff (1996, p.68) calls them. 
She examines his preference for ordinary language and relates it to a number 
of authors from poetry and other fields, Gertrude Stein among them, in 
order to better understand and explicate her conception of the poetic charge 
in Wittgenstein’s own work. 
‘In #11, language is compared to a “tool-box” (“there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a 
screw-driver, a ruler, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws”), and the author com-
ments, “The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects”; in 
#18, language is described as “an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, 
of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and 
this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and 
uniform houses.” ‘
 (Perloff 1996, p.68)
She tries to make his ‘simple’ metaphors and everyday analogies accessible 
by asking back quite bluntly:   
‘No one could quarrel with either metaphor: yes, language may be said to resemble 
a “tool-box”, and yes, language is a complicated structure like a city with buildings 
of different sizes and periods, but so what?’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.68)
Perloff answers herself by pointing out an important facet of reading about 
the language-game: 
‘As we make our way through the Investigations, we begin to see that the text itself 
is a complex language-game, to ‘play’ which we must practice the easier moves 
before we learn more difficult ones.’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.69) 
language 
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A similar experience was shared with me by Dr. Dorothea Franck, who 
introduced the reading of Gertrude Stein’s work to her students almost as 
a language course of a foreign tongue. One must first get into her language 
before being able to read her, Franck explains. Again ‘we must practice the 
easier moves before we learn more difficult ones’. 
 Hence, we can name colours after the colours of fruits, we compare 
words with a tool-box (Wittgenstein, 1953, #11) and word-functions with 
houses in a city. But what is the relationship between the colour we see, its 
name and the use of colour names in the context of language? The more spe-
cific we are within one comparison the more legible the analogy gets. Then, 
we hope, we can compare features that earlier on were incommensurable. 
The German expression ‘Man kann nicht Äpfel mit Birnen vergleichen’1  
(One cannot translate apples with pears) is commonly used to describe 
comparisons of disparate things or events. Obviously, the idiom suggests 
that we may want to compare the two because they belong to the same class 
(as similar kinds of fruits), but are in fact very different. Of course the saying 
also wants to prevent us from neglecting the class of things we compare. 
In other words, the ‘essence’ of the two compared entities might be entirely 
different and therefore can only be made alike with great effort. Anyhow, 
such sayings find their application in ordinary speech, and they are, as all 
figures of speech, passed-down as ‘images in language’  and they function as 
tokens within a language-game. Yet for certain language-games it is obvious 
to compare apples with pears – it depends on the filter we choose and the 
questions we ask. Imagine we want to know about a certain colour, we might 
describe it verbally by reference to a fruit, that bears this colour. We might 
want to compare its colour to apples and pears. 
 Show someone a homogenous shade of colour and ask this partici-
pant for the name of that colour. This was done in an experiment with 40 
participants for the work Palace of Colours in 2010 (see p.90). In very few 
cases, the name of the colour is a ‘proper’ name, such as for instance: black, 
blue, gray, green, magenta, purple, red, white, yellow. One needs to know the 
1 idiom, www.redensarten-index.de, literal translation: one cannot compare apples with pears.
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word in order to know what shade of colour it refers to. But in most of the 
cases, the given names of colours refer to objects which bear this colour in 
order to specify a certain tone or saturation: liquorice black, ocean blue, ce-
ment gray, apple green, strawberry red, snow white, lemon yellow. Here, one 
needs to know the object in order to know what specific colour is indicated. 
In ordinary speech we compare the shade of colour with an instance, situa-
tion or object we encountered previously. When a shade of red reminds us of 
a brick wall, we may call it brick red. Or we see similarities with a material 
like silver which becomes itself a proper name for a certain glittering shade 
of gray. Maybe a sentimental memory or a colour’s temperature makes us 
think of ‘sunset’ when we wish to name a warm dark red. At this point, we 
will not discuss the further implications of how memory and our body does 
this; a brief reference to basic biological fundaments for such descriptions 
will be given in the chapter on metaphor and metonymy (see p.61). The 
remarks on colour by Ludwig Wittgenstein are apt accounts of experiences 
with colour names and are vital for this research. The cultural scientist Brian 
Massumi gave, with his paper ‘Too Blue’ (2000), a good introduction into 
the relationships between our perception and memory of colour and the lit-
tle gaps between them. 
 Ezra Pound found a beautiful set of words which seem to float 
around our concept of ‘red’. He reminds us of the picture association every 
such term delivers, for how can we imagine a cherry detached from its 
colour? Even in black and white we understand the colour of the cherry. The 
word becomes the ‘abbreviated picture’, a word as symbol for the image or 
object it refers to.   
“(...) He is to define red. How can he do it in a picture that isn’t painted in red 
paint?
He puts (or his ancestor put) together the abbreviated picture of
     ROSE      CHERRY
 IRON RUST   FLAMINGO
That, you see, is very much the kind of thing a biologist does (in a very much more 
complicated way).” 
(Pound,1934, p.22) 
Pound: define red
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In order to follow Pound’s transition from a poetic to a visual image, one 
needs to have had contact with a red rose and a ripe cherry as much as with 
a rusty iron before seeing the similarity in colour between these arbitrary 
objects. In his ABC for Reading Pound claims that poetry and artistic form 
in general can be understood and judged by a rigid method of comparison.  
‘The proper METHOD for studying poetry and good letters is the method of 
contemporary biologists, that is careful first-hand examination of the matter, and 
continual COMPARISON of one ‘slide’ or specimen with another.’
(Pound, 1934, p.17)
From this statement we can assure that comparison is a pivotal practice 
within language-games. In language, one can compare by putting almost 
anything in relation to other things. Whatever pair is named one makes an 
effort to find some similarities or differences between the two.
 What can we compare? In one of her novels, Gertrude Stein com-
pares ‘resemblance and grammar’. Does she go so far as to compare gram-
mar to itself? She utilises illogical comparison paradox that can only be 
facilitated by the structure of a sentence, i.e. grammar.
‘What is the difference between resemblance and grammar. There is none. 
Grammar is at best an oval ostrich egg and grammar is far better.’ 
(Gertrude Stein, Arthur a Grammar in How to write, 1931) 
In an artist-book The Twins look alike from 2004 I have looked into the 
notion of comparison on the basis of a generic example sentence retrieved 
from a grammar book which became the title. The large format black-and-
white folio showed photographs of twins on each page. The pictures were 
collected from an online search on images of twins; the couples’ portraits 
range from innocent family snapshots to uncanny views of seeming clones 
in expression. In the printed book-work the pictures were filtered with a 
coarse raster alluding to early printing reproductions of silk screen in  com-
mercial printing and Pop Art of the 1960’s. In reference to the notion of fam-
ily resemblances by Wittgenstein and the issue of comparing visual features, 
method of 
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a selection of these images is included in the following spread. It displays 
a game between saying the sentence ‘the twins look alike’ and seeing their 
faces are in fact identical.  
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Image-set 3
Online repository ‘twins’, private archives, searched 2004, material for Melzer: The Twins look alike
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Gertrude Stein: Arthur a Grammar, in How to Write, 1931 
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3. FIGURE OF SPEECH
 
In the preceding chapter on Comparisons we introduced Wittgenstein’s 
method to show how ‘general terms’ can be explicated by comparative anal-
ogy of meanings in ordinary language use instead of by fixed definitions. He 
elucidates the idea of the ‘game’ in relation to the notion of ‘family resem-
blances’. Not all games have identical features. They share aspects which 
overlap, yet not every game includes physical exercise (like Chess) nor does 
every game require a partner to participate (like Patience). 
‘Consider, for example, the activities we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-
games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all? – 
Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they would not be called 
‘games’!” but look and see whether there is something they all have in common. 
(...) Now pass to card-games: here you find many correspondences with the first 
group, but others get lost.’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #66) 
Wittgenstein furthers this idea of general terms being constituted of sev-
eral groups of comparable features, similarities which are partly shared and 
partly absent in each individual case. 
‘ “(...)”whereas games form a family the members of which have family likenesses. 
Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the 
same way of walking; and these likenesses overlap.” ‘ 
(Wittgenstein: The Brown Book quoted by Monk 1990 p.338)
Perloff explains that  ‘from a Wittgensteinian perspective, such correspond-
ence between word and thing, visual layout and verbal referent, reduces 
meaning to the process of naming. Words, Wittgenstein argues throughout 
the Investigations, are not to be viewed as pointers designating particular 
objects; their meaning depends on their function in the specific context of 
action we call the language-game. ’ (Perloff 1996, p.98).
 In the examination of meetings between verbal and visual language, 
we need to take a closer look at this technique of creating a network of 
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figurative speech. Wittgenstein uses metaphorical examples incessantly in 
his attempts to show the workings of ordinary language and formation of 
meaning (Perloff 1996). What are metaphors and metonymies? Metaphors 
and metonymies are acts of comparison.
 In personal communication with my supervisor Prof. Antonio 
Caronia he called for a distinction to be made between metaphor and me-
tonymy. He described metaphor as a mostly rational language tool, which 
‘creates distance’, while metonymy is ‘the rhetorical figure of contact, touch 
and proximity’. He referred to a text by the Italian feminist philosopher 
Luisa Murado entitled La magli e l’unicinetto, ‘how to knit with one needle’. 
Caronia concluded that the knitting is metaphorical, while the needle is me-
tonymic. So metonymy is a question of proximity, images in metaphors can 
be rather far-fetched. The discussion of metaphors stands in a long tradition 
and will only be introduced elementarily here. In a recently published text-
book on the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, we can compare 
the following definitions:    
‘Metaphor is the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain is 
partially ‘mapped’, i.e. projected, onto a different experiential domain, so that the 
second domain is partially understood in terms of the first one. The domain that 
is mapped is called the source or donor domain, and the domain onto which the 
source is mapped is called the target or recipient domain. Both domains have to 
belong to different superordinate domains. ‘ 
i.e. LOVE IS A JOURNEY 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Barcelona 2003, p.3, own italics)
‘Metonymy is a conceptual projection whereby one experiential domain (the 
target) is partially understood in terms of another experiential domain (the source) 
included in the same common experiential domain.’ 
i.e. JOHN HAS A LONG FACE (drooping facial muscles for sadness / effect for 
cause) 
(Barcelona 2003, p.4-5, own italics)
The linguist Antonio Barcelona describes both figures of speech as largely 
specific to the culture (as we will see also with Whorf, p.68 and p.73) they 
are used in, ‘because the domains of experience are not necessarily the same 
Barcelona: CTMM
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in all cultures’ (Barcelona 2003, p.6). Yet there seem to be many kinds of 
metaphorical expressions concerning theoretical or conceptual experien-
tial domains. So-called ‘image-schemas’ (Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1990/1993, 
Taylor 1995, pp.127-130) like ‘upright’ and ‘inside’ that are thought to be due 
to our earliest universal experiences of our bodies. In the current discourse 
there is a dispute going on about whether metaphors and metonymies can 
be regarded as fixed  ‘models’ or as steady elements of our ‘cognitive equip-
ment’ (Barcelona 2003, p.6). Barcelona opposes the theories of Davidson 
and Grice, which ‘stress the primary role of the literal meaning of the lin-
guistic expression in metaphor interpretation’ (Barcelona 2003, p.6). Searle 
conceives of metaphors as extraordinary uses of language which require 
pragmatic rules to break them down to their literal meaning. (Searle 1979, 
pp.76-116, Barcelona 2003, p.6). Just as there is no final agreement about the 
cognitive status of the processing and production of metaphorical expres-
sions, there is no universal definition of the boundaries between metaphor 
and metonymy. Though the articles edited by Barcelona present different 
views on the subject, they try to clarify these boundaries by distinguishing 
‘conceptual mappings’ from ‘conceptual activations’ and are widely inter-
ested in the cognitive processes linked to what Barcelona calls the CTMM 
(cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy). 
 For the present research this specificity plays a marginal role. Here, 
the focus lies with what Barcelona calls the ‘ “encyclopedic” domain (i.e. 
[one that] includes all the entrenched knowledge that a speaker has about an 
area of experience)’ (Barcelona 2003, p.8-9), which are personal and not uni-
versal. The characterization of this personal domain is very interesting in the 
context of the examination of image-schemas, images in language such as 
proverbs and metaphorical expressions which occupy a borderland between 
verbal and visual language. Furthermore, metaphoric expression seems 
to offer examples for Wittgenstein of the language-games we play when 
ordinary language is at work. Apparently, there is also a reverse relationship 
between ordinary language, as in common conversation and metaphorical 
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expression. In this spirit, the author Diane Ponterotto regards our ability 
to express ourselves in figures of speech responsible for rendering spoken 
discourse possible. The condensed precision of metaphor, argues Ponterotto, 
is elementary to upholding the structure of a meaningful conversation. She 
notes that conversation is amorphous and is aided by memory as storage. 
Based on her hypothesis we can add that in regard to the experiential donor 
domain (i.e. vision) for figures of speech, that images especially can act 
as beneficial storage for the complex details that “flash by” during spoken 
discourse. Metaphors, proverbs and  sayings often sketch images, naming 
ordinary items in order to express complex circumstances in a habituated 
image (for instance straws and camels in the expression ‘the last straw breaks 
the camels back’). Ponterotto adds that entire ‘metaphor networks often con-
stitute the backbone1 of conversation and give cohesion’ (Ponterotto 2003). 
The understanding of expressions and words as units in continuous networks 
plays a vital role in the present research (see CCL as Poetic Method, p.282 
and Network of People, p.299). 
 One central hypothesis at the outset of this investigation is based 
on the belief that the signification of words is facilitated by the way we use 
them. Following the Wittgensteinian concept of a word’s meaning being 
determined by its very use – ‘meaning as use’ (Wittgenstein 1953, #43) –, an 
entire context as network of words surrounds every word. Consequently, no 
words are predefined units of signification isolated from each other; on the 
contrary they are hinges in a flexible, multiple and open-ended network of 
vocables. No word stands alone, isolated in fixed meaning. Ponterotto as-
signs exactly these qualities to metaphor networks (Ponterotto 2003). 
 In the present study, several experimental set-ups are included to 
show such network structures. A prominent one is the application of these 
ideas to the detection or generation of the Shared Vocabulary between Lud-
wig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein (see Shared Vocabulary, p.301). In this 
case, comparable text corpora of both writers are ‘filtered’ to detect overlaps 
1 i.e. http://thesaurus.com/browse/word or www.visualcomplexity.com
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and matching words. The procedure is facilitated by tools used in contras-
tive corpus linguistics (CCL), which are, used to compare large amounts 
of text (a corpus) with the support of computer programs. Generally this 
method is rooted in statistical data about the collocations of a word. This 
method collects and evaluates the words which are used in close proxim-
ity. The degree of ‘closeness’ and ‘proximity’, as well as the tokenization of 
words into lemmata (i.e. walking ---> walk) is part of the programming and 
filtering criteria for the CCL process (see section on lemmata, p.301). Today, 
the evaluated word lists are represented in visual graphic models; online 
dictionaries often offer a visual thesaurus or so-called tag clouds for showing 
the network of related words1. Another related practice-based experiment in 
this thesis was realised with the project Naming (2002 – 2009 and ongoing, 
see Naming, p.135). In this setup, a number of participants volunteered to 
be isolated and recorded for 20 minutes, requested to say the full names of 
everyone they can remember to have ever met. These long and incomplete 
lists of names signify large and complex networks of people –  the interper-
sonal relationships between the people signified by the names shift in focus 
of examination. There are strong analogies with figureheads of the contras-
tive corpus linguistic approach, as Michael Lewis hints at in his important 
statement ‘Words are like people’: 
‘Words are like people [. . . ] We all feel comfortable when we are surrounded by 
friends and acquaintances, but anxious in unfamiliar situations when we are sur-
rounded by strangers. We have friendships of different kinds – close, intense rela-
tionships which, even if relatively infrequent, are the most important in our lives – 
loved ones who live abroad, for example. But we also have relationships, which are 
frequent but unimportant – the person who travels on the same train to and from 
work, five days a week. There is also the one-night-stand – a serendipitous one-off, 
creative encounter, which may be more exciting than any regular encounter, but, 
however sadly, not part of everyday life. The relationships between words closely 
resemble the relationships between people.’ 
(Lewis, 2001)
The comparison between words and people feeds from a number of simi-
larities they display once we think of them as evaluated moving points 
within a flexible network. The relationships between them are constituted 
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by their habits. More detailed analysis can be obtained in the section about 
these networks (see chapter Contrasting corpora, p.285). However we might 
intuitively agree to the idea that image, words and people are connected 
because their relationships are commonly strengthened by the use of online 
social networks such as Facebook etc (see published paper You name it, on 
occasion of conference UNO - Unknown Narrative Object held March 2009, 
Forma Institute, Milan, see publications p.448). 
 As mentioned above, the investigation into ‘image-schemas’ in lan-
guage and expressions which involve a ‘mapping’ onto experiential domains 
(Barcelona 2003) sometimes touch upon universal experiences. Even though 
the boundaries between universals and culture-specifics are blurred, cer-
tain experiences in this grey area can be well exemplified once they involve 
experience of colour or sound. This is one reason that colour-experience is a 
returning subject in this research. In the section on Comparisons (see p.50) 
and in artistic setups realised in the framework of this research (i.e. Palace 
of Colours, p.90), the relationship between colours and the names we give to 
them is introduced and discussed in Colour Naming Debate (see p.78). Also 
in the discussion of possible distinction between metaphor and metonymy: 
colours and vision, sound and hearing have been included as fields of ar-
gumentation. In his quest for ‘the most fundamental processes of meaning 
extension’ John Taylor (1995) argues that metonymy is more fundamental 
than metaphor and more constitutive for metaphor than usually expected . 
Taylor gives examples which in his view employ synesthesia.   
‘(1) Loud music / Loud colour.
(2) Sweet cake / Sweet music.
(3) Black cloth /  Black mood.’ 
(Taylor 1995, p.124)
He tries to argue that metonymical mappings onto the visual domain feed 
from experiences of colour with variations in hue and saturation. Simi-
larly, in the realm of sound he names different categories as intensity of 
sound, pitch or the ‘manner of their production (knock, thud, tap, scrape, 
categories and 
experience
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rattle etc)’ (Barcelona 2003, p.37). In his paper he particularly takes the 
perspective of the perceiver into account. So instead of choosing sides on 
whether, for example, visual or auditive experiences are universally human 
or culture-specific, he looks closely at the effect of a specific colour or sound 
on a specific perceiver. In this way he is able to introduce the idea of a ‘folk’ 
experiential domain departing from a number of examples distinguishing 
‘normal’ experiences from those that involve ’breaking the norm’. In intro-
ducing a norm, Taylor accepts inherently a cultural background which says 
what is experienced as normal. When he says that people experience colours 
as unusual because ‘the domain of colour has a built-in norm for the cor-
responding scale, i.e. a “normal point” on the scale’ (Barcelona 2003, p.37) of 
degrees in saturation or brightness, does he conclude that there is a standard 
set of vulgar and norm-breaking colours? His characterization of colours 
and sounds as pleasant or unpleasant for the perceiver and one intuitively 
might support his argument, that obtrusiveness can be substituted by calling 
a colour ‘loud’ (O.E.D. definition of loud, indicated by Taylor). But this does 
not imply that there should be only one valid scale for every culture. In the 
discussion on linguistic relativism we will see why (see p.63). Taylor explains 
that the folk model of colours and sounds uses the impression they make on 
perceivers as ‘a major categorizing factor’. In  this sense the collected vocab-
ulary on the selected shades of colour in the work Palace of Colours concurs 
with this thought:
 ‘Apart from categorizing colours in terms of their hue (as red, gray, blue etc), 
their lightness or brightness (light (red), dark (green)), or their saturation (deep, 
suffused, etc), the average speaker categorizes them, in virtue of his/her reaction 
to them as pleasant or unpleasant, loud or quiet, relaxing or disturbing, boring or 
exciting.’  
(Taylor 1995, Barcelona 2003, p.37)
However, Taylor’s attempt forks into two important sections of the present 
research. Firstly, the hypothesis that the perceiver and subsequently the 
speaker is influenced by his experiences and the percepts that are forcing 
themselves on his attention. The one who undergoes an experience (i.e. see-
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ing a colour) finds suitable words to describe the experience in his own rep-
ertoire of past experiences, may they belong to the visual or another realm of 
experience. With the words he utters accordingly the speaker opens a view 
onto this experience. The personal classification of neon yellow as loud and 
deviant is not disputable, it may be even shared with many others from the 
same cultural background. In the work Palace of Colours, the participants 
clearly displayed a preference for choosing three colours: signal red, neon 
yellow and dark blue. The red and yellow were clearly the ‘loudest’ colours 
on the offered colour sample sheet and probably simply most attracted atten-
tion of the viewers. The dark blue is known to be a popular favourite colour, 
according to Burda Medien Forschung, for 25 percent of Germans, blue is 
their favourite colour1.  
 Secondly, the hypothesis that the cultural background frames a 
way of thinking, a mind-set which dictates what the perceiver experiences 
as normal or obtrusive. To go even further, it is language – and culture – 
which forms the way we think and conceptualise the world. The perception 
of stimuli and abstract notions like time and space are dependent on the 
language we are embedded in. This second conception of the relationship 
between world and language ows to linguistic relativism. The most promi-
nent reference for this research is the Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis and linguistic 
relativism which will be discussed in the chapters Universal vs Relative (p.69) 
and Colour Naming Debate (p.78). 
 Whorf ’s examination of everyday language in ‘Language, Thought 
and Reality’ gives strong examples of the  omnipresence of metaphorical 
expression. He compares so-called SAE (Standard average European Lan-
guages) with entirely differently structured languages. His main claim is that 
the structure of language fundamentally sets the structure of the view on 
the world, which is probed in his examination of abstract terms like space 
and time in different languages. He notes, however, that in SAE, metaphors 
reveal how we perceive of time and space. In respect to time ‘we express 
duration by ‘long, short, great, much, quick, slow,’ etc; tendencies by ‘more, 
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increase, grow, turn, get, approach, go, come, rise, fall, stop, smooth, even, 
rapid, slow (...)’(Whorf 1956, p.145). According to Whorf, we do not notice 
how indispensable metaphors are in our repertoire of expressions; he goes 
so far as to call them ‘virtually the only linguistic media available. The non-
metaphorical terms in this field, like “early, late, soon, lasting, intense, very, 
tending”, are mere handful, quite inadequate to the needs. ‘ (Whorf 1956, 
p.145, my italics) In a typically Whorfian fashion – which reveals his motiva-
tion to make linguistics more accessible for a general public – this specimen 
of ‘ordinary language’ will demonstrate how much we are dependent on 
figures of speech, in fact:  
(...)  ‘Since physical bodies and their outlines in PERCEIVED SPACE are denoted 
by size and shape terms and reckoned by cardinal number and plurals, these 
patterns of denotation and reckoning extend (change page) to the symbols of non-
spatial meanings, and so suggest an IMAGINARY SPACE. Physical shapes ‘move, 
stop, rise, sink, approach,’ etc, in perceived space; why not these other referents in 
their imaginary space? This has gone so far that we can hardly refer to the simplest 
nonspatial situation without constant resort to physical metaphors. I “grasp” the 
‘”thread” of another’s arguments, but if its “level” is “over my head” my attention 
may “wander” and “lose touch” with the “drift” of it, so that when he “comes” to his 
“point” we differ “widely”, or “views” being indeed so “far apart” that the “things” 
he says “appear” “much” too arbitrary, or even “a lot” of nonsense!’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.145-146) 
4. UNIVERSAL VS RELATIVE
In the second half of the 20th century, philosophy and linguistics have un-
dergone a shift in perspective. In philosophy of language as much as in other 
fields of humanities such as anthropology, the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ had 
changed the focus of attention to language as key to the field of study. Witt-
genstein was one of the forerunners of the development of that strength-
ened interconnection between language and philosophy. One major debate 
ensued between the universalists and their opponents, who do not hold one 
almighty set of predeterminations responsible for the properties of language 
ability. A name who is also popular with scientists outside linguistics and 
widely known partly because of his political outspokenness, is Noam Chom-
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sky, who stands for a strong universalist perspective. In simplified terms, 
his writing puts forward some of the ideas underlying the UG, Universal 
Grammar, updated with contemporary knowledge in philosophy of mind 
and neurosciences. This idea, roughly speaking, means that the child learns 
a language based on given universal structures, the LAD (language aquisi-
tion device), which facilitate language development as a structural given in 
the human organism. According to Chomsky, the possibilities in variety of 
languages are limited.
 The significance of Noam Chomsky in the context of this research is 
obvious, as the major voice in Wittgenstein’s generation of successors. Both 
Wittgenstein and Chomsky have influenced philosophy and of culture as 
a whole, irreversibly. In this research, however, Chomsky’s work, does not 
receive the attention it might deserve in another framework for a general 
discussions on language yet. In order to pay deference to his principle posi-
tion on language and language capacity, a recent public appearance is here 
referenced.
 In his lecture at the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin on 4 April  
2013, Noam Chomsky proved once more that he is one of the most impor-
tant philosophers on language today. Chomsky clarified right at the outset 
that one cannot detach any definition of language from the awareness of 
using language for discussing it. This position is a key motivation for the 
current research. Starting out with the question of the fundamental nature 
of language Chomsky reiterated one of the classic concepts on language and 
quoting Aristotle’s definition of language as a ‘sound with meaning’. 
 Chomsky explained that, in order to unriddle Aristotle’s defini-
tion, centuries of philosophers have examined the two notions ‘sound’ and 
‘meaning’, yet they neglected the crucial question about the function of the 
word ‘with’. This link, Chomsky suggested, has been underestimated because 
it ‘was assumed to be trivial’ (Chomsky 2013). The act of association seemed 
obvious and the  connection between name and object got oversimplified. 
1 Noam Chomsky: ‘Language Use and Design: conflicts and their significance’, presented at Royal Irish 
Academy, April 4 2013, UCD School of Philosophy, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iR_NmkkMmO8
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‘The child sees a cow and somebody says “cow” and so an association is set up 
between that thing and the word and out of that spins the meaning. But that 
doesn’t survive much examination, even if it did, it wouldn’t begin to touch the 
real question, which has to do with the fact that the number of the associations is 
unbounded. So it can’t be set up by experience.’ 1
Noam Chomsky: ‘Language Use and Design: conflicts and their significance’, 2013 
(min 0:02:20 – 0:03:13) 
 Here, Chomsky’s example links directly to the opening paragraph 
in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953), which quotes a key 
paragraph of Aristotle’s explanation of naming and language-aquisition by 
children. Also Wittgenstein firmly disagrees with Aristotle’s simplification. 
In his Dublin speech, Chomsky gave precedence to Galileo’s idea of the rela-
tionship between sound and meaning over Aristotle’s concept. 
‘Galileo was maybe the first to point out the pretty obvious fact that language 
capacity has infinite scope. He described the alphabet as the greatest invention that 
had ever been made because it enables us with 25 letters to express any thought 
that might come to our minds. But notice that he is not accepting Aristotle’s 
dictum exactly. That’s a description of meaning with sound, which is not quite the 
same as sound with meaning.’  1
Noam Chomsky: ‘Language Use and Design: conflicts and their significance’, 2013 
(min 0:02:20 – 0:03:13) 
 
In Chomsky’s introduction of the sound-meaning relationship, he suggested 
that this issue could be called the relationship between meaning and some 
form of externalization, the visual, haptic etc. The finite computational 
procedure which determines structures of an infinite range of categories and 
expressions is dual: one for sound, one for meaning. This aspect of language 
reflects some central issues of the fundament for the art practice within this 
research. Later, various documented works will show aspects of Chomsky’s 
reasoning in the context of conceptual art, i.e. The Complete Dictionary (see 
p.330), which is a computed list of  ‘all possible words’.  
 Again Chomsky states that language capacity is internal to us and 
there is strong evidence that language capacity, UG, ‘hasn’t changed in 
roughly 55,000 or more years’ (Chomsky 2013). Chomsky suggests that an-
other 55.000 years before there probably was no language at all.  In between 
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‘languagelessness’ and language The Great Leap took place which is consid-
ered to have enabled humans to use and make complex tools, systems for 
representation, numerical systems etc. Typically, Chomsky introduces his 
doubt about so-called evolution of language. He provokes with the statement 
that this topic does not exist as languages do not evolve, but change.  
 In the context of this research, Chomsky’s role is twofold. On the 
one hand, the influence of his thinking on the subject of language cannot 
be ignored, even though he might firmly disagree with some of the ideas 
proposed in this research. On the other hand, he is known to be a passionate 
communicator even today and manages to speak in simple but precise terms 
on complex issues. The implications of a fictive posthumous meeting of 
Wittgenstein and Stein in language are nourished by the undogmatic reality 
of Chomsky’s spirited lecture. 
 
 Other linguists, who consider themselves followers of the Anglo-
Saxon reading of Wittgenstein (see chapter Viennese roots, p.163), and still 
do accept a certain set of universals which all humans share. These univer-
sals do not, however, determine their language-structure. The philosopher 
John R.Searle calls universal features the Background: 
‘Part of the Background is common to all cultures. For example, we all walk up-
right and we eat by putting food in our mouths. Such universal phenomena I call 
the “deep Background,” but many other Background presuppositions vary from 
culture to culture.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.109) 
We will return to Searle and his concept of reality and intentionality in 
chapter Language Attributes (p.171). Generally, the relationship between 
word and world, between language and thought, turned into a primary issue 
of discourse in language philosophy. The discussion about the relationship 
between language and thought has, amongst others, led to a theory called 
‘linguistic relativity’. Its controversial assumption is that is the language of a 
person which determines, or at least influences, the way this person thinks. 
language and 
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Dependent on the degree of rigor, the determination of the thought extends 
to the determination of perception of the world (Lenneberg 1953). A diluted 
version is that the structure of language affects the structure of the world 
view or Weltanschauung. 
One figurehead of linguistic relativism was Benjamin Lee Whorf, a student 
of Edward Sapir, and who together are known for the ‘Sapir-Whorf-Hy-
pothesis’. For Whorf ’s collection of essays Language, Thought and Reality, its 
editor Stuart Chase writes in his foreword: 
‘Whorf, as I read him makes two cardinal hypotheses: First, that the structures of 
thinking are dependent on language. Second, that the structure of the language one 
habitually uses influences the manner in which one understands his environment. 
The picture of the universe shifts from tongue to tongue.’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.vi, foreword by Stuart Chase)
Whorf dedicates his research to the comparison between the SAE languages 
and native (American) languages. He tries to exemplify in simple terms 
and with numerous examples, the way a certain vocabulary is interlinked 
with culture-specific experiences and habits. Whorf argues with Sapir, that 
language must be held responsible for much more than merely facilitating 
communicative ends, as a purely pragmatic coordination-tool. Human lan-
guage is essentially the supporting structure for human society, claim Sapir 
and Whorf:
‘ “Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world 
of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the 
particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. 
It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the 
use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific 
problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the “real 
world” is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the 
group... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because 
the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpreta-
tion.” Edward Sapir ‘ 
(Whorf 1956, p.134, quoting Sapir) 
In the editor’s introduction, one motivation for Whorf ’s research is high-
lighted: he wished to make linguistics a popular subject for the general pub-
lic. He believed that linguistics and the study of language(s) is closely linked 
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to understanding our thoughts. This, Whorf presumed, is a subject which 
must be interesting for a general audience.      
‘Undoubtedly Whorf had it in mind to bring linguistics before the general public 
in a manner that had scarcely ever been attempted; in fact, he may be credited with 
being the first popularizer of modern linguistic science.(...)’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.18, introduction by John B.Carroll) 
In the context of the present research, there is a kinship between Whorf ’s 
belief and my own presupposition that language must be an utmost sapid 
subject for everyone. Not only has it been common knowledge since the 
19th century philologist Wilhem von Humboldt, that language is the key at-
tribute of humans (Humboldt 1907/1963, p.191-230), we also have – unless 
we are heavily impaired – hardly any chance to lead our lives excluded from 
language. Humboldt dedicated much of his work to the study of the relation-
ship between world and word, reality and language. 
‘The interdependence of word and idea shows clearly that languages are not actu-
ally means of representing a truth already known, but rather of discovering the 
previously unknown. Their diversity is not one of sounds and signs, but a diversity 
of world perspectives [Weltansichten]. … The sum of the knowable, as the field to 
be tilled by the human mind, lies among all languages, independent of them, in the 
middle. Man cannot approach this purely objective realm other than through his 
cognitive and sensory powers, that is, in a subjective manner. ‘ 
(Lafont, 2002 quotes von Humboldt)
James Underhill directly links Humboldt’s  conception of language to the 
Whorf-Sapir-Hypothesis in his book Humboldt, World view and Language 
(Underhill 2009). Whorf writes:  
‘Man is distinguished from other animals by language, and by his great develop-
ment of thinking.(...)’. 
(Whorf 1956, p.83)
Thinking, Whorf claims, is dependent on our native language. In reference 
to the visual work and the transdisciplinary research in this study, a desire 
for language to emerge into the field of vision of ordinary people and a 
general (art) public is one of the motivations. As quoted in the preface, the 
praise for language Whorf forwards is, very effective and topical. 
1 A detailled analysis of the influence of these artists for my artistic work will not be given at this point. It is 
obvious that the methodologies rely fundamentally on the autonomy of written text in visual arts during the 
arthistoric developments since the 1960’s. Some of their works are introduced and reproduced on p.191-192.
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‘The problems of achieving mutual understanding, of language barriers, of 
propaganda and advertising, of education, of the technique of managing human 
affairs without undue friction, of an intelligence in human relations that can keep 
pace with the changes brought about by the physical sciences, all run afoul of this 
matter of language and thought. Everyone is naturally interested in questions of 
language although they either do not know it, or know it and think they know all 
about it.(...)’  
(Whorf 1956, p.82, own italics)
 Similar presuppositions about language inform the artistic work 
within this research which always involve fellow language users. One way to 
involve ordinary language users in the reflection on language and thought in 
this work is to create simple setups to investigate the intersections between 
visual and verbal communication. For this end voluntary participants – art 
audience, employees from firms, students, colleagues – are invited to con-
tribute words and verbal expression in response to visual stimuli they are 
exposed to together with clear instructions to play a specific language-game 
(see practice-based works What’s in a name (p.112), Palace of Colours (p.90) 
and Naming, p.135). Some setups are reminiscent of psychological experi-
ments, yet well-positioned in the tradition of the conceptual art movement 
from the mid 20th century until today. Conceptual experiments with lan-
guage that have entered the awareness of the nonexpert art-viewing public 
included works by American artist Lawrence Weiner, who used language 
as an autonomous substance. Similarly the work of Joseph Kosuth, Barbara 
Kruger, Jenny Holzer and Hanne Darboven and the effort of the collabora-
tive Art&Language all address this aspect of language.1 These and others 
naturally form the historical context for this research and these artists have 
been crucial throughout the BA studies of Fine Arts. 
 The direct cultural environment of the sessions with my supervisors 
and fellows at M-node attracted my attention to the Italian art-movements 
which used written language and codes in their works, like Poesia Visiva.
Visual works on language as a system prepared the general public for art-
works which contain writing instead of images. The analogy with ideas from 
the realm of language philosophy is linked to language as a social activity 
and communication as a practice. Obviously, the Wittgensteinian notion of 
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‘meaning as use’ (Wittgenstein 1953, #43) is at the same time celebrated as much 
as put to test with interdisciplinary procedures. In the procedures of the works 
involving volunteers, the collected data is always formed of special segments 
from personal encyclopedic and biographical repositories but the participants 
form a group of language users. Often, the arrangement of the stimuli is prima-
rily visual, analogue and easy to access. Similarly in Stuart Chase’s foreword he 
suspects Whorf ’s motivation to do research stemmed from a general fascination 
with language as ‘a vehicle for meaning’: 
‘Some driving inner compulsion forced him to the study of words and language – not, 
if you please, the mastery of foreign languages, but the why and how of language, any 
language, and its competence as a vehicle for meaning.’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.v, Foreword by Stuart Chase)
Image 5-7 
Visual note of  Poesiva Visiva-5 Maestri: Lamberto Pignotti Foto ricordo, 1972 (p.211) an
Salenco Il Corriere della Sera 1981. (p.387) and cover on opposite page. photo: Nadja Niemann
Poesia Visiva
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5. COLOUR NAMING DEBATE
 How to study language? How can one assume the role of words as 
vehicles for meaning? How do words relate to what we see? Often, primary 
visual stimuli based on things such as the perception of colours are points of 
contact in the debate on linguistic relativism. The debate on colour naming 
especially, has enabled a discussion on the major issues about language and 
thought in linguistic relativity, and helped to articulate the general dispute 
between ‘relativists’ and ‘universalists’ (see preceding chapter Universal 
vs Relative). Also, the use of words in reference to colour as a stimulus is 
relatively easily transferable across cultural and linguistic boundaries; the 
sight of a colour field can be directly referred to by an interviewee and 
much research has been done on comparing names given perceived colours. 
Evidently, categories of naming and shifts in perception or translation get 
exposed quite quickly this way and this facilitates the dispute between rela-
tivists and universalists.
 Research on colour-impressions and their names stands in a tradi-
tion: in the 19th century, the question of colour-perceptions and a colour-
vocabulary was examined by Gladstone and Geiger. Gladstone and Geiger 
studied Ancient Greek literature in search of an explanation for the seeming 
absence of colour names. Their hypothesis was, according to Regier and his 
colleagues (Regier, Kay, Gilbert, Ivry 2007), that the physiological develop-
ment since Ancient Greece has enabled us to perceive, distinguish and label 
a larger spectrum of colours. Their hypothesis is based on our bodies as 
determining instruments for perception.
 In the 20th century, the colour debate became a battle-field between 
two convictions: the universalists insisted that due to the similar biological 
make-up of all humans, the way we perceive and name our impressions of 
colour should be close to identical, thus universal. The relativists claimed the 
opposite, namely that it is cultural backgrounds which define explicit differ-
ences and variations in the colour terminology1. 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity_and_the_color_naming_debate, accessed August 8 2011
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A strong opponent of the relativists’ position, namely the Sapir-Whorf-
Hypothesis, was Berlin and Kay with their popular book Basic Colour Terms: 
Their Universality and Evolution (Berlin & Kay 1969). Its authors claimed 
that it can be demonstrated on the basis of colour naming that linguistic and 
terminological universals independent from cultural-specific phenomena do 
exist. Berlin and Kay have created entire lists which identify the similarities 
between all human languages. In these compilations they systematically de-
code the conditions for a universal colour terminology (Berlin & Kay 1969). 
They claim that all people use names for black and white. Altogether, Berlin 
and Kay classify 11 basic colours,  namely ‘white, black, red, green, yellow, 
blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and grey’ (Berlin & Kay 1969) and suggest 
several criteria for these basic colours that are valid for every language. They 
also formulated a hierarchy of progression between these basic colours: 
      ‘All languages contain terms for black and white.
 1.  If a language contains three terms, then it contains a term for red.
 2.  If a language contains four terms, then it contains a term for either 
      green or yellow (but not both).
 3.  If a language contains five terms, then it contains terms for both 
      green and yellow.
 4.  If a language contains six terms, then it contains a term for blue.
 5.  If a language contains seven terms, then it contains a term for brown.
 6. If a language contains eight or more terms, then it contains a term for
     purple, pink, orange, and/or grey.’ 
(Berlin & Kay 1969, p.2)
 Like the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that preceded it for linguistic 
relativism, the Basic Colour Terms by Berlin and Kay meant a breaking point 
for the colour naming debate. Since they published their findings, numer-
ous scholars have disputed this universalist position. Amongst others, the 
philosopher Barbara Saunders defends the relativist position and criticised 
the methodology of Berlin and Kay (Saunders 1995). Interestingly, she up-
dates the discussion by identifying the difficulty of the relationship between 
memory, perception and ‘colour talk’ (Saunders 1995). She clarifies this by 
naming a set of influences on the perception of colour:
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‘Ordinary colour talk is used in a variety of ways – for flat coloured surfaces, sur-
faces of natural objects, patches of paintings, transparent objects, shining objects, 
the sky, flames, illumination, vapours, volumes, films and so on, all of which inter-
act with overall situation, illumination, edges, textures, patternings and distances, 
making the concept of sameness of colour inherently indeterminate.’ 
(Saunders 1995, p.19–38)
She stipulates we must not neglect the context of ‘colour talk’, which can be 
assumed to be a key to playing the language-game called ‘naming’. In recent 
years, the discussion on colour universals has continued; Wierzbicka also 
rejects the Berlin & Kay paradigm, based on a study of Australian native 
languages. 
‘Do all people live in a world full of colours? Perceptually, yes (unless they are 
visually impaired), but conceptually, no: there are many languages which have no 
word for ‘colour’ and in which the question ‘what colour is it?’ cannot be asked and 
presumably does not arise. (...)’ 
(Wierzbicka 2008, abstract)
These debates also come up in ordinary language use, in the form of urban 
legends. One is the widespread myth that Innuit (Eskimo-Aleut language 
users) have many more names for snow than any other people. Fed by the 
relativist perspective, namely Whorf ’s, the specific syntax and grammatical 
structure of other language groups suggest large numbers of words for snow. 
‘In a popular 1940 article on the subject, Whorf referred to Eskimo languages hav-
ing seven distinct words for snow.‘ 1. 
For the present research, this reference is here to demonstrate popular the 
interest which a general public shows in linguistic phenomena. The ‘hun-
dred words for snow’ became a metaphor for SAE language users, for the 
way that  words depend on our world. This legend is probably fed by our 
romantic view of the exotic way-of-life of people living in a white world. 
This reflects a wide-spread belief that a different kind of life and landscape 
necessitates a specific vocabulary according to the needs of the environment. 
Is this observation discernible as either ‘relativist’ or ‘universalist’? 
  
Dark White  
(2013)
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A populist interest in phenomena of language is possibly fed by the desire to 
feel empathy and to understand other ways of life (see chapter Words in and 
out of Order, section form of life, p.356), and the pleasure in hearing about 
the language-games in other cultures. It reveals the other language’s games. 
This is a universal tendency rooted in hubs of relative world-and word-
relationships. 
 An artistic reflection on these considerations was realised with 
the set of visual works titled Dark White (2013) in the arctic environment 
of Northern Iceland in winter using a white A4 sheet of paper as common 
reference for the colour white fails to cover the spectrum of whites. The 
photographic series titled White Balance plays with the technical device of 
calibration; the office-white paper fails to appear white in the context of a 
snowy landscape and the scarceness of daylight dims all whites into shades 
of blue. The text work Dark White and an installation, together with quotes 
from Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour (ed. Anscombe 1977) completed the 
photographic work. The text work plays on the production of colour-names 
referring to specific objects bearing this colour. A vocabulary for a white 
palette is established: snow white, rabbit white, fur white, sugar white etc.  
 Again, in the context of the present research, this debate presents 
a good access point for more specific questions concerning the relationship 
between word and world in philosophy of language. As mentioned above, 
the Linguistic Turn manifested tendencies to consider language the key 
to (thinking about) the world in general (Lafont 2002). These transitions 
between visual and verbal expression in ordinary language are addressed by 
the research presented here. In this borderland, sometimes the examined use 
of language can float between analytical description and poetic suggestion. 
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Image 8
Melzer: White Balance I, panoramic photograph (Gigapan), 2013. photo: Leonhard Hoefter
colour naming debate colour naming debate
82 83
Image 9
Melzer: White Balance II, panoramic photograph (Gigapan), 2013. photo: Leonhard Hoefter
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Image-set 10
Melzer: Dark White, text work for installation, 2013
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Image-set 11
Melzer: Remarks on Colour, projection of quotes on Colour-terms, 2013
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 6. PALACE OF COLOURS
This chapter returns to the reception of colour. Introduced by the debate on 
colour naming earlier, here we see an example of the methodology of con-
necting relevant studies from humanities with artistic procedures. The issue 
of the gaps between perception and memory have been mentioned earlier by 
Brian Massumi (p.55). Here, the English psychologist Nicholas Humphrey 
has contributed a good foundation on memory and perception of colour. 
In his book ‘Seeing Red: a study in consciousness’ (Humphrey 2006) he ad-
dresses the role and function of perception in relation to colour sensation. 
“Seeing a red screen tells us a fact about something in the world. But it also creates 
a new fact - a sensation in each of our minds, the feeling of redness. And that’s the 
mystery. Conventional science so far hasn’t told us what conscious sensations are 
made of, or how we get access to them, or why we have them at all. From an evolu-
tionary perspective, what’s the point of consciousness?” 
(Humphrey 2006, book jacket)
 
 Colour-terms are, as we have seen already in the chapter Compari-
sons (p.50), prime examples for examining the relationship between word 
and world. Though our language habits support numerous operations with 
colour names, there is no absolute agreement on the categories of colour 
terms nor on the indication of the role they play in the context of the debate 
on universals in language (see chapter Universal vs Relative, p.69). 
 Apart from Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Colour, in the Philosophical 
Investigations, he repeatedly returns to examples of colour terms to indicate 
the status of names in reference to sense impressions. So in #57 he reflects 
on the difference between a red thing and redness as a quality independent 
from its present state of existence. In the dialogical structure typical of his 
writing –  he contrasts questions and objections in direct speech with the 
voice of the author, while both merge into his particular mode of reflection – 
he ponders: 
 
a red thing 
and redness
palace of colours
‘ “Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed and that is why the 
meaning of the word ‘red’ is independent from the existence of a red thing.” ‘ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #57)
This voice continues, that 
‘ “What the names in language signify must be indestructible; for it must be pos-
sible to describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. 
And this description will contain words; and what corresponds to these cannot 
then be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have no meaning.” I must not 
saw of  the branch I am sitting on...’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #55)
In personal communication with Prof. Antonio Caronia, he remarked imp-
ishly, that this research addressed ‘a similar problem’: the circular reasoning 
in #55 reveals a major issue in the discussion  on words and their ‘corre-
sponding elements in reality’ (Caronia). This relationship is by no means 
as simplistic as expressed by the voice in #55; it invites us rather to enter 
an entire discourse on the relationship between what we call reality and 
corresponding references to reality in language. Again in #59 Wittgenstein 
directly formulates this idea:
‘ “A name signifies only what is an element of reality. What cannot be destroyed; 
what remains the same in all changes.”‘ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #53)
This conception of names is not to be confused with Wittgenstein’s concept 
of the meaning of words depending on their use in language. The above 
quote opens discussions on leading  positions in philosophy of language and 
other classic fields of philosophy. We will encounter some of these in the 
course of this thesis. To name a central discussion, Wittgenstein’s position 
is difficult to accept from an empirical point of view: redness as such cannot 
for an empiricist exist independent from a red thing. The whole concept of 
redness could not have entered the mind prior to experiencing an object 
carrying and evoking an experience of redness. The English philosopher 
and physician John Locke argued that all concepts spring from experience 
(Locke, 1690. Essay concerning human understanding). 
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‘Although he [Locke] shared with the Aristotelians the dictum that ‘there is noth-
ing in the intellect that was not first in the sense’, he rejected their claim that the 
human intellect abstracts the real essences of substances from sensory particulars.’ 
(Garber & Ayers, 2003, p.985) 
Wittgenstein continues his reasoning on naming colours, drawing on the 
faculty of memory: 
‘Suppose that the colour struck you as brighter on one day than on another; would 
you not sometimes say: “I must be wrong, the colour is certainly the same as 
yesterday”?’
Wittgenstein, 1953, #57)
Furthermore, in the same paragraph he identifies the key distinction be-
tween the term itself and its use (Wittgenstein 1953), which has its origin in 
Frege’s argumentation. 
 It is in this field of discourse that the work Palace of Colours was 
initially situated. Memory, comparison and language-games on colour in 
ordinary language were central points in the project.  
 In 2010 the opportunity arose to realise artistic works on colours 
within the project Palace of Colours. The works were commissioned by Art@
Work #005, an initiative by the IT-service provider BSgroup Technology 
Innovation AG, Zurich. The project-based work on location resulted in an 
exhibition of site-specific installations, an online tour, a silk screen edition 
and a offset-printed publication1. The Zurich initiative Art@Work aims at in-
troducing contemporary art practice in to the workaday life of the office. The 
employees cooperate on a voluntary basis for the artistic project; for Palace 
of Colours, the work was ignited by a series of one-to-one interviews with 
around 3 dozen employees. Each interviewee was asked to select three out 
of 20 shades of colour given as pigment silk screened printed on paper. They 
were then asked to give each selected colour a name and fill in a form about 
their experiences and encounters with that colour. Their memories and as-
sociations with colour tones established a limited collective vocabulary on 
colours within their language group (see chapter Labels of a group, p.106). 
vocabulary of 
colour names
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palace of colours 
The interaction with the participants was a swift exchange of commonplaces 
on specific associations within visual perception; the most attractive colours 
(the ones which were chosen above average) were plain red, blue and  yellow. 
The other 17 arbitrary shades were less clear and needed to be classified by 
naming objects which bear the same tint. Here the simple set-up met the 
target: as the volunteers delivered a large vocabulary of shades by naming 
coloured objects, the relationship between word and thing, between name 
and colour was revealed. The relationship between memory and word, per-
ception and memory comes into focus when we look at the vocabulary itself.
 The colour names fed into an alphabetically sorted list in German 
and English which informed the graphic print Palast der Farben published 
by Interbellum Amsterdam in 2011 and the installation Palace of Colours at 
Motive Gallery Amsterdam in 2011. In the context of the offices in Zurich, 
the colour terms were the basis for another text-installation: the words asso-
ciated by colour shades were sorted into ‘verbal fields of colour’. This meant, 
that a collection of names linked to one particular tone were installed as 
word-lists at locations within the office building. This way the colour tone 
could be evoked by the verbal stimuli from reading the list. This game also 
relates to Joseph Albers’ remarks on colour as the marked difference be-
tween people’s remembered version of a certain colour and its actual experi-
ence is explicit.  
‘If one says Red (the name of a colour) and there are 50 people listening, it can 
be expected that there will be 50 reds in their minds. And one can be sure that all 
these reds will be very different.’
(Albers, 1963)
The word lists are now fixed parts of the office culture and continue to exist 
in photographic documentation outside of the work space. The introduction 
to issues of language philosophy for the participants, in the ‘language-game’ 
and the insertion of the results into their daily surrounding, as well as the 
opening of the project to a general public and the issued publication alto-
gether contributed to the objective of bringing this topic into the awareness 
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Image12
Melzer: Palace of Colours, colour samples, 20 colour silk screen, 2010
transdisciplinary 
research as popu-
larizing strategy
Wittgenstein: 
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of a broad audience. Such projects facilitate an awareness of the mechanisms 
we use in everyday language to describe common experiences and everyday 
perception. In the intersection of philosophy of language and visual art, 
installations such as the Palace of Colours can render language in a visual 
form. 
 The term colour itself hosts several concepts: its name signifies a 
colour perception independent from the kind of source, pigment or light 
projection, for instance. Colour as paint is mentioned in #33, when he refers 
to mixing colours and the difficulties of hitting the shade of the sky, for 
instance. 
‘ “ Look at how different effects these two blues have.”
“Do yo see the blue book over there? Bring it here.”
“This blue signal-light means...”
“What’s this blue called? – Is it ‘indigo’?” ‘  
(Wittgenstein, 1953, # 33)
 
This last remark extends the discussion from the basic colour terms to a 
richer colour vocabulary that we use everyday. We say indigo because this 
certain tone of colour originates from the Latin and Greek indikón, as it 
came from India. Its chemical formula is C16H10N2O2, its tone a dark violet. 
Some colours are named according to their occurrence in reality. Usually we 
use terms to name colours that allude to their appearance in the world: the 
colour term for a certain tone of red is sanguine is which is derived from the 
Latin sanguis, which means blood (see Pound’s remark on colour already 
quoted in Comparisons, p.50). 
“(...) He is to define red. How can he do it in a picture that isn’t painted in red 
paint? He puts (or his ancestor put) together the abbreviated picture of
     ROSE      CHERRY
 IRON ROAST   FLAMINGO
(Pound, 1934, p.22) 
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Image 14c
Melzer: Palace of Colours, participant, Zurich 2010
Image 14a
Melzer: Palace of Colours, participant, Zurich 2010
Image 14d
Melzer: Palace of Colours, participant, Zurich 2010
Image 14b
Melzer: Palace of Colours, participant, Zurich 2010
palace of colours
Image 13
Melzer: Palace of Colours, interview setting Zurich, 2010
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palace of colours
Image 15b
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of dark blue, 
installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
Image 15a
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of light blue, installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
Image 15c
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of dark gray, 
installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
palace of colours
Image 15d
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of dark green, installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
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Image 15f
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of light green, 
installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
Image 15e
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of light blue, installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
Image 15g
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of gold, 
installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
palace of colours
Image 15h
Melzer: Palace of Colours, field of dark blue, installation view, 2010 photo: Lea Meienberg
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vocabulary of 
colour terms given 
by the office em-
ployees in Zurich, 
English translation 
ABSENCE GRAY
ACID YELLOW
AIR BLUE
ALASKA BLUE 
ALBICELESTE
ARGENTINIA BLUE
ATOMC YELLOW
AUSTRIA VIENNA PURPLE
AZZURO 
BLAST RED
BLUE LAGOON BLUE
CABRIOLET BLUE
CADZAND BLUE 
CAMEMBERT WHITE
CAMOUFLAGE GREEN
CAT BLACK
CHALK RED
CLOUD BLACK 
CLOUD GRAY
COFFEEBEAN BROWN
COLD NIGHT BLACK
COOL BLUE 
CORN YELLOW
COSTA RICA GREEN
CRISTAL BLUE
DAWN GREEN
DIRT BROWN
DOVE GRAY
DOWNTOWN YELLOW
DRAGON GREEN 
DRAMA GRAY
DARK BLUE
DYNAMO ORANGE
EASTER GREEN
ELEPHANT GRAY
EMANZIPATION PURPLE
ENERGY ORANGE
EXTROVERT YELLOW
FEATHER GREEN
FERRARI RED
FISHBLUE
FLOWER PURPLE
FRESHGREEN
FUNGUS GREEN
GIRL PINK
GLOW GOLD
GLASS GRAY
GLACIER BLUE
GLACIER GRAY 
GLOOMY DAY GRAY
GOBI GOLD
GOLD
GOLD YELLOW
GRAS GREEN
GRAVY BROWN
GRAY SCALE GRAY
GREEN TEA GREEN
HOLLAND ORANGE
HORIZON BLUE
ICEBLUE
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INNOCENCE RED
KILIMANJARO YELLOW
KINGS BLUE
KISS RED 
LIGHT BLACK
LIPORI GREEN
LOUD YELLOW
LOVE RED
LOW SKY GRAY
MATERIAL RED
MENORCA YELLOW
METAL GRAY 
MILITARY GREEN
MINTGREEN
MIST GRAY
MOUSE GRAY
NIGHT BLACK
NEON YELLOW
NEW YORK CITY BLACK
NORTHSEE BLUE
NOT SNOW WHITE
OFFICE YELLOW
OLIVE GREEN
ORANGE
OCEAN BLUE
PACIFIC GREEN
PERITO MORENO GRAY
PURA VIDA GREEN
RACE CAR RED
RASPBERRY ICECREAM PINK
RELAX GREEN
ROSE RED
ROSE WHITE
SAND GOLD
SAND GRAY 
SAND YELLOW
SECRET GRAY
SIMPLE GRAY
STORM GRAY 
SKY BLUE
SMOKE RED
SOWJET RED
SPRING GREEN
STAVANGER YELLOW
STONE GRAY
SUN YELLOW
SUNFLOWER YELLOW
SUN SET RED
SWAMP GREEN
SWEDEN RED
SWIMMINGPOOL BLUE
TREEGREEN
TERRACOTTA RED
TEXTSTUDY YELLOW
TOMATO RED
TRANSISTOR RADIO ORANGE
WAVE BLUE
WEAK BROWN
WINTER DAY WHITE
YOKE YELLOW
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palace of colours
Image 16b
Melzer: Palace of Colours, installation details 
Motive Gallery Amsterdam, 2011
Image 16a
Melzer: Palace of Colours, installation, Homo Ludens Act I, Motive Gallery, Amsterdam, 2010 photo: Mike Bink
Image 16c
Melzer: Palace of Colours, installation details 
Motive Gallery Amsterdam, 2011
palace of colours
Image 17
Melzer: Palace of Colours, detail from publication, 2010. See p.448
identifying colours 
with their 
occurrences
i.e. sky blue
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7. LABELS OF A GROUP
In Sapir’s analysis of the world humans live in, he identifies three areas. 
Apart from the ‘objective world’, he specifies ‘the world of social activity’ 
and ‘the particular language which has become the medium of expression 
of their society’ (Whorf 1956, p.134, quoting Sapir). The role of language as 
determinant of our world view has been introduced in the chapter Universal 
vs Relative (p.69). Here, we will direct our attention even more closely to the 
specific group of language users who surround us. Sapir claims that: 
‘The fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously 
built up on the language habits of the group... We see and hear and otherwise 
experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community 
predispose certain choices of interpretation.’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.134, quoting Sapir)
In other words, the Sapir-Whorf-Hypothesis claims that one’s experience of 
reality is established by the habits shared by members of a language commu-
nity. Our impression of the real world is therefore dependent on the linguis-
tic society we inhabit. Within this society the ‘means of communication’ en-
able us to share our perceptions. The linguistic habits of a society shape the 
perception of its members and make them compatible with the language-
games around them. The interpretation of images, situations, signs and 
contexts is to a large extent part of ordinary language; the desire to picture 
something, to name it and to categorise it, is an important social function 
of language. The social role of gossip in ordinary language is commonplace 
and which we will return to briefly in the chapter Meeting (p.201). In Robert 
Dunbar’s words, language is a social instrument for sharing: 
‘And language remains our greatest treasure, for without it we are confined to a 
world that, while not one of social isolation, is surely one that is a great deal less 
rich. Language makes us members of a community, providing us with the opportu-
nity to share knowledge and experiences in a way no other species can.’ 
(Dunbar 2002, p.5)
categorization
Foucault: 
non-place of 
language
labels of a group
Within these social interactions of language, the ability to label a situation 
and to correlate words and things is vital. Because we are capable of giving 
names, we can function in linguistic exchange with others. The vocabulary 
we use to enable verbal exchange helps to describe, show and share what we 
see, experience and remember. Our ‘opportunity to share knowledge and 
experience’ (Dunbar 2002) establishes mutual links between one subject 
and another. Each corresponding network of words and sentences, rang-
ing from fixed expressions to subtle jokes reflects a certain language com-
munity. Its members in turn, strengthen the network of language practices 
by their habit of falling back on established conventions of the group. The 
balance between conservation and change of language habits is discussed by 
Keller in chapter Language Attributes (p.171). Yet the mere act of classifica-
tion is a key attribute of language which Whorf advances in his essay titled 
The Punctual and Segmentative Aspects of Verbs in Hopi. Language arranges 
sense data and categorises experience ‘in a certain world-order, a certain 
segment of the world that is easily expressible by the type of symbolic means 
that language employs. In other words, language does in a cruder but also 
in a broader and more versatile way the same thing that science does.(...)’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.55). Language orders the world. Foucault also celebrates 
language’s capacity to classify the world into categories which make even the 
most remote elements meet in language. 
‘The animals ‘(i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair 
brush’ – where could they ever meet, except in the immaterial sound of the voice 
pronouncing their enumeration, or on the page transcribing it? Where else could 
they be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language? Yet, though language can 
spread them before us, it can do so only in an unthinkable space. (...)’ 
(Foucault 1970/2009, p.xvii) 
We will return to Foucault’s well-known introduction to The Order of Things 
(1970) in the chapter Treasury of Words (p.312). The words we use to label 
what we see, hear and touch are thus not merely temporary indices for 
‘pointing at’ sensuous experience; the ‘symbolic means’ of a language are 
effectively the link between the external nonverbal illegible world and the 
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very same world structured in our consciousness. Chomsky’s strict dictum 
in the Dublin speech April 2013 is, that even most of the language activity 
is beyond our consciousness (see p.70). Whorf sketches consciousness as 
constituted of a ‘sensuous and a nonsensuous’; 
‘(...)We may call the sensuous – what we are seeing, hearing, touching–the ‘present’ 
while in the nonsensuous the vast image-world of memory is being labelled ‘the 
past’ and another realm of belief, intuition, and uncertainty ‘the future’; yet sensa-
tion, memory, foresight, all are in consciousness together–one is not “yet to be” nor 
another “once but no more.” ‘ 
(Whorf 1956, p.143-144)
 
Arguing for an essentially different conception of what we label as time in 
Hopi language, Whorf opposes the idea, that perception, recollection and 
anticipation are separated into strict strata of past, present and future. That 
means, if we label a memory with the tag ‘past’, then it conforms with the 
concept of time facilitated by our language structure. Whorf exemplifies viv-
idly, how differently a Hopi speaker perceives structures of duration, spacial 
extension and distance compared to SAE language users. Wittgenstein notes 
in one of the last entries in the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus that 
“ The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time. 
(Wittgenstein, 1922, # 6.4312)
Whorf ‘ran up against the borders of language’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, #119) 
as he tried to show which concepts of SAE are absent in Hopi. How to write 
about their linguistic concepts if they are not transferable or translatable into 
our language and vice versa because the corresponding concept is absent? 
How to conceptualise something which is a void in the target language? 
Despite his conviction about the relativity of world-views, Whorf seems 
to argue for a universal hub which might be called preverbal. One could 
read his statement that ’EVERYTHING is consciousness, and everything in 
consciousness is, and is together.’ (Whorf 1956, p.143/144) in such a way, 
that the structure of language determines the structure of the world view 
on top of a primary pool of consciousness. The linguistic relativist Whorf 
labels of a group
thus could be considered a universalist concerning the issue of conscious-
ness. Only then is it conceivable that one language can function without any 
names for abstracts like time and space, while another relies fully on meta-
phorical reflections that convey these concepts. In order to come to terms 
with the language habits of a group, Whorf offered a breathtaking analysis of 
different groups, which delimit general statements on ‘language’. 
 In recent years, the American psychologist and neuroscientist Jaak 
Panksepp has attempted a clear and unprejudiced examination of the brain/
mind interface of mammals. In his renown book Affective Neuroscience: The 
Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Panksepp 2004) he addresses 
questions of emotion and motivation in all mammal life, animals alongside 
humans. Panksepp distinguishes clearly between the basic emotional stages 
all mammals share and the complex questions of perception and conscious-
ness in humans, and contributes to the examination of what could be called 
the preverbal. One hypothesis is that precognitive could mean preverbal.  
 Generally,  this thesis does not study origin of language or its exact 
relationship to cognition. Rather it uses existing  language structures as a 
link between the different fields connecting the research question. But Pank-
sepp’s  book is a fine example of making a complex field of study accessible. 
It is also an example of a courageous attempt to operate beyond the exist-
ing separation of disciplines, eager to find models to connect them. In his 
introduction Panksepp makes generous use of metaphoric language, using 
the analogy of map-making, adventure and navigation in order to explain 
his trajectory in the current landscape of what he calls the development of a 
‘science of emotion’ (Panksepp 2004, introduction).  
108 109
Wittgenstein: 
the mystical
labels of a group
This is an English sentence, I speak German and Dutch fluently. Altogether I 
am a citizen of the SAE language community and thus involuntarily im-
paired regarding some world-view springing from different structures of 
language. 
 The mystical or the moral in Wittgenstein escapes the capacity of 
our words, it lies ‘outside of language’. 
“There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical” 
Wittgenstein, 1922, #6.522
The absent, the secret, the unspoken and the unsayable are categories dif-
ficult to grasp in our language (“Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die 
Grenzen meiner Welt,” (Wittgenstein, 1922, #5.6). With the above in mind, 
is Whorf ’s suggestion of preverbal consciousness and Wittgenstein’s post-
verbal ‘moral’ delineating the very same linguistic void? Whorf states that
‘The picture of the universe shifts from tongue to tongue.’ 
(Stuart Chase in Whorf 1956, p.vi, foreword)
If this shift becomes an abyss, translation of worlds, not of words is needed. 
 Once one does not leave one’s own language group, influences of 
a particular language on the group of language users are easier to observe. 
Then it is possible to look closely at the links made between the verbal labels 
of a group, which translate more easily due to a widely similar conceptual 
basis. In the most fundamental sense this means that if there is an entry 
on the term ‘time’ in your dictionary, and you have a habituated notion 
about its use, then we might share a set of meanings and uses related to this 
abstract subject. One must be wary though, that similar yet not identical 
language habits from one group lead to slight shifts in meaning. For exam-
ple, analogies function by shifting the focus of meaning, sometimes quite far 
from the initial object, comparisons function by giving  parallel examples 
(see chapter Comparisons, p.50). 
how words direct 
our thinking about 
the world
systems of 
relationships
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Whorf mentions a number of simple examples of how words direct our 
thinking about the world. As he was employed as an expert for fire preven-
tion, he gives examples for fire danger. 
The conventional words on warning signs lead to underestimation of the 
danger, as empty equals harmless, but ‘empty gasoline drums’, might ‘contain 
explosive vapour’: 
‘Physically the situation is hazardous, but the linguistic analysis according to 
regular analogy must employ the word ‘empty’, which inevitably suggests lack of 
hazard.’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.135) 
‘Such examples, which could be greatly multiplied, will suffice to show how the cue 
to a certain line of behavior is often given by the analogies of the linguistic formula 
in which the situation is spoken of, and by which to some degree it is analyzed, 
classified, and allotted its place in that world which is “to a large extent uncon-
sciously built up on the language habits of the group.” And we always assume that 
the linguistic analysis made by our group reflects reality better than it does.’  
(Sapir quoted by Whorf 1956, p.137)
Classification, analogy and recognition of interrelationships between name 
and named are capacities of the mind, both in thinking and in language. 
According to Whorf, they form ‘systems of relationships’, which ‘are inescap-
ably bound up with systems of linguistic expression.’ (Whorf 1956, p.84).
‘The story of their evolution in man is the story of man’s linguistic development–of 
the long evolution of thousands of very different systems of discerning, selecting, 
organizing, and operating with relationships.’ 
(Whorf 1956, p.84)
In other words, Whorf considers the linguistic capacity of humans as the 
precondition for establishing and maintaining mental networks of thought-
relations. The links between thought and verbal expression feed back on 
each other. The phrase labels of a group signifies both. One signifies the 
labels a group gives to the sensations their members perceive and share. The 
other means the labels one can attach to a group of language users, exam-
ined from outside the group.
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1 Shakespeare: Romeo and Juliet (1597): “Whats’ in a name, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.” 
I owe this link to Leila Peacock. 
2 Gray Magazine published by the Gerrit Rietveld Academy on occasion of the final examinations 2009.
from image to 
words
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8. WHAT’S IN A NAME?
It is the ‘vast image-world of memory’ Whorf refers to in his characteriza-
tion of consciousness (Whorf 1956, p.143/144) which comes to the fore-
ground in this part of the research. What started as a simple rephrasing of 
Sapir’s thought – that reality is constituted by the language habits of the 
surrounding group – culminated in an attempt to display habits of subjects 
in a group-project that would demonstrate links between a particular image-
world and words. Other senses than the visual in relation to memory are 
not explicitly addressed in the following project. It manifested as an artistic 
experiment which was realised in 2009 together with my colleague professor 
Henk Groenendijk and two classes of first year students from the Gerrit 
Rietveld Academy, Amsterdam. Its title plays on the quote from Shake-
speare’s Romeo and Juliet1, which became an English proverb and which 
questions the importance of names altogether. The German equivalent of 
the English expression ‘What’s in a name’ is ‘Ein Name ist Schall und Rauch’, 
which underlines the fugitiveness of names as temporary phenomena. 
(Schall means accoustic noise, Rauch means smoke).
  The project What’s in a name? is a commission for a publication2 in 
response to a personal image archive of slides taken by art historian André 
Klein throughout 30 years of teaching art history. The collection contains 
over 8.000 slides for which several professors were invited to design a 
method of sharing this image archive. This response to the collection later 
got published in GRAY magazine (Gerrit Rietveld Academy,  Groenendijk 
& Melzer 2009). The approach of Groenendijk and I was an experiment 
that aimed to create a vocabulary from a vast collection of images from the 
context of visual art. It became a format for collecting data, raising questions 
and demonstrating an instant response from the participants. Its outcome 
served as the basis for further analysis and has manifested in various forms 
of presentation. The generated data has been processed into a data base and 
the original material was used for exhibition purposes. 
1 I owe this link to Egon Stemle.
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The project was realised as a two day workshop for three dozen students in 
the Foundation Year. This examination group was the source of the labels 
and naming mechanisms. The participants were from 12 different countries, 
their mother tongues were Danish, Dutch and Dutch Antilles, German, Eng-
lish, Icelandic, Japanese, Moroccan, Norwegian, and Polish. The language for 
the vocabulary was English. 
 The process started with a concentrated session in the projection 
room, where all slides were projected as digital contact-sheets. The partici-
pants had a few seconds to view each sheet showing 20 images. The group 
voted on each sheet and this way they reduced the amount to a total of 1.000 
images. Then, the selected images were provided as thumbnail prints on 
individual sheets of paper. The stack of 1.000 images was distributed among 
the participants and rotated during the subsequent steps of the procedure. 
The procedure was set up as a game with strict rules. The challenge was to 
write one word below an image, naming the picture with a simple label. The 
tags could be given by analogy, association or literal naming of a depicted 
element. Then, the given word was added to an alphabetical list gathering 
all the words associated with the images. In this way the alphabetical lists 
collated the entire vocabulary generated by the group, while the loose sheets 
collected a growing list of different tags, given by different people, to the 
same image. Once the list of tags seemed exhausted, the participant could 
decide to hang the sheet on the wall and, doing this, close the process of tag-
ging for that particular image. On the wall hung a continuously expanding 
a grid of images and associated words, which again started to relate to each 
other by proximity. The network of relationships – of words, of images and 
of association between words and images – later filled the entire room and 
invited the participants and audience to uncover the associated meaning, 
likenesses and accidentally poetic links within the network. 
 Labelling pictures is important in the context of online archives of 
images. The computer scientists Luis von Ahn and Laura Dabbish (2004)
have developed an online computer game which uses similar mechanisms.1
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The participating students were:
A selection of created word-lists from this vocabulary are the letter Q and I:
letter Q
quotation, quiz master, queen, queer, question mark, queens day, quarrel, queue, 
quiet, quivering
letter I
I am a kid, I burn, ice, ice cube, iceberg, ice-cream, Iceland, ideal, IKEA, ill, illusion, 
illustration, image, imagination, immigration, imitate, imitation, immaterial, im-
pale, imperfection, impossible, impression, incense, incest, inconvenient, increasing, 
identical, India, Indian, Indians, industrial, industry, infinity, influence, informa-
tion, ink, inner space, innocence, inquiry, insane, insect, insecure, inside, insides, 
installation, institute, instruction, instruments, integrate, intellectual, intense, 
interaction, intercourse, interest, interference, intergalactic, interior, intertwine, 
intimacy, intruder, invasion, invention, invisible, invitation, irresponsible, island, 
isolation, it, Italy, itch
participants’ 
feedback
what’s in a name
In the evaluation of the process we collected feedback from the participants, 
who described their experiences during the procedure and the effect the 
project had on their perception of images and words. Generally, there was 
a discrepancy between two main streams of feedback: one part of the group 
experienced the activity of tagging all these ‘random’ images as tiresome 
and senseless. The other subgroup was excited about the force of this mo-
notonous activity and the filtering effects on their perception. The students 
discussed parallels between the exercise with digital networks, online search 
engines and issues of titling in general. Nearly all participants mentioned an 
intervention on what they called the ‘psychological dimension’ and ‘sub-
conscious mechanisms’. They also clearly distinguished between systematic 
problems or obstacles – like the restriction to use only the English language 
– and abstract questions on the ‘system’ of the procedure. The following 
quotes some of the participants remarks:
“It continued outside this room, on the way home I gave a name to everything I 
saw.” – “I wasn’t able to function normally. No more information was processed.”
“It was exhausting and I had crazy dreams with hundreds of images blending in. It 
was amazing that one could remember all these images. By tagging you got the im-
age into your own system, your own mind and memory.” – “In the beginning it felt 
like a waste of time. On the second day it started to make sense. Later, after a few 
tags each image, it started to become something.” – “It was also about the people, 
not only about the images. The tags interacted, started to communicate with each 
other, once they were hung on the wall.”  – “In the beginning I found quite literal 
tags, a house for a house etc. Later I tried to find more and more ‘strange’ words to 
relate to the image. Was that true or honest to the system? Which system?” – 
“The feeling to be in a system feels nice, even if you don’t know what the system is.”
“What’s the choice? To be creative and inventive or stick to one procedure?”
“I felt it was an insufficient system for what we were investigating.” – “It is interest-
ing to see the relationship between Image and text; flickr, google etc do this already 
more efficient and better.” – “Doesn’t it reverse the digital database in a way?”
“It was pretty frustrating that we stopped there; I would need to continue to find 
a conclusion.” – “It looked like in a prison where the prisoners produce mocca-
sins...” – “We are so frustrated not to know the goal of this work: it’s this human 
thing: We need to have an end, we need to know what we are searching for, or what 
the outcome could be.” – “Maybe it can be interesting to let it be done by differ-
ent groups of people, lawyers, prisoners, asylum seekers...” – “To see something 
growing, not only the memory of having done it. Also the data and images seems 
to become more. After a moment in the end, it turned into something with many 
possibilities.” 
Feedback by participants of ‘What’s in a name’ 2009
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Image 18a
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, one sheet of Klein’s archive, 2009
what’s in a name
Image 18b
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, one of the 
labelled images, 2009
Image 18d
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, one of the 
labelled images, 2009
Image 18c
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, one of the 
labelled images, 2009
Image 18e
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, one of the 
labelled images, 2009
what’s in a name
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Image 19a
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, detail with pinned up labelled images, 2009 
photo: GRAY Magazine
what’s in a name
Image 19b
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, overview of alphabetical collection of words, 2009 
photo: GRAY Magazine
Image 19c
Groenendijk & Melzer: What’s in a name, overview of one wall of the labelled images, 2009 
photo: GRAY Magazine
what’s in a name
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1 personal communication with Prof. Antonio Caronia, Composite Session, December 2010, Milan
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1 http://www.festisite.com/text-layout/, rebus generator, rebus for the word ‘meeting’, accessed 1 January 
2012
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Here,  when we say ‘language’ we refer to written language. First of all let us 
recall briefly the general hypothesis on the origins of writing and its deriva-
tion from pictures. For this research it is elementary that the first writing in 
cuneiform (stylised drawings of stylised objects) was simple memory hooks, 
which were assembled into ideograms to express more complex ideas (Jean 
1987, p.14). Even though there are many transitions which have been identi-
fied in the development of writing throughout the history of cultures, the 
rebus-structure has been identified as key to the development of writing as 
we know it today.
‘The representation of sounds lies at the root of all true writing. The remarkable 
achievement of the Sumerians, and elsewhere the Egyptians, was to make use of 
a system as simple as a child’s game: the rebus. They came on the idea of using a 
pictogram, not to represent the object itself, but rather the sounds that made up 
its name – as if, for instance, one wrote ‘carpet’ using drawings of a ‘car’ and a ‘pet’. 
(...) ‘ 
(Jean 1987, p.16). 
9. IMAGE VOCABULARY
The quasi-systematic process of the project What’s in a name? is one way to 
extract a vocabulary about the relationship between word and image from 
ordinary language. It is clear that the approach is a playful extension of the 
idea of a language-game in a small and temporary language community. The 
supply of data could be subject to future research as well as a demonstrating 
group processes in a teaching context. The present chapter revolves around 
shifts of meanings of image and text which are directly displayed together. 
 In several discussions with my first supervisor Prof. Antonio Caro-
nia, it has become evident that the relationship between image and memory 
is especially complex, and challenging to describe with (verbal) language. 
Memory, he stated, is related to image in a less strict way than to language. 
When we speak, Caronia said, memory can’t be avoided nor eliminated; 
memory is a constitutional part of language, but not for image1. Then he 
added: ‘We have to look at images to lend them something from us.’ This re-
mark in particular redirects the focus from the purely lexical approach about 
the meaning of a word or name and its reference to the difference between 
sense and meaning (the Sinn in Frege, 1884), between its sense, its significa-
tion. When we look at an image, we supply it with something. In the course 
of naming images we can observe mechanisms which can be compared to a 
funnel-effect: we perceive an image and may have sensations fed by memory 
and analogy. The pool of images, comparisons and associations may be 
called individual but not personal, as the French literary theorist and phi-
losopher Roland Barthes insists ‘our pleasure is individual, but not personal’ 
(Barthes 1973, p.62). It is the pool of individual associations, which supplies 
us with access to the image. When we search for one word to describe the 
image, this array of impression-data is filtered through a word-list we have at 
our disposal. In the experiment What’s in a name (p.112), the total vocabu-
lary was shown to be limited by the simple fact that almost no one of the 
tagging group was a native English-speaker. 
Many forms of riddle using text and image are present in the art of the 20th 
century. An icon for the development of this relationship between writing 
and pictures is René Magritte’s painting The Treachery of Images from 1928-
1929, better known as Ceci n’est pas une pipe / This is not a pipe. 
1
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This work, as well as Ceci n’est pas une pomme (1964) (This is not an apple)is 
regarded as an paradigm-shift in the evolution of the image-text relationship 
in visual art. Magritte’s work strikes a balance between philosophical reflec-
tion and expounding issues of representation; word and image, significa-
tion and reference are main concerns of his paintings (Meuris 1990/2007). 
Magritte’s particular role in this research is evident also in relation to 
linguistic phenomena as negation and absence (see chapter Presence vs Ab-
sence, p.223). His paintings are, to different degrees, visual language-games, 
image-sentences which suggest game-like structures inherent to jokes and 
riddles. His oeuvre opens up a variety of issues in language and manages to 
make accessible the relationship between word and world, name and object. 
In his most iconographic works Magritte uses idealised everyday objects (an 
apple, a rose, an egg, a pipe), locates them in generic spaces (a landscape, a 
bedroom, a doorway, a balcony) and makes slight adjustments to shift their 
relation to one another. Often their scale is manipulated so that the rose 
Image 21
Visual note of Magritte: The Treachery of Images from 1928-1929. In Meuris,J., 
2007/1990. Magritte. Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag, p.120. photo: Nadja Niemann
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blossom or an apple appear humongous in size (Le tombe des Lutteurs, 1961, 
La chambre d’écoute, 1958). Slightly shifted perspectives and cut-outs give 
view to both peculiar and yet familiar sights. In the context of this research, 
Magritte’s huge red rose cannot help but echo Gertrude Stein’s most famous 
phrase A rose is a rose is a rose (see p.356). 
 Both Stein and Magritte have become commonplace with their 
most famous works. And both dedicated their work to the examination of 
everyday objects and familiar sights, whose meaning shifts by manipulation 
of the rules or the structure of the game. 
Image 21
Visual note of Magritte: Le tombe des Lutteurs. 1961. In Meuris,J., 2007/1990. Magritte. 
Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag, p.98. photo: Nadja Niemann
In the work of Magritte (and Stein), there is a strong awareness of the influence 
of the emblematic qualities of a depicted object on its signification. The objects 
in Magritte’s paintings act like signs. The painting’s title usually acts like a code 
to clarify or guide our interpretation or to display imaginary realities (La repro-
duction interdite, 1937). Magritte and Stein play with our language habits. 
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The art historian Meuris argues:
‘It was necessary that the title corresponded to the mental process, which lead 
the artist to produce the painting. It had to guide us mentally from one depiction 
of one object to another object, that were linked in such a way that similarities 
became apparent which were suitable to surprise and raise questions.’ 
Meuris 1990/2007 p.120, own translation
Image 22
Visual note of Magritte: La reproduction interdite. 1937. In Meuris,J., 2007/1990. Magritte. 
Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag, p.88. photo: Nadja Niemann
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essentially part of it. Anything beyond the limits of language corresponds 
with ‘the limits of my world.’  
“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world” Die Grenzen meiner 
Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt,” 
(Wittgenstein, 1922, Tractatus # 5.6)
This sentence alludes both to language and to meaning; ‘The limits of my 
language mean the limits of my world’, which may also be taken as a depar-
ture point for a theory of meaning. Foucault and Magritte stood in writ-
ten correspondence with each other. Foucault wrote an essay on Magritte’s 
work titled ‘Ceci n’est pas un pipe’, pulished in 1983. Foucault concludes that 
‘(...) Magritte names his paintings in order to focus attention upon the very 
act of naming.’ (Foucault 1983, p.36, see Naming, p.135) As we see later in 
this research there is a strong notion of the world as a symbolic world. The 
ethnologists Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss state that whenever we 
navigate within the system of language, we stay inside the symbolic system, 
which is all there is. Everything beyond the limits of the symbolic system 
falls ‘straight into incommunicability’ (Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.37, also see Shift-
ing Names, p.147). Magritte, Wittgenstein and Stein were contemporaries. 
All three knew the ordinary language, image codes of the everyday and its 
vocabularies were sufficiently precise materials to work with. All three ac-
cepted – to a differing degree – the use of conventional forms to extend the 
limits of language from within. Later Marcel Broodthaers came to continue 
this discourse, with his painting ‘Ceci n’est pas un Magritte’ (1967). 
 This image shows is one of the plaques which accompanied all 
exhibits in his fictional Museum d’Art moderne – Departement des Aigles 
(1968). The use of ephemeral objects, like cloakroom tickets, in 
Broodthaers work emphasises its relationship to the language and 
objects of the everyday.  
Meuris continues that the titles had to allude to the realm of poetry, so that 
the image could activate the viewer’s imagination. Magritte manages to do 
this by prompting the shown as much as the not-shown. In this way Magritte 
accentuates an issue that is prominent in the philosophy of language of Witt-
genstein: Wittgenstein’s conception of language remained bound up with its 
very limits; the mystical, the ethical, remained for Wittgenstein in a non-
linguistic and nonverbal zone. He argued that all that escaped his writing was 
Image 23
Visual note of Broodthaers: Ceci n’est pas un object 
d’art. 1968. photo: Nadja Niemann 
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Despite all its conventional formal qualities of painting, Magritte’s work is 
provocative in its simplicity, a trick, a riddle to be solved or a secret to be 
uncovered (see Secrets in Visual Works, p.384). With their plain depiction 
Magritte’s paintings show questions which could be interesting for essayistic 
texts in the line of Philosophical Investigations. Magritte’s work indicates the 
limit between saying and showing pointed out by Wittgenstein (Wittgen-
stein, 1953). In the iconic painting of the pipe with the sentence ‘This is not 
a pipe’ painted below it and its title The Treachery of Images, all the elements 
are presented for a discussion on representation, reference and signification. 
The painted pipe is not essentially a pipe, but a painted representation of it, 
oil on canvas. Foucault underlines this visual pun: 
‘(...) But who would seriously contend that the collection of intersecting lines 
above the text is a pipe? Must we say: My God, how simpleminded! The statement 
is perfectly true, since it is quite apparent that the drawing representing the pipe is 
not the pipe itself. And yet there is a convention of language: What is this drawing? 
Why, it is a calf, a square, a flower.’
(Foucault 1983, p.19) 
And so again the analogies about word-object-relationships make this 
artwork iconic within the history of art. Foucault captures this affront to 
our viewing habits in his analysis on the ‘infinite’ relationship of language to 
painting:  
‘(...) the relations of language to painting is an infinite one. It is not that words are 
imperfect or that, when confronted by the visible, they prove insuperably inad-
equate. Neither can be reduced to the other’s terms: it is in vain that we say what 
we see; what we see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt 
to show, by the use of images, metaphors, or similes, what we are saying; the space 
where they achieve their splendor is not that deployed by our eyes but that defined 
by the sequential elements of syntax. And the proper name, in this context, is 
merely an artifice: it gives us a finger to point with, in other words, to pass surrepti-
tiously from the space where one speaks to the space where one looks, in other 
words, to fold one over the other as if they were equivalents.’ 
(Foucault 1970/2009,  quoted in translators introduction Foucault 1983, p.9) 
The oeuvre of René Magritte, rooted in surrealism, is essential for the devel-
opment of conceptual art and influenced the work of many artists.  
Harkness: 
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The philosopher Foucault noticed the relevance to questions of representa-
tion and language of Magritte early, when he reflected on The Treachery 
of Images, and started a correspondence with Magritte about it in 1966 
(Foucault 1983, p.57/58). James Harkness, the translator and editor of the 
publication This is not a pipe identifies the particular tone which Foucault 
finds to analyse Magritte’s puzzling painting:  
‘(...) Ceci n’est pas une pipe introduces a less familiar [Foucaultian] humor, a play-
ful, punning voice narrating a kind of analytical cartoon. It is a cornucopia of 
wordplays, wisecracks, and slapstick repetitions, many of which are either untrans-
latable or else require so much explanation as to be tedious.’ 
(translator’s introduction by James Harkness in Foucault 1983, p.11)
 
The ‘analytical cartoon’ in philosophical writing marks the climax of what 
we could say began with the Sumerian rebus. The mechanisms at work 
culminate in what Wittgenstein characterised as language-games. Harkness 
identifies with de Saussure how closely both Foucault and Magritte operate 
to the realm of language philosophy and linguistics. 
Image 24
Visual note of Magritte: Double-Self Portrait. 1936. In Meuris,J., 2007/1990. Magritte. 
Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag, p.74. photo: Nadja Niemann
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Harkness specifies that 
’(...) both Foucault and Magritte engage in a critique of language – the former 
historico-epistemological, the latter visual. Each in his way concurs with the 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure in asserting the arbitrariness of the sign – that is, 
the essentially circumstantial, conventional, historical nature of the bond between 
the signifier (i.e. a word) and the signified (the object or concept represented). In 
Saussurean linguistics, words do not ‘refer’ to things themselves. Rather, they have 
meaning as points within the entire system that is a language – a system, further, 
conceived as a network of graded differences. (...)’ 
(Translator’s introduction by James Harkness in Foucault 1983, p.5)
Everything in language is inter-relational, like a house of cards1. Harkness 
compares the role of words in Saussurean linguistics with the images in 
Magritte’s work. For Saussure, Harkness states, words do not simply ‘refer’ 
to things, just as Magritte’s images do not just ‘resemble’ elements from a 
unilateral visual repository of meaning (Harkness in Foucault 1983, p.7). 
What, then, are the mechanisms at work in this conception of language as ‘a 
network of graded differences’ (Harkness in Foucault 1983, p.5)? Foucault 
calls it the ‘network of the similar’ (Foucault 1983, p.47) and in his major 
work The Order of Things he explains that ‘the relationship of language to the 
world is one of analogy rather than signification’ (Foucault 1970, p.36-37). 
He classifies analogies as an inescapable field of reflecting resemblances 
within an array of mutual associations and relations. Analogy is the order 
between word and world (‘relationship of language to the world’), we are the 
centre of this ‘network of graded differences’ which Foucault calls the system 
of language. 
‘The space occupied by analogies is really a space of radiation. Man is surrounded 
by it on every side;  but, inversely, he transmits these resemblances back into the 
world from which he receives them. He is the great fulcrum of proportions – the 
centre upon which relations are concentrated and from which they are once again 
reflected.’
(Foucault 1970 p.36-37) 
Can the idea of analogy hold in itself the diversity of mechanisms at work 
– memory, association, naming, interpretation, misinterpretation, commen-
Pound: on analogy
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tary, recognition, description, provocation and so forth? One method in this 
research is to link two writers by a literal approach: the same word in both 
works establishes a meeting of a sort. Wittgenstein and Stein meet in a list of 
words, and Foucault enters a virtual conversation on the word ‘analogy’ with 
his colleague writer, Ezra Pound. Skeptical, Pound states: 
‘You can prove nothing by analogy. (...) Aristotle had something of this sort in 
mind when he wrote ‘apt use of metaphor indicating a swift perception of 
relations.’ 1
(Pound, 1934, p.84)
Pound maybe right that we are not able to prove anything by analogy, but 
it seems that we can show many things by analogy, which otherwise escape 
our (verbal) language systems. What does Magritte himself say about the 
relationship between words and objects?
‘(...)Between words and objects one can create new relations and specify 
characteristics of language and objects generally ignored in everyday life.’
(Magritte, quoted by Foucault 1983, p.39)2
We saw earlier, with the origins of writing and games like rebus, that an im-
age can take the place of a word, and it works both ways: 
‘Sometimes the name of an object takes the place of an image. A word can take the 
place of a word in a proposition.’  
Magritte: quoted by Foucault 1983, p.39, 
cited by Foucault from P.Waldberg’s ‘Magritte’ 
The following statement by Magritte refers to the inextricable tangle of 
words and images and to the absence of a common ground to sustain them:
 ‘In a painting, words are of the same cloth as images. Rather one sees images and 
words differently in a painting.’
(Magritte: quoted by Foucault 1983, p.39, 
cited by Foucault from P.Waldberg’s ‘Magritte’)
Magritte is a key figure for preparing the context of the meeting between 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein in language. His methodology is 
both reflective and artistic, it uses both visual and verbal language-games.
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10. YOU NAME IT
Still orbiting around the notion of names, the relationship between word 
and world, or object and name can be approached in various other ways. The 
role of a word as a tag or label for something brings up a series of issues we 
experience in daily verbal interactions. To state a simple example, everyone 
is to a certain extent aware of the linguistic phenomena of homonyms – these 
words which are identical in spelling and pronunciation but which designate 
different objects. The same word can have totally different meanings. It is 
easy for anyone to find a few of them, at least in their mother-tongue (the 
English words bank and bench are both called die Bank in German). Similar-
ly, we are aware of several people bearing the same name, without the name 
losing its significance or power of reference for a particular person. Caronia 
also discussed the phenomenon of homonymy in his paper on the work of 
artist Janez Janša. 
‘The sense (at least) of surprise that overcomes us when we run into a person that 
has our same name shows that we are facing something that we all perceive as 
something bizarre – (...) In short, homonymy represents a potential menace for the 
individual identity of people.’ 
(Caronia, Identity, Possibility, Rigid Designators: On Formally 
Undecidable Propositions of Janez Janša and Concerning Systems, 
Translated by Denis Debevec, 2009, p.142) 
The practice of name-giving, and related religious rituals such as baptiz-
ing, are strongly present in all cultures; all people have a name for practical 
reasons of indication, as much as for administrative purposes of identifica-
tion. Here, the name is literally the sequence of sounds or letters in the name 
of a person, not its figurative meanings or a name as substitute for a person’s 
reputation. 
 Naming in general is, to a certain extent, a hereditary practice of ap-
propriation. We give names to what we own or are responsible for: children, 
animals, objects. A ship is named during its launch ceremony, so are streets 
and entire pieces of land. A child gets to name the pet it takes care of. 
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A name, in ordinary terms is thus a word which refers directly to something 
or someone in the (real or fictional) world.  
 Linguistically, a name fulfils different complex functions. In lan-
guage philosophy there has been much discussion of the ‘semantics of 
names’ (Kripke 1972, p.5), especially as a new means of evaluating models 
of formal logic after Frege and Russell. For the purpose of valid operations 
in logic a language requires unambiguous signs and symbols designating 
the respective elements. In other words: no matter, how precise or efficient 
any formal or natural language may be – sooner or later one will have to 
plunge into questions about words as signs and their referent(s). In ordinary 
language we call such words ‘names’, yet the exact functioning relationship 
between a name and the designated object (thing, person) is disputable. 
Even more so in formal languages, where the distinctions and relation-
ships between referents, names, designators and so forth need to be clearly 
defined in order for the game to function. 
 Saul Kripke attempts to define these relationships in Necessity and 
Naming. In his analysis he clarifies the term ‘name’ as ‘proper name’, ‘i.e. 
the name of a person, a city, a country etc.’ (Kripke 1972, p.24). He does not 
include descriptions in his concept of a name; this means that the descrip-
tion ‘the woman who married my father’ only works together with the name 
of one particular person, the referent, and is ambiguous as soon as the father 
marries more than once. Kripke suggests we use the common term designa-
tor to cover both names and descriptions (Kripke 1972, p.24). 
In his investigation Kripke departs from the principle of identity in formal 
logic which introduces Leibnitz’s Law of the indiscernibility of identicals. 
Simply put, this principle states that ‘identicals have all properties in com-
mon’.1 In his investigation Kripke is especially interested in rigid designators  
(Kripke 1972, p.2, preface).  What are rigid designators?
‘In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designa-
tor when it designates (picks out, denotes, refers to) the same thing in all possible 
worlds in which that thing exists and does not designate anything else in those 
possible worlds in which that thing does not exist. (...)‘ 1
1 ‘schematically (x) (y) (x=y  (and Fx     Fy), not to be confused with the identity of indiscernibles.‘ in foot-
note by Kripke 1972, p.3
c
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‘From (ii) all that strictly follows about so-called ‘names’ in natural language is 
that either they are not rigid or true identities between them are necessary. Our 
intuitive idea of naming suggests that names are rigid, but I suppose that (...) such 
ordinary names must not be rigid.’  
(Kripke 1972, p.4) 
In the course of identifying the differences and connections between name 
and description, he refers to John Stuart Mill’s thesis ‘that names have deno-
tation but not connotation’ (Kripke 1972, p.26, on John Stuart Mill’s book A 
System of Logic). He sees this as a misconception and instead forwards the 
position of Frege and Russell who characterise proper names as ‘abbrevi-
ated’ or ‘disguised’ definite descriptions (Kripke 1972, p.27); in other words, 
a proper name, for example ‘Philipp’, is a camouflage for the sense which 
is associated with an exact description (‘Philipp is my brother’). Although 
this seems to cause imprecision in ordinary language, Kripke defends this 
alternative position by calling the associations linked to every name a ‘fam-
ily of descriptions’ (Kripke 1972, p.31). With this term he strengthens his 
argument with an idea from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, in 
which Wittgenstein exemplifies that in practice we always attach a group of 
possible uses to a name. Also the term family echoes Wittgenstein’s notion 
of ‘family resemblances’ and the language-game. In Wittgenstein’s example 
the name ‘Moses’ which takes on several functions in different contexts: the 
name refers in one statement to a historical figure, to a religious leader, then 
to a figurative collective name for a historical event or a character in the nar-
ration of the Bible. Altogether, despite the lack of one equivocal relation, the 
variety of connotations do not annul each other (#79). Similar, Kripke adds, 
is Searle’s argumentation in (Searle 1958, pp.166-173) that ‘the referent of a 
name is determined not by a single description but by some cluster or fam-
ily’ (Kripke 1972, p.31). 
In Caronia’s paper published on the conceptual artwork of Janez Janša, he 
lays out the history of this problem of identity and proper names in language 
philosophy. Caronia told me about an important detail of the work of Janez 
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Janša. Three colleague artists went through the formal process of changing 
their legal names into Janez Janša. As a trio bearing the same name, they 
realise large scale conceptual installations dealing with issues of naming and 
identity. Caronia argues with Frege to distinguish between Sinn (sense) and 
Bedeutung (reference or meaning). He explains that Frege 
‘(...) is led to assume as a paradigm of “signs” that function well those which have 
minimum extension (i.e. refer to one single object) and  maximum intension (the 
richness of properties, qualities, specifications that define univocally that single 
object): a well delimited and specified Bedeutung and a vast and rich Sinn.’ 
(Caronia, 2009, p.139) 
This distinction was already made in the chapter Image Vocabulary (p.124), 
where Caronia sketches the different role of memory for the repository of 
meanings activated in image as compared to language. In relation to rigid 
designators, Caronia summarises Kripke’s objective: 
‘(...) to free the proper name from any attempt to determine it through a descrip-
tion, and instead to classify it as a “rigid designator”, or a sign that designates the 
same object in every possible world it exists in; if that is not the case, the designa-
tor is “unrigid” or “accidental”.‘
(Caronia, 2009, p.141)
Caronia concludes the consequence of Kripke’s theory of proper names is 
that his concept of the rigid designator highlights the metaphysical side of 
the relationship between language and reality, between word and world. 
In Caronia’s view, Wittgenstein and Stein meet in the world of possibility, 
because language is real. Caronia notes that Kripke often refers to the saying 
by Bishop Butler: “Everything is what it is and not another thing.” 
‘If “everything is what it is”, language has no other task but to reflect the things “as 
they are”, and “possible worlds” are nothing but self-consistent universes, separated 
from each other and rigorously alternative. The possible does not mix with the real. 
The existence of “invariant” objects with regard to possible worlds reassures us of 
the stability of the world. The “rigidity” of Kripke’s conception extends, through 
designators, to all of reality, but, on the contrary, it is reality itself that sometimes 
reminds us how unstable it is and what role possibility plays within and around it.’ 
(Caronia, 2009, p.141)
Caronia’s conclusion opens up the view on the vast realm of a world reflected 
by words in this conception of language. Kripke’s idea, ‘the possible does not 
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mix with the real’, contrasts with the main hypothesis of a possible meet-
ing of Wittgenstein and Stein beyond reality. But, I argue, their lives have 
materialised in their literal works and so the possibility of their meeting lies 
in language. Within the maelstrom of coordinates for a possible meeting, 
Caronia also seems to allow possibility to have a de-stabilising effect on what 
we call reality, and thus returns a certain autonomy to language.
 How do Wittgenstein and Stein deal with the issue of proper names? 
The critic Marjorie Perloff summarises the perspective of Wittgenstein on 
name-words in relation to Gertrude Stein’s work:
‘From a Wittgensteinian perspective, such correspondence between word and 
thing, visual layout and verbal referent, reduces meaning to the process of naming. 
Words, Wittgenstein argues throughout the Investigations, are not to be viewed as 
pointers designating particular objects; their meaning depends on their function 
in the specific context of action we call the language-game. And Stein, as we have 
seen, was in this respect a thorough if unconscious Wittgensteinian: the substitu-
tion of the equal sign (=) for the word “is”, she would have posited, cannot change 
the fact that “is” sometimes means “equals” but sometimes not.’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.98) 
At this point it is useful to take a closer look at the way Wittgenstein and 
Stein have dealt with the issue of identity respectively. Naturally, Witt-
genstein’s fundamental ideas on names and referents reoccur often in the 
present research. In Stein’s case, identity and reference play a constitutive 
role in the very style of language she developed, which is based on repeti-
tion. Stein does not argue nor verify in her writing – she demonstrates that 
even at the edge of conventional syntax we are flexible in our understand-
ing of words in a particular context. Stein proves Wittgenstein’s concept of 
‘meaning as use’. 
‘For we say there isn’t any doubt that we understand the word, and on the other 
hand its meaning lies in its use. There is no doubt that I now want to play chess, 
but chess is the game it is in virtue of all its rules (and so on). Don’t I know, then, 
which game I want to play until I have played it? Or are all rules contained in my 
act of intending? ...’ 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, p.69, #197)
This hypothesis – that the meaning of a word is to be found in its use in 
language – is central to the entire research on the meeting between Ludwig 
and Gertrude in language. Perloff frames their overlapping perspectives 
1 Repetition itself is an important motive in language, especially the role of repeating referents, which how-
ever will be discussed merely indirectly in this research. 
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once more within Wittgenstein’s discussion of identity in the Philosophical 
Investigations. This comparison provides a useful context for Stein’s own 
‘experiments’ with language (Perloff 1996, p.92): 
“But isn’t the same at least the same?
We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity in the identity of a thing with 
itself. I feel like saying; “Here at any rate there can’t be a variety of interpretations. 
If you are seeing identity too.”
Then are two things the same when they are what one thing is? And how am I to 
apply what the one thing shows me to the case of two things?” 
(Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, #215)
‘(...)repeat the same and it is no longer the same. This commonsense discrimi-
nation forms the basis of Stein’s mode of repetition, a mode that is, after all, an 
extreme form of literalism.’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.92) 
Repetition plays a vital role in language. It helps to create and maintain con-
ventions and is an essential part of rule-following.1 
11. NAMING 
Naming, an artwork from 2009, was inspired by some of the most basic 
aspects of identity and reference in the language of everyday from this 
research. Several volunteers were invited to join an experimental set-up in 
Amsterdam. Each one sat isolated in a small sound-proof room, only fac-
ing a video camera, a photo camera and a microphone. During a period of 
twenty minutes, they were asked to name all people they had ever met. Each 
remembered person had to be pronounced by first name and surname and 
no other speaking was permitted. This way, the speech recorded consisted 
exclusively of names in the personal order given by the participant, inter-
rupted by silence. The recordings captured several layers of the experiment: 
strings of names were sound-recorded and transcribed into lists. 
The image recording devices captured video and still images. The video 
records the whole, often painfully slow and monotonous process and offers 
a glance at the interior tension each participant was exposed to. This work is 
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thus documented as video and photographic work. The photographs focus 
on the participant as an individual and a selection of the pictures creates a 
set of portraits. 
 Another part of the practical exercise is the feedback given by the 
participants. They all reported a high degree of concentration, interrupted 
by phases of dull emptiness and moments of black-out. They discovered 
similar strategies to fulfil the task which they all took surprisingly seriously. 
The exercise of naming became a personal affair. All participants reported 
the surprising force of the mental mechanisms: rather than being master 
of one’s memory, some commented, one could not steer and control the 
memory towards the desired people. The people’s names appeared often in  
irrational order, disregarding objective categories or preferences. In other 
words, although they tried the participants were hardly capable of structur-
ing the given names into categories such as ‘family members’, ‘loved ones’, 
‘colleagues’, ‘old schoolmates’. Many participants reported that it was difficult 
to think and speak simultaneously. Most of the participants also deplored 
the lost hierarchy of names although the names stood for people they knew, 
they loved or they disliked. Similarly, school-mates from primary school 
were recalled unfailingly, while significant acquaintances in later life were 
missing. Some of the most important friends, in one case the husband, had 
been forgotten. 
naming
Image 25a
Melzer: Naming, set-up in Amsterdam, 2009
Image 25b
Melzer: Naming, detail from set-up in Amsterdam, 
2009
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Image 26c
Melzer: Naming, participant Hanne Lippard, 
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 26a
Melzer: Naming, participant Hanne Lippard, 
native languages: English / norwegian
 
Image 26d
Melzer: Naming, participant Hanne Lippard, 
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 26b
Melzer: Naming, participant Hanne Lippard, 
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
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Image 27c
Melzer: Naming, participant Liam Tickner, 
Amsterdam, 2009
Image 27a
Melzer: Naming, participant Liam Tickner, 
native languages: English / German
 
Image 27d
Melzer: Naming, participant Liam Tickner, 
Amsterdam, 2009
Image 27b
Melzer: Naming, participant Liam Tickner, 
Amsterdam, 2009
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Image 28c
Melzer: Naming, participant Peter Sattler, 
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 28a
Melzer: Naming, participant Peter Sattler, 
native language: German
 
Image 28d
Melzer: Naming, participant Peter Sattler, 
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 28b
Melzer: Naming, participant Peter Sattler, 
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
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Image 29c
Melzer: Naming, participant Re’em Aharoni
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 29a
Melzer: Naming, participant Re’em Aharoni 
native language: hebrew   
Image 29d
Melzer: Naming, participant Re’em Aharoni
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 29b
Melzer: Naming, participant Re’em Aharoni 
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner 
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Image 30c
Melzer: Naming, participant Rutger Emmelkamp
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 30a
Melzer: Naming, participant Rutger Emmelkamp, 
native language: dutch 
 
Image 30d
Melzer: Naming, participant Rutger Emmelkamp
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 30b
Melzer: Naming, participant Rutger Emmelkamp
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
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Image 31c
Melzer: Naming, participant Katarzyna Szugajew
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image 31a
Melzer: Naming, participant Katarzyna Szugajew, 
mother-tongue: polish
 
Image 31d
Melzer: Naming, participant Katarzyna Szugajew
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
Image31b
Melzer: Naming, participant Katarzyna Szugajew
Amsterdam, 2009, photo: Liam Tickner
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Image 32a-b
Melzer: Naming, excerpts from a written version by anonymous participant. Zurich 2013
naming
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This art project highlights the subjective complexities linked to a person’s 
network of people (see chapter Network of People p.299). The selection of 
a small group of participants alludes to scientific conditions from psychol-
ogy or perception experiments. It does not result in representative data to 
support or refute a hypothesis, it is not a scientific but an artistic experi-
ment. It imports common formal set-ups from a ‘scientific’ practice into the 
artistic context. In psychology, interview situations are often used to test any 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between i.e. language and cognition.  
 The social psychologist Daniel Wegner has formulated the ‘ironic 
process theory’, a hypothesis concerning thought suppression (Wegner 
1994). Wegner described cognitive mechanisms concerning the impos-
sibility to suppress certain thoughts and the effect of a suppressed thought 
persistently returning (White Bear Effect, Wegner & Schneider 2003). The 
hypothesis is present in the participants feedback in Naming and in the 
typographic example Do not think of a red balloon on page 306.
 The participating language-users are vital for language-philo-
sophical questions to appear unprepared to contribute to these subjective 
vocabularies. In the field of conceptual arts, the project can host a variety of 
objectives, some of which some even the artist cannot anticipate. 
 The work Naming1 became a tool for introducing the subject of 
memory and naming to the participants and an art audience. In another 
context it can also function as a parlour game.  It travelled, with different 
groups of participants in several countries. This research contains a portrait 
series of the first version in Amsterdam (2009) and several written versions  
(2009 ongoing). 
 The previous discussion is the fundament for further steps in the 
research; from rigid designators we pass to their more adaptable relatives, 
floating signifiers (Lévi-Strauss) and shifters in language. The latter are verbal 
phenomena which are, on the contrary, extremely potent because of their 
lack of equivocal relations. It seems the more ambiguous they are the more 
powerful these words become.
1 The documentation of Naming in Amsterdam has been realised with assistance of photographer Liam 
Tickner and video artist Egle Budvytyte. 
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12. SHIFTING NAMES 
We have seen that defining the relationship between a name and its ‘refer-
ence’ is challenging. On the one hand there is the issue of what a name 
exactly designates and how it can stand for someone or something (identity). 
On the other hand we operate perpetually with words which lack a clear-
cut set of unvarying reference. The entire investigation into the relation of 
designator and designated, signifier and signified (de Saussure, 1916) deals 
with the issue of variety of reference. With Wittgenstein, the whole idea of 
a clear-cut set of reference got upgraded to the ‘meaning-as-use’–hypoth-
esis (Wittgenstein 1953, #43). But the current subchapter will amplify this 
hypothesis by turning our attention to words that function exceedingly well 
without any fixed reference at all. These are words which change their refer-
ence dependent on the context. Shifters are words which shift their denota-
tional meaning according to speaker, place and time of the utterance. 
 One pivotal observation made by anthropologists in the early 20th 
century concerned linguistic structures alive in the investigated linguistic 
society (Mauss, Lévi-Strauss): the impact of social structures on language. 
In anthropology, generally the role of language within a given community 
gained more prominence in theorizing social phenomena. The entire ques-
tion of reality became an issue of shifting perspective between one cultural 
perspective and another. Later, language and perception of reality was 
declared by Sapir and Whorf as interwoven as linguistic relativism states, as 
we have seen in chapter Universal vs Relative (see p.69). ‘Indeed, as early as 
1924’, the ethnologist and anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss writes in his 
short but influential essay on the sociologist Marcel Mauss, who ‘defined 
social life (...) as a “world of symbolic relationships” (Lévi-Strauss 1950, 
p.10-11). Mauss was praised for his insightful hypothesis that we inhabit a 
symbolic reality. Lévi-Strauss supports this concept, that outside phenomena 
do not (need to) be translated into symbols, but rather we should reverse the 
changing reference
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act of interpretation: the extrinsic world (needs) to be reduced to the inher-
ent symbolic system at work (Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.37). Lévi-Strauss explains,
 
‘Like language,’ ‘the social is an autonomous reality (the same one, moreover); sym-
bols are more real than what they symbolise, the signifier precedes and determines 
the signified. We will encounter this problem again in connection with mana.’ 
(Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.37)
 Examining linguistic phenomena has gradually promised to give ac-
cess to the social reality of people and their structure of thinking. The hope 
was to fully grasp the linguistic implications of an expression that could 
mirror the conception of reality, one that reflects the way one thinks about 
the world. The interaction between the social, conceptual and the linguistic 
structure(s) is accurately described in a few cases in indigenous languages 
which illustrate the great flexibility of meaning of a word, depending on 
its use and context. Lévi-Strauss identifies Mauss’s concept of the analogies 
between social and linguistic structures with reference to floating signifiers 
which can express a variety of, even contradictions, states:  
‘In other words, accepting the inspiration of Mauss’s precept that all social phe-
nomena can be assimilated to language, I see in mana, wakan, orenda, and other 
notions of the same type [all are floating signifiers], the conscious expression of a 
semantic function, whose role is to enable symbolic thinking to operate despite the 
contradiction inherent in it. [...] ‘ 
(Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.63) 
Lévi-Strauss compares these notions with algebraic symbols which perform 
as vague signifiers. They are themselves emptied of meaning and thus avail-
able for ‘any meaning at all’ (Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.56): 
‘Floating signifiers operate entirely as filler medium for the gap between the signi-
fier and the signified, or more exactly, to signal the fact that in such a circum-
stance, on such an occasion, or in such one of their manifestations, a relationship 
of non-equivalence (16) becomes established between signifier and signified, to the 
detriment of the prior complementary relationship.’ 
(Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.56)
 
These examples laid down here for a number of reasons: the present re-
search, engages in a Wittgensteinian perspective on meaning as context-
dependent use. This perspective is challenged with visual artistic work. The 
social phenomena 
held in language
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work of Gertrude Stein developed a dimension in her writing which partly 
succeeds in showing this notion of creating meaning-as-practice and mak-
ing sense on the edge of conventional meaning. In this way she augments 
Wittgenstein’s idea of the language-game and puts it into practice, tests 
its limits on her own language and the reader’s. Stein’s work represents an 
experimental test of Wittgenstein’s meaning-as-use hypothesis. She puts his 
ideas into practice. One consequence of this claim is that the perspectives 
forwarded by Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, Sapir and Whorf have a lot in common 
with Wittgenstein and Stein. They continue to be relevant today, where 
cognitive science and linguistics have become interested in the relationship 
between social and linguistic structures, as we will encounter later with the 
contrastive approach (see chapters CCL as Poetic Method, p.283, and Con-
trasting corpora, p.285). This approach might then lead to new methods for 
investigating the works of the philosopher Wittgenstein and writer Stein. 
 Language of the everyday reveals some of the social background 
and conceptual frameworks a speaker operates from. In contact with foreign 
languages we can observe the relationships between concept and language 
otherwise too close to us in our native language. The Finnish vocable matala 
means low (as a flying aeroplane) as well as shallow (as a pond). Through 
differences of word-concept relations, we can empathise with the subtly 
shifted world-view of the linguistic other. Mauss describes languages which 
operate with very different conceptual schemes and warns us not to expect 
identical concepts in all languages. For example in Papuan and Melanesian 
there is no concept for antithesis. 
‘ “Papuan and Melanesian”, he [Mauss] notes, “have only one word to designate 
buying and selling, lending and borrowing. Antithetical operations are expressed 
by the same word.”(5) 
(Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.49 quoting Mauss)
  
meaning from 
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In the present investigation the focus lies on vocabularies and words which 
shift meaning according to the context of their use. Floating signifiers en-
chant us with their simplicity and vigour. 
 A vivid example is the Algonquian word ‘manitou’, which designates 
everything ‘which does not yet have a common name, which is unfamiliar’ 
(Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.54 quoting Mauss). In Mauss’ Equisses he quotes an 
observation by Father Thavenet on this word, who gives the example of a 
woman who is afraid of a thing she does not know. She calls it ‘manitou’. The 
other people know what it is and tell her its name: salamander. Everything 
which is unknown, unseen or wonderful is called ‘manitou’.
 Another effective example of a floating signifier is the Polynesian 
term ‘mana’. Mauss examines it carefully and explains that mana can adapt 
to all possible semantic situations: it can designate ‘force and action; quality 
and state; substantive, adjective and verb all at once; abstract and concrete; 
omnipresent and localised.‘ (Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.63- 64 quoting Mauss).  
Both examples can be seen as words which are Speech-acts: it is the action of 
the transaction which is the point here.
 Do such magic words exist in the SAE languages1? Another striking 
example by Lévi-Strauss is a woman asking about an unknown fabric (red 
flannel) “What is the red animal?”, which shows that textile is understood 
as animal skin. Lévi-Strauss calls such transfers ‘assimilations’ (Lévi-Strauss 
1950, p.55) and compares them to shifts in our language. When we want to 
refer to 
‘(...) an unknown object, or one whose function is unclear, or whose effectiveness 
amazes us, by the French terms truc or machin. Behind machin is machine, and, 
further back, the idea of force or power. As for truc, the etymologists derive it 
from a medieval term which signifies the lucky move in games of skill or games of 
chance (...)’ 
(Mauss quoted by Lévi-Strauss 1950, p.55). 
We employ such magic words whenever we lack a proper name or long to 
express our amazement. When we look closely we notice that SAE languages 
1 Whorf: standard average european languages
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are full of small words which continuously shift from one target of designa-
tion to another. These words are shifters, atomic words with high frequency 
in ordinary language, like pronouns or designators for space and time. 
In linguistics, the phenomenon of context-related meaning of a word or 
phrase is called ‘deixis’. This is clarified as:
‘Words which have a fixed semantic meaning, but have a denotational meaning 
that constantly changes depending on time and/or place, are deictic. A word or 
phrase whose meaning requires this contextual information — for example, Eng-
lish pronouns — is said to be deictic.’ 1 
Personal pronouns – words like ‘you’ and ‘I’ – are shifters and so are words 
like ‘here’ and ‘now’ which require contextual information to complete their 
function as referents. The term shifter was introduced by Danish linguist 
Otto Jespersen and picked up by the Russian linguist and literary theorist 
Roman Jakobson. Both explain this linguistic mechanism in reference to a 
corresponding ‘message’ to contextualise the meaning 2. Yet the structuralist 
Jakobson opposed the concept of shifters lacking a constant general meaning 
and argued that ‘the personal pronoun “I” always means “the person utter-
ing I”. This makes the shifter a “symbol.” ‘ (Jakobson 1957). In other words, 
apart from their indexical function, Jakobson assigns a symbolic function to 
the role of shifters (Jakobson 1957). Jakobson defined the shifter as an in-
dexical symbol, while his follower Jacques Lacan defined it as indexical sig-
nifier3. From there Jakobson develops possible scenarios for grammar being 
essentially context-free and discusses the role of the signifier for a statement 
and the index for an enunciation.4 Apart from Jakobson’s analysis of shifters, 
his views on the relationship between art and science will be again relevant a 
little later (see p.154). 
 First, the position of Stein and Wittgenstein regarding the shifters in 
language will be explained. In her comparison of modes from Futurism with 
Gertrude Stein’s work, Marjorie Perloff adds that 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deixis accessed October 2010 
2 http://nosubject.com/Shifter accessed again 11 August 2011
3 http://nosubject.com/Shifter, accessed 5 October 2010 
4 http://nosubject.com/Shifter, accessed 5 October 2010
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‘(...) Stein wholly subverts the paratactic mode of Futurism (or, for that matter, Im-
agism and Vorticism), using syntactic context and impersonal pronouns (“They,” 
“this,” “he,” “it,” “What”) in a series of short, staccato sentences that, far from creat-
ing a constellation of revelatory images, undercut one another. The technique is to 
take ordinary language (“We said we have it. We will take it to Paris. Please let us 
take everything”) and create a “narrative” in which nothing really changes except 
your own “Capacity to see something as something” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.213)’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.109)
  
We will return to notion of the capacity to see something as something with 
the famous duck-rabbit by Jastrow (see p.315). In her analysis of poetic strat-
egies that utilise language-games, Perloff underlines the potential confusion 
caused by shifters – at least for non-native speakers –, because there are no 
fixed referents (Perloff, 1996, p.88). Stein plays with the possibilities of shift-
ing as a poetic act in language: shifting referent means shifting attention. A 
‘you’ detached from any context is, says Perloff, ‘continually shifting from 
self to lover to friend to reader–a reader who cannot know what language-
game is being played. (...)’ (Perloff 1996, p.205). This uncertainty provides 
the possibility for poetic language to function on the border with image (see 
Secrets in Visual Works, p.365). In poetic works, the repository of verbal and 
visual language overlap, like they often do in metaphors. Also deictic formu-
las enable a given supply of meaning to shift from one form to the other.  
 Wittgenstein himself explains deictic phenomena as follows: 
‘ “I” is not the name of a person, nor ‘here’ of a place, and ‘this’ is not a name. But 
they are connected with names. Names are explained by means of them. (...)’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #410)
He adds that ‘It is also true that it is characteristic of physics not to use 
these words’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, #410) and thus opens a perspective on 
the distinction between ordinary, poetic or scientific modes of expres-
sion. In this context it is useful to examine more closely the peculiar style 
of Wittgenstein’s writing. Consciously avoiding the usual academic jargon 
(Monk 1990), Wittgenstein challenges language conventions by outlining 
short samples of situations in ordinary language. In his manner, he suggests 
constellations which seem simple and dense, which he often unravels with a 
Wittgenstein: 
shifters in science
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game of question and answer. In his writing, Wittgenstein creates a context 
of the words in question to be tested in. As only one of his books (Tractatus 
Logico Philosophicus, 1922) was published during his life-time and the sec-
ond (Philosophical Investigations, 1953) was prepared by him for publication 
and yet came out posthumously, much of the literature currently available 
consists of preparatory notes and rewritten fragments which often repeat, 
complement or challenge the authorised publications. Perloff claims that 
Wittgenstein’s method of writing in the Philosophical Investigations, 
‘(...)should actually be looked at as a single, ongoing, revisionary composition. 
Revisionary in both senses: Wittgenstein repeatedly draws on the same corpus, 
revising and adjusting his examples so as to make meaning as precise as possible, 
and revisionary in the sense of inventing a new way of “doing” philosophy that is 
no longer quite philosophy. (...)’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.65) 
Perloff again points out the actions and transactions in language: the words 
are traded within speech-acts. She reminds us of the strong stance taken by 
Wittgenstein on the only proper practice of philosophy: 
‘I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought re-
ally to be written only as form of poetry.‘ 
(Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 1933-34 /1980, p.24) 
‘Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefasst zu haben, 
indem ich sagte:  Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten.’  
(Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p.24)
Ezra Pound noted that the German verb ‘dichten’ (to verse) fascinated lexi-
cographers like Basil Bunting, who ‘has rendered it by the Italian verb “to 
condense” ‘ (Pound 1951, p.36).
 
‘Dichten = condensare’
The examination of language in its poetic and creative dimensions fascinated 
Roman Jakobson, who inspired new views on the riddle of language. He 
hoped to find a solution to this riddle looking at art (especially of the 1920’s) 
philosophy as 
poetry
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and poetic language 1. He also conceived there was no strict borderline 
between art and science. Jakobson, it is commonly believed, apprehended it 
an advantage of poetry not to claim logical truth value, because it can reveal 
the functional perfection of language through the very act of speech. Poetry 
is, for Jakobson, the highest form of language. A good sentence – even if 
beyond the conventions of grammar (Stein) – or a clear image, can comple-
ment the quest for the core of language. It may be a detour, as it may double 
or distort literal meaning; but it shows aspects ‘many of which are either un-
translatable or else require so much explanation as to be tedious.’ (Foucault 
1983, p.11, translators introduction by James Harkness). 
13. SHIFTERS’ ODE
In the work Shifters’ Ode (2010), the term shifter is brought to an art public, 
a homage to shifters in language. Shifters are words, which we use constant-
ly, but which change or shift their denotational meaning depending on the 
context, time and place. 
 As we have seen in the section on Magritte it is possible and some-
times even desirable to dissect a visual artistic work to its maximum by anal-
ysis of all employed elements and references. It is important for any valid 
statement to know, and sometimes to name, the conventions of the image, 
the implications of technique and time period of creation, etc. When images 
act as arguments in the quest into meaning, they should also be interrogated 
and analysed. Not always, however, it is necessary to name and decode all 
underlying references for the image to move a lever to communicate the 
desired message: conventions not only regulate verbal language, they also 
order and facilitate our habits of seeing (Berger 1972/1990 and Staniszewski 
1995). Deliberate word choices make poetry dense and effective. Deliberate 
choices of visual elements, of form, colour and material enable visual work 
to do the same. In the conceptual work within this research the key to com-
1 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Jakobson#Zum_Verhältnis_von_Kunst_und_Wissenschaft, 
accessed August 11 2011
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Cup>, accessed 9 December 2011
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municability lies in picking the appropriate object or conventional structure 
to reach this goal. 
 Similar to words, objects also have conventional meanings. Every 
ordinary object has – because it is part of everyday experience – an inherent 
subtext of conventional use, similar to the meaning of words which depend 
on use in everyday language (Wittgenstein, 1953). We are reminded of 
Magritte’s iconographic image riddles (see chapter Image Vocabulary, p.120) 
in which a painted egg, for instance, encodes many possible significations: 
the beginning, the source, the shelter, life, death, identity, and so forth (see 
Double Self-portrait, 1936, by René Magritte, see p.117). Different objects 
carry different subtexts and these subtexts change meaning (in the Fregian 
sense of Bedeutung, see p.161) according to different time periods and cul-
tural contexts. Different objects, like different words, know various degrees 
of abundance – universal symbols (like an egg) imply more universal sub-
texts or symbolic conventions than, say, a cup. The word cup may signify an 
ordinary coffee cup or a trophy – the object itself, or the reproduction of it 
as image, makes the subtext accessible. The visible object and its subtext gen-
erate a particular context, a cultural, social or historical background which 
influences its interpretation. In the context of visual art, when we say cup we 
are reminded of the famous surrealist work by Meret Oppenheim, a tea cup 
covered with fur, titled Object: Fur Breakfast from 1936. 
 In the context of sports competitions, a challenge cup travels from 
one season’s winner to the next. Often, its base is used to engrave the subse-
quent champion’s name. My supervisor Derrick de Kerckhove pointed out to 
me the extreme form of such a trophy, the Stanley Cup, which includes the 
names of ‘all of the winning players, coaches, management, and club staff 
engraved on its chalice.’1 
 The challenge cup is a symbol for the winner (a single player or a 
club or team) and identifies that winner in the specific context of time and 
space. Its current location and its temporary owner signify the present state 
of reference. In some SAE languages, translation of challenge cup reveals its 
sub-text of objects
sub-text of a cup:
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function of moving from winner to winner: in German the Wanderpokal 
literally means ‘hiking trophy’, in Dutch it is called wisselbeker, the shifting 
cup. Cups thus embody the characteristics of  shifters described above. In 
the light of this research, the autonomous visual work Shifters’ Ode (2010) 
connects the verbal features of shifters or indexical symbols (Jakobson 1957) 
with the visual conventions inherent in the exposed objects. A set of com-
mon shifters in several SAE languages (English, German, Dutch, French, 
Spanish, Italian) has been realised as engravings on the base of several 
classically shaped trophies. The entire collection of these cups seems to be a 
repository of the shifters we use all the time, mostly unnoticed. On the one 
hand, this is a simple analogy for celebrating the potentiality of these special 
words. On the other hand, every single word-trophy bears its meaning 
according to the specific context, situation and reader. Isolate one cup and 
place it on your desk and its meaning will have already shifted.
shifters’ ode
Image 33
Premier Cup Stanley, 1893
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Cup>, 
accessed 9 December 2011
Image 34
Stanley Cup Today
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Cup>,
 accessed 9 December 2011
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Image 35c
Melzer: Shifters’ Ode, TODAY,  2010 
photo: Elisabeth Real
Image 35a
Melzer: Shifters’ Ode, I, 2010 
photo: Elisabeth Real
Image 35d
Melzer: Shifters’ Ode, TOMORROW, 2010 
photo: Elisabeth Real
Image 35b
Melzer: Shifters’ Ode, NOW, 2010 
photo: Elisabeth Real
now
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Image 35e
Melzer: Shifters’ Ode, shifters in English, German, French, Italian, 2010 photo: Elisabeth Real
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Image 35g
Melzer: Shifters’ Ode, shifters in English, German, French, Italian, 2010 photo: Elisabeth Real
Image 35f
Melzer: Shifters’ Ode, I, NOW, HERE, TOMORROW, THERE, YOU, TODAY,  2010 photo: Elisabeth Real
14. WHAT DO YOU MEAN?
The starting point for the role of words as designators in this research was 
the relationship between a name and its reference. Singular words which 
designate something: red, this, I were discussed. The methodology of this re-
search is based on vocabularies. But does reference reside in the single words 
of the vocabulary we use? The American language philosopher John R. 
Searle reminds us that ‘sentences, not words, are used to say things’ (Searle 
1969, p.25). He interprets Gottlob Frege’s statement ‘Nur im Zusammenhang 
eines Satzes bedeuten Wörter etwas.’ (Frege 1884, p.73) as such that ’only in 
the context of a sentence do words have reference –‘  (Searle 1969, p.25, my 
italics)1. 
 Although the relationship of a word to an object can be described, 
how does it work to 
‘(...) mean or intend a particular object to the exclusion of all others? Some facts 
incline us to think that it is a movement of the soul–but can I intend just one 
particular object independent of any description or other form of identification I 
could make of it?’ 
(Searle 1969, p.87) 
Searle examined problems of identification and reference in relation to the 
Speech Act Theory of his teacher J.L.Austin and others like Paul Grice. In 
his major work ‘Speech Acts’, he declares that ‘reference is a speech act, and 
speech acts are performed by speakers in uttering words, not by words.’ 
(Searle 1969, p.28). He attempts to explain the notion of reference by fram-
ing them to abbreviations of pointing expressions: singular referring expres-
sions, like personal pronouns (‘I’, ‘you’), proper names for people and cities, 
and descriptions such as ‘your copy of today’s newspaper’ or ‘the lady living 
on the ground floor’. Everything else, every identification of activity, proce-
dure, occurrence or thing he calls a referring expression. 
‘Referring expressions point to particular things; they answer the questions 
“Who?” “What?” “Which?”.’ 
(Searle 1969, p.26-27) 
1 Also the language philosopher Humboldt (1903/1967) states this similarly: “Die Sprache liegt nur in der 
verbundenen Rede, Grammatik und Wörterbuch sind kaum ihrem todten Gerippe zu vergleichen.” (Krämer 
& König 2002). “Language lies only in connected speech, grammar and dictionary are not even comparable 
to its bones.” (my translation)
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What do you mean? or: What is meant by this notion of pointing? Searle has 
been praised for his later work Mind, Language and Society, for his ability 
to condense his life-long theory in a clear ‘well-written’ style1. He managed 
to convey general problems of philosophy in concise and simple terms. It 
is this simplicity, and his writing, that motivates the accessible style of this 
research. When we ask ourselves, what exactly is meant by this ‘pointing’ or 
what is it to ‘mean’ something, Searle points out that in language we often 
fail when challenged to phrase what we know. He calls this the difficulty ’of 
converting knowing how into knowing that’ (Searle 1969, p.14, my italics). 
Even if we know ‘in one important sense’ (Searle 1969, p.14) what words like 
‘cause’, ‘intend’ or ‘mean’ mean in ordinary language, we cannot easily de-
clare what they mean. We can, for instance, try to find metaphorical expres-
sions to communicate an object we put our attention to. For attention, Searle 
uses the metaphor of a searchlight: 
‘Attention is like a light that I can shift from one part of my conscious field to 
another.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.78) 
This shifting of attention can be compared with the same experience of lin-
guistic shifters and floating signifiers (see Shifting Names, p.147). The point-
ing gesture is even physically present if I say “this” and point with a slight 
movement of the head or hand in the direction of the object I intended to 
identify. The gestures have survived in our own everyday communication 
as a fundamental, yet culturally shifting, code. One movement of the hand 
can express a large variety of significations which could replace sentences: 
appeals (“come closer”), orders (“do this now”), rejection (“go away”) and 
so forth. The significance of gesture and nonverbal code for explaining the 
path which human communication took – and with that the development of 
verbal communication – is undisputed. The linguist Noam Chomsky (Dub-
lin speech 2013) has called our attention to the difference between language 
and communication: we communicate a lot using nonverbal codes. We state 
things even by the way we move and dress.
1 backcover on reprint of Searle 1999, comment by Owen Flanagan, James b. Duke professor of 
philosophy, Duke University
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But what is it to mean something? What role does the intention of the agent 
play, when they talk or act? How does Searle’s notion of intentionality and 
institutions help us to understand the faculty of language? And what does he 
owe to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language? 
‘And Ludwig Wittgenstein, the most influential philosopher of the twentieth 
century, is taken by many to have shown that our discourse is a series of mutually 
untranslatable and incommensurable language games. We are not engaged in one 
big language game, in which there are universal standards of rationality and eve-
rything is intelligible to everybody, but in a series of smaller language games, each 
with its own inner standards of intelligibility.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.4) 
From here, the argument splits: In the upcoming section, the discussion 
plunges into the background of Wittgenstein (and Stein) as former citizens 
of fin-de-siecle Vienna. Wittgenstein’s work will be regarded as ethically mo-
tivated, seen in the continuum of Viennese cultural debate on language and 
detached from the Anglo-Saxon tradition. After which, both paths reunite 
in an attempt to reconcile the ‘ethical’ and ‘logical’ reading of Wittgenstein’s 
work (see Language Attributes, p.171).
‘A common mistake in philosophy is to suppose there must be a right and un-
equivocal answer to such questions, or worse yet, to suppose that unless there is a 
right and unequivocal answer, the concept of referring is a worthless concept.’ 
(Searle 1969, p.28)
15. VIENNESE ROOTS
In the current section it is necessary to return to the interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy by his successors – and from there to the funda-
mentally different understanding of his writings when seen in the context of 
his Viennese background. Philosophers like Searle, Grice and Austin have 
approached the notion of meaning partially in the light of Wittgenstein’s 
heritage. In much of their thinking, rules are central topics and the relation-
ship with elements of what Wittgenstein characterised as ‘language-games’ 
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are present to various degrees. Drawing attention to Wittgenstein’s Viennese 
background is not to denigrate the Anglo-Saxon tradition of interpreting 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but it is a shift of attention in representing his 
ideas.1   
 In the course of this research work, many attributes of ‘the lives’ of 
Ludwig and Gertrude have been compared. ‘The lives’ is put in quotation 
marks in order to stress the vague reference of this term. What word could 
be more complex and more arbitrary than this? A more detailed discussion 
of this issue is given in the section on Auto/Biography (p.220), dealing with 
concepts such as biography, heritage, lifework and posthumous classifica-
tion.  
 The question posed about the meeting of the two, Wittgenstein 
and Stein, has its ‘context of discovery’ (Hoyningen 1987), on the intuitive 
level, based on the subjective experience of their language. Thereafter, facts 
and details gathered from relevant literature have supported the thesis by 
providing significant boundary points between the two. Both have roots in 
Hapsburg Vienna; in 1875, Stein came from the USA to Vienna and spend 
her childhood with her family who lived the ‘comfortable, correct life of the 
prosperous middle-class’ (Hobhouse 1975, p.3). Wittgenstein was born in 
Vienna and left only as a nineteen-year-old in 1908 to study aeronautics in 
Manchester (Monk 1990, p.28). There he was ‘exposed to a rigorous training 
in the mathematics and physical theory of men like Heinrich Hertz and Lud-
wig Boltzmannn‘ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.29). Before that he was brought 
up in the fashion of wealthy Viennese families, which included education in 
music and the arts. 
 Even in his later years he cleaved to the literary influence of his early 
days, exerted by people such as Karl Kraus and Fritz Mauthner. The promi-
nent role of Viennese culture for Wittgenstein has long been neglected. It is 
possible, that the preference for classifying Wittgenstein as a British analyti-
cal philosopher has also obstructed the appreciation of the poetic charge of 
his work. 
1 It has been discussed vidvidly with Prof.Antonio Caronia, whether the common interpretation of Wittgenstein 
as a logician in the British tradition, which is still held by philosophers alive like J.R.Searle, can be upheld. We 
persistently ask ourselves, whether Searle’s prioritization of intentionality helps to solve open questions in Witt-
genstein’s philosophical work. And how Wittgenstein’s perseverance in ethical matters fits into this picture.
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It has been shown in several outstanding works that the poetic charge of 
Wittgenstein’s work and its relationship to contemporary movements in 
arts and culture cannot be disregarded any longer (Perloff 1996 and 2003,   
Janik&Toulmin 1996). The impact of Wittgenstein’s work has spread out 
from the early appreciation of his work in UK, where it was recognised first. 
Nevertheless, he cannot be regarded simply and misleadingly as an analyti-
cal philosopher in the Anglo-Saxon tradition who took over and overshad-
owed (amongst others) his teachers Russell and Moore, and doing so laid 
the basis for the Speech Act Theory and others to come. In the course of this 
research it emerged how one-dimensional an interpretation of Wittgen-
stein’s work is, if one loses sight of Wittgenstein’s Viennese roots (Perloff 
2003, Janik&Toulmin, 1996). In their remarkable analysis of the close bond 
between Wittgenstein’s culture of origin and his philosophical work, Janik 
and Toulmin give a precise account of the influence of Viennese culture onto 
Wittgenstein’s ideas. They criticise the fact, that: 
‘Wittgenstein’s writings have commonly been viewed as contributions to the 
development of either twentieth-century mathematical logic or British analytical 
philosophy. His personal associations with Russell and Frege, G.E.Moore and John 
Wisdom, have overshadowed everything else in his cultural origins and intellectual 
concerns. (...)’ 
(Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.23)
The authors argue, that ‘paradoxes and inconsistencies distort our view of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, both as a man and as a philosopher.’ (Janik&Toulmin 
1996, p.19).  On the social, as much as on the intellectual and moral plane, 
they characterise Wittgenstein as thin-skinned and eccentric with an unusu-
ally strict and acute moral attitude. Nevertheless, his fellows in Cambridge 
ignored his affectations and abnormalities and praised him for the incom-
parable input ‘to the development of English philosophy.’ (Janik&Toulmin 
1996, p.20). Janik and Toulmin even go as far as to state that the Anglo-Sax-
on interpretation has lead to a major misunderstanding of his ethical point-
of-view and moral philosophy, simply because his audience in England had 
no close insight into the discourse which was going on between pre-World 
War One Viennese intellectuals. Moreover, they hold Russell’s introduction 
misunderstanding 
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to the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus responsible for this misunderstanding. 
Despite the fact that Wittgenstein himself considered not publishing the 
book with the introduction by Russell because he considered it ‘mislead-
ing’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.24), the English audience has ‘continued to 
consider it an investigation of the logic of language, with certain curious 
implications about values (..).’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.24). This discrepancy 
in understanding the intention of the Tractatus results in either an ‘ethical’ 
interpretation or a ‘logical’ one (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.24). Consequently 
the authors of Wittgenstein’s Vienna focus on  the crucial question of what 
philosophical problems Wittgenstein already had in mind, before he got in 
touch with Frege and Russell (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.28, my italics). They 
answer this in detail with reference to the special cultural and intellectual 
milieu of the late Hapsburg Vienna. Similarly, they sustain their thesis with 
reference to Austrian companions of Wittgenstein who affirm that all his 
attempts had a moral motivation. Closest to Wittgenstein was Paul Engel-
mann, who indicated a typical misconception:  
‘ “A whole generation of disciplines was able to take Wittgenstein as a positivist, 
because he has something of enormous importance in common with the positiv-
ists: he draws the line between what we can speak about and what we must be 
silent about just as they do. The difference is only they have nothing to be silent 
about. Positivism holds–and this is its essence–that what we can speak about is all 
that matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really 
matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about.” ‘
[Engelmann, Letters from Wittgenstein, p.97]‘ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.220). 
The distance between what ‘we can say’ and ‘what can be shown’ is of major 
relevance to this research. It refers also to the successful book by the histori-
ans and sociologists of science Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer about the 
history of experimentation (Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 1985)1. Shapin and 
Shaffer relate the conditions which came to define  experimental methods as 
a means of establishing truth. It is this central distinction which facilitates a 
useful model for the correspondence between scientific and artistic exer-
cises. They are not each other’s antagonists; they operate in different areas of 
language. 
1 I owe this link to Leila Peacock. 
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This passage from the things we can talk about, to the zone ‘we must be 
silent about’ (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, 1922, last para-
graph) is itself excluded from verbal analysis. We sense this transfer when 
confronted with a deliberate artwork. 
 What, then, were major influences on Wittgenstein from the Vien-
nese scene? Janik and Toulmin show that the critique of language was an 
essential point of discourse in Vienna at that time. The relationship be-
tween medium and message, they suggest, had been vivid in the discussion 
amongst artists and intellectuals in early twentieth century Vienna long 
before Marshall McLuhan (1967) made these subjects popular in the later 
twentieth century (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.31). The Viennese discourse 
asked the question: ‘In what sense if any could music (for example), or 
painting, architecture, or everyday language, be regarded as a “represen-
tation”, or Darstellung?’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.30). Janik and Toulmin 
demonstrate that the idea expressed in the Tractatus about ‘representations’ 
or ‘pictures’ released by symbols, language and various forms of expression 
was thus not newly introduced by Wittgenstein himself, but readily present 
in the Vienna he had left for England. They continue that ‘Wittgenstein’s 
achievement, (...) was not to initiate this discussion, but to finally draw the 
threads together by providing a general and definitive analysis of these is-
sues involved.’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.30). It is perplexing, that the Vienna 
which was ostensibly well-prepared for Wittgenstein’s synthesising opus 
failed to provide a publisher for Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. Janik and 
Toulmin do not give an explanation why it was published first in England 
(Monk, 1990), despite their claim that the Viennese audience was better pre-
pared for this work. Possibly with the breakout of the First World War and 
the breakdown of Hapsburg Vienna is what made this undertaking impos-
sible.
 However, it is a convincing thesis that as an intellectual and artist in 
Vienna at that time generally ‘one had to face the problem of the nature and 
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limits of language, expression and communication.’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, 
p.117).  
 It is Wittgenstein’s close friend Engelmann, who amongst others, 
acknowledges the strong intellectual influence exerted on Wittgenstein 
by the writer Karl Kraus and the novelist and critic Fritz Mauthner. Kraus 
had been one of the most important public voices in Vienna, a journalist 
and critic of the press and editor of the journal Die Fackel. One of his key 
concerns was language which was exercised and examined from the small-
est detail in punctuation to the manifest power of public speech in politics 
(Janik&Toulmin 1996). Kraus established the idea that language, ‘bears 
within itself all the signs one needs to understand the moral and ethical 
quality of that statement and of him who made it. Conversely, it is necessary 
to read a statement in a way that is supremely sensitive to all its linguistic 
qualities, in order to discover the truth.’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.90 quoting 
source 48). 
Mauthner, on the other hand, is known for an aphorism which heralds the 
tone for the Tractatus: 
‘Nur was ihr in Worte fassen könnt, könnt ihr denken.’ 
(Mauthner in Janik&Toulmin, 1996, p.120)
Wittgenstein himself mentions (and corrects) him in the Tractatus:
‘Alle Philosophie ist Sprachkritik. Allerdings nicht im Sinne Mauthners.’
(Wittgenstein 1922, Tractatus, # 4.0031) 
Mauthner was a dedicated nominalist and as such was suspicious of the 
human ability to have direct access to the world. He represented a form of 
philosophical scepticism that stemmed from a critique of language. Ac-
cording to Mauthner, language always mediates and influences our access 
to reality.  He understood metaphorical language as the main instrument of 
everyday language as well as philosophical language, which he claimed to 
Kraus, Mauthner 
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be merely a refined form of ordinary language. In Mauthners view, ‘names 
are at best metaphors for what the senses perceive.’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, 
p.122). His perspective on language gave way to the concept that ordinary 
forms of language and thought were embedded into experiences from our 
senses. The ‘limits or boundaries of the “reason” were thus, implicitly, the 
limits or boundaries of representation and language also.’ (Janik&Toulmin 
1996, p.122) Here, we notice the importance of language in relation to our 
capacity to have access to the world. This point echoes in Wittgenstein’s 
work as well as in the discussion of the issue by Searle (see chapter What 
do you mean p.163) and Whorf (p.75). Mauthner distinguishes cultures by 
their means of organisation, which most of all is constituted by language. 
Language of a culture holds, according to Mauthner, the shared memory of 
‘customs and practices’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.127). 
‘Hence Mauthner continually refers to language as the “common sensorium” of a 
culture.’ 
(Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.127)
Since Wittgenstein, these views on language have become commonplace. 
Mauthners formulations and the metaphors used by Janik and Toulmin al-
low a fresh perspective on Wittgenstein’s conception of language. Language, 
so Mauthner believes, mediates between acting individuals, but is also an 
obstacle for individuals gaining access to the world; it is not owned by any-
one but it exists in between us. 
‘Just as an ocean simultaneously separates and joins continents, so too language is 
at one and the same time bridge and barrier between men –“However, language is 
not common to two men, because plainly two men never conceive the same thing by 
words.”[Mauthner, Beiträge, Vol III, p.646] This is so because language is essentially 
metaphorical.(...) Not only language, but the whole of culture as well, is continually 
in a state of transformation. Nothing stands still.’
(Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.128, my italics) 
If language is ‘essentially metaphorical’, we may take the poetic charge in 
writing very seriously. Mauthner outlines the consequences this has for 
the status of words in the arts. He states that the metaphorical essence of 
language fits well to poetic expression, but is less suitable for science and 
philosophy. 
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‘It is impossible to arrest the conceptual content of words permanently. Therefore 
knowledge of the world through language is impossible. It is possible to arrest the 
motive content of words. Therefore art is possible through language, verbal art, 
poetry.’ 
[Mauthner, Beiträge, Vol I, p.92]
We are reminded of the important aphorism of Wittgenstein ‘Philosophie 
dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten’ (Wittgenstein in Culture and Value, p.24, 
see also chapter Shifting names p.159) and the position which Jakobson takes 
in the liaison between art and science 1, (Perloff 1996). Janik and Toulmin 
rephrase it as: 
‘Science too is, at best, poetry.’ 
(Janik&Toulmin, 1996, p.129) 
Further still, Mauthner continues, 
‘ “The laws of the natural sciences and the moral sciences then turn into social 
phenomena, the natural rules of the party game of human cognition. ” ‘
(Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.129, quoting Mauthner Beiträge, Vol I, p.34)’. 
The social aspects are central in the discussion of language as social phe-
nomena. Further implications of this are discussed in the section on the 
biographical junctions between Wittgenstein and Stein (Presence vs Absence,  
p.225, and Network of People, p.301) and, finally, in the meeting within their 
Shared Vocabulary resulting from the compared corpora (chapter CCL as 
Poetic Method p.285, and Shared Vocabulary p.303). 
 At this point, the discussion bifurcates: one the one side, we are 
lead back to the discourse on metaphor, its connection to the senses and the 
(visual) arts (see earlier chapter Figure of Speech p.63). The other path raises 
a puzzling attribute of language: that it is continuously in flux. Looking into 
the transformation of language can serve as useful detour to understand 
what language essentially is.
1 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Jakobson#Zum_Verhältnis_von_Kunst_und_Wissenschaft, 
accessed August 11 2011
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16. LANGUAGE ATTRIBUTES
What is language? This question remains difficult to answer. In the phi-
losophy of language, several definitions have been given and they are often 
formulated in an indirect way: 
‘How do words relate to the world? (...) How do words stand for things? What is 
the difference between a meaningful string of words and a meaningless one? (...) 
Such questions form the subject matter of the philosophy of language. (...)’ 
(Searle 1969, p.3)
When tackling the primary research question on the possibilities of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein meeting in language, this research deals 
primarily with ordinary language passing into poetic and visual language. 
It aims to offer selected models for explanation from the realm of language 
philosophy which attempt to explain what constitutes language, side by side 
with visual works which try to show key attributes of language and link 
them to our daily experiences of it. It is a challenging task to characterise 
language in its own modes of expression. Within this discourse, language is 
subject and vehicle at the same time (see Comparison, p.52). We need lan-
guage to discuss language. This fact sometimes obstructs a direct approach 
to its core. Then, slight detours can help to display language behaviour and 
avoid plain definitions. 
 The suggestion is that one can best observe features of language 
from the corner of one’s eye while looking at a specific issue. In this sense, 
the philosopher Rudi Keller characterises language attributes as a side-effect 
of analysing the transforming nature of language. Keller does so in giving 
a sound and accessible account of the factors which make language oper-
ate in flux. In his book Sprachwandel (1994, ‘language transformation’) he 
introduces a summary of central issues around language.  One of his aims 
is to reach a general public by using ordinary language and including basic 
statements wherever possible. Meanwhile, major aspects of the origin, use 
and mechanisms of language are revealed. 
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He alludes to the strong interdependencies between the genesis of language, 
its purposes, and its incessant change (Keller 1994, p.30). In this sense, he 
acknowledges that language ‘serves far more purposes than exchanging 
thoughts and making true statements about the world’ (Keller 1994, p.17, 
my translation). In his introduction, Keller manages to bundle major posi-
tions on the origins of language, alongside catchy phrases from philosophy 
of language like as Chomsky’s famous question ’Have you or have I created 
the English language?’ (Chomsky 1980/1981, p.18, Keller 1994, p.24). Quot-
ing Max Müller (1892, p.29) Keller adds: 
‘Not even the Bible claims that language was God-given. In the Bible1 it’s not the 
creator who gives names to all creatures, but Adam!’
Keller (1994)quoting Max Müller (1892, p.29, my translation, my footnote)
The issue of the origin of language is also discussed in Prof. Pier Luigi 
Capucci’s paper From Life to Life –The multiplicity of the Living (2008), which 
includes fascinating organic explanations of the development of speech 
organs in relationship to other human physiognomy. And the neuroscientist 
Prof. Roy Patterson has contributed research on the evolution of language 
and specifically on the relationship between communication sounds and the 
physical size of the speaker.2 
 Keller approaches the issue of language from a social point of view. 
He sees language as a collective phenomenon where intention is central, 
and that language changes all the time without its speakers intending any 
change. All communication, he states, means wanting to influence (Keller 
1994, p.20). He forwards body-based theories on the origins of language, 
ranging from simple body responses like blushing and sweating (‘Symptoms 
that can evoke similar effects as language signs.’ Keller 1994, p.38), to simple 
gestures like clapping hands to chase away birds (Keller 1994, p.46). One 
commonplace hypothesis is that human language evolved from animal com-
munication, like the expression of warning sounds. 
 When considering what kind of a structure language is, Keller char-
acterises language as belonging to the group of phenomena which are ‘the 
1 Genesis II, 19
2 Prof Roy Patterson was guest lecturer at University of Plymouth in November 2012 with the pres-
entation titled ‘Size Matters! The Size Information in Speech Sounds and a Procedure for Estimating 
Speaker Size’. http://psychology.plymouth.ac.uk/events-seminars/roy-patterson/
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result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.’ (Fergu-
son 1767, p.187 / 1904 p.171, Mandeville’s Paradox, quoted by Keller, 1994, 
p.58). The philosopher Adam Smith (1776) explained such phenomena with 
the so-called ‘Invisible hand’. 
‘An invisible-hand-explanation is a Conjectural History of phenomena, the (sum 
of) results of human action, but not the execution of a human plan.’ 
(Smith, An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776, 
quoted by Keller 1994, p.61) 
Both Smith – who gave supremacy to language – and Keller identify lan-
guage, along with law and the market, as ‘one of the institutions that make 
up human culture’ (Whitney quoted in Keller, 1994, p.79). ‘Communication 
and trade share the same underlying principle’ (Keller 1994, p.70, my trans-
lation), Keller concludes. Language, he specifies, is a conventional means of 
settling up or speeding up, refining or enabling to make the other under-
stand what one wants him to do (Keller 1994, p.71). Keller agrees, that the 
world we encounter can be characterised as natural phenomena or artefacts, 
yet he is not satisfied with the explanation that language belongs to either 
of the two and therefore suggests a threefold distinction as an alternative to 
this dichotomy:
‘First sort: things that are natural phenomena and which are not the aim of human 
action: walking upright, the language of bees, the weather, the alps.
Second sort: things that are artefacts and which are the aim of 
human action: the Cologne Dome, a cake, the ghetto in Soweto, the language 
Esperanto.
Third sort: things that are results of human action, but not their aim (as in inten-
tion): the inflation of the Dollar, the short-cut path over the lawn, the ghetto in 
Harlem, our language.’ 
(Keller 1994, p.85, my translation) 
The essential feature of this third sort lies in the combination of both causal 
production – as proper to natural phenomena, which are caused on a large 
scale by many users simultaneously – and an intentional act by an indi-
vidual, which is on a small scale comparable to the deliberate production of 
an artefact. Language, in other words, is ‘causally determined by a variety of 
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individual intentional acts, which at least partially serve similar intentions’ 
(Keller 1994, p.92, my translation). 
 These phenomena of the third sort are exactly the sort of phenom-
ena which Ferguson described above. They are what the philosopher Robert 
Nozick characterised as Invisible-hand-Theory, using Smith’s term. Nozick 
specifies that an Invisible-hand-explanation typically explains the emergenc-
es of social institutions and sociocultural structures such as money, norms, 
taste and language (Nozick, no date, p.32, in Keller 1994, p.97). 
 Also in terms of analogy, there has been general agreement: Keller 
refers to a comprehensible image for the development of language, which 
has already been employed by Fritz Mauthner. Mauthner, who had been a 
fundamental influence on the thinking of Wittgenstein before he went to 
England (Janik&Toulmin, 1996), has compared the emergence of language 
practices with the formation of a trail produced by many people taking a 
short-cut over the lawn1. He describes – step by step – how the inhabitants 
of a village contribute to the slowly but steadily emerging foot trail. ‘Every-
time’, he states, ‘the peasant lifts his leg, a psychological factor called either 
will or habit’ is responsible for this resulting path-structure. Just in the same 
way, he continues, each individual operates within the ‘movements of hu-
mans which we gather under the term language’. (Mauthner 1912/1982, p.93 
/ Keller, 1994, p.109/110, my translation). 
 In Searle’s discussion of the conditions which constitute Mind, 
Language and Society (1999), he also insists on the institutional character of 
language. He stresses the difference between phenomena which are depend-
ent on the human mind and those which are mind-independent. On the last 
point, the contemporary philosopher Alva Noë researches theory of per-
ception and consciousness and is recommended for further reading. Searle 
states trenchantly:
‘For example, money, property, marriage, wars, football games, and cocktail 
parties are all dependent for their existence on conscious human agents in a way 
that mountains, glaciers, and molecules are not.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.14)
1 The creation of a foot trail is a at the same time a common metaphor for a paradigm shift.
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Image 36 a 
Melzer: Room / Rudi Keller und Ludwig Wittgenstein in einem Raum (2013), site specific text 
installation based on quotes by Wittgenstein, Keller and Humbold, transparencies, needles, 
Museum Bärengasse Zurich, 2013. photo: Paul Brunner
Rudi says: ‘Communicating means first of all wanting to influence in a specific way.’ 
(Rudi Keller: Sprachwandel, 2.Auflage, UTB, Francke Verlag Tübingen/Basel, 1994, p.202. translation: Melzer) p.20
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Image 36b
Melzer: Room / Rudi Keller und Ludwig Wittgenstein in einem Raum (2013), site specific text 
installation based on quotes by Wittgenstein, Keller and Humbold, transparencies, needles, 
Museum Bärengasse Zurich, 2013. photo: Paul Brunner
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Image 36c
Melzer: Room / Rudi Keller und Ludwig Wittgenstein in einem Raum (2013), site specific text 
installation based on quotes by Wittgenstein, Keller and Humbold, transparencies, needles, 
Museum Bärengasse Zurich, 2013. photo: Paul Brunner
Ludwig says: ‘You could imagine his having learnt the rules of the game without ever having been shewn an actual piece.’ 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations, 1953, #31
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In this context, that springs from Keller’s introduction of a notion of  inten-
tion, Searle’s understanding of intentionality becomes relevant. He observes 
that there is an important link between the conscious human mind and 
our ability to make representations of the world to ourselves. This feature is 
‘possessed by beliefs and desires, hopes and fears, love and hate, pride and 
shame, as well as perception and intention. It is a feature that has a technical 
name in philosophy: “intentionality.” ’ (Searle 1999, p.64). In order to make 
this term accessible, he gives simple examples of what he calls collective 
intentionality. He reminds us that – even though the term is quite unhappy1 
–  that it is ordinary, practical and integral to our every day lives. 
‘Look at any football game, political rally, concert performance, college classroom, 
church service, or conversation, and you will see collective intentionality in action. 
(...) Whenever you have people cooperating, you have collective intentionality.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.120) 
All these examples given by Searle are variations on the list of language-
games given by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (#23). 
Forming and testing a hypothesis, Presenting the results of an experiment in tables 
and diagrams,  Making up a story; and reading it, Play-acting, Singing catches, 
Guessing riddles, Making a joke; telling it, Solving a problem in practical arith-
metic, Translating from one language into another, Asking, thanking, cursing, 
greeting, praying.
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #23)
An early work based on Wittgenstein’s writing was this stamp, produced 
in 2002, quoting the examples he gave of such institutionalised language-
games. Nearly all of our ordinary language behaviour is included here.
The level of cooperation may vary, as Searle remarks in his casual tone typi-
cal to his later work: 
 1 note Searle’s remark ‘Intentionality is an unfortunate word, and like a lot of unfortunate words in 
    philosophy, we owe it to the German-speaking philosophers.’ (Searle 1999, p.85)
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Image 36 d
Melzer: Room / Rudi Keller und Ludwig Wittgenstein in einem Raum (2013), site specific text 
installation based on quotes by Wittgenstein, Keller and Humbold, transparencies, needles, 
Museum Bärengasse Zurich, 2013. photo: Paul Brunner
Rudi says: ‘Most likely one cannot find two single people who share the exact same vocabulary.’ 
(Rudi Keller: Sprachwandel, 2.Auflage, UTB, Francke Verlag Tübingen/Basel, 1994, p.202. translation: Melzer) 
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‘If one man comes up behind another in a dark alley and hits him on the head, no 
collective intentionality is required. But for a prize fight, a wrestling match, a duel, 
or even an exchange of insults at a cocktail party, a level of cooperation is required. 
In order to be fighting at one level we have to be cooperating in having a fight at 
another level.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.120)
For Searle, intentionality lies at the root of ‘all linguistic meaning’: 
‘All linguistic meaning is derived from intentionality. ‘ 
(Searle 1999, p.93)
 
Consciousness and intentionality are, according to Searle, observer-inde-
pendent, although they are features of the mind. He has a strict concept of 
language as an external operational tool, which does not constitute reality. 
He specifies that ‘intentional states (...) do not depend on what anyone out-
side of me thinks. They are not, like sentences of language, only the things 
they are because outsiders think that is what they are.’ (Searle 1999, p.94) 
At this point, Searle’s idea of language and reality veers off to an absolute 
supremacy of the mind over language. He repeats persistently that the ‘in-
tentionality of language already depends on the intentionality of the mind’ 
(Searle 1999, p.90), which contrasts with the linguistic relativism of Whorf 
and the view of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss on the relationship between reality 
and language (see Shifting names, p.147). Lévi-Strauss states explicitly the 
supremacy of language over other institutions: 
‘We have very little chance of finding that reality in conscious formulations; a bet-
ter chance in unconscious mental structures to which institutions give us access, 
but a better chance yet, in language.’ 
(Lévi-Strauss, 1950 / 1985, p.48-49)
In linguistic relativism and related perspectives, it is assumed, that ‘reality’ is 
not one fixed and universal set of facts in which all people operate similarly. 
Reality includes the realities of different cultures alongside each other; and 
it is essentially dependent on the language structure alive in a culture. So, in 
their view, language holds attributes which are constitutive for reality.  
1 note that this is not the same as Wittgenstein’s opening thesis from the Trcatatus Logico Philosophicus, 
that  ‘The world is everything which is the case’.
linguitsic 
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Reality, we might agree, is the entirety of facts1. But with reality being de-
pendent on language, facts cannot be entirely independent from language. 
Yet that is precisely what Searle states: 
‘The facts exist, utterly independent of language. (...) Facts are conditions that 
make statements true, but they are not identical with their linguistic descriptions. 
We invent words to state facts and to name things, but it does not follow that we 
invent the facts or the things.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.22) 
For the current research, this contrast is left to stand for itself. But I have 
noticed in the course of constructing a meeting of two writers by literally 
comparing the vocabulary they left behind, that in this case it is necessary to 
rely on the supremacy of language above ‘reality’ (see CCL as poetic method, 
p.283). 
 I realise that the issue of the relationship between reality and lan-
guage often evokes contradictory positions. How does this contrast relate to 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophical work? Searle claims to follow it in many 
respects; his concept of Intentionality is closely linked to what he calls Back-
ground. The Background is constituted by several aspects which precede and 
influence a subject, who is part of any linguistic community. Searle argues 
that the concept of a Background is similar to the concepts provided by 
several other thinkers, including Wittgenstein’s private language argument:
 ‘The work of the later Wittgenstein is in large part about the Background’. 
(Searle 1992 p.177)
Also the concept of degrees of familiarity is borrowed from Wittgenstein, 
who introduced the notion of family resemblances (Familienähnlichkeiten) 
to characterise notions which escape one-dimensional definition and yet 
operate frequently in ordinary language, like we have seen with the notion of 
a ‘game’. 
        
contradictions
Background
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‘The next feature of our conscious experiences is that they come to us in varying 
degrees of familiarity. We experience things on a continuum, on a spectrum, that 
goes from the most familiar to the most strange .’ 
(Searle 1999, p.79)
As Wittgenstein suggested, words belong to a family of meanings. Despite 
Searle’s partiality for Wittgenstein, he neglects important indications of (lin-
guistic) relativity in his understanding of language-games. In the previous 
chapter (see Viennese roots, p.163) it became apparent that our understand-
ing of Wittgenstein’s moral and cultural intentions has been partly inhibited 
by the common Anglo-Saxon interpretation, which Searle indulges as well. 
The key insights into the influence of Viennese culture on Wittgenstein’s 
entire work – the ‘early’ as well as the ‘late’ Wittgenstein – provided by Janik 
and Toulmin stipulate that 
‘(...) Wittgenstein’s later philosophical teaching displayed a clear – almost anthro-
pological – recognition of cultural diversity, and of the relativity of language games 
to the modes of human life within which they are operative (...)’ 
(Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.245) 
While this statement quite succinctly closes the gap between a strict ‘ethical’ 
and ‘logical’ reading of Wittgenstein’s work, Searle succeeds only partly in 
reconciling the work of, what he called, ’the most influential philosopher of 
the twentieth century’ (Searle 1999, p.4) with his own explanation of what 
Speech Acts are (Searle 1969). On the one hand, he summarises correctly 
that 
’Wittgenstein thought that the urge to philosophical error came primarily from 
a misunderstanding of the workings of language, and also from our tendency to 
overgeneralise and to extend the methods of science into areas where they are not 
appropriate.‘ 
(Searle 1999, p.9) 
One the other hand, it seems to me, Searle fails exactly by over-generaliz-
ing the conditions for a speech act to be successful. He states that ‘it is in 
principle possible for every speech act one performs or could perform to 
conclusion on 
Searle: one-sided 
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be uniquely determined by a given sentence (or set of sentences), given the 
assumptions that the speaker is speaking literally and that the context is ap-
propriate.’ (Searle 1969, p.18)’. The assumption that the ‘speaker is speaking 
literally’ conflicts with the relatively flexible conditions of a successful lan-
guage game, as well as with the common insight that ‘language is essentially 
metaphorical’ (Janik&Toulmin 1996, p.128. see p.169). To end on a placatory 
tone, Searle himself admits that 
‘Just as an arrow can be fired at a target and miss, or fired even if there is no target 
there, so an intentional state can be directed at an object and be misdirected, or fail 
altogether because there is no object there.’ (Searle 1999, p.99). 
17. DIALOGUES
Language has many more attributes than are identified above. However, it is 
of importance to accept, that the search for what language essentially is can 
result in shifts of interpretation demonstrated in this research. Analysis of 
language involves a deliberate use of language which often simultaneously 
reveals how we use it. Even in disagreement, we are accomplices to a cer-
tain degree (Searle’s example was the ‘exchange of insults’ see p.182). Each 
dispute offers the opportunity to witness the language-games played by the 
arguing parties which leads to the question: What are necessary conditions 
for a language-game?
 One mode of language where we can clearly see language-games 
at work is in dialogues. Dialogue is often between two parties engaged in a 
mutual exchange of thought. This two-sided structure does not in fact spring 
from the syllable di- as in Latin for two; in fact, the word dialogue, or dialog, 
has its roots in the Greek dia for ‘through’ or ‘across’ and logos which means 
thought or structuring order. The way we use the word, however, suggests a 
two-fold structure. Current sources for English suggest, that entangling both 
meanings is valid today: 
key-notion
dialogue 
etymology: 
dia - log
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‘Curiously enough, [dia] often applies to two things. (...) It also actually has its 
ultimate root in a word meaning “two.” So diameter literally means “a measure-
ment through (or across),” and dialogue means “words across,” i.e., spoken with 
someone else.’ 1 
In the current research, this doubling is of essential relevance: being two cre-
ates a space in which language-games can be played. Furthermore, all forms 
of collaboration require a certain resilience in relation to doubt. 
‘Etymologically, the English word doubt (...) comes from the Latin dubitare (hesi-
tate), which is derived from dubius (two-sided). Thus doubt means ‘being in two 
minds’. Also the German word for doubt, Zweifel, incorporates the numeral two, 
zwei: Zwei-fel, ‘being two’, ‘being in two minds about something’.’ 
(Melzer Dialog, 2008, p.4)
I bring this up, because in dialogues, doubt is an essential mechanism for 
collaboration; though it might have negative associations in ordinary lan-
guage, I consider it essential for a useful synthesis of positions in a language-
game. Moreover, spoken discussions as well as collaborations in artistic 
practice require certain conditions in order to succeed: there needs to be a 
minimum of mutual trust, respect for the other position and for the agreed 
rules of the game played. Doubt and play can become productive mecha-
nisms in collaborations as soon as the cooperating partners rely on each 
other. 
 The very act of collaboration in visual art today has its founda-
tions in conceptual art and process-based practice of the 20th century. The 
exercise as a shared artistic practice is a rather new phenomenon. An apt 
example from my own artistic practice is the collaboration with visual artist 
Kasper Andreasen2. Andreasen/Melzer exists as an artist duo separate from 
our individual art practice. Always in close collaboration, we investigate, 
decide and formulate rules for the execution of a new project. In its realiza-
tion, the copyright of the idea is shared and an individual ‘stroke’ as singular 
artist disappears. In this sense, the project Inventory (2008) with its subse-
quent artworks is based, amongst other things, on the execution of a set of 
exercises, which rely on the strength of being two equally responsible artists. 
 1 http://englishplus.com/news/news0999.htm, accessed October 7 2011
2 www.kasperandreasen.com
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A prime example for this is our collaboration on the artist’s book The Grass 
is Greener on the Other Side (2005). In this cooperation, the work was again 
created together. In order to set up a language-game and to observe its 
course visually, we defined the procedure and set the rules for the chosen 
practice. The work’s title is derived from a proverbial expression for never 
being satisfied with what one already has.1 The procedure we established was 
to draw lines denoting grass, filling page after page individually. Formally 
alluding to writing or drawing, these drawings mark the passing of time, 
and the entire sheets show differences in ‘handwriting’ of both of us. They 
represent a system of notation, allude to tracing and automatic writing and 
still remain simple gestural signs for what one could consider a simple line 
of sprouting grass. 
 As absurd as it seemed at first, the hours and days we sat across 
each other drawing the grass decreased the doubt about the use and value of 
such a practice. While drawing, we felt the meaning of the proverb unfold 
in front of us: experienced the neighbourhood of two similar things which 
differ only so slightly. This revealed a set of essential notions of interpreta-
tion and context involved in a dialogue. Our analogue drawing practice and 
the stubbornness not to give up following our own rule until around 300 A3 
pages were filled with the same gestural green lines created a set of mean-
ings we did not anticipate. The lines became lines of signs, similar to writing, 
they echoed systems of counting and simultaneously denotated orderly laid 
sprouts of grass. In addition to that, we sat across from each other captivated 
by the version of the other, which was so close to our own. The grass is 
greener on the other side.
 The meaning of the work got increasingly complex as the pages 
were filled, because another proverb, a Dutch expression, shifted the inter-
pretation of the entire work once more. The bookbindery we commissioned 
to bind the piles of drawings into large bible-like editions, was part of a 
monastery in Vaals2, in the Flemish speaking part of Belgium. The book-
binder, himself a monk, refused to bind the edition at first. 
1 Is it by chance related to another expression of jeaousy based on colour ‘going green with  
   envy’? In discussion with Leila Peacock she agreed that green seems to have negative associations in 
   English. It is a mysterious and sometimes evil colour. The Green Man etc. 
2 www.benedictusberg.nl
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Image 37a 
Andreasen & Melzer: The Grass is Greener on the other Side,  2005  
Image 37b
Andreasen & Melzer: The Grass is Greener on the other Side, 2005
dialogues
Image 37c
Andreasen & Melzer: The Grass is Greener on the other Side, 2005, comparing the two handwritings 
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Image 38
Andreasen & Melzer: The Grass is Greener on the other Side, installation-view, Rijksakademie van beeldende kunsten, 
Amsterdam, 2005
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Image 39
Andreasen & Melzer: The Grass is Greener on the other Side, 2005, The Receipts, silk screen 
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The bookbinder from Vaals was in doubt about our intentions with the work 
and felt slightly insulted by it. How was this possible? He asked us on the 
phone, as calmly as possible, whether he was right to assume that we were 
not native Dutch speakers. He was: our mother tongues being Danish and 
German, we had no idea about the Dutch expression monnikenwerk, which 
signifies a dull, monotonous and repetitive and rather useless practice. This 
proverb was embodied by what the monk saw in our work at first. Undoubt-
edly he felt insulted at first, but he readily bound the edition after he saw the 
real intention behind it.
 The mechanism responsible for the shift of meaning between what 
we made and what the monk saw has many names. A few of those we came 
across earlier, i.e. in the Background of Searle (Searle 1992), which is related 
to his reading of Wittgenstein and the conditions necessary for a language-
game. Similarly, mechanisms for verbal jokes are rooted in a shared origin 
or background, while visual jokes often require less cultural agreement. The 
Grass is Greener on the Other Side, as it became after the interaction with the 
monk, bridges the verbal with the visual logic of meaning(s). It remains an 
autonomous artwork which requires interpretation by the audience, not by 
the makers. It is a conceptual visual art work and escapes exhaustive verbal 
interpretation; even after we have said what we can say about it, it embodies 
issues of language.
18. ON INTERPRETATION
As introduced earlier, Wittgenstein’s idea on the difference between saying 
and showing, now interpretation, becomes a central point of discussion. In 
order to keep this unwieldy subject under control in this research, an exem-
plary article will be discussed as a key reference. 
 Published in the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad in 1993 
(Oosterhof, & Ramdas, 1993) and reissued by the SSP Amsterdam  in 
1 http://www.enotes.com/interpretation-overinterpretation-salem/interpretation-overinterpretation, 
accessed October 6 2011
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1994 as Op het snijvlak van culturen (Oosterhof, & Ramdas, 1994, p.24), it 
shows crucial mechanisms of interpretation. The artist Frans Oosterhof and 
Ramdas collaborated for many years in a process of presenting images and 
text together: Ramdas wrote with words and sentences, the artist Oosterhof 
presented words and images. Their cooperation was consolidated by their 
shared urge to identify and show matters of meaning in verbal discourse and 
visual language. In this way, their work is an early inspiration for developing 
new publication formats and art forms which make issues of communication 
and interpretation their core focus and which addresses a large audience. 
Image and text were created apart from each other to avoid illustration.
 In the article ‘Interpretation’, Ramdas refers to the publication of In-
terpretation and Overinterpretation (Eco, Collini, Culler and Rorty, 1992), a 
book which was heavily discussed in the early 90’s, because it tackled issues 
of language in relation to the responsibility of the interpreter. The Dutch 
critic Carel Peeters wrote a recension on the Dutch translation (Over Inter-
pretatie) in the cultural magazine Vrij Nederland in 1993, which is the start-
ing point for Ramdas’ review of the confrontation between literary theorist 
Umberto Eco and the philosophical pragmatist Richard Rorty.1 Apart from 
the merit of Oosterhof ’s and Ramdas’ approach to language, the article owes 
its exemplary status to the clearly articulated positions of opponents Eco 
and Rorty. Rorty and Eco discuss the relationship between reader and read 
material and firmly disagree over the power-relations between interpreter 
and text. However docile a text may be, Eco states, it has its limits of inter-
pretation, which are hard to define but yet determined by its own inherent 
intention. A text will rebel against arbitrary interpretation, which any reader 
has to respect, says Eco. Rorty, in contrast, claims that the liberty of interpre-
tation is in principle unlimited. Ramdas figures, that while Eco really refers 
to interpretation, the pragmatist Rorty is concerned with the usage of a text. 
It is no surprise that Rorty also refers to a metaphor which is borrowed from 
Wittgenstein’s metaphor of language as a tool-box in Philosophical Investi-
gations #11. 
Eco meeting Rorty
tool-box metaphor
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Image 40
Oosterhof: Plaatsbepaling (positioning), 1994
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‘Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a
saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws.—The
functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.
(And in both cases there are similarities.)’
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #11)
Rorty claims that an entire text can be considered a tool, like a screw-driver, 
which is capable of performing a variety of useful actions without disre-
specting the ‘inherent intention’ of the object. While Eco points out the 
limits of the tools, Rorty explains that the limits are not inherent to the tools 
(the text) itself, but based on the ethics of the user. Rorty wants, in other 
words, to liberate the text from some vague inherent limits of interpretation 
and hand the responsibility over to the reader, who might be confronted 
with his/her own limits of interpretation. This perspective on the Back-
ground and the context of both speaker and receiver increases the varia-
tion of interpretations of the actual situation. Again, such a situation may 
be sketched in words in a text, as well as shown with words in combination 
with an image. The image counterpart by Oosterhof published with Ram-
das’ text shows strikingly how the words added change the meaning of the 
image markedly (Oosterhof & Ramdas 1994, pp.24). If language is a tool-
box, then this work demonstrates how sharp the tools are. In Oosterhof ’s 
work Plaatsbepaling (positioning) we see a young couple holding hands in 
the clearance of a thick forest, a car hiding behind a tree. Spread clockwise 
there are the capitalised words the meeting, the border, the picnic, the trap, the 
farewell, the rope. The interpretation of the image is charged by each one of 
the ‘subtitles’ differently – we experience the discomfort of being left alone 
with such variety of possible interpretations. We have an uneasy sense of 
Rorty being right to say, that we are responsible for our interpretation – it is 
us, our Background, the social structure of our culture and language, which 
makes sense of text and image. It is the same set of conditions which enable 
us to understand a visual or verbal pun. In his work, Oosterhof concentrates 
on dynamics between identifying images and matching messages with what 
we think to know. It is our very own interpretation which displays to us 
how insecure we are about the meanings around us. These dynamics create 
an experience of what we see. The difference between understanding and 
metaphor of a 
tool-box
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Image 41
Oosterhof: Harpisboard, 1994
experience is a strong argument for Wittgenstein’s concept of the differ-
ence between saying and showing. Laying out different aspects of saying and 
showing here function as my own practice in this research, but other forms 
of expression and interpretation – like nonverbal expression, dance, sound 
and listening etc – are neglected.
  In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk (1990) points out that 
he expresses the connections between word and meanings with the meta-
phor of a chain: they ‘connect directly (...) like the links of a chain’ (Monk 
1990, p.308). Monk continues that the ‘direct connection (...) between the 
word and the deed (...) must be seen’ (Monk 1990, p.308). Monk sums up 
this connection, the link between a word and its meanings, as similar to 
Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning as use: 
‘The connection between a word and its meanings is to be found, not in a theory, 
but in a practice, in the use of the word’ 
(Monk 1990, p.308) 
Oosterhof placed the words in the image of the couple in the forest in order 
to offer simultaneous a perspective on how to interpret the situation from 
several angles. The shift of perspective is so radical – it sways between 
romantic picnic to lurking violence – that we are downright confounded by 
the possibilities for interpreting the depicted situation. We can agree with 
Wittgenstein: 
‘ ”Here seeing matters essentially: as long as you do not see the new system, you 
have not got it.” (...)’ 
(Wittgenstein quoted by Monk 1990, p.308)
Elsewhere Oosterhof presents a new system of seeing in a nonverbal way: 
his work entitled Harpisboard (1994) shows a black and white photograph 
of hands playing the harp. The fingers in typical posture do not touch the 
strings but hold a white A 4 sheet of paper, which is inserted into the image 
by digital manipulation. An analogy of systems is created. This work dem-
onstrates once more how habits of seeing entrap our perception and how the 
artist’s awareness of this fact causes poetic shifts of meaning. 
on interpretation
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John Berger’s Ways of Seeing (1972), an influential and popular book about 
our relationship with image codes, is a useful introduction to some of the 
mechanisms playing in Oosterhof ’s work. In the second half of the 20th cen-
tury, words and texts became part of the material vocabulary of visual art-
ists. Still concerned with the interplay between literal and pictorial meaning, 
Conceptual Art has continued Magritte’s heritage (see p.124). Iconic figures 
in this investigation are in the 1960’s Joseph Kosuth, Lawrence Weiner and 
the movement Art& Language. Their work has become an essential historic 
fundament for the contemporary conceptual approaches which employ 
words and language structure as artistic material, including my own artistic 
practice (Kosuth, 1989). These artists, consequently, rediscovered the writ-
ings of Wittgenstein and sometimes used his work as direct quotes or as a 
literal counterpart, as Kosuth did with several artist’s books (Perloff, 1996). 
Philosophical concerns as we collectively recall from conceptual artworks 
from the 1970’s or the famous On Kawara work One Million years (1999) 
have continued to exist in works using new media technologies. Kawara’s 
massive collection of a list of 1 Mio years bound as a series of books is a 
fundament for some of my own works, too. The Complete Dictionary may 
have existed in the 1970’s as an idea, yet it’s realization needed the help of 
new media technology (see p.333). Other obvious  influences on my work 
and this research are the artists Sigmar Polke, Marcel Broodthaers, Barbara 
Kruger and in the present discourse Frans Oosterhof who have continued 
to examine image-word relationships in their work. Set in another political 
and sociological context, their work also included language of commercials 
and growing critique of mass media1. Artists like Jenny Holzer have used 
technologies for displaying text for a large audience, like LED signs, pub-
lic billboards and public projections2, playing upon the media as a tool for 
showing the conflicts between authority, anonymity and individual desire.  
 The interactions between image and words are complex are dis-
played indirectly within this research. Similarly to language they are best 
observed from ’the corner of one’s eye’ (Keller 1994).
   
on interpretation
1 www.barbarakruger.com/art.shtml, accessed May 6 2013
2 www.jennyholzer.com/
dialogues
Image 44 
Visual note of Sigmar Polke, Höhere Wesen befahlen: 
rechte obere Ecke schwarz malen!, 1969, offset print. 
photo: Nadja Niemann
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Image 43
Visual note of Joseph Kosuth: One and Three Chairs 
(1965).Wood folding chair, mounted photograph of a 
chair, and mounted photographic enlargement of the 
dictionary definition of “chair”. http://www.moma.org/
learn/moma_learning/joseph-kosuth-one-and-three-
chairs-1965. photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 42
Visual note of Marcel Broodthaers: Pipe, 1969.photo: 
Nadja Niemann
19. MEETING
When two or more people come together we usually call this a meeting. 
When people meet, they exchange language and other rule-governed be-
haviour in order to communicate. Traditionally, people meet in person, yet 
today we ‘meet’ via technically supported mediated forms as well. Always we 
meet in language. People meet, they to get to know each other for practical 
purposes such as trade and business, they meet by chance or by arrange-
ment. Contemporaries meet, friends and colleagues, rivals and even enemies 
meet. Sometimes, meetings are remembered for posterity, and even if the 
record of the exchange has been lost, important  past meetings are authen-
ticated by place and date and retold by witnesses, devotees and biographers. 
Meetings can be of a simply personal significance, or of historical or political 
impact. In ordinary of small talk it is commonplace to ask a couple how they 
met, and when we get formally introduced to a stranger, after we are asked 
“Have you met...?”. The meeting as a physical encounter is dilated in meta-
phorical language: when our eyes meet across the table, when the announce-
ment was met with protest, or they failed to meet the deadline, and spiritual 
kinship is rephrased as meeting of the minds1.
 The etymological origin of meeting lies in the Germanic language, 
related to Dutch moeten, which means in English must; it thus suggests an 
obligation. All meetings require a certain mode of cooperation, as Searle, 
Keller and others have pointed out with language in general (see chapter 
Language Attributes, p.171). 
 This idea of confrontation as a key notion was the focus of the 
practice-based work This is how we meet (2009/2013). As stated earlier the 
attempt to approach the topic of language and meeting in the field of visual 
art aims to complement the written parts of this research. The visual practice 
aims to produce an experience (showing) of what is described (saying) in the 
way of a transdisciplinary methodology. 
meeting as 
personal encounter
meeting as 
metaphor
etymology meeting
meeting  dialogues
1  New American Dictionary 2009 
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Image 45
Visual note of Lawrence Weiner: Een vertaling van de ene 
taal in een andere. From One Language To Another (1969) 
Public sculpture,  Spui, Amsterdam/The Netherlands. 
photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 48
Visual note of Jenny Holzer: Protect me from what I want 
(1983-85). photo: Nadja Niemann 
Image 46 
Visual note of Lawrence Weiner: Learn to read Art. 
http://kasinihouseartshop.com/magazine/2013/what-is-
contemporary-art, Authentic Contemporary Art Propa-
ganda Pack by Fresh Number 1 and Ric Kasini Kadour
photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 47
Visual note of On Kawara: One Million Years. www.
warmenhoven-venderbos.com. photo: Nadja Niemann
This is 
how we meet 
 
 
adds to the curiosity of the audience decades and even centuries later. 
 Some of the legendary meetings are mentioned here to prepare the 
meaning of a possible meeting between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gertrude 
Stein. Monroe met Khrushchev, Nixon met Presley, Dalí met Freud, Proust 
met Joyce, as the writer Craig Brown (2011) described in Hello Goodbye 
Hello: A Circle of 101 Remarkable Meetings (each of the 101 meetings uses 
exactly 1,001 words, making the book 101,101 words long1 ). Edgar Al-
lan Poe met Charles Dickens in March 1842 in Philadelphia.2 The meeting 
between two of the greatest physicists of their time, Werner Heisenberg and 
Niels Bohr, is recorded for 1941. The political implications and consequenc-
es of this meeting on the development of the atomic bomb remain relevant; 
the fact of their meeting inspired a work of performative arts, the play ‘Co-
penhagen’.2 In one of the most remarkable meetings,  Pope John Paul II met 
his own assassin Mehmet Ali Ağca, in 1983.2  Samuel Beckett was stabbed in 
1938 and visited his assassinator in jail. He later married the young woman 
who called him an ambulance.3
 For the current research, some authenticated meetings have been 
pointed out by my supervisors. Ezra Pound met Marshall McLuhan, which 
Prof. De Kerckhove pointed out in personal communication. The Viennese 
inventor of psycho-analysis Sigmund Freud met and analysed Ludwig’s sister 
Margarethe Wittgenstein in the 1930’s, because she was one of his clients for 
psycho-analysis. Lawrence Stern is believed to have met Sigmund Freud and 
James Joyce in 1908 in Trieste. James Joyce and Gertrude Stein did not meet 
and Stein deliberately avoided the encounter with her rival. Stein even broke 
ties with the publisher Silvia Beach after she started to support and issue 
Joyce’s work (Hobhouse 1975, see p.351 in this research). 
The speculation on famous meetings arouses our curiosity in many ways; in 
one sense public figures simply feed gossip. Gossip in ordinary language is 
a social need and a from of social capital, trading information about both  
celebrities and people we know personally. Gossiping we reflect our own 
opinions and desires and fascinations.  
fascinating 
meetings 
The work This is how we meet (2009) is a tool for intervention in language 
and consists of an offset edition of pins, the round metal badges familiar 
from popular culture worn on the lapel. Each pin is 25 mm in diameter and 
shows white words on neutral grey background saying: This is how we meet. 
The mechanism which is borrowed from our everyday interaction, is the 
common intervention between the one who wears and the one who sees 
such a badge. Every badge turns the other into the reader of one’s statement. 
The sentence is printed in a deliberately small type-size so the one who 
wants to read it is forced to come closer. The position of the pin on the lapel 
and the movement towards it results in an encounter between two people, 
the one who wears the badge and the one who reads it. This is how they 
meet, given that the relatively small distance between them is sufficient to 
speak of a ‘meeting’. 
Meetings of famous people invites public interest. The meeting of great 
philosophers seems to attract special attention; Eco met Rorty (see preced-
ing chapter), Chomsky met Foucault1. In the scientific world conferences 
can facilitate a framework for meetings. Famous people who met in person 
contribute to each other’s immortality; a meeting of two such people often 
Image 49
Melzer: This is how we meet, 2009. 2nd edition 2013, offset.  
1 The Chomsky-Foucault Debate [excerpt, part 1/2],  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WveI_
vgmPz8 and The Chomsky-Foucault Debate [excerpt, part 2/2], http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=S0SaqrxgJvw, accessed December 31 2012
1 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443659204577573012719035048.html  
2 http://listverse.com/2009/01/21/10-fascinating-meetings-in-modern-history, accessed October 19 2011
3 http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0413.html
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Image 50
Ulises Carrión, Gossip, scandals and Good Manners, 1981, pubished in ‘We have won! Haven’t we?’, Projectgroep 
Ulises Carrión, Amsterdam - Rob Perrée, Harry Ruhé, Guy Schraenen, Annie Wright, 1992, page 72
‘Next time you are in a café or bar, just listen for a moment to your neighbours. 
You will discover, as we have in our research, that around two-thirds of their con-
versation is taken up with matters of social import. Who is doing what with whom, 
and whether it’s a good thing or a bad thing; who is in and who is out, how to deal 
with a difficult situation involving a lover, child or colleague.’ 
(Robin Dunbar, 2002, p.4/5)
The Mexican artist Ulises Carrión (see also chapter The Complete Diction-
ary, p.330) created a graphic work titled Gossip, scandals and Good Manners 
in 1981, which shows directional forces of social interaction in ordinary 
language-games like rumours, slander and the like. Slander was also subject 
of the work Rufmord I made in 2006 (see p.390).
 In ordinary language of daily life we may say we ‘know’ someone 
when we have met a particular person. For public figures it is a different 
kind of ‘knowing’ to ‘know’ a certain writer, artist or politician. We use their 
name synonymously with their work or public image, and evaluate their 
heritage synonymously with their name (see chapter Naming, p.135). When 
you are asked “Do you know Hemingway?” you may affirm when you have 
read his work. 
 Gertrude Stein knew Hemingway personally. That is to say he met 
her in Paris after Hemingway approached her for advice on his writing1. 
Besides the professional alliance, she became godmother of his first son, 
before they broke ties (Hobhouse, 1975, p.176). Furthermore Stein is known 
to have met Charlie Chaplin and Anita Loos in Beverly Hills, outside Hol-
lywood. (Hobhouse, 1975, p.176 )
 There is an atmosphere of glamour to famous meetings. In ani-
mated film, an early example was the visualization of the meeting of the two 
Hollywood icons Marilyn Monroe and Humphrey Bogart, who were the 
protagonists for an early computer-programmed walking sequence in ‘Ren-
dezvous à Montreal’ by Daniel Thalmann (1977) .1 
Dunbar: gossip
Ulises Carrión
Stein & 
Hemingway 
Monroe & Bogart
meeting
1 Stein’s role as a mentor for Hemingway’s work is known. ‘Dear Ernest, remarks are not litera-
ture’ (Hobhouse, 1975). 
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The meeting of famous people often makes them representatives of their 
time. Names transport a certain atmosphere. Monroe and Bogart? One is 
reminded of the Hopper painting ‘Nighthawks’ (1942), which pictures a 
few solitary people in an American Diner. Hopper exhibited in the Armory 
Show in 1913, which included early avant-garde paintings and which Ger-
trude Stein attended (see chapter Evelyn Whitehead’s Country Club, p.233)
 There is a fantasy element to imagining famous meetings. Did Stein 
meet Hopper in 1913?  
1 http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~echo/40e_Web/Bios/Thalmann.html accessed October 19 2011
2 Goethe is known for having had numerous meetings with important people of his time, as reported 
exemplarily in an article in the weekly newspaper DIE ZEIT 28, July 5th 2012, section: History, p.18
 
meeting Goethe
meeting
Image 51
Visual note of Hopper, E., 1942. Nighthawks. Oil on Canvas, 84.1 cm 
× 152.4 cm, accessed 12 dec 12 2011. photo: Nadja Niemann
between Goethe the composer Beethoven in 1812. The artist and researcher 
Jennifer Kanary named, in personal communication, a meeting of Goethe 
in fiction, with the American writer Ernest Hemingway. The Czech novel-
ist Milan Kundera dedicates much of his work Immortality (1991) to factual 
and fictional meetings between celebrities,  a common trope in post modern 
fiction. Most iconic is Kundera’s description of the meeting between French 
emperor Napoleon Bonaparte and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Factually, 
Napoleon invited Goethe to Erfurt ‘where, on October 2, 1808, an unforget-
table meeting between the immortal commander and the immortal poet 
took place.’ (Kundera 1991 p.59). Kundera speculates on Goethe’s considera-
tions upon accepting the invitation whether he did so because Napoleon was 
evidently already an immortal during own life-time – more so than Goethe 
himself. 
’When Goethe (...) received the invitation, he knew he had to accept. He was ex-
actly one year short of sixty. Death was approaching and with death also immortal-
ity (...), and Goethe had to consider that he was being invited to an audience with 
an immortal.’ 
(Kundera 1991, p.59) 
Kundera pictures immortality as desirable attribute which accompanies the 
lives lead by important ‘artists and statesmen’. 
‘Naturally, when it comes to immortality people are not equal. We have to distin-
guish between so-called minor immortality, the memory of a person in the minds 
of those who knew him (the kind of immortality the village mayor longed for), and 
great immortality, which means the memory of a person in the minds of people 
who never knew him personally.’ 
(Kundera 1991, p.55)
In his novel, he arranges a posthumous  meeting between Hemingway and 
Goethe in which they converse freely about the disadvantages of being im-
mortal. 
‘ ‘You know, Johann,’ said Hemingway, ‘they keep bringing up accusations against 
me, too. Instead of reading my books they’re writing books about me. (...).’  – 
‘That’s immortality,; said Goethe. ‘Immortality means eternal trial.’ 
(Kundera 1991, p.91)
Kundera: Goethe 
& Napoleon
meeting
The fascination surrounding speculation upon possible meetings is echoed 
in the artwork This is how we meet (p.202). It reflects an element of chance 
and fleetingness. People meet cursorily, but the ones who experience a meet-
ing ‘subtitled’ by the tautology from the badge may be made aware of their 
encounter. 
 The German poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe is known for hav-
ing spent much of his time meeting other important people. In literature, 
reports on Goethe’s presence are numerous. Until today, meetings with 
the so-called Dichterfürst inspire writers for their work, may it be only to 
magnify the differences between a common man and a legend, as the con-
temporary Swiss writer Markus Werner alludes to in his half-historic novel 
Der Ägyptische Heinrich (1999). In 2012 a newspaper2 discussed a meeting 
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Naturally, Kundera does not fail to include Gertrude Stein’s role in the life of 
Hemingway, where he abuses his predicament of being a known but dead – 
and therefore defenceless – author: 
‘ ‘‘I was lying dead on the deck and saw my four wives squatting around me, writ-
ing down everything they knew, and standing behind them was my son and he was 
scribbling too, and that old dame Gertrude Stein was there writing away and all 
my friends were there blabbing out all the indiscretions and slanders they had ever 
heard about me, and behind them a hundred journalists with microphones jostled 
each other and an army of university professors all over America were busy clas-
sifying, analysing, and shovelling everything into articles and books.” ‘
(Kundera 1991, p.92) 
Kundera concludes that we are mainly constructed of the image others have 
of us (Kundera 1991, p.142) and even our attempts author our own stories 
and bequeath an autobiography cannot protect against unfavourable inter-
pretation (see Auto/biography, p.218).
 In history, famous people stand for their work or heritage. And 
when they meet in fiction separated from their historic context, different 
times meet. In fiction, meetings between people can be arranged with no 
regard to their life spans and the exact geographical whereabouts of their 
factual lives. People who have not even been contemporaries, can meet after 
death like Goethe and Hemingway in Kundera’s work. 
 Another strategy is to place them in a ‘realistic’ setting of time and 
space during their lifetime. Guy Davenport developed a convincing method 
of augmenting biographical knowledge with a poetic work. In his early 
article Aeroplanes at Brescia (1970) he picks up the title and plot of the first 
story published by Franz Kafka. Kafka recalls his visit to the air show in Italy 
in 1909, which he attended together with his friends Otto and Max Brod. 
In Davenport’s extrapolation on this fact he includes the young student of 
aeronautics Ludwig Wittgenstein, who could possibly have been present.1 
In her article comparing Kafka’s and Davenport’s Aeroplanes Anna Glazova 
goes into detail at the Kafka Project published online2. For Glazova Dav-
enport, writing about places and times in which he absent, allows him to 
1 http://www.enotes.com/aeroplanes-brescia-salem/aeroplanes-brescia, accessed October 20 2011
2 http://www.kafka.org/index.php?aid=227, accessed October 20 2011
Davenport: Kafka 
& Wittgenstein
 meeting
observe and reconstruct from an advantageous distance. Davenport’s fictive 
reality, writes Glazova, not only links up with factual events, but creates a 
continuum of possible sequels of the historical moment. Wittgenstein was 
absent at the air show, yet he possibly could have been there according to 
our knowledge of facts from Wittgenstein’s life. The invented event fits the 
time period as well as his proper field of study back then. Glazova concludes 
that  Davenport desires to make one of the major spirits of 20th century 
literature almost encounter this major mind in philosophy. The possibility of 
a meeting expresses proximity and kinship. Their ways could have crossed 
each other and seen in retrospect their meeting seems natural, which I 
would argue is the case with Wittgenstein and Stein.
 The following fragment of Davenport’s Aeroplanes at Brescia (1970) 
describes a dialogue between Franz Kafka and his friend Max Brod.
‘Otto gave the page to Franz.
- There’s the name of the man you asked about, he said. He wrote it down for 
giornalista.
Kafka looked at the name. It read, in light pencil, the kind meticulous men used to 
jot down fractions and the abbreviated titles of learned journals, volume, number 
and page, probably a thin silver pencil with fine lead, Ludwig Wittgenstein.
- Who? Max said.’ 
(Davenport,1997, p.70)1
Marjorie Perloff has reviewed and praised many of Davenports writings1, 
and Perloff herself speculated on the meeting between Wittgenstein and 
Stein. In the course of this research, Perloff became a major support for the 
key hypothesis ventured here.
‘(...) Wittgenstein figures in a number of essays as a kind of re-inventor of Heracli-
tus, but Davenport’s most sustained consideration of Wittgenstein comes in a re-
view of the philosopher’s note-card entries collected posthumously in 1967 under 
the title Zettel. (...)  “Wittgenstein,” we read in the essay’s last paragraph, “did not 
argue; he merely thought himself into subtler and deeper problems” (Davenport 
1974/1981, p.335). This might be an auto-portrait of Davenport himself. Let me 
conclude with the following passage—a terse and ingenious rendition of Wittgen-
stein’s critique of Heraclitus (...): “What about the sentence—Wie ist es mit dem 
Satz—‘’One cannot step into the same river twice?” That Heraclitean perception 
has always been admired for its hidden second meaning. One cannot step . . .; it is 
not only the flux of the river that makes the statement true. But is it true? No, Witt-
genstein would smile (or glare), but is wise and interesting. It can be examined. It 
is harmonious and poetic.” (Davenport 1974/1981, p.334)
(Marjorie Perloff, Davenport Renaissance2)
1 http://www.kafka.org/index.php?aid=227
2 http://marjorieperloff.com/articles/davenport-renaissance/, accessed October 20 2011
Glazova: possible 
sequels of the 
historic moment
Perloff quotes 
Davenport
meeting
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20. LUDWIG MEETING GERTRUDE
From all the literature referenced for this research, Marjorie Perloff is very 
outspoken about the possible, but unlikely, meeting between Wittgenstein 
and Stein. In Perloff ’s writing, poetry and science are often shown to share 
as similar strategies. In the early stage of this research, Perloff was the first 
and only one also concerned about their possible meeting. She speculates 
that they would have not liked each other if they had met. 
‘This Wittgenstein is an obsessively playful grammarian, whose riddling, discon-
nected sentence sequences bring to mind those of a fellow avant-gardist Wittgen-
stein never read, never met (and would have thoroughly disliked if he had met!)–
namely Gertrude Stein. “Strangely simultaneous in their stylistic concerns,” Writes 
Guy Davenport in The Geography of the Imagination, “the two were at work from 
1917 onwards on identical linguistic phenomena: the splashed meaning of chat-
tered language, language which is gesture, politeness and social formula... Gertrude 
Stein is not interested in the absurdity of language but in the astounding implica-
tions that can be flushed from its ordinariness.” (Davenport 1974/1981, p.311)’ 
(Perloff, 1996, p.17, my italics) 
As stated earlier a meeting of the minds means a thorough understanding or 
agreement between people. Yet these speculations on possible encounters 
between people do not aim at their social interactions, rather it is a way of 
reconsidering their life’s work after their death using fiction. An imagined 
meeting can offer a new perspective on their work because the other acts as 
a new point of reference. As was noted earlier in Dialogues (p.185), enter-
ing a dialogue opens up a field of tension, in which a (perhaps minimal) 
‘cooperation in language’ (Searle) takes place. The curiosity to know how 
Wittgenstein and Stein might have reacted to each other is thrilling for 
several reasons. These reasons are displayed in a two-fold structure which 
runs beneath the attempt to examine their possible ‘meeting-points’. These 
meeting-points are of a linguistic nature and purely based on their profes-
sional achievements, through there are also thrilling personal analogies in 
their lives. 
 On the one hand, as Perloff, Davenport and others have remarked, 
the work of both examines ‘ identical linguistic phenomena’ (Davenport 
examination of 
identical linguistic 
phenomena
 ludwig meeting gertrude
1974/1981, p.311), though one operates against a backdrop of poetry, the 
other in the field of philosophy. The ‘meeting’ of both is thus based on the 
subject of their work; the kinship in their work and life links them tightly as 
important protagonists of the Avant-garde. We will return to Stein’s par-
ticular role in the Avant-garde and her influence on what we call Modern 
Art (see p.352). Perloff suggests that Wittgenstein’s place as an Avant-garde 
author has been neglected: 
‘The status of the Tractatus as a war book as well as an avant-garde one has re-
ceived little attention from philosophers, whose central concern has primarily been 
to make sense of the “picture-theory” of language that Wittgenstein’s “treatise on 
logic” expounds.’  
(Perloff 1996, p.19)
Though Wittgenstein’s and Stein’s agreement about issues on language and 
meaning may be entirely involuntary, the references throughout this re-
search articulate many parallels. Their overlap in the handling and use of 
ordinary language, their dedication to ‘the splashed meaning of chattered 
language, language which is gesture, politeness and social formula’ (Dav-
enport 1974/1981, p.311) makes them akin to each other. For Perloff ‘the 
writings of both Stein and Wittgenstein represent a side of modernism(...)’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.21).
 ‘Indeed, the enigmatic Tractatus may be closer to the language games of 
Duchamp or Gertrude Stein than to the erotic exhibitionism characteristic of 
Klimt and Schiele, much less the witty, amoral ironies of Schnitzler.’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.37-38)
modernism     
 ludwig meeting gertrude
Image 52
Visual note of Gustav Klimt: Margarethe “Gretl” Stonborough-
Wittgenstein by Gustav Klimt (1905) , 1905. In Monk, R., 1990. 
The Duty of Genius. New York: Free Press, illustration 7. photo: 
Nadja Niemann  
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Image 53
Visual note of Wittgenstein awarded Fellowship 1929. 
In Monk, R., 1990. The Duty of Genius. 
New York: Free Press, illustration 35. photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 56
Visual note of Cecil Beaton, 1938. Rue Christine, Paris 
1938. In Debray, C., 2011, p.87. photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 54
Visual note of Wittgenstein in Swansea, taken by Ben Rich-
ards. 1947. In Monk, R., 1990. The Duty of Genius. 
New York: Free Press, illustration 50. photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 55
Visual note of Man Ray, 1921. Rue de Fleurus, avec le 
portrait de Gertrude Stein par Pablo Picasso. Collections du 
Centre Georges Pompidou, Musé national d’art moderne.In 
Debray, C., 2011, p.17. photo: Nadja Niemann
On the other hand, Wittgenstein and Stein share noticeable overlaps of 
biographical details. They were contemporaries and were both alive in the 
period between 1889 (Wittgenstein’s year of birth) and 1946 (Stein’s year of 
death). Also their geographical whereabouts overlap partly; Gertrude spent 
her early years of childhood, Ludwig his years until post adolescence, in 
Hapsburg Vienna. During their lives they both stayed in Great Britain and 
the United States of America, as well as visiting parts of Europe where they 
hypothetically could have met. Both published their work in English – Witt-
genstein involuntarily, as the German version of Tractatus could not find 
a publisher at first and so he agreed to publish his English translation with 
Ogden in England first. His second and last work, published posthumously, 
Philosophical Investigations, operates in ‘a curious in-between or exile space, 
not wholly “German” or “English” in its articulation.’ (Perloff 1996, p.75) 
Perloff explains that 
‘The “limits of my language” thus ironically refers to the limits imposed on “his 
world” by the construction of Wittgenstein as an author-in-translation, an author 
partially created by the community of Cambridge philosophers who have dissemi-
nated his writing.’ 
(Perloff 1996, p.75) 
We see a similar struggle with native language and modes of expression in a 
foreign tongue with Gertrude Stein. Stein who learned German as a child: 
‘ “Our Gertie is a little Schnatterer. She talks all day long and so plainly. She out-
does them all. She’s such a round little pudding, toddles around the whole day and 
repeats everything that is said or done.” ’ 
Aunt Rachel on her niece Gertrude in Vienna (Hobhouse 1975, p.3)
Before her teens she learned English as a second native language, and her 
language was subject to commentary by some of her contemporaries.
 ‘For both Gertrude’s parents English was a second language, and it is highly likely 
that it was not until she was able to read her first books in America and to live with 
other Americans that Gertrude would have known the look and sound of “proper 
English”. Although she later read English with a passion and cited an enormous list 
of childhood reading in the classics, her early essays at Harvard in the 1890s show 
that as late as the age of twenty-one (her critics would claim even later), Gertrude 
Stein was writing simple English sentences with great difficulty, failing in her com-
mand of basic grammatical constructions and simple spelling.’ 
(Hobhouse 1975, p.7) 
analogies in 
biography
native languages
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Both Stein and Wittgenstein lived the better part of their lives away from 
their home-country and both tried to master the language of the host as 
well as possible. Other parallels between Ludwig and Gertrude are their 
unconventional life-styles and their preference for homosexual relation-
ships. Several historians consider Stein a forerunner for living in a publicly 
exposed lesbian relationship with great awareness about style and public 
image. The important role of Leo and Gertrude Stein for Modern Art was 
the focal point of the exhibition at the Grand Palais, Paris in 2011 and has 
been summed up in the documentary movie The Stein Family, The Making of 
Modern Art by Elizabeth Lennard (2011). 
 However, one cannot ignore tremendous differences in their charac-
ter. While Wittgenstein was extremely reclusive and only outwardly indig-
nant at times, Stein was extravagant, entertaining, loud and self-confident 
(Hobhouse, 1975 / Monk, 1990). That might be one motive for Perloff ‘s 
assumption that they ‘would have thoroughly disliked’ each other (Perloff 
1996, p.17). These portraits show Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein 
in the 1930’s.
private parallels
 ludwig meeting gertrude
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Image 58
Visual note of Van Vechten,1934. Gertrude Stein aux 
Charmettes, June 1934. In Debray, C., 2011, p.39. 
photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 57
Visual note of Trinity Portrait 1930. In Monk, R., 1990. 
The Duty of Genius. New York: Free Press illustration 36. 
photo: Nadja Niemann
My desire to compare their lives was ignited by the presence of language-
games in their work. In the course of this research, two main methods for 
approaching a posthumously arranged meeting have been sketched: by 
either juxtaposing the content of the work or comparing biographies. In 
the latter, we have to realise that apart from some ratified data of location 
and time, it is people who witness someone’s existence in history. The social 
import of language (Dunbar, p.98) and the relevance of contemporaries for 
the legacy of a person (Kundera, p.199) echo here. Everyone – though they 
maybe as reclusive as Wittgenstein – is located centrally within one’s own 
network of people (see p.299). Starting with the family members, to teachers, 
colleagues, friends and lovers, one cannot escape coeval contact. This fact is 
essential to our understanding of Lewis’ comparison of words and people. 
‘Words are like people’, because the way they communicate with and are af-
fected by neighbouring words echoes the behaviour of people (Lewis, 2001). 
In order to facilitate Ludwig and Gertrude meeting in language literally, on 
the basis of the words they used (see chapter Contrasting corpora, p.285), we 
will examine the experiment of the Shared Vocabulary (p.301).
network of people
 ludwig meeting gertrude
We know from records of witnesses that Wittgenstein and Stein not only 
shared a cultural background and a native language. They also shared a part 
of the same circle of friends and had continuous contact with people they 
were both well acquainted with (Hobhouse 1975 / Monk 1990). 
 On the quest into locations and time periods for possible meet-
ings, the names of their contemporaries were of utmost importance. Fully 
dependent on the work of their biographers relying on personal notes, diary 
entries and autobiographical material, it is part of the methodology to iden-
tify at least one person who they both had genuine contact with. This link 
was necessary to enable and subsequently identify a possible setting in time 
and space. The meeting between Wittgenstein and Stein had to be found in 
continuum of facts, and set in the realistic possibility of a shared ‘fold’ in 
their biographies, in the manner which Davenport introduced with Wittgen-
stein and Kafka. 
 The person identified as an acquaintance of both Stein and Witt-
genstein was Wittgenstein’s mentor Bertrand Russell and his elder colleague 
and coauthor of the Principia Mathematica (1910, 1912, 1913) Alfred North 
Whitehead. On Gertrude’s side, Russel and Whitehead were her and Alice’s 
hosts her in an extended summer trip to England (Hobhouse 1975, p.84-85. 
Stein, 1933: The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas). Stein and her partner 
Toklas stayed several weeks at Whitehead’s vacation cottage in summer 
1914, a place which also attracted other intellectuals from Britain and else-
where (Hobhouse 1975). In the exact same house, Wittgenstein spent some 
days the preceding summer, 1913, with Russell and Moore (Monk 1990 
p.84-85). In the framework of this research, the discovery of this overlap in 
location and social network became the focus for a potential meeting (see 
chapter Fictional Biography, p.231). The identification of those biographi-
cal facts connecting Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein is one of the 
contributions to knowledge delivered by this thesis. The relevance of this 
discovery on their shared network of people and related metaphors as mod-
els for the CCL approach are discussed in depth in the chapter Network of 
People (p.299). 
aquaintances
possible meeting 
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Image 60
Visual note of One of the last photographs of Wittgenstein, 
In Monk, R., 1990, illustration 52. photo: Nadja Niemann
Image 59
Visual note of Man Ray, 1927. In the studio of Man Ray. 
In Debray, C., 2011, p.19. photo: Nadja Niemann
When biographers speculate on whether or not people have met in person, 
they can reveal a network of people existing between them: contemporaries, 
colleagues, rivals and enemies that link them to a social culture, even if they 
have not met in person. Ray Monk (1990) speculates on a meeting between 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Virginia Woolf, the late wife of Lytton Strachey. 
 
‘It is possible that at one of Keyne’s parties Wittgenstein and Virginia Woolf may 
have met; if so, neither seems to have made much impression on the other. After 
Virginia Woolf ’s death Wittgenstein spoke to Rush Rhees about the effects of her 
background. She grew up, he said, in a family in which the measure of a person’s 
worth was his distinction in some form of writing or in art, music, science or poli-
tics, and she had consequently never asked herself whether there might be other 
‘achievements’ This could be based on personal acquaintance, but it could equally 
well be based on hearsay. There are no references to Wittgenstein in Virginia 
Woolf ’s diaries, and only a few incidental mentions of him in her letters.(..)  ‘ 
(Monk 1990, p.256-257)
The British writer and critic Lytton Strachey, as we know now from this 
research, is another person who has met both Wittgenstein and Stein in per-
son. Strachey had met Wittgenstein at a gathering of the philosopher’s club 
The Apostles in Cambridge, and had met Stein during her stay in England 
in summer of 1914, which will be central to the chapter Evelyn Whitehead’s 
Country Club (p.233).  
21. AUTO/BIOGRAPHY
Biographical facts are fundaments for the historical significance of the hy-
pothesis that Wittgenstein and Stein could have met. In the current research, 
the notion of biography requires special diligence: apart from the thorough 
biographies available on Wittgenstein and Stein (Monk 1990 / Hobhouse 
1975 and others, see Bibliography), we are confronted with the autobio-
graphical work of writers and fictional biographies. As mentioned earlier, 
attempts to write an autobiography does not save one from unflattering 
interpretation (Kundera 1991, p.92). Wittgenstein did not leave behind any 
autobiography. His mentor Bertrand Russell published many of the corre-
Monk: 
Wittgenstein & 
Woolf
(auto)biographical 
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 ludwig meeting gertrude
spondences of private and professional matter (Russell, The Autobiography 
of Bertrand Russell 1872-191. 1951/1967). In Russell’s autobiography, we find 
letters between him and his fiancée Lady Ottoline Morrell, who, as a patron, 
met Gertrude and Alice in England 1913/14 (Stein 1933, Hobhouse 1975). 
Furthermore there are letters by Strachey, who was present at Whitehead’s 
cottage in summer 1914, where he met Gertrude and Alice. In a letter dating 
from 3rd March 1908 he pays homage to his friend Russell:
‘Oh! – I shall have this engraved on my tombstone – 
HE KNEW MOORE AND RUSSELL and nothing more.’ 
(Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell 1872-1914, p.302)
These solemn words shifts the focus to the link between immortality, 
memory and the nuances of knowing that have already been addressed in 
the preceding chapter. 
 
 The most striking contribution to this particular point of discus-
sion on language, memory and reputation is probably the autobiographic 
novel by Gertrude Stein herself. By publishing The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas in 1933 she turned the tables on authorship and discretion in an 
unprecedented manner. Not only did she act as a ghostwriter to her lover, 
Alice, who was named as author of the book in the title and who lent her 
voice to the text. Moreover, by doing so, Stein controlled the perspective 
on the actual heroine, Gertrude Stein, herself. Her lover’s name momentar-
ily became her pseudonym and her disguise. She could have her say all she 
wanted by putting her own words into Alice’s mouth, vividly copying Alice’s 
style of inflexion. This gimmick allowed her to be ever more plain in judg-
ing her contemporaries, many of whom broke ties with Stein after reading 
the ambiguous ‘Autobiography’. The list of people who felt it damaged their 
reputation included Fernande Picasso, Mr and Mrs Matisse and Ernest 
Hemingway (Hobhouse 1975). With this work Stein extended her way of 
playing with language into the very issue of authorship itself. Maybe she 
Strachey knew 
Moore and Russell
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even consciously alluded to the ‘scandalous memoirs’ from the 17th century, 
which likewise know hardly any dissimulation.1 
 Another extraordinary aspect of the shift of voices between Alice 
and Gertrude is compounded by the fact, that Alice used to type up all Ger-
trude’s manuscripts; Alice B. Toklas was therefore the first one to read the 
words Gertrude put into her own mouth. 
 Certainly, autobiographies are typically subjective. The author 
bases his memoir on his own memory, which is not an objective authority 
for accuracy. One might not be capable of, or inclined to, recall past events 
correctly, yet the author still contributes to the pool of ‘historical’ facts.2  
Similarly, the motive of posterity, to honour someone, can also encourage 
the creation of myths around a person that do not necessarily agree with the 
facts. 
 Significance for posterity is exercised in the space we share. It is 
a common practice to mark memorable locations where memorable peo-
ple have lived or stayed; the house they were born in, lived in, died in. For 
Wittgenstein, having become a name in Dublin, his past whereabouts are 
tagged all-over the city. Wittgenstein paid several visits to Dublin: a sum-
mer with Francis Skinner and Drury in 1934 (Monk 1990, p.357 and p.524), 
then he stayed at Ross’s Hotel (now Ashling Hotel) in Dublin for the first 
two weeks, and later moved to the county of Wicklow to stay at Kilpatrick 
House in Redcross (Monk 1990, p.520, Nedo 2013). The guest house is still 
open today and – naturally – both the hotel and the guest house now have a 
plaque mounted on the walls stating the past presence of the famous guest 
Wittgenstein.  
 In response to the Irish habit to mount commemorative signs all-
over the place – Beckett and Joyce are omnipresent, and so are all great Irish 
poets – several visual works for this thesis  were realised during an at the 
artists residency at the Irish Museum of Modern Art in Dublin in autumn 
2009 (see I was not here, p.224, The Stairs, p.226).
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autobiography, accessed October 21 2011
2 Media Talk; ‘Mrs. Clinton Seeks Ghostwriter for Memoirs’ By David D. Kirkpatrick January 8, 2001 http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html
editing facts
creating myths: 
Wittgenstein
Idols and plaques
 auto/biography  auto/biography
Image 62
Ashling Hotel, formerly Ross’s Hotel, Dublin, 2009
Image 61
Visual note of Ross’s Hotel on a postcard from Wittgenstein to Moore, 1948. Michael Nedo, 2013. Ludwig Witt-
genstein - Ein biographisches Album von Michael Nedo (ed.). Munich: C.H.Beck p.394. photo: Nadja Niemann
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22. PRESENCE VS ABSENCE
In the process of localizing a possible encounter between Ludwig Wittgen-
stein and Gertrude Stein, I tried to ascertain evidence for a place and time 
they could have met (see chapter Ludwig meeting Gertrude, p.210 and map 
p.281-283). Simultaneously with this the notion of presence and absence 
comes to the fore: the game of matching Ludwig and Gertrude geographical-
ly also plays with the location in general. Yet at the same time, the supposi-
tion that the two have never met also renders locations which exclude the 
other if one is present. Because of this agreement hitherto, we can conclude 
the absence of Stein wherever Wittgenstein has shown up and vice versa. 
This truism is manifested in the simple intervention I was not here (2009). 
A clear reference to graffiti of the everyday (as we know it from public walls 
and toilet doors), the urge to leave traces, often followed by name and date, 
is familiar to everyone. 
coordinates of 
presence
I was not here
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Image-set 63
Some of the many plaques commemorating Wittgenstein’s stays. Online repository.
 auto/biography
Image 64
Plaque at Rue Fleuris in Paris, photographed 2011
I was here.
When this sentence is turned into its negation ‘I was not here’, it becomes a 
paradoxical statement, especially when it is handwritten. Who could have 
been the person writing ‘I’ if not the writer themselves? The shifter ‘I’ refers to 
the person having written the statement (see Shifting Names, p.147 and Shifter’s 
Ode, p.154). The shifter ‘here’, artlessly refers to the very context of the sen-
tence in place, which is another source for a contradiction in terms. 
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Image 65
Melzer: I was not here, 2009
On one of Wittgenstein’s trips to Dublin it was Drury who took him to the 
Botanic Gardens at Glasnevin, where ‘the heated Palm House provided a 
warm and congenial place in which to work during the winter. During the 
winter months in Dublin, Wittgenstein worked with great intensity.’ (Monk, 
1990, p.536). Today, a plaque embedded in the stairs inside the Palm House 
attests that he ‘liked to sit and write at these steps’ in the winter 1948-49. 
Wittgenstein in 
Dublin: Botanic 
Gardens
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Image 66
Plaque inserted into the steps inside the Palm Tree House of the Botanic Gardens, 
Glasnevin, Dublin, 2009 photo: Tine Melzer
It was emphasised earlier that the deceased is at the mercy of ensuing ages; 
in this case, the pathos of the inscription is unmistakable. Posterity idolises 
and sugar-coats characters and facts, or ‘poetises’ them to say the least: who 
knows if Wittgenstein ‘liked’ to sit there. In reaction to this topical idealiza-
tion, the material function and design of this plaque was reutilised to create 
the visual piece The Stairs (2009). 
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Executed in the very same style of typography and lay-out, a cast-bronze 
plaque was made which stated, that the American writer ‘Gertrude Stein 
(1874–1946) did not meet Ludwig Wittgenstein in the winter 1948–1949 at 
these steps’. Part of the practical methodology of this research is to create, 
it simple adjustments to given forms which spark a game with meanings: 
Stein is not where Wittgenstein is. That the plaque states a solemn fact and is 
not fictional at all: comparing the life data of both, it is evident that Ger-
trude could not possibly have sat in the Palm House in the winter 1948–49, 
because she died in 1946. Language offers a structure to order and facilitate 
knowledge and facts, yet it also has great potential to disguise and truncate 
what we know of the world. The cast-bronze is a material manifestation 
of a verbal joke turned into a visual one. The installation The Stairs (2009) 
consists of several elements, which can vary from show to show: the bronze 
is mounted on the floor, an image of the original plaque in the Palm House 
is shown on the wall behind – either as slide-projection or as large paste-up 
of prints. Images of the view one has when sitting on the designated step 
complements the set-up: a dull cut-out of a few stems from low palm trees 
suggests the view Wittgenstein had when he sat there. Jokes, irony, humour 
and the like are delicate language-games and very hard to manage if we don’t 
want to ruin them. They are implied here, yet the matter is deeply serious: 
how do we deal with and pass on the biographical heritage of our idols? 
The Stairs
biographical 
heritage
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Image 68
Melzer: The Stairs, slide projection, installation detail, 2009 
Process Room, Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin 
presence vs absence
Image 67
Melzer: The Stairs, bronze, 2009 
Image 69
Melzer: Stairs, plaque 2009, 2013 installed at KUMU, Museum for contemporary Art, Tallinn, Estonia. photo by 
Arne Maasik
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Image 70
Melzer: The Stairs, rasterised photograph of view from the stairs where Wittgenstein ‘liked to sit and write’, 
Botanic Gardens, Glasnevin, paste-up, installation detail, 2010, Return Gallery, Goethe Institute, Dublin
Certainly, fact and fiction are important notions in this context. Witt-
genstein’s early work, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1922) has become a 
standard example for dedicating philosophical work to the examination and 
determination of what facts are. 
 In his later work Philosophical Investigations (1953) he generously 
reflects on the processes going on in a reader consulting a table or word list, 
the subject’s memory and the relation of both to what is ‘true’.
265. Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that
exists only in our imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify
the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we also to call it
a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the imagination?
—”Well, yes; then it is a subjective justification.”—But justification
consists in appealing to something independent.—”But surely I can
appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don’t know if I
have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check
it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn’t it the same
here?”—No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is
actually correct. If the mental image of the time-table could not itself
be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the
first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning
paper to assure himself that what it said was true.)
Looking up a table in the imagination is no more looking up a table
than the image of the result of an imagined experiment. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein 1953, # 265, my italics
Again, Wittgenstein offers various examples in order to show the situations 
we come across in the language-games he wants to address. The sentence in 
parentheses has struck me and it became the instruction for a new artwork.  
 The fragment of the quote was produced as a large rubber stamp, in 
English (2010, Dublin) and in German (2013, Zurich). During two public 
exhibitions (Turku 2009 & Zurich 2013), two identical local morning papers 
were bought and stamped on their front cover. The growing pile of the dou-
bled newspapers became absurd. We know from our experience of language-
games that the notion of truth cannot be verified by looking at the exact 
reproduction of the same information. A copy of something is always ‘true’ 
to its original. Moreover ‘facts’ in newspaper at best the result of interpreta-
tions and approximations of journalists. In the worst case, newspapers are 
instruments of manipulation or propaganda. 
presence vs absence
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Image 71
Melzer: Morningpaper, 2010 / 2013
rubber stamp. During public exhibitions, two identical local morningpapers are bought and displayed, stamped on 
their front cover. Exhibition Museum Bärengasse, Zurich. photo: Paul Brunner
23. FICTIONAL BIOGRAPHY 
The genre of biography is usually an in-depth record of someone’s life, work 
and personal experience. Usually it is nonfiction based on various testimo-
nies. ‘Fictional Biography’ is not a conventional term, yet the term ‘fictional 
autobiography’ has been coined to define novels about a fictional character 
written as though the character were writing their own biography, of which 
Daniel Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722), is an early example. Charles Dickens’ 
David Copperfield (1850) is another classic example as well as J.D. Salinger’s 
The Catcher in the Rye (1951). 
If the characters are not fictional and the facts not wholly invented, but pos-
sible continuations of a factual event where biographers have filled in the 
gaps, we might call this fictional biography. Artistic creation can augment 
the study of facts. Just as Glazova praised Davenport for his ‘fictive reality’ 
which does not only link up with factual events, but create possible continu-
ations of the historic moment1 (see chapter Meeting, p.201). Questions of sto-
rytelling, self-image and creation of myth are discussed centrally in this thesis. 
Now, the transitions between historic fact and literary fiction are examined. This 
examination is essential to the methodology of following a scientific procedure 
to then augment the facts at its borders with artistic interpretation. This method 
shows an important mechanism of how knowledge becomes material for a pos-
sible extension of facts in works of art.      
 This current section of the research focuses on transitions between fact 
and fiction, between history and story is constituted by comparing the authority 
of historic facts with (auto)biographical sources. The previous chapter and this 
present chapter clarify the notions of presence and absence, idols and myths in 
this research. It is core to the rational of the thesis that these mechanisms are im-
plemented into the thesis itself, as will be done in chapter 24 and 25, where the 
facts are implemented into artworks. This application shows issues of language 
being a shared activity between generations of (often anonymous) participants 
as introduced early on in the thesis with Edward Sapir calling language the ‘most 
massive and inclusive art we know, a mountainous and anonymous work of 
unconscious generations.’ (see p.46). 
 The practice-based visual work in this research tries to do the same: 
augment the study of facts. On the one hand, there are the artworks made to 
1 http://www.kafka.org/index.php?aid=227, accessed October 20 
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complement and complete the current research, on the other hand writers 
and artists from several disciplines were commissioned to amplify results 
from this research. These works are autonomous contributions responding 
to the idea of Ludwig and Gertrude meeting in language. The contributors 
were offered access to the research outcomes, the biographical comparisons 
and the Shared Vocabulary resulting from the contrastive corpus linguistic 
approach (see chapter CCL as Poetic Method, p.283). First, all biographi-
cal research outcomes were used to commission a text about the possible, 
but fictional, meeting of Ludwig and Gertrude taking place in the garden 
of Whitehead’s cottage in Lockeridge in 1914. As we know now from the 
research at hand, this was a location both Stein and Wittgenstein actually 
visited with only a one year time shift. Both professors Bertrand Russell and 
George Moore, as well as Alfred North Whitehead and Lytton Strachey were 
acquainted with Wittgenstein and Stein. Stein’s stay in the English country-
side in July 1914 is documented (Hobhouse 1975, Stein 1933), Wittgenstein’s 
short trip to England’s capital is recorded for the year before (Perloff 1996, 
p.257) and the same year (Monk 1990) as Gertrude’s longing for support 
to publish her novel  brought her back to England in 1914 just before the 
outbreak of World War I. As stated earlier, Stein was already in touch with 
Russel’s lover Lady Ottoline Morell (Hobhouse 1975). Wittgenstein’s short 
trip to London was motivated by his desire to see his friend Pinsent once 
more, before he himself went to fight in the Austrian army. (Monk 1990). 
 All relevant facts on life, work and social background of both Lud-
wig and Gertrude were made accessible to a so-called ghostwriter who wrote 
a short story highlighting the major conditions for the meeting possibly 
taking place at that time. The choice of a ghostwriter is functional. Firstly, 
as stated earlier, cooperation and dialogue (see chapter Dialogue, p.185) 
with other disciplines is in line with the methodology of this research. Since 
language is the subject matter in my artistic work, plus language is a shared 
activity, I seek different forms of collaboration within this research as well.  
 Secondly, the commissioned text is a tool for integrating issues 
facts about 
possible meeting
 fictional biography
on authorship (see Auto/biography, p.218). A ghostwriter is a professional 
writer, who is paid for writing on behalf of another person. The ghostwriter 
is in turn not credited for the text, which is an allusion to authorship and 
originality of language. 
 Thirdly, hiring an anonymous ghostwriter highlights a certain mo-
mentum of mystery (which is alluded to in Presence vs Absence, p.223) and 
of secrecy involved. This link will be examined further towards the end of 
this research (Secrets in Visual Works, p.375 and The Mystical, p.408).  
 Finally, making the collaboration with a ghostwriter official inter-
acts with the convention of concealing this rather awkward deal. It alludes to 
general conventions of property in language and rules of writing a thesis in 
particular. 
The short story ‘Evelyn Whitehead’s Country Club’ has been one source of 
inspiration for the autonomous artistic contributions. The works are con-
tributed especially for the framework of this thesis by Alicja Bielawska, Egle 
Budvytyte, Mithra Daryabegi, Sarai de Haan, Arjan van Helmond, Louis 
Lüthi, Kirsten McMahon, Alexandra Navratil, Frans Oosterhof, Leila Pea-
cock, Vanessa Piffaretti, Rachel Pimm, Ilse van Rijn and Curdin Tones.
24. EVELYN WHITEHEAD’S COUNTRY CLUB1
The county of Wiltshire in southwest England witnessed an unusually hot 
summer in 1914. Only in the West Woods it was pleasantly cool. Close to 
this cool forests lies Lockeridge, a village where Alfred North Whitehead, 
the British philosopher and mathematician, owned a cottage. Whitehead 
had just published his Principia Mathematica, a standard work on logic, on 
which he had been working for several years together with his friend Ber-
trand Russell. His wife had turned the cottage into an exceptionally beautiful 
country estate where he liked to retreat during the summer months recover-
1 July 2011 commissioned to a ghostwriter,  September 2011 translated by Emilie Stemle, based on research 
by Tine Melzer, 2008-2011
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ing from the bustling London city life. However, Evelyn Whitehead tried 
to keep up their social life even in the countryside, so that the London and 
Cambridge society used to meet in rural Lockeridge quite frequently. The 
guests of such an outing were usually Whitehead’s friends from London and 
Cambridge including among others, George Moore, Bertrand Russell, Lytton 
Strachey and John Maynard Keynes.
 It was exactly one year earlier, in August 1913 in Cambridge, that 
Whitehead and Russel met Ludwig Wittgenstein, Russell’s friend and fa-
vourite pupil, who informed his mentor about his latest discoveries which, 
according to Wittgenstein, would brighten ‘everything’. Whitehead’s wife 
Evelyn thought this earnest young man was amusing – sometimes he did 
not talk and then he talked incessantly – and she invited him to Lockeridge. 
Whitehead himself was not particularly enthusiastic about it even if he 
kept a stiff upper lip towards Wittgenstein and even pretended that – given 
Wittgenstein’s discoveries – probably the first part of his own Principia had 
to be rewritten, which he actually would never have done. Whitehead held 
Wittgenstein at bay, if possible. What he particularly declined was the abso-
lutism of the Austrian philosopher and his insistence that certain questions 
must not be asked. Moreover, Whitehead had the feeling that Wittgenstein’s 
way of dealing with philosophy would split science from philosophy where-
as, he himself aimed at a reconciliation. Russell, however, was thrilled with 
the idea to spend a few days with his beloved pupil Ludwig in the country-
side.  He loved this young impetuous, hidden engineer and saw in him the 
genius that would bring the next big advance in philosophy.
 Wittgenstein accepted Evelyn Whitehead’s invitation very reluc-
tantly. He was just about to leave for Norway where he wanted to spend 
the summer holidays with his friend David Pinsent. Furthermore, he hated 
such social obligations and expectations which life in Cambridge repeatedly 
brought about. His distaste for this sort of life was partly due to the shal-
lowness of human relations and partly to the almost unbearable conflict he 
was plunged in being always torn between adaptation and defence. Witt-
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genstein was deeply engrossed in logical problems. They were the heart and 
soul of his life leaving room for nothing else. Hence, he joined the circle of 
the Cambridge Apostles although he thought this circle was quite pedantic. 
And even the elect of Cambridge’s intellectual elite regarded Wittgenstein 
as an interesting and clever but in no way an exciting or brilliant young 
scientist. Lytton Strachey blatantly called Wittgenstein a wet blanket lack-
ing any humour. Actually Wittgenstein was not very popular, he could be 
quite exhausting and meetings with him were extremely difficult because he 
was in no way willing to have his basic convictions questioned. Anyone who 
wanted to talk to him had to share his beliefs.
 Around the same time, at least the same year – 1913 – there was 
the Armory Show1 in New York. The exhibited pictures by Matisse, Picasso, 
Brancusi, Léger, Braque, Duchamp and Kandinski sparked America’s  cu-
riosity for Paris where more of these pictures were shown. There were lots 
of American culture pilgrims – some of them in the Rue de Fleurus, where 
Gertrude Stein lived with her friend Alice B. Toklas and already possessed a 
considerable collection of Modern art. Gertrude was flattered and praised as 
an important member of international modernism. Everyone wanted to get 
into her legendary saloon in the Rue de Fleurus. But Gertrude was actually a 
writer and wanted to be perceived as such. In order to facilitate the publica-
tion of her book ‘Three Lives’ she went with Alice to London where she met 
John Lane, the publisher of Beardsley. Gertrude and Alice were popular 
guests in the London scene and so, once again, they met the Bloomsberries 
as well as the art patron Lady Ottoline Morrell, Bertrand Russell’s lover. They 
had lively discussions but a publisher for her book was not in sight.
 A defining characteristic of Alice B. Toklas was without doubt her 
tenacity. Every morning she sat at her desk and typed – neatly and meticu-
lously – the handwritten manuscripts Gertrude had written the night before. 
It was this perseverance of Alice which made Gertrude return to London 
one year later in July 1914 and knock again at Lane’s door. This time they 
were successful, John Lane was willing to enter into a contract for the pub-
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lication of ‘Three Lives’. With the contract being signed, Gertrude and Alice 
went to see friends in Cambridge, where they met Alfred North Whitehead 
whom Gertrude considered to be a genius. Whitehead was enthusiastic 
about Gertrude, this little woman who, when sitting down, looked like a 
living Buddha. She usually wore bulky shirts, long brown corduroy skirts, 
jackets with wide pockets, and special hats. Her whole solid appearance 
made her look neither masculine nor feminine; but somewhere in between. 
However, more impressive than her physical presence was her personality. 
She was lively, clearly articulating, affectionate, domineering and quarrel-
some. She tended to dominate all situations in the public and if somebody 
happened to push her into the background she did not stay there for a long 
time. She loved the social gathering with tea and liquor where her brilliant 
conversation could inspire the guests with awe. She took up idioms of her 
conversation partners unfolding them in a process of continuous associa-
tions. In this way she seemed to implant something of herself in any person 
she met. Something similar seemed to have happened during her encounter 
with Alfred North Whitehead with whom she could talk endlessly about 
philosophy and art. Whitehead invited the two American ladies to spend the 
weekend at his country estate in Lockeridge where Bertrand Russell, George 
Moore and the writer Lytton Strachey were also his guests. As it turned out 
later, the weekend was to last for several weeks.
 As already mentioned, Russell and Wittgenstein had met in White-
head’s cottage almost precisely a year before. Shortly his stay at Whitehead’s 
cottage in 1913, Wittgenstein left for Norway, where he lived for a long time 
in solitude on the Sognefjord north of Bergen. Norway meant a huge relief 
to Wittgenstein because there, he could deal just with himself or – which 
was almost synonymous – deal with logic.
 Wanting to escape the tourist season in Norway Witttgenstein left 
the country in June 1914. First he went to see his family in Austria, subse-
quently he wanted to go on holiday with Pinsent. During his stay in Austria 
in the summer of 1914 he could not wait to donate part of his inherited 
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fortune – his father had died in early 1913 – to artists in need. The distribu-
tion of the amount of 100,000 crowns was entrusted to Ludwig von Ficker, 
editor of the magazine Der Brenner and praised by Karl Kraus. In July, after 
the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the political situation 
grew more and more critical and the European powers were mobilizing. 
Nevertheless, Wittgenstein and Pinsent made an appointment for the 24th 
of August at the Grand Hotel at Trafalgar Square in London. During the 
weekend, as Wittgenstein and Ficker discussed the allocation issue, the fate 
of Austria-Hungary had been sealed. The ultimatum that was made to Serbia 
was due on 25th July at 6 pm. The deadline passed and Austria declared war 
on Serbia on 28th July. In these late, definitely too hot days of July 1914 the 
discussions in Whitehead’s cottage revolved almost exclusively around the 
political situation in Europe and during the weekend of 4th August the news 
about the German invasion in Belgium was spread. A strange atmosphere 
prevailed among the guests. 
 Otherwise normal and well-established social conventions were 
ignored in a peculiar way in the wake of an overwhelming fear and uncer-
tainty. The mood ranged from a strange mixture of plain patriotism, roman-
tic crusade euphoria and the naive expectation that the forthcoming military 
action will solve in one way or another all those problems that had piled up 
during peaceful times. It was Whitehead who became particularly addicted 
to the general delirium while Russell and Strachey vehemently spread their 
pacifist ideology. It was impossible for Russell to believe that Europe could 
be as insane as to plunge into a war and he was convinced that England 
would get involved. Unlike Whitehead, Russell was of the opinion that 
England should remain neutral. As a pacifist he was convinced that war was 
something imposed on hesitant people by their despotic Machiavellian gov-
ernments. Gertrude’s opinion was in great demand and Russell considered 
her views typically American. So far, she had given little thought to such 
matters and now, in these first days of war, she was just very nervous looking 
forward to an uncertain future in a foreign country.
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 Meanwhile, Wittgenstein was anxious to leave Austria in order to 
meet Pinsent in London on August 24 as they had agreed upon. When he 
was denied an exit permit he volunteered for the army. But due to a double 
hernia, which had still not healed and had led to his discharge one year 
before, his application was delayed. Without hesitation, Wittgenstein seized 
the opportunity and snatching up the most necessary things fought his way 
through to England. Before being engaged in the real warfare he tried to 
remove the deep misunderstandings which severely affected his once so 
friendly relationship with Moore. During Wittgenstein’s stay in Norway 
Moore had paid him a visit. Back in Cambridge, Moore made inquiries – on 
behalf of Wittgenstein – whether his logic was sufficient for a master’s thesis. 
However, the work was not accepted in Cambridge; it did not meet the 
examination regulations because of several formal errors. Moore informed 
Wittgenstein who could not believe it. His work – ‘the next great advance in 
philosophy’ – as it was described by Russell, should not deserve a master’s 
degree? That was too much.  He gave vent to his feelings in an angry, sarcas-
tic letter to Moore declaring the end of their friendship. However, Moore felt 
attacked and wrongly so. Moreover, Wittgenstein had not struck the right 
tone which deeply offended Moore. The injustice made Moore so angry that 
he felt physically sick. He left the letter unanswered and did not answer to a 
contrite letter written by Wittgenstein from Vienna on 3rd July. Wittgenstein 
was keen on clarifying his relationship with Moore before going to war. So 
he hoped to meet Moore in Cambridge.
 It was an extremely hot day in Lockeridge and the guests in White-
head’s cottage were sitting together under the big, shady trees in the garden. 
Everybody tried to get some distraction. Russell casually questioned Moore 
on the whereabouts of Wittgenstein, as he was slightly worried about his 
former pupil, when Gertrude joined them. Moore was talking about his dis-
pute with Wittgenstein and that last letter to which he was unlikely to reply 
since, he really did not want to see him again. Russell was taken by surprise, 
he did not know anything about this dispute. Though, he himself had been 
 evelyn whitehead’s country club
having a difficult relationship with his former protégé for some time. Witt-
genstein and Russell did not share the same values and ideals which made 
itself evident in their different attitude towards war. The former was keen 
on getting into the trenches, the latter was lecturing on war. Wittgenstein 
did not believe that war was the only possibility to save civilization, nor that 
it could renew human society. He did not at all believe in such things as to 
save and preserve civilization or to protect values. All these terms were ut-
terly unfamiliar to him. The only thing he was interested in was his own per-
sonal development and improvement – war was for him an opportunity to 
become a changed man. With Russell it was quite different: in the first days 
of war he wrote pamphlet after pamphlet analysing the steps that should be 
taken to end the war as soon as possible, always assuming that an enlight-
ened Europe would put national interests for the benefit of all above its own 
interests. Wittgenstein had nothing but cynicism for Russell’s idea that such 
a cultural ‘progress’ would be possible.
 The conversation between Russell and Moore made Gertrude prick 
her ears. She was craving for topics that would shift the threat of war onto 
a personal level; and she was fond of gossiping with Russell about mutual 
acquaintances. She already knew Wittgenstein by hearsay, Evelyn Whitehead 
had mentioned his name a few times. When she asked Strachey whether 
Wittgenstein was a member of the Apostles and why she had not made his 
acquaintance yet, he said that she would probably not enjoy ‘Mr. Sinckel-
Winckel’ because he was so bright but so boring – quelle souffrance! With 
his all-pervasive falsetto attracting everybody’s attention Strachey was just 
in top form when a young man with a serious face and an energetic step 
approached the party. He walked directly to Moore who jumped up from 
his chair and gave Wittgenstein a warm welcome. Still engrossed in her 
conversation with Strachey Gertrude had not noticed him at first. She was 
just about to go inside – it was time for her afternoon tea. But Wittgenstein 
was talking so forcefully and vigorously to Moore that she got aware of him 
and turned around to him. Their eyes met for a brief moment. Wittgenstein, 
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however, did not seem to notice her. With a fixed glance, his lips pressed 
together he seemed to stare right through her and instantly turned back to 
Moore talking to him persuasively. Moore tried to stop him, so he could 
introduce him to Gertrude, but Wittgenstein showed no interest at all. Lady 
Stein was obviously not used to such behaviour. Everyone, literally really 
everyone wanted to make her acquaintance. Such lack of interest in her per-
son went hard with her. Russell tried to save the situation taking her by the 
arm and leading her into the saloon where tea was being served.  
 He told her that Wittgenstein was really unbearable and had bad 
manners but he could turn a blind eye to Wittgenstein’s mistakes because he 
was really very fond of him and highly appreciated his philosophical work. 
Lady Stein asked what this terrible German was working on. Russell told her 
Wittgenstein was an Austrian concerned with the philosophy of language, 
with complex logical problems which he himself, unfortunately, could not 
solve. But he thought Wittgenstein’s real ambition was to investigate the use 
of ordinary, everyday language and its impact on our knowledge. Slowing 
down her steps, Gertrude tried to turn her massive body as unobtrusively 
as possible towards Wittgenstein. She wanted to take another look at this 
peculiar man who repelled and interested her at the same time. A slight tug 
on Russell’s arm made him tighten his grip so he could support her while 
they were going upstairs to the saloon. He expected the next great advance 
in philosophy to come from this former engineer, and he considered him to 
be a genius he continued to inform her. But Gertrude was hardly impressed 
by his words.  She rather let him understand that she preferred having her 
beloved tea without this vain peacock. To her mind the seats reserved for 
geniuses were already taken by Santanyana, James, Whitehead and of course, 
Stein. Perhaps she unconsciously realised that Wittgenstein and herself were 
quite similar in certain respects, so similar that there was no room for both 
of them.
 Contrary to her hopes Wittgenstein was invited to tea but he fol-
lowed the guests only very reluctantly. After all, he still wanted to meet 
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Pinsent but he had not finished with Moore yet, so he could easily be 
persuaded. In the saloon there was a very cheerful mood with lively conver-
sations. Engrossed in a conversation with Russell and Whitehead, Gertrude 
was the attraction of the whole party while Wittgenstein, quite detached, 
was standing at the entrance violently shaking his head as the maid offered 
him tea and raisin scones. With constant stomach problems and his dislike 
for tea he did not care  much for food. He preferred coffee, strong and aro-
matic1. Gertrude had just polished off her third raisin scone washing it down 
with a sip of steaming tea. She was speaking a lot and during her speech she 
seemed to acquire a rhythm of her own. Just for a moment, the futility of the 
beginning war was thrust into the background – otherwise it was the topic 
which permeated all the discussions in Lockeridge during this summer. It 
did not seem to be important for Gertrude what she was saying, she was just 
interested in the words themselves. This is because when a sentence is called 
senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of 
words is being excluded from the language, it is ‘language gone on holiday’. 
Wittgenstein had already slipped away. There was nothing left for him to 
do. He wanted to go to war, but first he wanted to meet Pinsent once more. 
This meeting was never to happen and Wittgenstein was not the only one to 
become a different man during this war.
1 note Wittgenstein’s remark on coffe in the Philosophical Investigations #610: ‘Describe the aroma of coffee.—
Why can’t it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking?—But how do we get the idea 
that such a description must after ail be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you 
tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?’
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25. AUTONOMOUS CONTRIBUTIONS
The reproduced work has been commissioned to selected writers and artists 
during the last phase of the research. Each work has autonomous status and 
is fully credited to the author. The approach is deliberately multiple and var-
ies from straightforward illustration of the suggested meeting to independ-
ent re-interpretation of the concept of ‘meeting in language’. The contribu-
tors reacted directly on the short story Evelyn Whitehead’s Country Club 
or were offered access to other research material. Originally, the word lists 
attained by the procedure of intersecting the vocabularies of Wittgenstein’s 
and Stein’s writing were prepared to be the primary source of inspiration 
for the autonomous contributions; in the course of the research, however, 
in most cases, the short story crystallised as more accessible and ready to 
extend into several disciplines. I want to thank all contributors once more 
for their valuable work. 
Contributions by Alicja Bielawska (PL) p.266-275, Egle Budvytyte (LT) 
p.243, Mithra Daryabegi (D) p.244-245, Sarai de Haan (NL) p.260-265, 
Arjan van Helmond (NL) p.256-257, Louis Lüthi (NL) p.249-251, Kirsten 
McMahon (D) p.246-247, Alexandra Navratil (CH) p.248, Frans Oosterhof 
(NL) p.279-280, Leila Peacock (UK) p.276-277, Vanessa Piffaretti (CH) 
p.252-254, Rachel Pimm (UK) p.259, Ilse van Rijn (NL) p.255, and Curdin 
Tones (CH) p.278.
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Image 72
Egle Budvytyte: Ludwig & Gertrude, digital collage, 2011
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Image 73
Mithra Daryabegi: The Meeting, graphic illustration, 2011
The illustration by 
Mithra Daryabegi 
was commissioned 
on the basis of the 
surpreme moment 
of Ludwig and 
Gertrude almost 
meeting in White-
head’s garden. On 
the left, Moore still 
stands up after 
having tried to 
introduce them to 
each other in vain.  
Centrally on the 
background we see 
Strachey lounging 
in a garden chair. 
Russell on the right 
tries to lead Stein 
away, Wittgenstein 
unimpressed and 
absent-minded. 
The portraits for 
the illustration 
were gathered 
from various 
archives and 
online sources 
to approach the 
actual age and 
appearance of the 
people meeting for 
the year 1914.
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Image 73
Kirsten McMahon: Neighbours, sketch, 2013
The architect 
Kirsten 
McMahon suggests 
a semi-detached 
house for the two 
neighbours Stein 
and Wittgenstein. 
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Image 74
Alexandra Navratil: Antagonists, photographs, 2011
The images in 
Alexandra Navra-
til’s contribution 
are selected from 
her capacious 
image archive. 
She mainly was 
inspired by the 
sentence ‘Perhaps 
she unconsciously 
realized that 
Wittgenstein and 
herself were quite 
similar in certain 
respects, so similar 
that there was no 
room for both of 
them.’ 
She immediately 
associated it with 
the medieval relief 
where two oppos-
ing figures share 
one head. Their 
posture is one of 
competition or 
confrontation, yet 
also an attitutude 
of equilibrium. 
And as they share 
one head they 
are congenial, 
even though 
antagonists, this 
is how Navratil 
understands their 
meeting. This 
also relates to the 
tensions as well 
as the lethargy 
in the advent of 
WW I. In the 
other image, the 
words NEWS and 
GIFTS are central 
for Navratil as for 
her they are both 
expressions of the 
same economical 
circuit, yet they 
follow different 
rules of circulation 
of ideas and social 
relationships. She 
is aware of the 
mirror axis in the 
images and strong 
vertical symmetry.
Small Objects Such as Shells
A man came out of the room, a carafe of hot coffee in his hand. That’s his wife over there, 
there’s a boy sitting on the step. “He gave you a flower?” the boy asked. I guess she was blind to 
the realities of her position. The opposite slopes glassed themselves in the deep dark water.
More data of this kind would be valuable. On the table, laid out in a straight line, were  
a glass of lemonade, bread, and butter. Cousinhood, that is, relatives sitting with arms folded, 
and on tv the spectacle of a city’s mass grief. “I found the letter in her bag,” he said. “And did 
you steam it open?” I said nothing, thinking: It is strange how things change. For I knew she had 
written down every single word, the hurt of being constantly ignored. But he, too, said nothing. 
After a while I looked up. There was some color back in his face. He lived in Deep River now,  
I was told: red and black tiles, flower arrangements, the public school system smashed to 
smithereens. Everything pointed to an eastern attack, or so it was claimed, roundly. 
I thought back on all the people I met … “Listen to this,” the hostess had said by way of 
introduction, “she not only wrote the text but also researched the photographs.” Still, all in all 
it was just an ordinary evening. Q: “How was it?” A: “Not so bad.” Though unordered, at one 
o’clock in the morning. Maybe I’ll regret it but I hope not. A man, a soldier, remarked: “Some 
people resemble their dogs.” Who was he? I have done the best I could, I reasoned, and I am 
willing to pay the difference (whatever the difference might be). With that I rose from the table, 
famished and single-minded. The moon was waxing or waning. She was not at the window. 
Then, all of a sudden, she stood at the window looking at the town spread out below.
*   *   *
The verandas were glazed in, trees and grass were glittering with dew. Five cents: he had been 
robbed of what little money he had. There once was a man, a nickel … At the break of day, every 
day, we thus fashion things anew, working backwards if need be. Out in the hallway it was dark 
and muggy. Downstairs was a room with two beds in it—there must be something wrong—and 
suggestions so originally and persuasively outlined. I stood at the threshold, undecided, while 
voices rose and fell, and rose and fell. We really should get rid of some stuff first, though: the 
days of the week, a degree or two of sincerity, the covers. I.e., various inhibitions.
A Virginia creeper was just beginning to change from green to gold, she saw it clearly  
in the rearview mirror. His appearance, on the other hand, was basically that of an undergrown 
man. “Are there,” he asked, “any castles in this area? It’s part of human nature to be attracted 
to that which is aesthetically pleasing.” We both scanned the horizon. The sky was turning red; 
fault lines had weakened and shattered the rocks. During the early hours of the morning it had 
seemed like an act of heroism, true, yet the more she thought about it, the more devastating the 
gesture, as such, became. In the zoological gardens the ferns began to change shape. He had 
the impression that someone was watching him. Indeed, someone was coming. “I’m quite—” 
There she stopped (because all that was long ago, before the war). “Is anything wrong?” she  
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Louis Lüthi: Small Objects Such as Shells, prose poem composed by replacing each word of the opening 
section of Gertrude Stein’s ‘Tender Buttons’ with its example sentence in the Oxford English Dictionary, 
2011
Lüthi’s work is a 
collage-like prose 
piece that circles 
around a meeting 
between a “he” and 
a “she,” at a soirée of 
sorts. On a sentence 
level, it is a mix of 
assorted idioms, 
which has to do 
with it being the re-
sult of the following 
procedure: he took 
the beginning of 
Stein’s ‘Tender But-
tons’ and, progress-
ing word by word, 
chose a dictionary 
sentence example 
for each word (there 
are often several). 
So for example, 
the title is derived 
from a sentence 
example for the 
word ‘Object’, which 
is the first section’s 
heading. ‘A’ gives 
‘A man came out of 
the room’, ‘carafe’ 
gives ‘a carafe of hot 
coffee’, and so on. 
Lüthi rewrote it (‘a 
carafe of hot coffee 
in his hand’) in or-
der to make it more 
coherent, or rather, 
less incoherent, so 
that a way of read-
ing is hinted at but 
never completely 
resolved, as it were. 
Part of that has to 
do with the unspe-
cific nature – or the 
odd detail – of these 
types of sentences 
(for instance, the 
word ‘coffee’ comes 
up several times). 
There are, however, 
a few key-words 
that resonate with 
the lives of Stein 
and Wittgenstein: 
soldier, teacher, 
hostess, music, 
not-knowing. 
Which grounds it, 
I think, in relation 
to a larger subject, 
namely that of 
language, of ‘ordi-
nary’ language and 
language games. Or 
some such.
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was asked, more out of courtesy than of concern. “No.” I tried to blend in with the crowd.  
Hugh will be searching for the truth; one cannot but sympathize. 
There invariably comes a point where you give up. For instance, I wanted to be a teacher. 
Pretty ridiculous, I know, but there it is. On reflection it’s possible, I had to admit, that we have 
misunderstood each other. So I looked through her belongings in the hope of coming across 
some information. It wan an arduous, thankless chore. “From now on,” I said, “I will try and do 
what she says, honest.” He seemed pleased, then, that for the time being I was determined to 
continue with the task (this action is of course open to a number of interpretations). Besides, 
I’ll visit again sometime, slowly but surely manipulating the public. Any fool knows that. And 
she’ll be waiting. Unwelcome attentions from men—such as the sometime editor of the paper, 
there on the right—would result, however, if I were to lose face. Which is to be expected,  
really. The soldier sighed, his breath hanging like a cloud in the icy air.
I cried and cried. Forty months, there or thereabouts, had elapsed since I was last here. 
Accidents will happen, it is said. I was a kid, mowing the Orton’s lawn ten hours each summer, 
and I cut myself on the blade. “Is a sinecure” she asked, “a line of men marching two and two?” 
Nevertheless, people were captivated by her charm, very much so. Gesturing, he declared: “The 
hidden charms of the city are that big, perhaps even bigger.” (He’s from Missouri.) I remember: 
keep the wound clean. I remember: All human conduct is determined or caused—but there 
are causes and causes. A cleansing cream was procured. “A good idea,” she agreed. Her eyes were 
glittering with excitement. “Certainly!” My leg was better in no time. The doctor’s been here 
twice today—I wonder whether anyone else noticed? A handsome gift for the hostess appeared 
out of nowhere, and now to dessert, as on nbc our team cruised to a convincing win. 
*   *   *
We went on to Paris and stayed there eleven days. “Be careful,” Mr. Carter had said; I paid him 
no mind. To tell the truth, it was no easy job persuading her. But in the end she expressed her 
gratitude to the committee for their support, for dressing in their Sunday best. His death was in 
a way a mercy. Coffee and a scone of sorts for brunch, in the garrulous company of a woman in 
her thirties. “Your doctor will be able to prescribe medicines,” she assured me. “There, there, 
you must take all of this philosophically.” “Can you open the window?” I asked. For my part  
I was glad when September came. It is said elopers leave minor breakages behind them. 
Presently the admiral, a person of Japanese descent, breezed in. We need more people 
like that, upstanding subjects, what with it being Christmas soon. During the performance she 
leaned across the aisle and whispered: “This is boring.” “No, it’s not,” I replied, “the program 
includes Dvorˇák’s New World Symphony!” So I let her spend all that money on me, it was easily, 
shamefully, done. Unfortunately they were no more able to perform the task than I was, even 
though the lights flickered and changed color: R, G, B. Music is my chosen avocation and said 
approach I found refreshing because it breaks down barriers. Still, she was anxious to be off. 
Out of spite I thought: I’ll stay as long as I choose, observing this influx of tourists. Mannerisms, 
headgear, geometric structures: everything here seems to have been constructed yesterday. 
Image 75b
Louis Lüthi: Small Objects Such as Shells, prose poem composed by replacing each word of the opening 
section of Gertrude Stein’s ‘Tender Buttons’ with its example sentence in the Oxford English Dictionary, 
2011
What are we going to do about that? The muscles of her jaws showed white through the skin. 
She turned around and walked out. It began to spit.
Perhaps I should have been frank with him, when I had the chance. When she took her 
washing around to the launderette, for instance. As it was, I felt more and more like an outsider 
whereas he was always polished and charming. This, then, is the main point or difficulty. But it 
certainly isn’t worth risking your life over. On the mantel was a postcard showing the Wicklow 
Mountains, conjuring up scenarios for which there is no excuse. “Remember,” he wrote in his 
pad, “no obligation may be placed upon you without your consent.” At last count, one hundred 
and fifty bedrooms he’d slept in. Perhaps not surprisingly, he was cautious about committing 
himself. “If you had stayed,” she said, waving her hand, “this—the borrowing of clothes and 
whatnot—would never have happened.” I don’t agree with you there, I told myself.
The pain of not knowing exists. Natural disasters such as earthquakes exist. I collapsed 
on an ottoman. All humanity, it seems, is fallen. “Let him be,” said the soldier, adding: “if you 
want whiskey I’ll give you some.” “I could use another cup of coffee,” I said. In due course the 
assembled company went upstairs and knocked at the door, but there was no one in. 
All who have given thought to the matter agree: the mind cannot but wander.
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Louis Lüthi: Small Objects Such as Shells, prose poem composed by replacing each word of the opening 
section of Gertrude Stein’s ‘Tender Buttons’ with its example sentence in the Oxford English Dictionary, 
2011
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Image 76 a-c
Vanessa Piffaretti: Wittgenstein & Stein 1,2,3, collages, 2011
Vanessa Piffaretti 
contributed three 
collages based on 
the oeuvre she 
has developped in 
2010 and 2011. 
The playful and 
yet precise formal 
logic of the works 
alludes to the simi-
larities between 
Wittgenstein 
and Stein in an 
accessible way.  
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Image 77
Ilse van Rijn: Ambush, text, 2012
 autonomous contributions
Notes:
Danilo Kis, 
Garden, ashes, 
2003 [1975], first 
published in 1965. 
In his essay on 
Post-Yugoslav 
literature ‘The 
Return of History 
and the Actuality 
of Fiction’ Guido 
Snel juxtaposes 
Kis’s Garden, 
ashes and W. G. 
Sebald’s ‘most 
ambitious and 
perhaps most 
obsessive’ novel 
Austerlitz (2001), 
which ‘seems 
unimaginable 
without Kis’s 
explorations of 
the distinctions 
between fact and 
fiction.’ In: Thomas 
Vaessens and Yra 
van Dijk (ed.), 
Reconsidering the 
Postmodern. Eu-
ropean Literature 
Beyond Relativ-
ism. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam 
University Press, 
2011, p.130
Ambush
There it was, sitting at the bottom of the page. I had been leafing through the book, silently savouring each 
and every word, enjoying the syntactical order, the rhythmical construction of the sentences hiding a clear 
and unambiguous point of view. In Danilo Kis’s Garden, ashes unrealities take over. Masks prevail, roles 
change, true faces are concealed. Well before turning into an account of ‘my father, the story of the gifted 
Eduard Scham’ and the embodiment of simulations, Andi, his son, the narrator of the story and alter ego of 
the writer describes the situation of the Scham family during the first years of the Second World War, living 
in the former Yugoslavia close to the Hungarian border. The child delves the details which make up the uni-
verse in which personal and historical drama eventually take place. He draws the narrow rim of a tray, the 
barely visible grease which has collected around its tiny decorative protuberances. He tries to catch hold of 
the wings of the angel of sleep, to catch sleep in the act, in flagrante delicto, as it were. Throughout the book 
Andi doesn’t tire of ‘setting an ambush’ for the ephemeral and the invisible, for the muddy, the magical 
and for the dream. Facts are several and diverse. One day, when the Scham family comes home after a trip 
into the fields, the boy’s gaze falls on his mother’s Singer sewing machine, ‘next to the door, by the window’. 
Andi scrutinizes the machine’s arches, treadle and flywheel. He tries to comprehend it’s mechanism and to 
read its name. Then an image of the sewing machine is inserted in the narrative. For the reader it comes 
natural, although on a textual level you begin to question whether the meticulous and patient literary de-
scription were saturated, whether it couldn’t touch upon what the boy meant. So you return to the image, to 
the combination of text and image, to the image again, figuring there, at the bottom of the page.  
  
Do the careful analysis and the image of the apparatus evade or supplement each other? Do text and image 
double each other or do they contradict? The mere sight of the drawing makes you alert, as if the picture 
were the ambush set by the son who doesn’t trust language and words. To Andi, the incised letters of the 
name Singer, for instance, initially look like gigantic spiders. On closer examination he discovers the em-
blem to be visually repeating the machine’s inner workings. Language reveals itself as an image, the image-
as/and-language approaches the literal, mechanical and unvisible kernel of what it names. However, neither 
the emblem nor other image-words like ‘The Singer Manfg. Co.-Trade Mark’ which appear in bas-relief 
on all sides ‘as though the machine were a coin,’ are sufficient to pinpoint what the sewing machine is to 
the boy. Within the context of the long train trip from which he has just returned, he only hears the sound 
of the sewing machine which seems to be working to him. ‘I could hear the wheels buzzing along and the 
axles sliding softly, softly.’ The child sees the sewing machine and sees it as something else. He dislocates the 
sewing machine and understands the train, the vehicle’s movement and sound. And vice versa, hearing the 
rattling train or the illusion thereof he commences to interpret the sewing machine as a symbol for home. 
Of this last fact (sewing machine = home) the kid is bitterly reminded when he comes across the drawing 
up of the inventory of the family’s (?) belongings later on.
‘Eine Singermaschine!’
‘Ja.’
The object becomes part of the ‘enormous pile of junk, this onetime wealth suddenly deprived of meaning 
or context, [which] passes from hand to hand [italics IvR].’ At first, as to Andi’s personal point of view the 
referred to loss of meaning or context is imminent and understandable. His home is dealt with, carried 
away by foreign hands. However, we are outside of the four walls of the Scham’s home. This scene is another 
one, literally, that is. However painful, within the shifted circumstances the sewing machine functions 
otherwise. The thing gains another meaning. Andi hates to lose the machine, their treasure, but he loves the 
play of words. 
In Garden, ashes the limits of the child’s language are transgressed, one could say. Whereas before the 
sewing machine led Andi to rediscover his house (sewing machine = home), or, as his sister Anna would 
have it, ‘our room!’, now he learns to understand the apparatus as an object among many, as one of those 
reliquiae reliquiarum loaded on a cart. The once familiar becomes strange to him, a realization underlined 
by the foreign language with which the presence of the sewing machine is represented or announced. Even 
the repetition of the name Singer doesn’t conceal the felt, apparent or imaginary, difference between the 
mother’s sewing machine and the object in the inventory. The name doesn’t refer anymore to that particu-
lar object, standing on their table covered with a Hungarian lace cloth. The term participates in another 
sequence. The name ‘Eine Singermaschine!’ is traded with, as the answer resounds: ‘Ja.’ The more Andi be-
comes aware of the limits of his language, the more he becomes aware of the limits of his world. Language 
mystifies or plays you a trick, in other words. Things hide in the shadows of language. They are elsewhere, 
they are different than they seem.
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Image 78
Arjan van Helmond: Props, 2011, 90 x 51 cm, acrylic and gouache on paper
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Rachel Pimm’s
writing echoes
Gertrude Stein’s
strategy of Tender
Buttons (1914).
The language used
to describe the 
transference of 
liquids through
homewares
on a dinner table
takes on double
meanings.
Image 80
Rachel Pimm: Soft Bottom, 2012. 
1:Excerpt from Objects, Gertrude Stein, Tender Buttons, 1914
The Placemat
It is round, and it sits around, it takes up space and yet it doesn’t get in the way. It is 
hidden between 2 hard places. A softer middle to hold the 2 hard things together. The 
solid reliable flat big hard thing under all other things, and the shiny brittle hard things 
which need the soft.
The Plate
This is nearly flat and round. It is concave, but it finds its place in the round thing that 
sits beneath it.  It is hard. Brittle hard. It sounds clean, and it shines with emptiness, 
but it can’t be empty because it is flat and has no internal space. It has a bottom and 
anything which goes on top will meet it at its bottom. That is the secret to contain-
ment, is to locate the things to be contained at the bottom.
The Cutlery
The shapes are 4-tined, oblong and serrated, round and concave, and bigger and 
smaller. These shapes are meant to touch against a softer shape, which gives way. Not 
soft like my hand – softer. My hand is medium soft and the fingers wrap around the 
thing. One hand at a time even though there are 5 things and only 2 hands. It is made 
for touching but it is not nice to touch. No, the side that touches the softer thing is not 
nice and the side that touched the medium soft thing- the me part, is just as hard but 
somehow softer itself.
The Carafe
A kind if glass and a cousin, a spectacle and nothing strange a single hurt color and an 
arrangement in a system to pointing. All this and not ordinary, not unordered in not 
resembling. The difference is spreading.1
The Wine Goblet
It is 6 of the same thing but I can’t think of 6 of the same things at once so now it is 
just one thing. It’s a pink one but also a see through one I wrap my fingers around. 
The fingers wrap a bit around without touching. 3 millimetre rings don’t tell me age. 
Nothing tells me nothing. I am looking for a joining line but there isn’t one. It is a 
cylinder but a cone too.
It is heavier at the bottom. But everything is heavier at the bottom, or feels heavier at 
the bottom because that’s where the heavy feels. That’s where the heavy sits. It is this 
heavy that tells the contents where to go to.
 The contents are see-through but look pink. They look pink in the thing but 
they aren’t pink and don’t look pink on their way into the thing. The see-through is 
transparent going in and formed in the weighted bottom. Its shape isn’t perfectly 
solid, it has bubbles. Bubbles from going in.
 The bubbles sit on the rings. Maybe this tells me age. Age of function. The 
function in which the see-through gets into the bottom then back out of the bottom.
It gets out of the bottom by making the bottom no longer the bottom. My fingers 
rotate around my wrist and the top slowly becomes the side which slowly becomes the 
bottom, all the while with the see-through finding the bottom.
The sidemost part of the topmost ring, which is now the bottom most part of the side-
most ring is hard. It is hard so that it can touch against the soft. The soft is a seal and 
a carrier, and it also becomes part of the bottom. The see-through finds the soft and 
leaves the pink see-though hard thing, measuring itself over the rings.
The Bowl
It is an empty centrepiece for nothing. It is a see through one I wrap my fingers around. 
The fingers wrap a bit without touching. It is a ball but a hole as well. It sounds tinny. 
It sounds tiny. Inside the bowl it sounds rounder. It sounds like the inside of the bowl. 
The inside of the bowl speaks to the air around it. Now that the sound is that the bot-
tom, the very bottom.
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Image 79
Tine Melzer: Wittgen Stein, 2012. Homage to Beat Gloor.
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Sarai de Haan: Air, Between, Essential, Fact, If, text, 2012  
Story by:
Sarai de Haan
Titles:
Air
Between
Essential
Fact
If
Translation by:
Justin Gosker
Reference 
material:
Story written by 
a ghostwriter 
commissioned by 
and on the basis of 
research conducted 
by Tine Melzer.
The five selected 
words are from 
the Shared 
Vocabulary of 
Ludwig Wittgen-
stein and Gertrude 
Stein.
Introduced by
a fragment from 
the novel: 
The real life of 
Sebastian Knight 
by Vladimir 
Nabokov
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Image 81b
Sarai de Haan: Air, text, 2012  
Air
The man stepped in. He wore a long black coat. He held a suitcase in his hand. 
Once in the taxi, his gaze fell on the big woman looking intentionally out the 
other window. The passing cars seemed to disinterest her. There was a dog lay-
ing on her lap. The animal hid its head deep in the lady's fur coat. She turned 
her head to the tall man stepping in. Acknowledging him, she nodded, and he 
relaxed into the warm taxi. During the ride, he kept looking at the bald spot on 
the back of the taxi driver’s head. 
Mumbling to the head, the head nodded. She didn't understand his destination. 
The lady had been in a rush and had left the hotel too late this morning, and 
with the traffic at a stand still, she couldn't get away. The rain slammed against 
the taxi windows. The engine of the Mercedes drowned out the clatter of the 
rain against the car. The man didn't hear either sounds. 
He looked troubled and tired. The lady wondered if he was on his way to a fu-
neral. His face was pale. His hands appeared purple. Noticing her looking at his 
hands, he pushed them deep in the pockets of his black coat. Inconspicuously 
removing his hands, reaching for the buttons of his coat, he buttoned it shut and 
slid his hands back into his pockets. While patting her dog, she watched and fol-
lowed his movements. Her curiosity grew such that there came a moment that 
she had to know. Who is this man and where is he going? What interested her 
about him? 
He said nothing. What did this woman in her horrid fur coat want? And what 
an ugly beast lying on her lap. His day had started with the bus company strike. 
He was cold and couldn't really relax. The fat woman took in more than half 
of the already small space. He would be leaving the country this afternoon. It’s 
raining, people are running past each other through the rain. He feels nau-
seous and misunderstood. The bald man promised to drive directly to John F. 
Kennedy, where he will catch his flight. 
He left the house on time. It was on the eight-o-clock news that he heard about 
the bus company strike. He thought now about the newspaper article that took 
his attention this morning. 
He closed his eyes. He felt her body against his. He pushed his knees together 
to make more space for himself; the woman took up all the space. He was stuck 
between the door and the woman. He thought of opening the car door and 
hurling himself on the asphalt. 
Story writing by:
Sarai de Haan
Titles:
Air, Between, Essential, Fact, If
Translation by:
Justin Gosker
Reference material: 
Story written by a ghostwriter commissioned by and on the basis of research 
conducted by Tine Melzer.
The five selected words from the word list. This list is collected by Tine Melzer 
in cooperation with cognitive scientist Egon Stemle.
Air
Between
Essential
Fact
If
A fragment from the novel: The real life of Sebastian Knight by Vladimir Nabokov
‘The meeting is or seems accidental: both happen to use the same car belonging 
to an amiable stranger on a day the buses went on strike. The author’s task is to 
find out how his formula has been arrived at; and all the magic and force of his 
art are summoned in order to discover the exact way in which two lines of life 
were made to come into contact.
The odds seem unlimited. Several obvious lines of inquiry are followed with 
varying success.
Thus we are forced to assume that the outward circumstances of the meeting 
are not samples of fat’s activity in regard to two subjects but a given entity, a 
fixed point, of no causal import; and so, with a clear conscience we turn to the 
problem of why Q and the girl Anne of all people were made to come and stand 
side by side for a minute on the kerb at that particular spot. So the girl’s line of 
fate is traced back for a time, then the man’s, notes are compared, and then again 
both lives are followed up in turn.
We learn a number of curious things. The two lines which have finally tapered 
to the point of meeting are really not the straight lines of a triangle which 
diverge steadily towards an unknown base, but wavy lines, now running wide 
apart, now almost touching. In other words there have been at least two occa-
sions in these two people’s lives when unknowingly to one another they all met.
But every time, a minute mistake (the shadow of a flaw, stopped hole of an un-
watched possibility, a caprice of free will) spoils the necessitarian’s pleasure and 
the two lives are diverging again with increased rapidity.’
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Essential
The man stepped in. He wore a long black coat. Once in the taxi, his gaze fell 
on the big woman. A small dog lay beside her. The lady had been in a rush and 
had left the hotel too late this morning, and with the traffic at a stand still, she 
couldn’t get away. The hotel bed had kept her warm. The sound of the engine 
drowned out the rain clattering against the four-door Mercedes. They both 
ended up in the sympathetic taxi driver’s car on the day of the bus company 
strike. He drove them directly to the airport. 
She had the feeling that she had seen him before. Yesterday, she had been lying 
in bed in her hotel room. Bored, she had surfed the television channels. She 
felt too awake to sleep and too exhausted to go back to the conversation in the 
lounge, that was probably still going on. Having left the three of them talking, 
she had gone to her room. The boring three-way-conversation irritated her. 
The men had excluded her from dialogue. She had gone upstairs without say-
ing goodbye. Earlier, she had left the balcony door open. The carpet was still 
wet when she returned. A damned rain shower had passed over the city all of 
a sudden. She closed the doors and placed a white towel under the curtain. She 
intended to postpone packing her bags. The tv took up her time. She looked 
only at people’s heads and mouths. She flipped through the book she had writ-
ten and put it down again. The presentation had gone well. Not exceptionally 
well. People seemed to be impressed. But people often appear impressed even 
though they’re not. She spoke about the process of writing her novel and the 
loss of her close girlfriend. Her lecture is a game and she prides herself in play-
ing it well. Where does she know him from? Her gaze rests on his expression-
less face. Maybe I saw him on television yesterday, on a talk show. Though he 
does not seem like a talker. 
I have seen her before. At home. Not in this country. It’s only on occasion and 
with resistance that he goes to a party. People approach him if they fail to see 
his wall. An idiot will ask about his research. Old friends still greet him, but 
that’s it. There are exceptions. There are friends that he likes to talk to. Though 
these are few. This small group is important to him. They have accepted him. 
They have helped. They’re critical and don’t believe just anything, they keep 
questioning. The woman next to him held her nose high. 
Indeed, perhaps she had been at one of those parties. He could not have missed 
this big woman. She puffed up her cheeks and then relaxed them again. Weird.
Maybe I met him at a party with all those fabulous nice people.
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Sarai de Haan: Between, text, 2012  
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Sarai de Haan: Essential, text, 2012  
Between
The man stepped in. He wore a long black coat. Once in the taxi, his gaze fell 
on the big woman. A small dog lay beside her. He sank into the warm taxi. 
His day had started with the bus company strike. He was cold and couldn’t 
really relax. The fat woman took in more than half of the already small space. 
Reading a woman’s magazine, the woman next to him was unaware he’d gotten 
in the taxi. It was pouring rain outside, and the sound of the drops becoming 
ever more present made her look up. Silently, the door closed and locked. The 
cold had already entered. The lady had been in a rush and had left the hotel too 
late this morning, and with the traffic at a stand still, she couldn’t get away. 
The hotel bed had kept her warm. 
‘To the airport,’ said the man. The rain slammed against the taxi windows. The 
engine of the Mercedes drowned out the clatter of the rain against the car. 
As the taxi driver pushed the peddle in, the car started to move. There where a 
lot of people on the street, all on their way to work. The woman continued read-
ing her magazine as the traffic passed on either side of the car. With its head 
towards the man the dog seemed to sigh, releasing a nasty smell. ‘Good day,’ 
the man said politely. The middle-aged woman replied alike. The backbench of 
the car was full. 
Moving, he reached in his jacket, his bag and his trousers. He said something 
but she didn’t understand. ‘Have you lost something?’ she asked. ‘My keys,’ 
said the man, more to himself than as a reply to her question. She watched him 
first turn his pockets inside out, then empty his bag in his lap, lifting him self 
to reach his back pockets, his head pushed against the ceiling of the car, causing 
all the stuff on his lap to fall on the car floor. He cursed. Keeping her finger on 
the page she was reading, the woman closed her magazine. ‘Stay calm,’ said the 
woman. ‘Where did you last see your keys?’ Why doesn’t she mind her own 
business, he thought. 
‘The last time I used them was to lock my front door,’ he said. ‘I went down 
the stairs, then I went back because I forgot the address of where I need to go. 
I went upstairs, opened the door again and went downstairs, once I had locked 
the door for the second time. That’s where I met my neighbour. I asked her not 
to forget to water the plants and said goodbye. She wished me a pleasant trip 
and then I probably put the keys in my pocket as I picked up my bags that 
where already at the bottom of the stairs, prior to running upstairs to get the 
address that was still on the kitchen counter.’ ‘If I understand correctly you put 
your keys in your trouser pocket.’ The man thought about this. ‘Yes I think so. 
Well, I can’t remember any other place. Or I left the keys in the bathroom, be-
cause when I picked up my luggage, I thought I’d better go before… Ah never 
mind.’ ‘Could you not call your neighbour and ask if she saw them?’ ‘But what 
if they slipped out of my pocket before I stepped into the taxi, between the car 
door and the sidewalk.’ ‘Then they’re on the street, or in the gutter.’ 
He bent forward collecting his belongings that had fallen under the bench. Look-
ing at the man, the woman shook her head and continued reading where she 
had left off. With irritation the man searched under the drivers seat. Listening, 
the driver asked calmly ‘Should I go back?’ ‘No!’ yelled the head from under 
the drivers seat. ‘Fine,’ replied the driver.
‘I have your keys,’ said the woman. ‘My dog was sitting on them.’ Red in the 
face, he accepted the keys. He glared angrily at the dog. 
‘He didn’t do anything to you,’ said the woman disapprovingly. ‘They probably 
fell out of your pocket when you got in. They were here,’ pointing to where the 
reeking dog had been lying. 
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If
What if a man wearing a long black coat steps into a taxi that has stopped for 
him. What if he had just stepped out of his hotel. Where he didn’t need to greet 
anyone. Where he could pack his suitcase in his own time. It was in the hotel 
restaurant that he drank his last coffee before leaving. It’s pouring with rain 
outside. Later the rain will be slamming against the taxi windows. The sound 
of the engine will drown out the rain clattering against the four door Mercedes. 
There was quiet music playing in the business bar. From his bar stool the man 
looked into the dining room. It was empty. The bread laid out ready. He closed 
his long coat and left. Raindrops rested on his black coat. He waited on the 
sidewalk with his suitcase above his head. A young woman ran out of the hotel. 
Wildly looking around, she went towards the man. As the taxi stopped he 
looked at the woman. Unable to understand her he turned to open the door of 
the vehicle. With a swing he sank into the taxi. The woman waved at the taxi 
with the man’s keys. Inside the taxi, looking via the rearview mirror his gaze fell 
on the friendly taxi driver. During the ride he kept looking at the bald spot on 
the back of the taxi drivers head. The bald man in front of him had promised to 
drive directly to John F. Kennedy, where he would catch his flight. 
There were a lot of people on the street with sombre faces. Men with coats 
above their heads and briefcases firmly pressed against their chests, all on their 
way to work. Crying children held their mothers arm on their way to school. 
The traffic passed on both sides of the car. 
The car slowed down next to the sidewalk. The man in the back seat looked at 
his watch. The plane would leave in two and a half hours, he’ll be there in good 
time. He closed his eyes. Honking cars surrounded him. He opened his eyes and 
looked at the woman who had just gotten in. The woman wearing a summer 
dress smiled warmly. She was dressed too lightly for the wet weather. Her long 
blond hair fell like strings, she pressed her hair behind her ears. 
He looked at her as she intentionally looked out of the other window. The pas- 
sing cars seemed to disinterest her. Her face and hands where red. She noticed 
him looking at her hands. With her hands she slid her hair behind her ears. Con-
templating, she placed her hands on her lap. As she leaned forward, reaching for 
the magazine in her bag, her hair fell in front of her eyes. She tried repeatedly 
to clear her hair from her eyes. He observed these consecutive gestures. Now 
he leant forward to get a towel from his suitcase. Without saying anything he 
gave her the towel. She accepted it and thanked him. She dried her face. Her wet 
dress didn’t keep her warm at all. She continued to read her magazine. 
He started telling her, she looked up, about the bus company strike and the 
morning newspaper article that had grabbed his attention. 
Listening and once he’d finished, she told him that she’d left the hotel room late 
this morning. She was in a rush and the traffic was at a standstill. She, just like him, 
couldn’t get away because the bed in the hotel room had kept them both warm. 
She laughed at the joke he made. She picked up the towel. 
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Sarai de Haan: Fact, text, 2012  
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Sarai de Haan: If, text, 2012  
Fact
The man stepped in. He wore a long black coat. Once in the taxi, his gaze fell 
on the big woman. He sank into the warm taxi. During the ride he kept looking 
at the bald spot on the back of the taxi drivers head. The two adults in the back 
seat said nothing. 
The city is filled with taxis driving to and fro with tourists, residents and animals. 
Five hundred taxis a day depart from the sidewalk where the paths of these two 
strangers met. Why of all places x and y came to stand next to each other, for 
that moment on that precise spot on the sidewalk. The chances seem infinite. 
Three hundred of the five hundred taxi’s passengers drive directly to John F. 
Kennedy to make their connection to another country or city. More then half 
leave for business trips, a little less then half go on vacation and the rest emigrate 
to a new home base. 
The rain slammed against the taxi windows. The engine of the Mercedes drowned 
out the clatter of the rain against the car. Autumn had brought rain. Streets as 
sheets of glass had only four hours to dry. However it wasn’t worth it, big 
drops slammed against the asphalt. Sombre faces passed on the street. Men with 
coats above their heads and briefcases firmly pressed against their chests. Cry-
ing children holding their mothers arm on their way to school. Indoors they’re 
dry, going to school is no fun. 
The woman watches a mother with three children catch up with the taxi. 
Standstill. Traffic jam. The woman can’t stand being stuck. She left the house 
late this morning. She’s in a rush and the traffic is not moving. Getting out and 
walking is not an option, it’s raining and the airport is too far by foot. She looks 
at the traffic sign above the road reading the number of kilometres repeatedly. 
Like when you read a newspaper article hanging in the toilet, after a week you 
know it by heart. 
It seems as though all the traffic has gathered in this traffic jam. Moving as in a 
slow march, it makes its way out of the city. The man in the back seat looks at 
his watch. The plane leaves in two and a half hours, he’ll be there in good time. 
His wet coat doesn’t keep him warm. He closes his eyes. Honking cars sur-
round him. Opening his eyes he looks at the woman next to him. 
She had been observing him while he had his eyes closed. She continues looking. 
He closes his eyes again, she can look if she wants. She watches his eyes flicker 
whilst closed. They flicker in response to the light passing the car window. She 
sits on the shaded side. His nostrils move. He breathes calmly. The dog yawns. 
The airplane also leaves without her. 
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Alicja Bielawska: air, drawing, 2012  
The five selected 
words are from 
the Shared 
Vocabulary of 
Ludwig Wittgen-
stein and Gertrude 
Stein.
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Image 82b
Alicja Bielawska: between, drawing, 2012  
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Image 82c
Alicja Bielawska: essential, drawing, 2012  
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Image 82 d
Alicja Bielawska: if, drawing, 2012  
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Image 82e
Alicja Bielawska: fact, drawing, 2012  
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Image 83a
Leila Peacock: The Semiotics of a Silence that became a Story, 2013 
text work
Image 83b
Leila Peacock: The Semiotics of a Silence that became a Story, 2013 
text work
The semiotics of a silence that became a story. 
 
In art it is hard to say anything as good as saying nothing 
 
Inside every story there is an expectant space. This space is negatively 
defined by all this things that the reader feels could happen in the story but 
don’t. It is an expectant space through which the author cuts a diagonal 
line, dragging the myriad alternate possibilities in it’s wake, you cannot 
imagine the story without the space.  
 
So here is a space and this space is present in it’s silence. The sound of a 
thing unsaid. The impossible sound of a possible moment.  
 
This silence can be brought to bear. How do you express the inexpressible 
where the inexpressible can only be shown. What are the semiotics of a 
silence when this silence becomes a story. 
 
This is a re-reading of a ghostly re-writing of a retrieved moment from a 
possible reality in which two minds – in tune – may have met and conversed 
about nothing-in-particular. This story tells of a very particular nothing.  
 
Things may occur on the ‘spur of a moment’ but to inverse the proverb, a 
moment may have spurs, by which it sticks to a continuous present. These 
‘spurred moments’ continue to resonate and create contexts around them 
independent of any real sequence of events. 
 
Between historical fiction and philosophical fantasy, this is the story of one 
of modern language’s greatest silences, between two people who struggled 
so resolutely with the limitation of language, who struggled with what 
language could and could not mean, mapping its labyrinths until they 
located that electrifying linguistic boundary between expressing what is and 
is not known.  
 
Here is represented their failure to have had the conversation that they 
could have had. Here it is reduced to the petty rivalries of two great egos 
passing like icebreakers in the night. The silence between them is pure 
expectant space.  
 
Two Teutonic thinkers set adrift amongst the nauseating snobbery of 
Britain’s pasty elite, where meetings of great minds where engineered by 
great wives, who extended invites to postulate for the weekend, quenched 
by endless tea. A place where Wittgenstein stuck out like a disconsolate 
Walrus who’d rather be contemplating distant fjords, than making polite 
conversation in England’s green and pleasant lands. Where people would 
pick politely at his ideas like a parade of peacocks. This is where 
Modernism had a membership and you could join if the cut of your teeth 
was the right angle.  
 
Just as philosophy shares so much with poetical conceits, so do concepts 
operate like characters in this metaphorical pastoral. Wittgenstein and Stein 
become puppets, stock types in a miracle play about the forging of a new 
language. He the wiry Austrian, hostile, shy, lacking any capacity for small 
talk, stuttering in utter earnest, no one’s idea of fun company. Stein his 
antigen, loud, large, loquacious, eager to challenge and entertain and 
perhaps dominate. 
  
He pioneered logic in an illogical time; Europe on the brink of fracture, the 
great and devastating undoing the result of a new mechanized warfare that 
the Futurists could not have imagined in their wildest nightmares. 
Wittgenstein’s own logic proved awry, a champion of war before, but not 
after, he fought in one. He was soon to be broken, unable to publish more 
than his sole and seminal tract. 
 
She was an American in Europe, one of that Parisian clan. Pioneering a 
new form of English in a foreign land, liberating the language in French 
exile. Stein forged new dimensions in the familiar: losing, refusing, pleasing, 
betraying and caressing her own nouns. And here she was in a leafy 
English garden, no doubt talking about the new art of writing that defied its 
own reading.  
 
The climax of their silence has the rhetoric of unrequited romance, their eyes 
meet and he turns away, affronted she continues to hold court, enjoying the 
admiration of lesser minds.  
 
Both experts of the games we play with language, her words enacted so 
many of his ideas, his ideas were so akin to her use of words. These two 
mighty figureheads of speech could (but probably didn’t) have had a 
conversation that would have made sense of making sense and then 
deconstructed that sensical construction using the very tools that demarcated 
its coherence. But how can you know what you think until you have heard 
what you are going to say? And so we are left once more with a pregnant 
silence, heavy with the weight of such a promising abyss. And here we are 
describing the thing unsaid, wherein lies the essence of language’s power: 
to delineate those aspects of itself that are beyond it’s own power to 
express. Find the outlines of the void and draw. So this story is left to 
adumbrate with perpetual, and unrequited, promise. 
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Image 85a
Frans Oosterhof: Ludwig und Gertrude, 2012
ABCDE
FGH I J K
LMNOP
QRSTU
VWXYZ
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Image 84
Curdin Tones: Flies on a Window, for Ludwig and Gertrude, photograph, 2012  
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Frans Oosterhof: Ludwig und Gertrude, 2012
ABCDE
FGH I J K
LMNOP
QRSTU
VWXYZ
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Image 86a
Tine Melzer: Meeting in Evelyn Whitehaed’s Garden, map with hole, 2013. Drawing based on a map of Europe 
1914. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/
europe_1914 
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26. CCL AS POETIC METHOD
Apart from these artistic contributions, there has been a high degree of col-
laboration throughout many elements of this research. And of course the 
practice-based works rely on teamwork with colleagues and the readiness of 
participants to contribute their language experiences (i.e. Palace of Colours, 
p.90, What’s in a name, p.112, Naming, p.135). The enduring support from 
the cognitive scientist Egon Stemle in the work on the Shared Vocabulary of 
Ludwig and Gertrude was invaluable, and it is due to his tireless attempts to 
realise this vocabulary by means of contrastive corpus linguistics, that such 
word lists now exist. Since Stemle noticed my consistent interest in ques-
tions from his own professional field, his input has continued to influence 
my artistic work thoroughly. The meeting points in our collaborations lie in 
our strong fascination with language and the pleasure of sharing it across 
disciplines – which again is only possible through practicing a shared lan-
guage.
 The desired research outcome at the beginning of this research was 
twofold. On the one hand, the comparison of the lives and work of Ludwig 
and Gertrude and their mutual positions in language philosophy and poetry 
needed to be adumbrated. On the other hand, their literal heritage, in the 
form of the words they used, promised to present us with exact coordinates 
for a meeting in language. Each word they share, each vocable they both used 
and the list of words they have in common offers a corpus of locations where 
they literally meet. This collection of all words Wittgenstein and Stein have 
in common is called their Shared Vocabulary.
 Once we consider Ludwig and Gertrude as a case study, we may 
apply the method to other authors and literal works. The proposed proce-
dure of comparing linguistic corpora in order to enable encounters between 
authors could become its own cross-referential methodology. This pos-
sibility for analysis simultaneously becomes a poetic method for devising a 
meeting amongst any two writers. This procedure is a new contribution to 
collaboration as 
artistic strategy
contrastive 
approach as 
method for 
meeting literally 
contribution to 
knowledge
ccl as poetic method autonomous contributions
Image 86b
Tine Melzer: Meeting in Evelyn Whitehaed’s Garden, map with hole, 2013. Drawing based on a map of Europe 
1914. (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5-2.0-1.0)], www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/eu-
rope_1914 
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knowledge. In this thesis, a journey into contrastive corpus linguistics and 
computing is in turn charged with the hope of drawing poetic conclusions 
as well as analytical ones. The alliance between poetry and philosophy (see 
Jakobson and Perloff in chapter Shifting Names, p.147) and the hybrid nature 
of the background of my work in general combines in the realization and 
implications of this Shared Vocabulary. 
At this point of the research, two aspects come together – their work as peo-
ple and their language as heritage. 
 Firstly, we may conclude the examination of the biographical traces 
left by Ludwig and Gertrude presented us with a realistic possibility for their 
meeting. This is expressed in the overlap of places and time periods. The 
summer cottage in Lockeridge, England, acts as an ideal container for that 
meeting, disregarding other possible locations. A house in which both were 
guests sparks the imagination, the rooms they both moved through, the beds 
they slept in, the table they sat at and the cups they drank from. 
 Secondly, the network of people and the network of words become 
a metaphor for the location of both: people and words. This fragment calls 
to mind the statement of the contemporary linguist Michael Lewis quoted 
earlier, that words and people show similar patterns of occurrence.
‘Words are like people.’ 
(Lewis 2001, see p.55)
 
 As language-users they share a certain vocabulary – as we all 
do when engaging in language-games. In this research verbal and visual 
language-games mirror each other, where reflective and artistic methods 
intertwine. The Shared Vocabulary, this particular list of words, is therefore 
both a tool to identify meeting points in language by contemporary methods 
of linguistic computation, as well as becoming the source of an autonomous 
conceptual artistic gesture.
 As this research is rooted in the arts and addresses the heterog-
enous public of language users, not of linguists, the technical details of the 
a house as 
container
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contrastive corpus linguistic (CCL) approach will be kept to the essentials. 
And once the major verbal criteria for the lists has been generated, the lists 
become sources for poetic interpretation. Finally, the thesis is supplemented 
with two works which embody poetic interpretations: One is a large-format 
silk screen print in the back-pocket, which shows the Shared Vocabulary 
analogue to Basic English: A General Introduction with Rules and Grammar 
(1930) by Wittgenstein’s publisher, Charles Kay Ogden. The other work is 
the booklet Ludwig & Gertrude, displaying the realised actuality Shared 
Vocabulary in a novel format.
  The discussion will turn to the role of the ‘word’ in both philosophy 
and poesis (from Greek poesis ‘composition, poetry’, from poein ‘to make or 
compose’). Until now this research has collected ways to characterise ordi-
nary language highlighting relevant issues of returning interest in Wittgen-
stein’s work. Now we turn to the core of the thesis, where research becomes 
practice. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein here meet posthumously 
in their Shared Vocabulary, which uses CCL as poetic method. Wittgenstein 
and Stein act as a model case for applying the comparison of corpora as a 
creative method: the procedure can be applied to any other writers in the 
same way. So, this case study exemplifies CCL as a tool to augment knowl-
edge both in linguistics and the arts. Before we look at the generated Shared 
Vocabulary, which prepares CCL as poetic method, we need to prepare the 
process of contrasting corpora. 
27. CONTRASTING CORPORA 
This next section of the research details the applied work, where artistic 
practice is generated by tools from linguistics. When setting out to gather 
material for comparing the written heritage of Ludwig and Gertrude, there 
were several decisions to be taken concerning the selection of their literal 
literary heritage. 
Wittgenstein’s 
literal literary 
heritage
contrasting corpora
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 The initial idea of creating a comprehensive list of all words both 
authors ever wrote was soon abandoned due to the discrepancies in pub-
lished work of both writers. As stated earlier, Wittgenstein only published 
the work Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus (1922) during his life-time, while 
his second and last authorised publication Philosophical Investigations (1933) 
appeared shortly after his death. All other posthumous publications have 
been edited and assembled into a more or less authentic body of works by 
his followers, i.e. the philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe (who translated Philo-
sophical Investigations, 1933). Many publications rely on student’s notes of 
Wittgenstein’s lectures at Cambridge and elsewhere or are edited from lose 
unpublished notes (i.e. Remarks On Colour / Bemerkungen über die Farben, 
1991, ed. by G.E.M.Anscombe 1977 or Zettel (1967/2007). 
 For Wittgenstein’s corpus, only the ‘authorised’ works were used. 
For Gertrude Stein, on the other hand, we find a long list of publications, 
both of articles and entire books, some of which number over 1000 pages 
(The Making of Americans, written 1906-1908, published 1925). Wittgen-
stein, in contrast, was very sparing with words and opposed his first pub-
lisher Ogden’s request to add supplements in order to make the book ‘fatter’. 
‘ “There can be no thought of printing them’, he told Ogden. ’’The supplements are 
exactly what must not be printed. Besides THEY REALLY CONTAIN NO ELUCI-
DATIONS AT ALL, but are still less clear than the rest of my props.” ‘ 
(Monk 1990, p.207)
The feisty reply he send has become prime example for his solitary attitude: 
‘ “As for the shortness of the book I am awfully sorry for it; but what can I do? If 
you were to squeeze me like a lemon you would get nothing more out of me. To let 
you print the Ergänzungen would not be a remedy. It would be just as if you had 
gone to a joiner and ordered a table and he had made the table too short and now 
would sell you the shavings and sawdust and other rubbish along with the table to 
make up for its shortness. (Rather than print the Ergänzungen to make the book 
fatter leave a dozen white sheets for the reader to swear into when he has pur-
chased the book and can’t understand it.)” ‘
(Monk 1990, p.207)
This discrepancy between Ludwig’s stinginess with words and Gertrude’s 
abundance of them had to be dealt with in one of two ways: either to gather 
Stein’s abundance
Wittgenstein’s 
brevity
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all of the vast material by Stein and compare it to the rather thin booklets 
by Wittgenstein. Which would make Wittgenstein’s writing the measuring 
stick for the Shared Vocabulary. In other words, if one compares the text of 
a personal address book with all phone books, it is likely the first one will be 
represented quite well in the second one. The second option was to find two 
representative works which are of approximately the same length. The latter 
method was used for reasons of feasibility and clarity. 
 Within the formal conditions which apply, another major issue was 
the source language: The words in the corpus have  to be authorised and 
need to be genuinely theirs. Now we know that Wittgenstein wrote the first 
version of Tractatus in his mother-tongue, German. It was the fact that he 
could not find an Austrian publisher at first forced him to work on a transla-
tion for the first publication in English. This translation was started by an 
undergraduate student Ramsey, a relative of the publisher Ogden, in 1921. 
Wittgenstein worked word by word over the translation, he was concerned 
to: 
‘(...)relax the literalness of Ramsey’s translation. Not only was he forced to define 
particular German words and phrases; he also had to explain what he meant by 
them and then find an English expression that captured the same meaning and 
tone. Thus, to a certain extent, the English version is not simply a translation from 
the German, but a reformulation of Wittgenstein’s ideas.’ 
(Monk 1990, p.205-206)
This observation is vital for the authenticity of the words used in the pub-
lication of Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus in English because it justifies 
English as a ‘source language’ for CCL. This fact solved a problem which 
threatened the comparison of Wittgenstein’s and Stein’s vocabularies at the 
outset of the research. The contrastive approach naturally works only within 
one language, as the German word ‘rot’ and its translation ‘red’ would not be 
recognised by this method even if signifying the same colour. At this point 
it is appropriate to mention, that the British writer and linguist Charles Kay 
Ogden was not only the publisher of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico-Philo-
sophicus, but also the linguist who gave us the famous Basic English (1930). 
This artificial English-based controlled language is also known as Simple 
criteria for 
comparison
source language 
of Tractatus
Ogden’s 
Basic English
 contrasting corpora
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Basic english
Operations (100 words) come, get, give, go, keep, let, make, put, seem, take, be, do, have, say, see, send, may, will; about, 
across, after, against, among, at, before, between, by, down, from, in, off, on, over, through, to, under, up, with; as, for, of, 
till, than; a, the, all, any, every, little, much, no, other, some, such, that, this, I, he (she), you (me, we), who (which, what); and, 
because, but, or, if, though, while, how, when, where, why; again, ever, far, forward, here, near, now, out, still, then, there, 
together, well; almost, enough, even, not, only, quite, so, very, tomorrow, yesterday; north, south, east, west, please, yes.
Things (400 general words) account, act, addition, adjustment, advertisement, agreement, air, amount, amusement, animal, 
answer, apparatus, approval, argument, art, attack, attempt, attention, attraction, authority, back, balance, base, behavior, 
belief, birth, bit, bite, blood, blow, body, brass, bread, breath, brother, building, burn, burst, business, butter, canvas, care, 
cause, chalk, chance, change, cloth, coal, color, comfort, committee, company, comparison, competition, condition, connection, 
control, cook, copper, copy, cork, cotton, cough, country, cover, crack, credit, crime, crush, cry, current, curve, damage, danger, 
daughter, day, death, debt, decision, degree, design, desire, destruction, detail, development, digestion, direction, discovery, 
discussion, disease, disgust, distance, distribution, division, doubt, drink, driving, dust, earth, edge, education, effect, end, error, 
event, example, exchange, existence, expansion, experience, expert, fact, fall, family, father, fear, feeling, fiction, field, fight, 
fire, flame, flight, flower, fold, food, force, form, friend, front, fruit, glass, gold, government, grain, grass, grip, group, growth, 
guide, harbor, harmony, hate, hearing, heat, help, history, hole, hope, hour, humor, ice, idea, impulse, increase, industry, ink, 
insect, instrument, insurance, interest, invention, iron, jelly, join, journey, judge, jump, kick, kiss, knowledge, land, language, 
laugh, law, lead, learning, leather, letter, level, lift, light, limit, linen, liquid, list, look, loss, love, machine, man, manager, 
mark, market, mass, meal, measure, meat, meeting, memory, metal, middle, milk, mind, mine, minute, mist, money, month, 
morning, mother, motion, mountain, move, music, name, nation, need, news, night, noise, note, number, observation, offer, oil, 
operation, opinion, order, organization, ornament, owner, page, pain, paint, paper, part, paste, payment, peace, person, place, 
plant, play, pleasure, point, poison, polish, porter, position, powder, power, price, print, process, produce, profit, property, 
prose, protest, pull, punishment, purpose, push, quality, question, rain, range, rate, ray, reaction, reading, reason, record, regret, 
relation, religion, representative, request, respect, rest, reward, rhythm, rice, river, road, roll, room, rub, rule, run, salt, sand, 
scale, science, sea, seat, secretary, selection, self, sense, servant, sex, shade, shake, shame, shock, side, sign, silk, silver, sister, size, 
sky, sleep, slip, slope, smash, smell, smile, smoke, sneeze, snow, soap, society, son, song, sort, sound, soup, space, stage, start, 
statement, steam, steel, step, stitch, stone, stop, story, stretch, structure, substance, sugar, suggestion, summer, support, surprise, 
swim, system, talk, taste, tax, teaching, tendency, test, theory, thing, thought, thunder, time, tin, top, touch, trade, transport, 
trick, trouble, turn, twist, unit, use, value, verse, vessel, view, voice, walk, war, wash, waste, water, wave, wax, way, weather, 
week, weight, wind, wine, winter, woman, wood, wool, word, work, wound, writing, year.
Things (200 picturable words) angle, ant, apple, arch, arm, army, baby, bag, ball, band, basin, basket, bath, bed, bee, bell, 
berry, bird, blade, board, boat, bone, book, boot, bottle, box, boy, brain, brake, branch, brick, bridge, brush, bucket, bulb, 
button, cake, camera, card, cart, carriage, cat, chain, cheese, chest, chin, church, circle, clock, cloud, coat, collar, comb, cord, 
cow, cup, curtain, cushion, dog, door, drain, drawer, dress, drop, ear, egg, engine, eye, face, farm, feather, finger, fish, flag, floor, 
fly, foot, fork, fowl, frame, garden, girl, glove, goat, gun, hair, hammer, hand, hat, head, heart, hook, horn, horse, hospital, 
house, island, jewel, kettle, key, knee, knife, knot, leaf, leg, library, line, lip, lock, map, match, monkey, moon, mouth, muscle, 
nail, neck, needle, nerve, net, nose, nut, office, orange, oven, parcel, pen, pencil, picture, pig, pin, pipe, plane, plate, plough/plow, 
pocket, pot, potato, prison, pump, rail, rat, receipt, ring, rod, roof, root, sail, school, scissors, screw, seed, sheep, shelf, ship, 
shirt, shoe, skin, skirt, snake, sock, spade, sponge, spoon, spring, square, stamp, star, station, stem, stick, stocking, stomach, 
store, street, sun, table, tail, thread, throat, thumb, ticket, toe, tongue, tooth, town, train, tray, tree, trousers, umbrella, wall, 
watch, wheel, whip, whistle, window, wing, wire, worm.
Qualities (100 general words) able, acid, angry, automatic, beautiful, black, boiling, bright, broken, brown, cheap, chemical, 
chief, clean, clear, common, complex, conscious, cut, deep, dependent, early, elastic, electric, equal, fat, fertile, first, fixed, flat, 
free, frequent, full, general, good, great, grey/gray, hanging, happy, hard, healthy, high, hollow, important, kind, like, living, 
long, male, married, material, medical, military, natural, necessary, new, normal, open, parallel, past, physical, political, poor, 
possible, present, private, probable, quick, quiet, ready, red, regular, responsible, right, round, same, second, separate, serious, 
sharp, smooth, sticky, stiff, straight, strong, sudden, sweet, tall, thick, tight, tired, true, violent, waiting, warm, wet, wide, wise, 
yellow, young.
Qualities (50 opposites) awake, bad, bent, bitter, blue, certain, cold, complete, cruel, dark, dead, dear, delicate, different, 
dirty, dry, false, feeble, female, foolish, future, green, ill, last, late, left, loose, loud, low, mixed, narrow, old, opposite, public, 
rough, sad, safe, secret, short, shut, simple, slow, small, soft, solid, special, strange, thin, white, wrong.
  proper nouns, exclamations (text specific) Anna, Aryan, Catholic, Civis, Dane, Dublin, Eblanensis, Etrurian, Hircus, Joe, 
John, Latin, Livia, Norwegian, Plurabelle, Sanskrit, Suffolk, Trinity, Vico; ah, hey, o.
rules of grammar 
	 1. Plurals are formed with a trailing -s. The normal exceptions of standard English apply, notably -es and -ies (men, women).
	 2. There are four derivatives for the 300 nouns: -er and -ing, and two adjectives: -ing and -ed.
	 3. Adverbs use -ly from qualifiers.
 4. Degree is expressed with more and most. Be prepared to find -er and -est in common usage.
 5. Negative adjectives are formed with un-.
 6. Questions are formed by inversion and by do.
 7. Operators and pronouns conjugate in full (had; coming; gives; are, is, was, were; my, your, his, her, its, their, our).
 8. Compound words may be combined from two nouns (milkman) or a noun and a directive (sundown).
	 9.	Measurement, numerals, currency, calendar, and international terms are in English form (two, seven; chemist).
	 10. Technical expressions required and customary for the immediate task are included in the locally used form.
Charles Kay Ogden, Basic English, 1930
Image 87
Louis Lüthi: Basic Anna Livia Plurabelle, 2008/2011
1 Lüthi’s whole document is published in the secion ‘visual poetry’ at Ubuweb, www.ubu.com/vp 
2 The ccl method has been applied by the cognitive scientist Egon Stemle.
3 http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/5740, first accessed 16 October 2009
4 http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/15396, first accessed 16 October 2009
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English and is a radically simplified form of the English language.
It was designed mainly for purposes of teaching English as a second lan-
guage. ‘Basic English’ is still inspiring contemporary artists and designers. 
The reduction of English to a few hundred words and the simplification of 
the grammar to almost graphic relations inspired the typographer and de-
signer Louis Lüthi to make an artist’s book called Basic English in 2003. He 
gave permission to reprint a new issue of his version of Basic English in the 
context of this research and contributed an autonomous text based on this 
research (see p.239-241).
 Lüthi’s Basic Anna Livia Plurabelle uses the Basic English translation 
of a passage from Joyce’s Finnegans Wake. It is the first page of the 24-page 
document1, and it ‘reads’: “Ah, but she was a strange little old woman, 
anyhow, Anna Livia, with drops from her toes.” The numbers in the bottom 
right corner give the corresponding page number and line of the original, 
which in this case is page 215, lines 12–13. The original reads: “Ah, but she 
was the queer old skeowsha anyhow, Anna Livia, trinkettoes.” 
 As stated earlier, Ogden’s Basic English is also referenced in the silk 
screen print Basic Shared Vocabulary (2013) as a practice-based conclusion 
included in this research. The work uses the design from Ogden’s layout, but 
it lists the words of a Shared Vocabulary from Wittgenstein and Stein. The 
list has been generated by overlapping the source texts by both writers with 
the CCL method.2 These words were then sorted, according to Ogden’s cat-
egories, into operations, things (general or pictured) and qualities (general 
or opposites). 
 In order to overlap both texts, the examined corpora have to be 
available in digital form. For Wittgenstein, the digital version of Tractatus-
Logico-Philosophicus (1922) is obtainable be obtained online from the 
Gutenberg Project3. For Stein I used Tender Buttons. Objects—Food—Rooms  
(1914), also from the Gutenberg Project4. The former amounts to approxi-
mately 25,000 words, the latter contains around 20,000 words. That means 
that both works are more or less comparable in length and both are high-
profile publications. 
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1 This work inspired the text work by Tine Melzer in the publication ‘The Royalty Issue’ (Prisma (ed.), Pif-
faretti, Melzer, 2012) on p.446) as well as the contribution ‘Soft Bottom’ by Rachel Pimm (2012) on p.259.
Stein’s 
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contrasting corpora
Image 88
Gertrude Stein: Tender Buttons, 1914, p.14
What is the contrastive corpus approach? The ‘lexical approach’ (Lewis 
2001) is based on the habitual connection of a certain word with another 
word with a frequency greater than chance (i.e. strong + coffee). Often, the 
models to explain it remain metaphorical and visual-based. 
‘The corpus approach runs counter to Noam Chomsky’s view that real 
language is riddled with performance-related errors, thus requiring careful analysis 
of small speech samples obtained in a highly controlled laboratory setting.’1
In 2004, Egon Stemle introduced me to the method of contrastive corpus 
linguistics via an online project by the University of Leipzig2. The pro-
gramme is fed from a vast number of texts from all obtainable digital sourc-
es such as newspaper articles, books, and internet archives. Amongst other 
things, their free online service offers a word search in several languages 
allowing for an understanding of a word based on its use in language. First 
it gives a statistical summary of the particular word as it occurs in ‘ordinary 
language’ given by the source material. When typing any word, the site states 
the number of collocations in the entire available corpus and an absolute 
and relative classification of frequency. A word (i.e. ‘meeting’) is located 
within the array of these frequencies. The uses of a words are compared with 
each other in terms of frequency and occurrence. The words are then sorted 
into a frequency class relative to the very frequent word ‘the’. In this system, 
the word meeting has the value 7. That is equivalent to saying that the word 
‘the has got about 27 times the number of occurrences than the selected 
word’.3 In the body of text (corpus), the word in question is searched for and 
‘located’ amongst its neighbouring words. The result of this comparison is a 
precise list of significant occurrences of a word. Occurrences or collocations 
are thus the words which neighbour the word in question. The occurrences 
show the context in which the word occurs in written language. This list is 
sorted by frequency of occurrence: the most common neighbours of the 
word in question are first. All words come along with a number, which indi-
cates the number of occurrences with the word in question. 
For our example, the word meeting, the most frequent word which meeting 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corpus_linguistics 
2 http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de, first accessed may 2004
3 http://corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/ accessed October 27 2011
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The choice from Wittgenstein’s work has already been addressed. The justi-
fication for Stein’s Tender Buttons is manifold. Firstly, formally it plays with 
a list-like editing of text, which we also find in the Tractatus. Secondly, it 
dedicates itself to general subjects (Objects– Food–Rooms) rather than en-
gaging in a narrative of personal characters, as in Stein’s more prosaic works 
(i.e. Melanctha, in Three Lives, 1909). Finally, Tender Buttons has become 
a synonymous example for Stein’s controversial work with language as an 
autonomous material, which characterised her mature style as it crystallised 
into a dense form.1
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is accompanied by in their database is at (meeting at). The most frequent co-
ocurrences of the word stem from its use in language: a (69407.5) meeting, 
board (48448.6) meeting, annual (42591.4) meeting, the (38618.5) meeting, 
public (20996.9) meeting, next (20939.1) meeting or meeting with (104215), 
meeting in (27015.3), meeting between (26068.9), meeting room (11358.5).1
 Immediately it is clear that these word-couples show the way the 
words are actually used. Applying a Wittgensteinian interpretation, we gain 
insight into the meaning of a word if we see how it is used. The Wittgen-
steinian notion of meaning as use is central to the application of CCL meth-
ods for the meeting in language, and is core to the concept of this entire 
research. 
 It gets even more enticing if one looks further into the processing 
of the data: the significant occurrences are split into two separate statistics 
for those preceding and consecutive to the word. To use a human-related 
metaphor, they are called neighbours. The significant right (respectively left) 
neighbour offers a good summary of the most obvious links between the 
word in question and related words in ordinary language. We are shown a 
rich overview of the possible contexts and possible meanings of that particu-
lar word, simply by reading the lists of neighbours. The neighbours of the 
particular word reveal the possible contexts of its use, and through its use, 
its meaning is revealed. For example significant left and right neighbours of 
the word ‘meeting’:
‘ a (69407.5), board (48448.6), council (43076.6), annual (42591.4), the (38618.5), 
hall (26673.4), special (24559.6), (...)  public (20996.9), next (20939.1), first 
(20346.7), regular (20314.6), The (17562.6), emergency (16171.3), monthly 
(15391.2), (...) general (10089.5), closed-door (9633.78), after (9175.82), informa-
tional (8211.77), (...) face-to-face (4278.56), joint (4250.4), (...) weekly (2183.17), 
(...) team (1924.94), urgent (1785.95), A (1757.62), upcoming (1708.37), reorgani-
zation (1679.96), players-only (1617.08), (...) hour-long (...)  bilateral (1316.21), 
policy-setting (1314.92) (...) ’2 
‘with (104215), . (33685.2), in (27015.3), between (26068.9), (23774.5), of 
(23731.8), on (21448.7), at (19908.9), will (17162), room (11358.5), Tuesday 
(10841.3), Monday (9888.52), (...) scheduled (3094.7), tonight (2715.76), here 
(2524.6), begins (2489.06), yesterday (2086.1), that (2083.81), tomorrow (1920.42), 
space (1911.64), this (1873.35), Friday (1840.88), place (1672.79), (...) earlier 
(1514.88), later (1368.26), starts (1233.38), convened (945.78), where (916.51), (...) 
attended (519.3), took (512.42)(...) ’3
1 http://corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/ accessed October 30 2011
2 http://corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/ accessed October 27 2011
3 http://corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/ accessed October 27 2011
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This approach resulted in the attempt to visualise this network of relation-
ships between a word and its neighbours. Since 2004 the Leipzig-based 
CCL-database Wortschatz, which provided the word lists above, has used 
a plain but effective graphic representation, which translates the frequency 
values of the words involved, into an image. Words are connected by lines to 
signify the relations to each other. The terms are marked in colour; the word  
in question is red, the others are blue. The neighbouring blue words offer di-
rect links to other graphs. If one selects a blue word, the next diagram opens 
where it in turn is in the centre of the word-cloud.
 The connecting lines differ in length and thickness: the stronger 
a relation between two words is, the thicker and shorter the line appears. 
This way we see the network of words surrounding a certain term; we may 
choose between a simplified and more detailed graph. The proximity of 
words to each other in ordinary language is reflected directly by proximity of 
words to each other in the diagram. The graph for meeting1 looks like this: 
1 http://corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/cgi-bin/eng_news_2008/wort_www, meeting, accessed October 26 
2011 
Wortschatz: 
graphs for ccl 
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Image 89
graph for ‘meeting’ 1
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This simple two-dimensional representation, as I see it, invites us to perceive 
the network of lines as a model for a three-dimensional shape – like a crystal 
with words at its corners. This effect is dependent on the word in question. 
The graph available for the single word ‘secret’ shows this shape better than 
the one for ‘meeting’:
1 http://corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de/cgi-bin/eng_news_2008/wort_www, secret, accessed October 
26 2011
    
internal corpus 
comparison
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Image 99
graph for ‘secret’
contrasting corpora
Image 100
Melzer: See and Speak, Hear and Write, 2007. words on pins on table top, quoted from Hildegard von Bingen. 
The most frequent neighbouring words for ‘secret’ clearly suggest a context 
of intelligence services and international politics. The corpora tool always 
depends on the corpus used for its statistics. 
 In this research, this point will be exemplified by using the entirety 
of all words used in this thesis to create a contrastive corpus analysis. The 
outcome of this self-referential statistics will be produced as an artists pub-
lication and presented during the viva examination of the thesis. 
 From 2004 on this form of representation inspired a series of works 
based on the Wortschatz’s CCL method In one series, the words concerned 
were printed out on paper and later on transparencies and pinned up with 
tiny needles behind the glass of wooden display cases. The formal reference 
to collections of precious butterflies contrasts with the availability of a pool 
of words as immaterial, reproducible and shared property. The conventional 
analogue material (wood, paper, metal pins) counters the contemporary digital 
source of the graphs. The attempt to augment the suggested three-dimensional 
field of these word-clouds aligns with the tradition within conceptual art from 
the mid 20th century using words and language as matter (Weiner, Kosuth, 
Holzer, see p.65). 
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Infanger: 
words like sheep
  
  
 contrasting corpora contrasting corpora
In contemporary art, the word as creative element has undergone a big libera-
tion. New technologies and transdisciplinary approaches offer a wide spec-
trum of ways in which words and text become the main material for artworks. 
Language-works of today are often informed by new media and yet executed in 
an analogue, even archaic fashion (see The Complete Dictionary, p.320). 
 The graphic artist Sarah Infanger has realised a work with words on 
living sheep with a charming sense of humour. The project ‘Worte wie Schafe’ 
(2003) used a flock of sheep as carriers of a vocabulary, by spray painting one 
word on each animal. The small set of German words includes NEVER, WILD, 
LIKE, LAZY, KIND, ARE etc. The choice of material is clearly derived from 
a farmer’s practice of marking their animals and the use of minimal means 
achieves a maximum effective. The words behave as the sheep do, the words are 
like people-slogan (Lewis, 2001) is shifted. As the sheep move, the viewer reads 
the words and sentences they form. 
Image 101a
Sarah Infanger, Worte wie Schafe, 2009, videostill 1
Image 101b
Sarah Infanger, Worte wie Schafe, 2009, videostill 2
Image 101c
Sarah Infanger, Worte wie Schafe, 2009, videostill 3
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Old Sheep Shop
 contrasting corpora
28. NETWORK OF PEOPLE
In earlier chapters on naming (You name it, p.120 and What’s in a name 
p.102, Shifting names, p.137) common positions on the semantics of names 
(Kripke) and designators (Russell, Frege, Caronia) were summarised. 
Throughout this thesis we find that the terms word, name and person are 
closely related. In ordinary language we sometimes use these notions 
synonymously. In the later chapter on Treasury of Words (p.302) and The 
Complete Dictionary (p.320) this analogy will be elaborated on. Earlier in 
this research (p.55) we encountered a key metaphor by Michael Lewis, the 
editor of Teaching Collocation (2001), on the relationship between words in 
the CCL approach:
‘Words are like people [. . . ] We all feel comfortable when we are surrounded by 
friends and acquaintances, but anxious in unfamiliar situations when we are sur-
rounded by strangers. (...) The relationships between words closely resemble the 
relationships between people.’
(Lewis, 2001)
Using the corpus approach, the name of a person can be examined with the 
same method as a word. As names are words, the database of Wortschatz Uni 
Leipzig1 can generate a network of names which co-occur with the searched 
for name of a person, as long as the name is included in the source material 
which was used to feed the programme: as many digitised texts as possible. 
The names that appear in relation to a given name, i.e. Gertrude Stein, corre-
spond with the people who are in one way or another related to her, because 
they were mentioned within the proximity of a sentence in a text corpus. 
The network of names is a network of words; the network of names mirrors 
the network of people. In the graph for Gertrude Stein as generated by Wort-
schatz, one notices some of her company, i.e. Ernest Hemingway and James 
Joyce, but not Ludwig Wittgenstein. Comparing the graph of Wittgenstein 
and Stein, it would be gratifying to find an identical name. The possible links 
between them and the most probable people who connect them have been 
examined based on the comparison of their biographies in the chapter Lud-
wig meeting Gertrude (p.200) and Evelyn Whitehead’s Country Club (p.223). 
1 http://corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de
Lewis: words are 
like people
network of people
Image 102
Visual note of John Tenniel, Old Sheep Shop, illustration for Lewis Carroll Through the 
Looking Glass, 1871. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alice%27s_Shop, accessed July 22 2010. 
photo: Nadja Niemann
Sheep from another Lewis’ work here come to mind: Lewis Carroll’s novel 
Through the Looking Glass published in 1871 included the chapter Wool and 
Water. There Alice finds herself in the Old Sheep Shop, where an old sheep with 
glasses is knitting behind the counter, behind which are shelves in which objects 
move and shift, as soon as Alice tries to focus on them. The shifting objects in 
this strange shop offered an apt image for the shifters in language as discussed 
in chapter Shifter’s Ode (p.144). Here again, words assume the role of things, 
as small entities with a life of their own. In the context of contrasting corpora, 
these examples stress the charm with which single words attract the interplay of 
our imagination together with their habituated juxtaposition of collocations.
 
298 299
Again, the Wortschatz database is one possible source for contrasting cor-
pora. Given its unspecific source material (i.e. online journals on different 
topics), one may be surprised to gain results from the query on Wittgenstein 
and Stein at all. The use of different corpora will offer different results. To 
give an obvious example, a graph could be generated using the very words 
of this thesis: taking the corpus of the text of this thesis as the basis of a cor-
pus comparison, a graph would show a direct link between the mentioned 
names. Ludwig and Gertrude then could appear in a graph directly linked to 
each other, because they are repeatedly named together in one sentence.  
link between 
contemporaries
Wortschatz: 
graph for Ludwig 
Wittgenstein
Wortschatz: 
graph for Gertrude 
Stein
 network of people
Images  103 a-b
graphs for Gertrude and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wortschatz Uni Leipzig, online database 
www.corpora.informatik.uni-leipzig.de, accessed 13 01 2012
29. SHARED VOCABULARY
This chapter is a brief introduction to the technical procedure for generating 
the Shared Vocabulary, based on the CCL approach1. It is a comparison of 
the corpora of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (1922) 
and Gertrude Stein’s Tender Buttons (1914). To start with, the obtained texts 
are processed by well-establlished Computational Linguistic tools. This part 
of the research was executed with the crucial expertise of cognitive scientist 
Egon Stemle.
 The texts are split into sentences, individual words, and punctuation 
marks. This so-called tokenization is necessary because computers do not 
share our understanding of what a sentence is, and what a word is. However, 
because we are primarily interested in words one may think of this as sepa-
rating words from non-words. The texts are turned into lose words, with a 
total of 42782 words for both texts together. Then, the words are lemmatised, 
which means to ascribe to each word its canonical base form, its lemma. For 
example, plural nouns are ascribed their singular form – ‘apples’ becomes 
‘apple’ – verbs in different tenses are transformed to their infinitive form, for 
instance ‘go’, ‘going’, ‘goes’ all become ‘go’, adverbs and adjectives are ascribed 
their comparative form. Furthermore, each word is assigned its correspond-
ing part-of-speech (POS) tag within a sentence. Well known POS tags are 
nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs; this allows us to distinguish the usage 
of ‘print’ as a verb from its usage as a noun. For instance:
 problems ---> noun, plural
 was ---> verb, past tense
 deepest ---> adjective, superlative
After these processing steps we delve into numerical analysis. We will be 
analysing the texts on different levels using raw words, lemmata and POS 
tags. Stein’s former ‘text’ contains 20505 overall appearances of 2856 dif-
ferent lemmata. The corpus of Wittgenstein contain’s 28112 appearances of 
2122 lemmata. 
1 By combining the methodological advantages of computer corpus linguistics and the possibility of contrast-
ing texts in two or more languages, the structure and use of languages can be explored with greater accuracy, 
detail and empirical strength than before. The approach has also proved to have fruitful practical applica-
tions in a number of areas such as language teaching, lexicography, translation studies and computer-aided 
translation. I owe this explanation to cognitive scientist Egon Stemle.
Tractatus vs 
Tender Buttons
computational 
linguistic 
processing
tokenization & 
lemmatization
frequencies of 
lemmata
Shared Vocabulary
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Furthermore, we analyse the occurrences of individual lemmata: after dif-
ferent word forms have been reduced to their lemma, we count how often 
the lemma occurs, for instance ‘deep, deeper, deepest’ have all been trans-
formed to ‘deep’ – we now count how often ‘deep’ occurs; we do this for all 
lemmata. The count for each individual lemma is called ‘absolute frequency’, 
and the sum of all frequencies yields the total number of words. The quotid-
ian of the absolute frequency and the total number of words is called relative 
frequency. In order to calculate the relative frequency of each word (i.e. for 
the word ‘a’ 1171 occurrences) every word is divided by the sum of all lem-
mata in the text. The relative frequency of ‘a’ can then be expressed as the 
value 0.057083. The difference in the values for relative frequency are then 
calculated and sorted by decreasing size. For a lemma which does not occur 
in the text its value is zero (0). For example the term ‘proposition’ which 
Wittgenstein’ uses frequently in Tractatus but which never appears in Stein’s 
Tender Buttons. The sum over all relative frequencies is one (1).
 The lists were first processed into an Open Office document in 
November 2009 and then made accessible as a Google Spreadsheet1 in April 
2010. The lists, raw as they are, can then be sorted and filtered according to 
different criteria. The document contains four sheets which include lemma 
(containing all lemmata as the computer has calculated them), lemma_pos 
(containing all lemmata with the corresponding word class and word (con-
taining all words as they appear in the text like nouns, verbs etc in all their 
forms and tenses). 
 The engaging part is the option to sort and filter these lists again 
and again, by making use of the different columns.  The columns are:
 
A: form (one of the three types described above)
B: occurrences in Wittgenstein LW
C: occurrences in Stein GS
D: occurring in both LW and GS exactly once (the value is 1, otherwise 0) 
E: occurring in both LW and GS at least once (the value is 1, otherwise 0) 
F: occurring both in LW and GS
1 http://spreadsheets.google.com/ccc?key=0AhKPIPaKU6XxdDItZW9nRmVHOVdoNl80MU5TcUpMa
lE&hl=en&authkey=CM356qQE. see Appendix p.416
  
Stemle: word lists
Shared Vocabulary
Three of these lists1 have been selected for printing in this research; 
 List 1 is the list of words which occur once and only once in Wittgen/
Stein. The  frequency value of the word concerned is 1 for both Wittgenstein 
and Stein. This shorter list contains all words (tokens), which are the sum of 
all exclusive boundary points in the Shared Vocabulary. Each shared word is 
a precise point where the language of both texts intersect. Each word can be 
considered a coordinate for a meeting. In linguistic terms this list is called 
the list of hapax legomena. List 1 is printed below. 
1 The lists are deliberately set in an alternative type-face which alludes to children’s books about a child’s first 
words: Arial Rounded. 
tokens: 
precise coordinates
Shared Vocabulary: List 1
act
addition
adopt
aim
alteration
analysed
arise
articulate
assumed
bad
beneath
cast
claim
clash
containing
detail
determination
discloses
display
element
entangled
equals
extension
felt
frequently
greater
happened
hardness
holds
illusion
includes
indifferent
interest
lapse
leads
leaving
lilies
losing
mentioning
mirror
movement
page
particle
particles
particularly
passage
past
permitted
precise
precisely
presupposed
readily
relying
remainder
remark
resolution
resolved
roses
rows
scarcely
scientific
several
sides
simultaneous
sounds
standard
station
steps
sure
surrounded
today
uses
valuable
virtue
wit
yes
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 1 This list is the starting point for the booklet Ludwig & Gertrude (2013), which supplements this 
research.
types: 
family of words
List 21 is a list of 
all words both 
Wittgenstein and 
Stein have in com-
mon, independent 
from the frequency 
of any word.
Shared Vocabulary: List 2
,
;
.
“
a
about
absence
accept
accident
accomplish
act
action
actual
actually
add
addition
admit
adopt
after
again
age
aim
air
alike
all
alone
also
alter
alteration
altogether
always
an
analyse
ancient
and
another
answer
any
anything
anyway
appeal
appearance
argument
arise
arrange
articulate
as
ask
assume
at
attach
author
away
back
bad
be
beautiful
because
bed
before
begin
behave
being
believe
beneath
beside
between
black
blend
blue
book
both
break
build
building
but
by
c
call
can
capable
case
cast
cause
centre
certain
certainly
certainty
chain
chair
Shared Vocabulary: List 2
change
character
characteristic
choose
circle
circumstance
claim
clash
class
clear
clearly
climb
come
compare
compose
confuse
connect
consequence
consider
consist
constant
construction
contain
continue
contradiction
corner
could
cover
dark
day
degree
description
design
detail
determination
determine
difference
different
difficult
direct
direction
disclose
display
distinguish
divide
do
double
doubt
down
draw
e
each
easily
easy
either
element
else
empty
enable
end
enough
entangled
entirely
equal
error
essential
establish
even
ever
every
everything
exact
example
exercise
experience
experiment
explain
explanation
express
expression
extension
external
extreme
eye
f
fact
fail
feel
feeling
fill
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Shared Vocabulary: List 2
final
find
fine
first
fit
flat
for
force
frequently
from
front
full
gather
get
give
go
good
great
green
half
hand
happen
hardness
have
he
head
high
hold
horse
how
i
if
illusion
in
incline
include
indeed
indicate
indication
indifferent
inner
inside
instance
instead
intend
interest
into
it
its
itself
judge
just
kind
lack
language
lapse
last
later
lay
lead
least
leave
left
less
let
letter
lie
life
light
like
likeness
lily
line
little
long
longer
look
lose
make
man
many
mark
mathematics
matter
may
me
mean
meaning
means
measure
Shared Vocabulary: List 2
mention
method
middle
might
mirror
mistake
more
most
move
movement
much
music
musical
my
name
natural
necessarily
necessary
necessity
need
negative
neither
never
new
next
no
none
nonsense
nor
not
nothing
now
number
object
of
often
old
on
once
one
only
open
or
order
ordinary
original
other
out
outside
outward
over
ox
page
paper
part
particle
particular
particularly
pass
passage
past
peculiar
penetrate
perfect
perhaps
period
permit
piece
place
plan
play
pleasant
pleasure
point
position
possible
practice
precise
precisely
present
preserve
presuppose
principle
print
pure
put
question
quite
rain
raise
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Shared Vocabulary: List 2
rate
read
readily
real
really
reason
recognition
red
relate
rely
remain
remainder
remark
remarkable
resolution
resolve
result
right
rise
room
rose
round
row
same
satisfy
say
scarcely
scientific
second
see
seem
select
sense
serve
service
set
several
shade
shall
shape
short
should
show
side
sight
sign
silence
similar
simple
simply
simultaneous
since
single
size
slight
so
sole
solid
some
something
sort
sound
space
speak
special
spectacle
speech
spot
square
stand
standard
start
state
statement
station
stem
step
still
stop
stroke
subject
substance
substitute
success
successive
such
sudden
sufficient
suitable
sum
Shared Vocabulary: List 2
sun
supply
suppose
sure
surely
surface
surprise
surround
symbol
system
table
take
talk
than
that
the
them
then
there
these
they
thing
think
third
this
those
three
time
to
today
together
too
touch
track
translate
treat
true
truth
try
turn
two
type
under
understand
up
us
use
useless
valuable
very
virtue
wax
way
we
weather
well
what
when
where
which
white
who
whole
why
will
wish
wit
with
within
without
word
work
would
writing
wrong
yellow
yes
yet
you
youth
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1 This list has been used for the graphic poster Basic Shared Vocabulary (2013), which supplements the 
hard copy of this research. 
List 3 contains all 
words as types: 
each word is con-
verted to its gen-
eral form (lemma) 
and indicates a 
definitive family of 
words they share. 
Shared Vocabulary: List 3 Shared Vocabulary: List 3
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“
a
about
absence
accident
act
action
actual
actually
addition
adopt
after
again
aim
air
alike
all
alone
also
alter
alteration
altogether
always
an
analysed
and
another
answer
any
anything
anyway
appeal
appearance
are
argument
arise
arranged
articulate
as
asked
assumed
at
away
back
bad
be
beautiful
because
bed
been
before
beginning
being
believe
beneath
beside
better
between
black
blend
blue
book
books
both
building
but
by
c
call
called
can
capable
case
cases
cast
cause
centre
certain
certainly
certainty
chain
chairs
changing
character
characteristic
choose
chosen
circle
circumstances
claim
clash
class
clear
clearly
come
comes
composed
connecting
consider
consists
constant
construction
contained
containing
contradiction
corners
could
covering
darker
day
degree
description
detail
determination
determine
determined
did
difference
different
difficult
discloses
display
distinguish
do
does
done
double
doubt
down
draw
drawing
e
each
easily
easy
either
element
else
empty
enable
end
enough
entangled
entirely
equal
equals
essential
established
establishing
even
ever
every
everything
exact
example
exercise
experience
experiment
explain
explanation
express
expressed
expresses
expression
extension
external
extreme
eye
f
fact
feel
feeling
felt
final
fine
first
fit
flat
for
force
found
frequently
from
front
full
gather
gathered
get
given
giving
go
good
great
greater
green
had
half
happened
hardness
has
have
having
he
head
higher
hold
holds
how
i
if
illusion
in
includes
indeed
indicate
indicated
indication
indifferent
inner
inside
instance
instead
intended
interest
into
is
it
its
itself
just
kind
kinds
lack
laid
language
lapse
last
later
lead
leads
least
leave
leaves
leaving
left
less
let
letter
letters
life
light
lighter
like
likeness
lilies
lines
little
long
longer
look
losing
lying
made
make
makes
making
man
many
mark
marked
mathematics
matter
may
me
mean
meaning
means
meant
measure
measured
men
mention
mentioned
mentioning
method
middle
might
mirror
mistake
mistaken
mistakes
more
most
movement
much
music
musical
my
name
natural
necessarily
necessary
necessity
need
needed
negative
neither
never
new
next
no
none
nonsense
nor
not
nothing
now
number
object
objects
of
often
old
on
once
one
ones
only
open
or
order
ordinary
original
other
out
outside
outward
over
page
paper
part
particle
particles
particular
particularly
parts
passage
past
peculiar
perfect
perhaps
period
permitted
piece
place
placed
places
plan
play
pleasant
pleasure
point
position
possible
practice
precise
precisely
present
presents
presupposed
principle
pure
put
question
quite
raining
raise
rate
read
readily
real
really
reason
recognition
red
relying
remain
remainder
remains
remark
remarkable
resolution
resolved
result
right
room
roses
round
rows
said
same
satisfy
say
scarcely
scientific
second
see
seeing
seem
seen
selected
sense
service
set
sets
several
shade
shall
shape
should
show
showing
shown
shows
side
sides
sight
sign
signs
silence
similar
simple
simpler
simply
simultaneous
since
single
size
slight
so
sole
solid
some
something
sort
sound
sounds
space
speak
special
speech
spoken
spot
square
stand
standard
stands
starting
state
statement
states
station
stem
steps
still
stop
stroke
subject
substance
substituted
success
successive
such
sudden
sufficient
suitable
sum
sun
suppose
sure
surely
surface
surprise
surrounded
surrounding
symbol
system
tables
take
taken
than
that
the
them
then
there
these
they
thing
things
third
this
those
thought
three
time
to
today
together
too
touch
“true”
truth
turn
turned
two
type
under
understood
up
us
use
used
useless
uses
valuable
very
virtue
was
wax
way
ways
we
weather
well
went
were
what
when
where
which
white
who
whole
why
will
wit
with
within
without
word
work
working
would
writing
wrong
yellow
yes
yet
you
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30. TREASURY OF WORDS
In this research, Treasury of Words is a core metaphorical notion that encap-
sulates the spirit of the whole enterprise both literally and metaphorically. 
Firstly, the Shared Vocabulary is the treasury of words that the publications 
of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein have in common. Secondly, 
words and their relationship to the (visible) world are well-illustrated by this 
expression (which feels even more natural in the German word for vocabu-
lary, Wortschatz, which literally means treasury of words). A treasure is a 
collection of precious objects and words are precious things. Remember the 
child-like image of a treasure chest and then imagine a cornucopia of words 
flowing from it. Thirdly, there are a number of artworks resulting from this 
research, which allude to the notion of a treasury (link to Inventory, p.306, 
The Complete Dictionary, p.300, and Readingmachine, p.314). Finally, also 
the two practice-based works1 supplementing this research orbit around the 
notion of vocabulary. 
 Subsequent to obtaining the Shared Vocabulary questions on the 
particular characteristics of systems and order arise, which will be dealt with 
in the chapter Words in and out of Order (p.339). As we have seen in the 
chapter Labels of a Group (p.96), Whorf, just as his teacher Sapir did (Lan-
guage, 1921), dedicates his study to this very act of classification. Foucault 
illustrated this important capacity of language in his work The Order of 
Things. The words of the Shared Vocabulary, captured in the crystalline net-
work created by Wortschatz, give a factual representation for a meeting. But, 
as Foucault notes, it is in the list where all these words and things are united, 
where:
‘(...) they all have their common locus, like the umbrella and the sewing-machine 
on the operating table; startling through their propinquity may be, it is neverthe-
less warranted by and, by that in, by that on whose solidity provides proof of the 
possibility of juxtaposition.’ 
(Foucault 1970/2009, p.xvii) 
 
1 Both works, Basic Shared Vocabulary (2013) and Ludwig & Gertrude (2013), are manifestations of 
visual language-games played on the basis of the research. Both works rely on the aesthetics of lists and the 
purity of individual words out of context. The booklet Ludwig & Gertrude pays hommage to the fetish for 
repetition in the work of Gertrude Stein.
words are 
precious things   
order and 
classification
Foucault: The 
Order of Things
treasury of words
This small paragraph by Foucault bursts with references to the history of 
visual arts; the image of the ‘sewing machine and umbrella meeting on an 
operating table’ is a way of characterizing the DADA movement, starting 
with the Cabaret Voltaire1 in Zurich in 1916 and which still exists in its origi-
nal location in central Zurich2.
 Foucault emphasises the principle of proximity that applies to any 
words appearing in a list, or we could say, the proximity of these ‘objects 
in the world’. Propinquity, as he calls it, implies a kinship of sorts, however 
remote these objects seem at first, and so the umbrella and the sewing-ma-
chine are not merely closely related in space, but also in kind.  
 This suggestion encompasses the inkling underlying the main 
hypothesis that Ludwig and Gertrude are akin. They do meet in language 
and the Shared Vocabulary offers coordinates for further analysis and inspi-
ration. The sentences we read, hear or produce, the network of words in use, 
formulate and actualise relationships in the real world. Similar to notions of 
the Speech Act Theory, in Wittgenstein’s Ladder, Perloff ’s analysis of the rela-
tionship between language philosophy and poetry  makes a similar point: 
‘The task of the reader is to construct a context that might make sense of these rid-
dling references. Suppose X and Y are out sailing and X says to Y, who is steering 
the boat, “Watch out! We’re about to hit some rocks!” In that case, “Rocks are emit-
ted by sentence to the eye,” which immediately starts to scan the visual field. And 
other stories might be invented to account for the same grammatical construction. 
(...)’ 
(Perloff 1996; p.215)
1 www.cabaretvoltaire.ch
2 Marjorie Perloff (1996, p.251) points out the contradiction between the ‘antiwar’ attitude of the artists of 
Cabaret Voltaire and the ‘rhetoric of violence’ they adopted from political conditions around them.
DADA movement
words construct 
reality
Perloff: rocks are 
emitted by the 
sentence to the eye
treasury of words
“Rocks 
are emitted 
by the sentence 
to the eye.”
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A possible reading of The Speech Act Theory in Austin’s major work How to 
do things with words (1962) and Searle’s Speech Acts (1969), includes perfor-
mative utterances as speaking things into being. It supports Perloff ’s remark 
that the reader or the hearer of a sentence experiences the word in unity 
with the object it signifies. As discussed earlier, the relationship between 
word and world is very complex, but to put it plainly: the emitted word cor-
responds with the image it provokes (Wegner 1994, see p.138 this research). 
We may play games with this in order to experience the routine effects 
words have on our imagination:
Speech Act Theory
do not think of a 
red balloon
treasury of words
do not 
think 
of a red 
balloon.
Games with word and image, and the interplay between them occur on 
the verge of disciplines. Image processing links scientific disciplines (like 
psychology and philosophy or communication sciences) with disciplines in 
the visual arts. These language-games are part of a human practice, the life-
form, claims Wittgenstein (1953). They exceed the use of ordinary language 
and are governed by rule-following. Languages are formed by the habits 
and conventions of the written and spoken word as well as influenced by 
the visible world we are in and the objects which surround us. The analogy 
between words and things or words as things helps to uncover the kinship 
between text and image.    
Jastrow: duck-
rabbit-illusion
treasury of words
Image 104
Visual note of Jastrow, Joseph. Duck-Rabbit, 1899. In The Mind’s Eye. Popular Sci. Monthly 
Vol Nr 54, p.312. photo: Nadja Niemann
It has been valuable in science to use images to test habits and tendencies of 
the human mind. The picture puzzles and optical illusions in psychology are 
one form of doing so. The famous duck-rabbit illusion by the psychologist 
Joseph Jastrow (1899, p.312) also belongs to this category of image referred 
to by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations as he introduces his 
idea of ‘picture-objects’ (Wittgenstein, 1953, XI, p.194). 
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31. INVENTORY 
Ideas related to the treasury of words and Wittgenstein’s idea of the picture-
object have been the subject of several artistic projects in collaboration with 
artist Kasper Andreasen1. A key work in this search for the line between 
image and word, representation and reference is the art work Inventory. This 
work takes the form of a series of 12 graphic and installation works – which 
were consolidated in a publication by Kasper Andreasen and I in 2008. 
Starting from a simple procedure agreed beforehand (see chapter Dialogue, 
see p.175 and the work The Grass is Greener on the Other Side, p.178-181), 
we established a dialogue around the relationship between real and repre-
sented matter. We collected and inventoried things surrounding us in our 
household and studio, which lead to the set of artists books Thing Ding 
Chose Cosa, the core work in Inventory. 
‘The books are a treasury of everyday objects, like albums that index the physical 
presence of things. One by one, each item – a hammer, a cup, a pencil, a paper clip, 
a cable, a whisk, etc – was placed on a page and its outline drawn with a marker. 
How does circumscribing a three-dimensional object relate to procedures of map-
ping and naming? This way of drawing is a mode of tracing; these outlines are on 
the edge of abstract lines and language. The compilation of these drawings as an 
inventory of outlines charts a nonverbal vocabulary of signs – figures that induce 
the viewer to recall the form, usage and function of the object via tactile and visual 
memories. ‘ 
(Andreasen &  Melzer, 2008, p.2)
Within the publication, additional contributions by the typographer Louis 
Lüthi, the writer Ilse van Rijn and the philosopher and semanticist Mar-
tin Stokhof allude to signs and symbols, metaphors and language and the 
interrelation between words and things in general. Van Rijn reflects on the 
drawing in relation to its interpretation and observes the kinship between 
outlined object and typography. 
‘The drawing appeals to you as a symbol. (...) The firm or shaking hand intrinsic to 
an outline is part of the idiom of the printed letter. However much the impassive, 
empty form is also an abstraction, the visibly drawn line is the characteristic trait 
(the frill or frayed end) that is not erased. It marks the attempts at an approach, 
the possible translation. As if the thing suddenly writes and the writing, the drawn 
object becomes a thing. (...)  The desperation is present: is this a word or is this a 
thing? And the interplay between both. The continuous dialogue endures in that 
line: text is image is text is image. (...) Who draws and draws whom?’
 
(van Rijn  2008, p.12)
1 www.kasperandreasen.com
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 She examines the object’s physicality, as; 
‘(...) a shadow cast is a sign of the physical presence of an object. Yet when you lift 
it, it disappears. When drawn the shadow distorts the object. The same applies to 
mirroring and reflection. Is the shadow (and the appearance and reflection as well 
as the after-image, the memory and the dream) part of the object or not?’ 
(van Rijn 2008, p.11)
She reflects on the status of names and their meaning and concludes that 
‘Word and object never overshadow each other, never cancel each other out 
or undermine the other, or are reconciled into a higher ideal.(...)’ (van Rijn 
2008, p.12). 
  
 inventory
Image 105a
Andreasen & Melzer: Thing Ding Chose Cosa, artist’s book within Inventory, 2008
see also publication Inventory (2008) 
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In his article The Company of Objects, Stokhof introduces the difference be-
tween theories of direct reference and a conceptual approach to the relation-
ship between word and object. He notes that words have different meanings 
according to context and speaker and therefore 
‘(...) language and objects are related in many different ways, depending both on 
the objects, their nature and function, and on the purposes for which we use lin-
guistic expressions. What ‘electron’ means for a layman differs from what it means 
for a nuclear physicist. But the same holds for everyday objects.’ 
(Stokhof 2008, p.15) 
Stokhof stresses the importance of usage in a way that’s similar to Wittgen-
stein’s notion of ‘meaning as use’. He states that 
‘How language and objects are related is primarily a matter of how both are used, 
in a concrete and practical manner. It is in how we deal with objects that how we 
talk about them finds its grounding.’  
(Stokhof  2008, p.15)
We can connect this notion with the famous quote by Umberto Eco, who 
observed that ‘if there is something to be interpreted, the interpretation 
must speak of something which must be found somewhere, and in some way 
respected’ (Eco 1992, p.43). In Stokhof ’s direct reference to Wittgenstein’s 
remark on the impossibility to word the aroma of coffee (1953, # 610), he 
reminds us of the fact that all forms of representation fail to fully substitute 
a thing. 
‘Whenever we depict an object, paint its surface, sketch its contours, even when we 
photograph it or film it, the object itself is not there. It invites us, draws us close, 
but it always keeps its distance, however infinitesimal.’ 
(Stokhof 2008, p.15)
With Jastrow’s ambiguous picture of the ‘duck-rabbit’ Stokhof concludes, 
that: 
‘(...) what we see, and then express as ‘A rabbit!’, or ‘A duck!’ is not the object itself. 
No ‘inventory’ of objects can be made, only ever so many approximations, attempts 
that capture some part of what they are, determine some aspect of how they appear 
or function. But something escapes, always.’ 
(Stokhof 2008, p.15-16) 
Stokhof: 
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Image 105 b-c
Andreasen & Melzer: Thing Ding Chose Cosa, artist’s book within Inventory, 2008
see also publication Inventory (2008). Images by Kasper Andreasen, see www.kasperandreasen.com 
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Image 106 a-d
Andreasen & Melzer: spreads from publication Inventory (2008), design Louis Lüthi. 
Images by Kasper Andreasen, see www.kasperandreasen.com 
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In the publication Inventory, the quest for the meaning of words and things 
was mainly executed in using the line to demarcate the limits between 
(conventional) sign and (autonomous) shape. Kasper Andreasen calls it a 
non-verbal vocabulary:
‘Thing Chose Ding Cosa is a visual inventory of everyday objects, an investigation 
into their shape and function. (...) Each two-volume book, then, contains approxi-
mately 300 outlines, abstractions that constitute a non-verbal vocabulary and that 
each have the potential to recall to us the form, function, or personal significance 
of the original object.‘
Kasper Andreasen1
These drawings are on the edge of becoming verbal signs. For this non-
verbal vocabulary of the Inventory the proper names of all drawn objects 
were listed and translated into 6 SAE languages. This list of words alludes 
once more to Foucault’s characterization of the word–object relationship in 
encyclopedic works (1970/2009, preface p.xvi) and brings to mind a number 
of relevant art works which resonate with this research. In the introduction 
to Inventory, Andreasen and I agree that 
‘we are intrigued by the tension between an ideal concept, the way we name things, 
and their materiality and history. This publication [Inventory] reflects us as users 
in the ‘company of objects’ (Stokhof): the value of things as a childlike ode to their 
presence.’ 
(Andreasen &  Melzer 2008, p.2)
In artistic practice that deals with language, a work begins at times with a 
similar ‘childlike’ impulse allied with the longing to raise an inventory or 
vocabulary of a sort. Don’t we remember the awe with which we  try to grasp 
the scores of stars in the sky, and haven’t we wondered about how many 
words are out there in the world or how long would it take to read all books 
ever written? 
 Accordingly, two pivotal works of mine will be presented and their 
relevance to the current research explained . The work Readingmachine 
(2007 onwards) was made as an attempt to realise an impossible undertak-
ing – namely the reading of all existing books. The second work, The Com-
plete Dictionary (2003) attempts to list all possible words (see p.320). 
1 www.kasperandreasen.com, Thing Ding Chose Cosa, accessed 14 March 2013
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Image 107
Andreasen & Melzer: Things Layout case, part of Inventory, 2008
see also publication Inventory (2008). Images by Kasper Andreasen, see www.kasperandreasen.com
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32. READINGMACHINE
Language, as we have seen so far, is an ever-changing practice which escapes 
static definition. Its enchantment arises partly because of the dissimilar rela-
tionship between word and world. Many of the documented artistic projects 
in this research are rooted in a shared experience of language being at the 
same time a bounded space and an open clearing. We recall the metaphor of 
language as an ‘ocean which simultaneously connects and separates conti-
nents’ (Janik&Toulmin, 1996, p.128). 
 Perloff has investigated the implications of Wittgenstein’s notion 
of ‘The limits of my language are the limits of my world’ (Tractatus # 5.6) 
for poetry (Perloff, 1996). But where are these limits in poetry? In the 20th 
century, so-called magical realism has popularised works that play with 
language-philosophical issues, such as the tales of infinite libraries and new 
words by Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges1. In Borges’ most daring 
works he creates impossible spaces – in the metaphorical and physical sense 
– of innumerable quantities and abundant scale. Also Foucault’s reference 
to ‘a certain Chinese Encyclopedia’ (Foucault 1970/2009, p.xvii) is owed to 
Borges. 
 The work Readingmachine (2007 onwards) follows a similar logic: 
set up as a conceptual work, but realised within sculptural constraints. It 
plays on the traditional ideas we share about novels and books. This aware-
ness about conventional forms as containers for narrative language make 
it akin to the strategy in The Complete Dictionary (see p.320). The Read-
ingmachine2 relies on modes from narrative practice and novel writing, 
both hosted by the struggles of writing a book and the clichés connected 
to authorship. The Readingmachine is a potentially never-ending series of 
preciously-bound books of different sizes, thicknesses and languages. 
Each volume contains a different beginning for a story about a man who 
decides to read the entirety of all books. Each book ceases after the first 
page; the failed stories suggest an unlimited range of possibilities for an 
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2011/aug/24/jorge-luis-borges-google-doodle
2 The work was inspired by Dr.Dorothea Franck after her confession that she possessed “a suitcase full of 
first pages” of writings which she begins all over again and again. Later the reference to Italo Calvino’s 
novel ‘If on a Winter’s night a Traveller’ (1981) was pointed out to me by a number of people who saw 
the Readingmachine.
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unachievable goal1. The first pages are written in accordance with the already 
existing beginnings, yet starting each at different moments of the ‘entire’ 
(and unfinished, unfinishable) story. That means that one book may start 
with the protagonist’s decision to read all books in early childhood, another 
volume engaging in the story of the reader is in his sixties after more than 
five decennia of holding on to his decision to dedicate his life to this impos-
sible undertaking. Each beginning sets a tone, style and literary pace for the 
entirety of the suggested volume at hand. Additionally, the styles of writing 
differ greatly from book to book, and so do the number of pages. A maxi-
mum diversity of literary tones is employed, ranging from spelling styles of 
children books, via pulp fiction to poetic, subtle and suggestive autonomous 
literary writing. The different beginnings are translated into different target 
languages which add to the game of seclusion and access: the languages the 
reader can master, open the way to the ‘entirety’ of the story and simultane-
ously limit access to it by the fact that continually more volumes are added 
to the series. The sales-model guarantees a system of ‘infinite growth’ which 
mirrors the paradoxical movement of the protagonist in the story: the sale of 
one book pays for two new ones to be added to the series. 
 Its growth and incompleteness is the counter-movement to the 
attempts of the hero: both attempts are equally absurd. It plays with the 
writer’s attempt ‘to begin again and again’ which sound familiar with regard 
to the work by Wittgenstein and Stein (Monk, 1993, Hobhouse, 1975). It 
pays tribute to language-practice as a never-ending and life-long perpetual 
movement between things we know and master and the limits of language 
towards the Mystical (see p.398). The work is an example of an attempt to 
realise the difference between saying and showing in a Wittgensteinian 
sense: though we can explain and describe the work with words, one cannot 
manage to capture the experience of the work in its physical presence.  
 
1 Failure as a principle of this work resonates with the heritage of 1969 Nobel Price winner for Literature, 
Samuel Beckettwith his famous statement ‘Try again. Fail again. Fail better.’ 
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Image 108b
Melzer: Readingmachine, Return Gallery, Goethe 
Institute, Dublin, 2011 
Image 108c
Melzer: Readingmachine, Return Gallery, Goethe 
Institute, Dublin, 2011
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LA MAQUINA DE LEER
Entrevistas y charlas
Traducción 
Jose Recio
A – Z
 
Image-set 109
Melzer: Readingmachine, 2008
first pages from several books
Erstes Kapitel
Am ersten Februar neunzehnhundertachtundsechzig 
war auf dem Hof schon um sechs Uhr morgens eine 
neue Fuhre eingetroffen, die, früher als sonst, die 
Kisten der nächsten Woche hereinbrachte. Die Frau 
im Rahmen des Küchenfensters bewegte den Vorhang 
zur Seite, um hinaus sehen zu können.  
Sie lächelte nicht, als der Fahrer des Lastwagens sie er-
kannte und kurz nickte. Sie stand regungslos umrahmt 
vom kleinen Fenster im Erdgeschoss des niedrigen 
Etagenhauses. Sie sah hinaus und das so lange, bis sie 
durch das von ihrem Atmen beschlagene Glas nichts 
mehr sehen konnte. Dann ließ sie den Vorhang los. 
Die Falten des Stoffes machten kleine fahrige Spuren 
in dem Hauch der Frau. Die Frau ging zum Herd und 
nahm den Kaffee vom Feuer. 
Der Fahrer hatte das Licht am Wagen brennen lassen. 
Er stand draußen neben dem Fenster und rauchte. Der 
Fahrer hatte bisher geduldig gewartet bis die Frau ihn 
hereinbitten würde, jetzt trat er schließlich ein. Es war 
heller als sonst in der Küche und die Frau wendete 
sich vom Herd ihm zu und lächelte doch. Danke für 
Ihr Licht, sagte sie, Ihre Scheinwerfer, meine ich. Der 
Fahrer schwieg. Jeden Montag brachte er eine Fuhre 
an diesen Hof, wöchentlich einmal, seit zwölf Jahren. 
An den Umstand, dass es allein Bücher sind, die alle 
Kisten seines Anhängers füllen, hatte er sich anfangs
Tendre vers des choses impossibles, voilà quels 
étaient mes objectifs. Maintenant, je suis un 
homme vaincu car je suis capable d’entrevoir 
la ﬁn. Je me suis lassé de mes lectures.
Je me rends compte que je connais déjà toutes 
les choses qui me seront encore possible de
faire et celles que je ne serais plus en mesure
d’accomplir. Ne serais-ce que lire les livres 
dont j’ai déjà fait le tri, tout les titres
commençant par la lettre M en plus peut-être 
des dernières parutions du pays. Et ce serait 
déjà énorme. Le calme m’entourant s’étend à 
mesure que le silence s’installe. Le silence me 
rend nerveux. Comment pourrais-je continuer
à lire alors que les jours restant se raréﬁent
et qu’il parait improbable de jamais arriver à 
bout de toutes ces pages. De temps à autre, une
pensée m’agace; la pensée de ne pas avoir vécu 
avec plus de recul. Une forme d’hésitation 
comme seul garde fou, sans quoi rien ne
pourrait jamais être accompli. Le temps qui 
passe se visualise sur la tranche du livre, les 
minutes dans la page qu’on tourne. Depuis que 
One
Once upon a time, there was a young boy
who knew how to read before he knew how
to walk. The young boy liked playing with
books and he spent his days spelling words. 
Soon he knew all children books and fairy 
tales, later he read every book he could ﬁnd 
around the house. His father owned a library, 
which was attached to the house. He used to sit 
with him in the oﬃce. He sat on piles of books
to read one after another, often a few at a time,
several volumes a day. The boy grew up and
went to school. One day he sat down at his
desk and pulled out a pen. For the ﬁrst time in 
days he interrupted his reading for a while to
follow an idea. His dream was to continue
reading and so he developed this plan: he
wanted to read all  books. 
He calculated. He estimated. He wondered. If 
he only attempted to read all books written
in his mother tongue, he estimated a total of 
4800 books every day. And to these all new
books published every day everywhere also
have to be added. He was facing a task which
seemed impossible to complete.
‘And so, when writers enumerate all the things they 
know, that proves nothing whatever.’
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Image 108a
Melzer: Readingmachine, De Appel Arts Centre, Amsterdam, 2007
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Él era alto, delgado, pálido y sigiloso. Sus verdes o 
azules ojos nadaban como peces tras los amarillentos
cristales de sus gafas. Llevaba un pantalón azul
oscuro y la camisa bajo su jersey marrón seguro 
que algún día fue de color blanco. Llevaba zapatos 
de estar en casa, pantuﬂas marrones de un cuero 
brillante. Tenía unos 35 años y los aparentaba. Sólo 
cuando se movía parecía mayor. Su largo cuello no 
dejaba girar su cabeza y para girar la cabeza tenía 
que acompañarla con el cuerpo. Esto lo envejecía. 
Estaba sentado derecho en su silla con las manos 
metidas bajo los sobacos. Miraba hacia arriba y 
apoyando su cabeza sobre su cuello parecía
intentar recordar algo. ¿Cuanto tiempo había
estado leyendo? Leía ya desde antes de poder andar,
al menos eso era lo que siempre le habían contado
sus padres. Queda por decir que esto era una visión 
romantizada. Pues por una enfermedad en su 
primera infancia estuvo algunos meses amarrado
a una cama sin poder mover piernas o espalda. 
Supo leer desde muy joven, eso sí era verdad.
 Se saco las manos de entre los sobacos y 
las olió. Estaba solo. A su lado había una pila de
libros que hoy mismo se iba a leer. Se había 
resignado a llenar sus días con algo que nunca
terminaría, algo que él nunca podría terminar. Se frotó
la rodilla secándose el sudor de las manos. Se aclaró 
la garganta y cogió el primer libro del montón.
Prologue
 ‘The relationship between commitment and doubt is by 
no means an antagonistic one. Commitment is healthiest when it 
is not without doubt.’ The man who said this was a loner living
up North. Who was he?  When I ﬁrst heard of that man who
attempted to read all books, I took it for a legend, one of the most 
beautiful metaphors, which remained of Magic Realism. It must be 
a tale, I believed: the man who longed to witness the existence of 
all books with his life, to measure the text with his breath, he could 
impossibly be a sensible person. No living person commits to such 
enterprise. I was wrong.
 There was a man who committed, entirely out of free will, 
to this undertaking. Such vision could be imagined in the Middle
Ages, when an ambitious and lonesome monk asks the lord if 
he may dedicate his days to reading all books which the modest
library in the monastery had to oﬀer. The monk was tested for his 
wish to pay his lifetime in the currency of all books, which entered 
the library until 1620. He failed just because of dying three shelves 
before the end of his mission. Since then, his attempt remained a 
legend. Still today, if someone utters a plan, which challenges the 
limits of possibility, the saying goes: ‘Try, read all books.’
 Many years after I heard of these legends I received
a phone-call from a Scandinavian ﬁlmmaker, who prepared a
documentary about this man who lives up North. He, who decided 
to commit his life to the reading of all books. It was not a monk 
this time, but an oﬀspring of an old librarian family, who was
considered something in between a genius and an autistic boy. I 
set out to ﬁnd out more about earlier attempts, just like the one 
in he early seventeenth century, and made some calculations based 
on statistics of publishers worldwide. I realized that anyone who 
tried again in our times simply exercises failure. It was  impossible;
what gave him the power to hold on to this commitment, 
I wondered. I decided to come along.
Das war keine Wohnstube mehr. Das war kein 
Wohnraum mehr. Kein Zweifel, das, was noch vor 
Tagen einer Stube ähnlich war, hatte sich in eine 
Bibliothek verwandelt. Nein, nicht in eine Biblio-
thek, sondern in eine Stube, die mit hunderten 
Büchern verstellt war. Stapelweise ragten sie neben 
den Sesseln auf, stapelten sie sich neben Tischen 
und auf Stühlen der Decke entgegen. 
Die Raumecken waren einige Meter ins Innere des 
Raumes gerutscht, die Bücher, die in den Ecken 
gestapelt waren und sich in Reihen aneinander 
lehnten und ineinander verschränkten, verjüngten
den Raum zu den Seiten und ließen ihn weich 
und rund erscheinen. Wie eine Bienenwabe wuchs 
der Raum von den Seiten und Ecken her zusam-
men, verdichtete sich an allen Fußbodenleisten zu 
Schichten unregelmäßiger Buchstabenstufen. Wie 
enorme Papierpilze.
Die Stapel auf den Tischen bildeten Säulen bis 
unter die Lampe, unter den Sitzﬂächen der Stühle
füllten Buchbände vollständig den negativen 
Raum. Sein Leben war eine Buchhaltung. Das, 
was keine Wohnung mehr war, war die Wohnung 
des Lesers. Er hatte vor einiger Zeit den Entschluss 
gefasst, alle Bücher zu lesen, die es gab. 
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 A coincidence, I thought, has brought me here. 
It was coincidence or fate that I was born this child of my 
parents, who taught me all that determined my choices. Here 
I learned about all that forced me into all of this much later. 
 My profession is ridiculous, idealistic, and repulsive.
I would like to be honest, but I do not manage. I would 
like to describe precisely and truthfully how it happened 
that I do what I do: that I read. That I read only, all the 
time, without even wanting to understand or memorize 
what I read. That I read without the ambition to study,
remember and make use of the words. That I read without
wanting to know. I do not manage to explain how I 
found this decision or how the decision has found me.
I wish was capable to describe how I started to read, how I
continued reading and how I did not succeed to quit 
ever since. How the plan took over.   
 Having a plan which is hard to execute is not very 
particular. With an impossible plan itself, nothing is lost. 
But, as soon as one prepares to realize an unfeasible plan 
and plan one’s life according to it, then retreat becomes
increasingly unlikely. One will have to turn into a
fanatic to stick to an unachievable undertaking. The longer
I continued the attempt to model my life around this
impossible task, then the more absurd every thought of 
quitting became: it seemed more likely to me to be able 
to read the entirety of books than to be able to give up.
La machine à lire
Un monologue
Traduction de 
Joséphine Hirschi
A–Z
1
Er wacht auf. Er öﬀnet die Augen. Er schließt 
die Augen. Er öﬀnet sie wieder. Er setzt sich auf. 
Er setzt die Füße auf den Boden. Er ist allein. Er 
dreht sich um. Er blickt auf die Uhr. Er steht auf. 
Er geht hinaus. Er geht ins Badezimmer. Er lässt 
heißes Wasser in die Badewanne ein. Er nimmt ein 
Bad. Er trocknet sich ab. Er rasiert sich. Er kämmt 
sein Haar. Er fönt sein Haar. Er kleidet sich an. 
Er verlässt das Haus. Er grüßt den Mann. Er geht 
ins Haus. Er nimmt neben einem Stapel Bücher 
platz. Er sieht hinaus. Er sagt nichts. Er blickt zur 
Uhr. Es ist sehr früh. Er trinkt Kaﬀee. Er blickt 
hinaus. Er blickt auf die Uhr. Er nimmt das Buch 
ganz oben auf dem Stapel. Er schlägt das Buch auf. 
Er blickt zur Uhr. Er blickt ins Buch. Er beginnt 
zu lesen. Er liest. Er werde sich nicht regen, kein 
Wort sprechen, niemanden ansehen und das Buch 
erst weglegen, wenn er es gelesen habe. Er werde 
gleichmütig aussehen, still sitzen und ganz gleich-
mäßig die Seiten umblättern. Er werde schnell 
lesen ohne dabei hastig zu wirken. Er liest gegen 
die Zeit an. Er blickt kein einziges mal zur Uhr.
One
 His days started early in the morning. His breakfast 
was decorated with books. The ﬁrst book of the day was read 
by the time he ﬁnished his coﬀee, served by his wife. The big 
blue coﬀee pot. The second book he read sitting right there. 
The third book accompanied him over to the annex building of 
the library. He enjoyed the walk through the courtyard, passing
the containers and the parking lot. He read while walking. He 
turned the pages quickly and gently, obviously the pace of his daily 
routine. It was a fast pace, the time that allowed others to look 
at a page, just long enough to identify the language the text was 
written in. He could read faster than anyone else in the world.
 The only thing he was lacking was time. (The time to 
ﬁnish what he started. His motive was to ﬁnish all books there 
were, steadily growing stacks of books that were printed every
day abroad, collected and packed, shipped from abroad to 
the island and delivered in big trucks to the institute. The 
enterprise was soon in its sixth year and foreign investors 
from Europe started to gain interest in the project. Around 
that time, every book available on the island has been read. 
He was puzzled by the donation that arrived to his house short 
after a Finnish camera team had made a documentary about 
his work. The letters he had received from admirers of his work 
stunned him. The letters themselves, however, were opened 
and read by his wife, who used to read fragments of them at 
the dinner table during the ﬁrst years of their commitment.)
 He ﬁnishes his fourth book when entering the Big Hall 
of the archive. The hall was a present by the cultural ministry of 
Sweden, and although it was ﬁnished since months, he could not get 
used to its mere size. The hall was about forty meters wide and three 
times as long and high enough to shelter an airplane. It was ﬁlled 
with a chain of moving belts and shelves on wheels. On the chairs 
in front of the belts were seats for up to thirty-eight employees, who 
prepared the books for the Reader. He approached, silently, greeted 
some men and women sitting there. He walked over to belt number 
ﬁve, sat down and continued with the next book. It will take him
328 329
1 http://www.kuenstlerbuecher.com/mostre.php
Neither can the description replace the detailed implications and meanings 
that can be retrieved from the confrontation with the work in its original 
form. The interaction with the piece, the moment of choice by the audience 
when they select a volume to read, the slow unriddling of the concept by us-
ing the work as a reading installation and the actual experience of the texts 
as conventional forms and books as common objects is impossible to replace 
with a mere description. A work of art cannot be substituted for an account 
of it, even if the work is based on verbal language.     
33. THE COMPLETE DICTIONARY
How big is a complete dictionary? Using this question as a departure point 
a possible answer was formulated in the field of the visual arts rather than 
in the discursive form of a philosophical paper. The process of including 
knowledge from the field of language philosophy into the concept of a physi-
cal artwork became manifested in the early work The Complete Dictionary 
(2003). Inspired by the work The New Art of Bookmaking (1973, published in 
Kontexts no.6-7) by Mexican artist Ulises Carrión, a long series of questions 
on language, words, books and the reader followed, from which the question 
‘How big is a complete dictionary?’ emerged as the most pressing.  
 Fascinated as they were by the order of words, alphabetised sen-
tences and language-games, the art movements from the 1960’s have had 
great influence on my own artistic interests. The artist’s book1 has its origins 
in the collaborations between visual artists (often painters) and writers 
(often poets) and became an autonomous art form in the second half of the 
20th century, where artists reclaimed the book as art object and autonomous 
medium. Today both forms coexist and numerous publications and fairs 
celebrate the book as art medium with its own scene (Michael Glasmeier, 
1994). In my work, this medium has been a form of expression and enquiry 
since 2000. 
How big is 
the complete
dictionary?
Carrión: The New 
Art of Bookmaking
artist’s books
 the complete dictionary readingmachine
Image 110a
Ulisses Carrión: The New Art of Making Books, published in ‘We have won! Haven’t we?’, 
Projectgroep Ulises Carrión, Amsterdam - Rob Perrée, Harry Ruhé, Guy Schraenen, An-
nie Wright, 1992, page 51
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The Complete Dictionary includes all possible words up to six letters from 
the Latin alphabet. It contains the meaningful words and all vacant letter-
combinations based on a formula designed to generate pronounceable1 
words. Altogether Fifty Million words have been computer-generated in 
alphabetical order, split and printed into 26 volumes from A-Z. Each of 
these thick A4 folios counts 1,600 pages and weighs 3 kg. The corresponding 
data was issued in a small edition on CD-ROM and takes merely 350 MB of 
‘space’. The physical edition occupies 2m of shelf. 
 Despite the formal likeness with some of the pioneering works of 
Carrión, Kosuth, Weiner and other artists in relation to Conceptual Art, and 
a kinship with Jorge Luis Borges and Arthur C.Clarke’s works of fiction, The 
Complete Dictionary still bears properties which are utterly contemporary to 
its year of making in 2003. It was realised with the help of cognitive scien-
tist Egon Stemle within a few months by using a programme for a regular 
personal computer. This technology was unavailable to artists between the 
1960’s and 1980’s. Although the idea probably existed in the minds of previ-
ous conceptual artists, the time it would take to calculate all possible words 
would simply take too long – longer than a life-time. However, the idea was 
proposed by several authors, especially Clarke, which the bookbinder of The 
Complete Dictionary called to my attention to after having finished the bind-
ing.
 The short story of famous British science fiction author and inven-
tor, Sir Arthur Clarke, The Nine Billion Names of God (1953) anticipates 
most accurately the relationship between words, naming and the ‘mean-
ing of the world’ in The Complete Dictionary. In this story the monks of a 
Tibetan monastery try to list all names of God, because they believe that the 
purpose of the universe is to collect all the possible names of God, which 
would at the same time complete and end the universe.   
‘Writing the names out by hand, as they had been doing, even after eliminating 
various nonsense combinations, would take another fifteen thousand years; the 
monks wish to use modern technology in order to finish this task more quickly. ‘2 
1 Pronouncability as validation is formulated from the experience as a SAE language user, like I am myself. 
This means, that a maximum alteration between vowels and consonants is desireable. See p.311.
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Nine_Billion_Names_of_God, accessed November 10 2011
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Image 110b
Ulisses Carrión: The New Art of Making Books, published in ‘We have won! Haven’t we?’, 
Projectgroep Ulises Carrión, Amsterdam - Rob Perrée, Harry Ruhé, Guy Schraenen, An-
nie Wright, 1992, page 52
332 333
In other words, Sapir considers the word not as a ready-made mental unit 
made up of its formal aspects, like vowels and consonants. A word is rather a 
form in flux as it is used.
‘Such features as accent, cadence, and the treatment of consonants and vowels 
within the body of a word are often useful as aids in the external demarcation 
of the word, but they must by no means be interpreted, as is sometimes done, as 
themselves responsible for its psychological existence. They at best but strengthen a 
feeling of unity that is already present on other grounds.’ 
(Sapir, E. 1921, p.35)
Sapir asks ‘If function is not the ultimate criterion of the word, what is?’. He 
characterised the word as ’one of the smallest, completely satisfying bits of 
isolated “meaning” into which the sentence resolves itself.’ (Sapir, E., 1921, 
p.34), and he continues that ‘the true, significant elements of language are 
generally sequences of sounds that are either words, significant parts of 
words, or word groupings.’ (Sapir, E. 1921, p.25). In his analysis he distin-
guishes between the conceptual charge of words and their formal properties 
(compare Stokhof 2004, p.331 this thesis). 
‘The word is merely a form, a definitely molded entity that takes in as much or as 
little of the conceptual material of the whole thought as the genius of language 
cares to allow. Thus it is that while the single radical elements and grammatical ele-
ments, the carriers of isolated concepts, are comparable as we pass from language 
to language, the finished words are not.’ 
(Sapir, E. 1921, p.32) 
We will return to the role of words within sentences in chapter Words in 
and out of order (p.339). For the word list in The Complete Dictionary, the 
distinction between vowels (v)and consonants (k) lead to the restriction of 
a maximum repetition of letters of the same subgroup per letter-sequence. 
The following principle applies, which is analogous for the pattern for words 
with more letters: 
v | k
vv | vk | kv | kv | kk  
vvv | vvk | vkv | kvv | vkk | kvk | vkv | kkv | kkk 
vvvv | vvvk | vvkv | vkvv | kvvv| vkkk | vkvk |vkkv |  kvkv | kkvv | kkvk | kkkv 
Sapir: plastic unity 
of the word
Sapir: a word is 
merely a form
the complete dictionary
In the context of this research, some aspects of interpretation reoccur, such 
as the notion of infinity, tautology and restrictions on how words can be 
formed from letters. 
 In alphabet-based sign-systems like Latin words are composed of 
one or more letters. The choices when making this work are based on argu-
ments for the visual and physical impact of the work. Restrictions are neces-
sary to realise this work in order for it to be ever completed.1 For instance 
the limitation to six letters per word is due to the combinational conse-
quences the word length has on the entire volume of the ‘dictionary’. With 
a six-letter limited word length, the series of volumes from A–Z alludes 
instantly to encyclopedic works, where one letter is contained in one book. 
A word length of up to, say, seven letters per word would already entail a 
twenty-fold increase in data, resulting in 20 books containing words starting 
just with the letter A. 
 Also the number of identical letters is limited in order to avoid 
letter-combinations which lose their appearance as words and look like 
abbreviations. But the formula used for calculation is very simple; it is 
based on the classification of 26 letters of the Latin alphabet into vowels (v) 
and consonants (k). All letters from both subgroups are then subsequently 
calculated into sequences from two to six letters, while restrictions ap-
ply on the frequency of each group (v or k) per word. Within the notion 
of ‘pronounceableness’ there is a necessary limitation of words consisting 
of consonants only (i.e. wrjnmn or series of identical letters like ttttt). The 
hypothesis was that the alteration between vowels and consonants creates 
forms we recognise as ‘words’. So the rules are applied in order to come close 
to the experience we share in SAE languages (Whorf, 1956, see Universal vs 
Relative, p.59) for ‘pronounceable’ words. In his influential work Language 
(1921), the America linguist-anthropologist and teacher of Whorf, Edward 
Sapir, claims that words are provided with a ‘definitive plastic unity’ (Sapir, 
E. 1921, footnote on p.34), though he warns against mistaking the formal 
unity for mental entity.  
1 In German, for instance, words can become extremely long, as nouns connect directly. 
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word-length
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a (v)
b
c
d
e (v)
f
g
h
i (v)
j
k
l
m
n
o (v)
p
q
r
s
t
u (v)
v
w
x
y
z
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Image 113
Melzer: The Complete Dictionary, 2003
first exhibition in June 2003, Amsterdam
the complete dictionary 
Image 112
Melzer: The Complete Dictionary, 2003
first exhibition in June 2003, Amsterdam
Image 111
Melzer: drawing for The Complete Dictionary, 2003
sketch in phase of conceptualization, January 2003
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luebdo
ludumb
ludumc
ludumd
ludume
ludumf
ludumg
ludumh
ludumi
ludumj
ludumk
luduml
ludumm
ludumn
ludumo
ludump
ludumq
ludumr
ludums
ludumt
ludumu
ludumv
ludumw
ludumx
ludumy
ludumz
ludun
luduna
ludunb
ludunc
ludund
ludune
ludunf
ludung
ludunh
luduni
ludunj
ludunk
ludunl
ludunm
ludunn
luduno
ludunp
ludunq
ludunr
luduns
ludunt
ludunu
ludunv
ludunw
ludunx
luduny
ludunz
luduo
luduob
luduoc
luduod
luduof
luduog
luduoh
luduoj
luduok
luduol
luduom
luduon
luduop
luduoq
luduor
luduos
luduot
luduov
luduow
luduox
luduoy
luduoz
ludup
ludupa
ludupb
ludupc
ludupd
ludupe
ludupf
ludupg
luduph
ludupi
ludupj
ludupk
ludupl
ludupm
ludupn
ludupo
ludupp
ludupq
ludupr
ludups
ludupt
ludupu
ludupv
ludupw
ludupx
ludupy
ludupz
luduq
luduqa
luduqb
luduqc
luduqd
luduqe
luduqf
luduqg
luduqh
luduqi
luduqj
luduqk
luduql
luduqm
luduqn
luduqo
luduqp
luduqq
luduqr
luduqs
luduqt
luduqu
luduqv
luduqw
luduqx
luduqy
luduqz
ludur
ludura
ludurb
ludurc
ludurd
ludure
ludurf
ludurg
ludurh
luduri
ludurj
ludurk
ludurl
ludurm
ludurn
luduro
ludurp
ludurq
ludurr
ludurs
ludurt
luduru
ludurv
ludurw
ludurx
ludury
ludurz
ludus
ludusa
ludusb
ludusc
ludusd
luduse
ludusf
ludusg
ludush
ludusi
ludusj
ludusk
ludusl
ludusm
ludusn
luduso
ludusp
ludusq
ludusr
luduss
ludust
ludusu
ludusv
ludusw
ludusx
ludusy
ludusz
ludut
luduta
ludutb
ludutc
ludutd
ludute
ludutf
ludutg
luduth
luduti
ludutj
ludutk
ludutl
ludutm
ludutn
luduto
ludutp
ludutq
ludutr
luduts
ludutt
ludutu
ludutv
ludutw
ludutx
luduty
ludutz
luduu
luduub
luduuc
luduud
luduuf
luduug
luduuh
luduuj
luduuk
luduul
luduum
luduun
luduup
luduuq
luduur
luduus
luduut
luduuv
luduuw
luduux
luduuy
luduuz
luduv
luduva
luduvb
luduvc
luduvd
luduve
luduvf
luduvg
luduvh
luduvi
luduvj
luduvk
luduvl
luduvm
luduvn
luduvo
luduvp
luduvq
luduvr
luduvs
luduvt
luduvu
luduvv
luduvw
luduvx
luduvy
luduvz
luduw
luduwa
luduwb
luduwc
luduwd
luduwe
luduwf
luduwg
luduwh
luduwi
luduwj
luduwk
luduwl
luduwm
luduwn
luduwo
luduwp
luduwq
luduwr
luduws
luduwt
luduwu
luduwv
luduww
luduwx
luduwy
luduwz
ludux
luduxa
luduxb
luduxc
luduxd
luduxe
luduxf
luduxg
luduxh
luduxi
luduxj
luduxk
luduxl
luduxm
luduxn
luduxo
luduxp
luduxq
luduxr
luduxs
luduxt
luduxu
luduxv
luduxw
luduxx
luduxy
luduxz
luduy
luduya
luduyb
luduyc
luduyd
luduye
luduyf
luduyg
luduyh
luduyi
luduyj
luduyk
luduyl
luduym
luduyn
luduyo
luduyp
luduyq
luduyr
luduys
luduyt
luduyu
luduyv
luduyw
luduyx
luduyy
luduyz
luduz
luduza
luduzb
luduzc
luduzd
luduze
luduzf
luduzg
luduzh
luduzi
luduzj
luduzk
luduzl
luduzm
luduzn
luduzo
luduzp
luduzq
luduzr
luduzs
luduzt
luduzu
luduzv
luduzw
luduzx
luduzy
luduzz
ludv
ludva
ludvaa
ludvab
ludvac
ludvad
ludvae
ludvaf
ludvag
ludvah
ludvai
ludvaj
ludvak
ludval
ludvam
ludvan
ludvao
ludvap
ludvaq
ludvar
ludvas
ludvat
ludvau
ludvav
ludvaw
ludvax
ludvay
ludvaz
ludve
ludvea
ludveb
ludvec
ludved
ludvee
ludvef
ludveg
ludveh
ludvei
ludvej
ludvek
ludvel
ludvem
ludven
ludveo
ludvep
ludveq
ludver
ludves
ludvet
ludveu
ludvev
ludvew
ludvex
ludvey
ludvez
ludvi
ludvia
ludvib
ludvic
ludvid
ludvie
ludvif
ludvig
ludvih
ludvii
ludvij
ludvik
ludvil
ludvim
ludvin
ludvio
ludvip
ludviq
ludvir
ludvis
ludvit
ludviu
ludviv
ludviw
ludvix
ludviy
ludviz
ludvo
ludvoa
ludvob
ludvoc
ludvod
ludvoe
ludvof
ludvog
ludvoh
ludvoi
ludvoj
ludvok
ludvol
ludvom
ludvon
ludvoo
ludvop
ludvoq
ludvor
ludvos
ludvot
ludvou
ludvov
ludvow
ludvox
ludvoy
ludvoz
ludvu
ludvua
ludvub
ludvuc
ludvud
ludvue
ludvuf
ludvug
ludvuh
ludvui
ludvuj
ludvuk
ludvul
ludvum
ludvun
ludvuo
ludvup
ludvuq
ludvur
ludvus
ludvut
ludvuu
ludvuv
ludvuw
ludvux
ludvuy
ludvuz
ludw
ludwa
ludwaa
ludwab
ludwac
ludwad
ludwae
ludwaf
ludwag
ludwah
ludwai
ludwaj
ludwak
ludwal
ludwam
ludwan
ludwao
ludwap
ludwaq
ludwar
ludwas
ludwat
ludwau
ludwav
ludwaw
ludwax
ludway
ludwaz
ludwe
ludwea
ludweb
ludwec
ludwed
ludwee
ludwef
ludweg
ludweh
ludwei
ludwej
ludwek
ludwel
ludwem
ludwen
ludweo
ludwep
ludweq
ludwer
ludwes
ludwet
ludweu
ludwev
ludwew
ludwex
ludwey
ludwez
ludwi
ludwia
ludwib
ludwic
ludwid
ludwie
ludwif
ludwig
ludwih
ludwii
ludwij
ludwik
ludwil
ludwim
ludwin
ludwio
ludwip
ludwiq
ludwir
ludwis
ludwit
ludwiu
ludwiv
ludwiw
ludwix
ludwiy
ludwiz
ludwo
ludwoa
ludwob
ludwoc
ludwod
ludwoe
ludwof
ludwog
ludwoh
ludwoi
ludwoj
ludwok
ludwol
ludwom
ludwon
ludwoo
ludwop
ludwoq
ludwor
ludwos
ludwot
ludwou
ludwov
ludwow
ludwox
ludwoy
ludwoz
ludwu
ludwua
ludwub
ludwuc
ludwud
ludwue
ludwuf
ludwug
ludwuh
ludwui
ludwuj
ludwuk
ludwul
ludwum
ludwun
ludwuo
ludwup
ludwuq
ludwur
ludwus
ludwut
ludwuu
ludwuv
ludwuw
ludwux
ludwuy
ludwuz
ludx
ludxa
ludxaa
ludxab
ludxac
ludxad
ludxae
ludxaf
ludxag
ludxah
ludxai
ludxaj
ludxak
ludxal
ludxam
ludxan
ludxao
ludxap
ludxaq
ludxar
ludxas
ludxat
ludxau
ludxav
ludxaw
ludxax
ludxay
ludxaz
ludxe
ludxea
ludxeb
ludxec
ludxed
ludxee
ludxef
ludxeg
ludxeh
ludxei
ludxej
ludxek
ludxel
ludxem
ludxen
ludxeo
ludxep
ludxeq
ludxer
ludxes
ludxet
ludxeu
ludxev
ludxew
ludxex
ludxey
ludxez
ludxi
ludxia
ludxib
ludxic
ludxid
ludxie
ludxif
ludxig
ludxih
ludxii
ludxij
ludxik
ludxil
ludxim
ludxin
ludxio
ludxip
ludxiq
ludxir
ludxis
ludxit
ludxiu
ludxiv
ludxiw
ludxix
ludxiy
ludxiz
ludxo
ludxoa
ludxob
ludxoc
ludxod
ludxoe
ludxof
ludxog
ludxoh
ludxoi
ludxoj
ludxok
ludxol
ludxom
ludxon
ludxoo
ludxop
ludxoq
ludxor
ludxos
ludxot
ludxou
ludxov
ludxow
ludxox
ludxoy
ludxoz
ludxu
ludxua
ludxub
ludxuc
ludxud
ludxue
ludxuf
ludxug
ludxuh
ludxui
ludxuj
ludxuk
ludxul
ludxum
ludxun
ludxuo
ludxup
ludxuq
ludxur
ludxus
ludxut
ludxuu
ludxuv
ludxuw
ludxux
ludxuy
ludxuz
ludy
ludya
ludyaa
ludyab
ludyac
ludyad
ludyae
ludyaf
ludyag
ludyah
ludyai
ludyaj
ludyak
ludyal
ludyam
ludyan
ludyao
ludyap
ludyaq
ludyar
ludyas
ludyat
ludyau
ludyav
ludyaw
ludyax
ludyay
ludyaz
ludye
ludyea
ludyeb
ludyec
ludyed
ludyee
ludyef
ludyeg
ludyeh
ludyei
ludyej
ludyek
ludyel
ludyem
ludyen
ludyeo
ludyep
ludyeq
ludyer
ludyes
ludyet
ludyeu
ludyev
ludyew
ludyex
ludyey
ludyez
ludyi
ludyia
ludyib
ludyic
ludyid
ludyie
ludyif
ludyig
ludyih
ludyii
ludyij
ludyik
ludyil
ludyim
ludyin
ludyio
ludyip
ludyiq
ludyir
ludyis
ludyit
ludyiu
ludyiv
ludyiw
ludyix
ludyiy
ludyiz
ludyo
ludyoa
ludyob
ludyoc
ludyod
ludyoe
ludyof
ludyog
ludyoh
ludyoi
ludyoj
ludyok
ludyol
ludyom
ludyon
ludyoo
ludyop
ludyoq
ludyor
ludyos
ludyot
ludyou
ludyov
ludyow
ludyox
ludyoy
ludyoz
ludyu
ludyua
ludyub
ludyuc
ludyud
ludyue
ludyuf
ludyug
ludyuh
ludyui
ludyuj
ludyuk
ludyul
ludyum
ludyun
ludyuo
ludyup
ludyuq
ludyur
ludyus
ludyut
ludyuu
ludyuv
ludyuw
ludyux
ludyuy
ludyuz
ludz
ludza
ludzaa
ludzab
ludzac
ludzad
ludzae
ludzaf
ludzag
ludzah
ludzai
ludzaj
ludzak
ludzal
ludzam
ludzan
ludzao
ludzap
ludzaq
ludzar
ludzas
ludzat
ludzau
ludzav
ludzaw
ludzax
ludzay
ludzaz
ludze
ludzea
ludzeb
ludzec
ludzed
ludzee
ludzef
ludzeg
ludzeh
ludzei
ludzej
ludzek
ludzel
ludzem
ludzen
ludzeo
ludzep
ludzeq
ludzer
ludzes
ludzet
ludzeu
ludzev
ludzew
ludzex
ludzey
ludzez
ludzi
ludzia
ludzib
ludzic
ludzid
ludzie
ludzif
ludzig
ludzih
ludzii
ludzij
ludzik
ludzil
ludzim
ludzin
ludzio
ludzip
ludziq
ludzir
ludzis
ludzit
ludziu
ludziv
ludziw
ludzix
ludziy
ludziz
ludzo
ludzoa
ludzob
ludzoc
ludzod
ludzoe
ludzof
ludzog
ludzoh
ludzoi
ludzoj
ludzok
ludzol
ludzom
ludzon
ludzoo
ludzop
ludzoq
ludzor
ludzos
ludzot
ludzou
ludzov
ludzow
ludzox
ludzoy
ludzoz
ludzu
ludzua
ludzub
ludzuc
ludzud
ludzue
ludzuf
ludzug
ludzuh
ludzui
ludzuj
ludzuk
ludzul
ludzum
ludzun
ludzuo
ludzup
ludzuq
ludzur
ludzus
ludzut
ludzuu
ludzuv
ludzuw
ludzux
ludzuy
ludzuz
lue
lueb
lueba
luebaa
luebab
luebac
luebad
luebae
luebaf
luebag
luebah
luebai
luebaj
luebak
luebal
luebam
lueban
luebao
luebap
luebaq
luebar
luebas
luebat
luebau
luebav
luebaw
luebax
luebay
luebaz
luebb
luebba
luebbe
luebbi
luebbo
luebbu
luebc
luebca
luebce
luebci
luebco
luebcu
luebd
luebda
luebde
luebdi
luebdo
Image 116
Melzer: The Complete Dictionary, 2003
one page of volume L, containing the word ludwig
the complete dictionary 
Image 115
Melzer: The Complete Dictionary, 2003
Museum voor hedendaagse kunst, Antwerp, 2008, photo: MuhKA
Image 114
Melzer: The Complete Dictionary, 2003
Rijkskademie van beeldende kunsten, Amsterdam, 2005, photo: Renaat Janssen
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are maybe more important. He points to the special alphabet used in pho-
nology and phonetics, which are capable of expressing more sounds than 
our standardised alphabet, he also notes that: 
‘(...) the restrictions on letter-combinations are strongly linked to ‘pronounceabil-
ity’. These restrictions, however, are different for different languages. Therefore, the 
concept of ‘possible word’ as such has little significance in linguistics.’ 
(Stokhof 2004) 
In relation to a word’s meaning Stokhof notes that there are many more 
homonyms than synonyms in a language and argues that ‘Form is subor-
dinate to meaning in the sense that the same form (word) often represents 
more than one meaning. This is because the context (in spoken and written 
language) almost always makes clear which meaning is represented by the 
form in that specific context.’ In my view, Stokhof engages in a Wittgenstein-
ian perspective, when he further writes about the function of words:  
‘How words come into being and whether they survive, depends on how well they 
serve this function: to convey meanings.’ 
(Stokhof  2004)
He continues to explain that the functions words have in our practices will 
eventually determine what is ‘possible’.1 These practices: 
‘(...) define to a high degree who we are; what it means to be human. To question 
possible words, thus turns out to be related to the question what possible practices 
are. And the latter question is essentially the question of what we, as individuals 
and as a community, could be. The question of possible words, lexica, languages, is 
therefore not only a linguistic question, but also an anthropological one: the ques-
tion of our possible identities.’ 
(Stokhof 2004)
Stokhof ends by sharing his experience of the suggestion of a complete over-
view of all our practices, a complete index of the imaginary. 
‘It is both intriguing and alarming, when one is confronted with the idea of a com-
plete list of all possible meanings, a list that effectively says: “Look, this is every-
thing you could possibly think.” 
(Stokhof  2004)
For the present research the idea of a vocabulary is central and documenting 
vocabulary as a word-list is essential. In the following chapter, we will look 
once more into the properties of lists.
1 With saying practice, the influence of Wittgenstein’s meaning as use–hypothesis is evident. Additionally, 
the possibility  of Ludwig Wittgenstein meeting Gertrude Stein is touched upon in a literal way, as the words 
they both used – their Shared Vocabulary – establishes their meeting.
    
the complete dictionary
Words can be pleasurable and even fetishistic. In the course of so-called de-
constructivist tendencies, the French post-modern philosophers managed to 
dedicate much of their attention to text and word. In The Pleasure of the Text 
(1975) Roland Barthes classifies language-users into four categories taken 
from in psychoanalysis: The Hysteric, who ‘joins in bottomless (...) comedy 
of language’ (...) with ‘no critical scrutinity’, The Fetishist, who is ‘intrigued 
by ‘divided up text’, ‘formulae’ and ‘pleasure of the word’, the Obsessive as 
‘logophiles, linguists, semioticians’ and the Paranoids ‘who consume and 
produce complicated texts’ with ‘constructions like games’ and ‘secret con-
straints’ (Barthes 1973/1975, p.63). Deleuze is known to have experienced 
words as autonomous entities and that a philosopher is the inventor of new 
words and new concepts. 
‘Early on, he recalled, philosophical concepts struck him with the same force as 
literary characters, having their own autonomy and style.’ 1
The ‘autonomy’ of the letter springs form its formal unity, just as we see 
common words as single units. Concepts, I believe, feed from the linguistic 
unity they are often formulated by. The Complete Dictionary contains new 
words in the sense that most of the listed letter-combination are still void of 
meaning; they are, in other words, still available for us to use. This encyclo-
pedic artist’s book (which is strictly speaking neither a dictionary as it lacks 
translation, nor complete as it is embodying precisely the limits on which it 
is based) has no mother-tongue. Any reader can search the pool of possible 
words and recognise those he is accustomed to in his language(s). A com-
plete vocabulary is potentially infinite and expanding, yet the abundance of 
words paradoxically do not solve the social dilemma in language: ‘how many 
words do we need in order to understand each other?’
 A similar note point is made by the philosopher Martin Stokhof, 
who wrote a short article on this work which was published in the art 
magazine HTV #50 in 20042  to introduce linguistic notions of a word to the 
general public. He explains that apart from the formal aspect (in the work ‘a 
word is viewed as a sequence of letters’), the aspects of sound and meaning 
1 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/deleuze/ accessed March 14 2013
2 This issue of HTV was called the ‘sewahd’ issue. This word was still void of meaning,  and the editor in 
chief chose this word from The Complete Dictionary, for the title of the magazine to become its new meaning.
http://www.htvdeijsberg.nl/. With special thanks to Alon Levin.
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1 This spread shows a collection of words fabricated by his pupils – here Leopoldine Eichberger – which laid 
the foundation for Wittgenstein’s dictionary.
1 During his work as a school teacher in rural Austria, Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote and published a 
dictionary for the pupils. The aim of this ‘Wörterbuch für Volksschulen’ (1926) was to improve orthogra-
phy of words and to set a standard vocabulary based on the actual practice and use of language from his 
experience. It is included here in order to display that Wittgenstein’s efforts as a teacher came from language 
practice. It underlines the specificity of a group of language users.
The alphabetical order is but one way to sort items, yet it is the most com-
mon, formal and neutral one, as it is non-hierarchical and neglects the 
‘status’ or meaning of a word. That brings about the entirely different word-
orders in lexica and encyclopedia of different languages. In English, cab 
and cabbage are close neighbours, in the German translation, Taxi does not 
neighbour Kraut. The ordering of words into lists is also just the nucleus of 
what it can mean to view words together, as we know from words in sen-
tences, where they follow a more rigid inherent order than in the arbitrary 
list. 
‘Order is, at one and the same time, that which is given in things as their inner law, 
the hidden network that determines the way they confront one another, and also 
that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an examination, 
language; and it is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in 
depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment of its expression.’ 
(Foucault 1970/2009, p.xxi)
Today the Internet provides an immense question-and-answer-game. When 
we type in the question ‘How to order a list?’ into a search engine we receive 
an output instantly. As example we quote a certain Jeff, who stresses that the 
act of classification is essential to any order. 
‘Re: Best way to sort a list by a specific order
http://forums.asp.net/t/1537241.aspx
03-17-2010, 3:29 PM  Jeff wrote:
You can sort things by the order of a category or attribute. Largest to smallest, 
alphabetically, numerically, by colour, size, smell or whatever. You can’t sort some-
thing without having an order. So your problem isn’t sorting your data but rather 
giving your data an attribute you can sort by. This could even be an additional col-
umn in your table that you call the sort order, as long as whatever is in the column 
can be sorted and ends up with the records in the order you want.’ 1
In this research we have encountered word lists in alphabetical order (Palace 
of Colours, p.80, What’s in a name, p.102, The Complete Dictionary, p.320). 
Some lists were ordered by subjective criteria, as in the memory-experiment 
of Naming, where participants named people they met purely based on the 
irreproducible order of retrospection (see p.125). Another ordering prin-
ciple is based on statistics, like the network of words exemplified by the 
1 http://forums.asp.net/t/1537241.aspx, 03-17-2010, 3:29 PM
alphabetical order
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34. HOW TO ORDER A LIST?
We have encountered word-lists earlier in this research. However, we need 
to look closer at the properties of words once they are taken out of the con-
text of a sentence, once they are enumerated or sorted in order. Language 
itself invites speculation about its modes, dimensions and scale. Again it is 
Barthes who poeticises this notion of language, when he writes: 
‘One evening, half asleep on a banquette in a bar, just for fun I tried to enumerate 
all the languages within earshot: music, conversation, sound of chairs, glasses ...’ 
(Barthes 1973/1975, p.49)
Where lies the power of enumeration, of ordering items in lists? Is there is a 
difference between lists of items and lists of words? We now turn to enumer-
ation as such an ordering principle in an extended poetic sense. Foucault 
iterated this in his work The Order of Things (Les Mots et Les Choses, 1970), 
where he writes about the act of raising an inventory: 
‘(...) We are all familiar with the disconcerting effect of the proximities of extremes, 
or, quite simply, with the sudden vicinity of things that have no relation to each 
other; the mere act of enumeration that held them all together has a power of 
enchantment all of its own: (...)’  
(Foucault 1970/2009, p.xvii)
Everything that is enumerated is brought into relation with each other. In 
the children’s game ‘I packed my suitcase’ a list of belongings is named in 
turns (‘I packed my suitcase with an apple, a banana and a canary.’ 1). Each 
participant has to remember all items in order and add another before pass-
ing to the next player. As simple as this game is, it sums up both aspects 
of chronology and proximity of listed words. This ‘poetry of proximity’2 
and Foucault’s captivation with the encyclopedic list, in which all items are 
close due to a set rule of classification, like the ‘alphabetical series (a, b, c, d) 
which links each of those categories to all the other.’  (Foucault 1970/2009, 
p.xvii). 
1 http://www.activityvillage.co.uk/i_packed_my_suitcase.htm
2 I owe this expression to Leila Peacock.
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‘They are naturally of great value to the literary artist. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that even to the artist they are a danger. A word whose customary feeling-
tone is too unquestionably accepted becomes a plushy bit of furniture, a cliché. 
Every now and then the artist has to fight the feeling-tone, to get the word to mean 
what it nakedly and conceptually should mean, depending for the effect of feeling 
on the creative power of an individual juxtaposition of concepts or images.’ 
(Sapir 1921, p.41) 
Is Sapir’s warning about the ‘emotional’ meaning a remark about the meta-
phorical charge of words? When Ezra Pound elaborates on the feel of words 
in relationship to (creative) writing, he departs from his definition of litera-
ture as ‘language charged with meaning’ (Pound, 1934, p.28). Pound sums 
up three major ways to charge words with meaning: phanopoeia (‘throwing 
the object on to the visual imagination’, (Pound, E. 1934, p.63), melopoeia 
(‘including emotional correlations by the sound and rhythm of speech’ 
(Pound, 1934, p.63) and logopoeia, which includes both former effects ‘by 
stimulating the associations (intellectual or emotional) that have remained 
in the receiver’s consciousness in relation to the actual words or word groups 
employed.’ (Pound, 1934, p.63) He explicitly characterises the latter as risky, 
because it relies on a specific relation to usage, ‘that is, to the kind of context 
in which the reader expects, or is accustomed, to find it.’ (Pound,1934, p.37). 
This is but one link to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘meaning as use’ (1953, #43), 
and there is another curious similarity to Wittgenstein’s writing: Pound af-
firms that the choice of words is essential to the creation of a good text, and 
that a word implies the lore of preceding usage. It is remarkable, to find the 
analogy of the word as chess piece1 in his contemplation, which we know 
from Wittgenstein’s argument that the word is a metaphor for a pragmatic 
unit of language use.
‘When one shews someone the king in chess and says: “This is the king”, this does 
not tell him the use of this piece—unless he already knows the rules of the game 
up to this last point: the shape of the king. You could imagine his having learnt the 
rules of the game without ever having been shewn an actual piece. The shape of the 
chessman corresponds here to the sound or shape of a word.’
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #31)
1 De Saussure also uses a chess metaphor in order to explain the difference of language studied synchroni-
cally or diachronically. A person watching a chess game half-way does not profit from the historical develop-
ment (diachronical), but studies the present case synchronically, which means as an entire system at any 
moment in time.
Wittgenstein: 
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CCL approach, where proximity of words is dictated by their frequency of 
occurrence in a text. For the Shared Vocabulary of Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
Gertrude Stein, we can exemplify how different ordering principles gener-
ate different lists, which in turn raise various questions (see p.292). When 
we turn to the digitised word lists (see Google Spreadsheets, see p.414) we 
can view the words sorted by different criteria; the order of appearance on 
the list always changes our perception of the vocabulary. An alphabetised 
list allows one to search for words systematically. A list sorted by frequency 
tells us more about the condition of language usage (and user). The former 
enumerates words independent of their frequency (and meaning), the latter 
reflects the (status of) words within a certain context. Classification of words 
are manifold. They can be sorted by formal criteria or by to its sound or 
meaning, as has been noted in the preceding chapter The Complete Diction-
ary  (Stokhof 2004).  
 The American poet and critic Ezra Pound dedicated much of his 
attention on the disquisition of words. In his text book ABC of Reading he 
discusses the desire to find objective categories for words: 
‘You have to go almost exclusively to Dante’s criticism to find a set of OBJECTIVE 
categories for words. Dante called words ‘buttered’ and ‘shaggy’ because of the dif-
ferent NOISES they make. Or pexa et hirsuta, combed and hairy. He also divided 
them by their different associations.’ 
(Pound, 1934, p.37) 
The American linguist-anthropologist Edward Sapir characterised these 
types of associations as ‘feeling-tones of words’ (Sapir, E., 1921, p.40). Al-
though he finds the implied mood perceptions of words useless for science 
and even considers them as the ‘most insidious enemies’ of the philoso-
pher, he acknowledges that humans depend on a certain emotional charge 
of words, for ‘(...) man is rarely engaged in pure science, in solid thinking. 
Generally his mental activities are bathed in a warm current of words as 
gentle aids to the desired excitation.’ (Sapir, E. 1921, p.41). Yet also in crea-
tive writing, Sapir warns the literary artist of the dangers of words becoming 
stereotypes or platitudes. 
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35. WORDS IN AND OUT OF ORDER
One of the most eminent writers of the 20th century, Samuel Beckett, 
achieved a great autonomy and puissance of language in his work. In the 
context of this thesis, Beckett’s work will only be refereed indirectly; yet his 
role in the literary scene of the Avant-garde in relation to this discussion 
is notable. His work has been positioned on the edge of disciplines, as his 
novels and plays have greatly influenced many visual artists. In Beckett’s 
work we see the same concerns with issues of language in his work as we 
do with Wittgenstein and Stein. Beckett alongside the Nobel Prize recipient 
James Joyce the other celebrated Irish writer of the 20th century, is credited 
with renewing literature. He was also part of the literature scene composed 
of Irish, British and American ex-pats in Paris just like the American writer 
Gertrude Stein. A novelist, playwright and essayist Beckett, who lived until 
1989, is literary icon who garners as much acclaim as Wittgenstein himself. 
His work is considered one of the most radical and most powerful expres-
sions of language as a dynamic entity and full of opposing forces1. Relevant 
for this research is his dedication to the implications and consequences of 
naming (The Unnameable, 1953) and the failure of language. In his novel 
Watt written in 1945 and published in 1953 – the same year as Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations was published posthumously in the English 
translation by Anscombe – the subject of words and their meaning, the pos-
sibility of new meanings and ‘nonsense’ words in literature  is evident: 
‘ “Ot bro, lap rulb, krad klub. Ot murd, wol fup, wol fup. Ot niks, sorg sam, sorg 
sam. Ot lems, lats lems, lets lems. Ot gnut, trat stews, trat stews.” ‘
(Beckett, Watt, 1953, p.181)
In this particular fragment, we also notice repetition of words being used as 
an autonomous form or strategy of writing, which relates to the later style of 
Steins writing (see, for instance How to Write 1931, i.e. a page from Arthur a 
Grammar, see p.50). Marjorie Perloff dedicates much of her literary critique 
1 http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0413.html
Beckett
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’And the good writer chooses his words for their ‘meaning’, but that meaning is not 
a set, cut-off thing like the move of knight or pawn on a chess-board. It comes with 
roots, with associations, with how and where the word is familiarly used, or where 
it has been used brilliantly or memorably.’ 
(Pound, 1934, p.36)
 
Is it possible to assume that Wittgenstein was familiar with Pound’s exam-
ple?1 Maybe the parallels between Wittgenstein and Pound’s expressions are 
too captious; but let us remember the discussion between Ogden and Witt-
genstein about the shortness of the Tractatus and the metaphor Wittgenstein 
employed to repel his publisher’s idea of adding supplements (see chapter 
Contrasting corpora, p.225): 
’To let you print the Ergänzungen would not be a remedy. It would be just as if you 
had gone to a joiner and ordered a table and he had made the table too short and 
now would sell you the shavings and sawdust and other rubbish along with the 
table to make up for its shortness. (...)‘
(Wittgenstein quoted by Monk, 1990, p.207)
Pound used a table metaphor to stress the importance of the finished crea-
tion and its inherent order, when he claims that 
‘It doesn’t matter which leg of your table you make first, so long as the table has 
four legs and will stand up solidly when you have finished it.’ 
(Pound, 1934, p.62) 
Pound supports Wittgenstein’s insistence on condensed writing, when he 
states that 
‘Incompetence will show in the use of too many words.’ 
(Pound, 1934, p.63) 
Departing from the word as single unit of meaning, words ordered by syntax 
in sentences naturally occupy a central position in the analysis of language 
and literature. The role of the sentence and grammar in literary writing will 
be briefly introduced in the following chapter. 
 1  One can hardly resist to wonder whether Pound and Wittgenstein have ever met.
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In this question about the word in relation to a sentence, Sapir characterises 
the sentence as the dominant operative entity of speech, which has ‘like the 
word, a psychological as well as a merely logical or abstracted existence.’ 
(Sapir, 1921, p.35). He defines a sentence generally as ‘the linguistic expres-
sion of a proposition. It combines a subject of discourse with a statement in 
regard to this subject.’(Sapir, E. 1921, p.35). Sapir emphasises the necessity 
for convention in the use and variation of words and sentences: while the 
format for words in sentences are mostly fixed, the variation lies in finding 
corresponding structures to existing forms. He claims that 
‘New words may be consciously created from these fundamental elements on the 
analogy of old ones, but hardly any new types of words. In the same way new sen-
tences are being constantly created, but always in strictly traditional lines.’ 
(Sapir, 1921, p.37)
The sentences of Stein, however, do not seem to keep within these ‘strictly 
traditional lines’. Sapir admits that no grammar is entirely regular and intro-
duces a metaphor, which echoes Gertrude Stein‘s Arthur A Grammar:
‘Unfortunately, or luckily, no language is tyrannically consistent. 
All grammars leak.’ 
(Sapir, 1921, p.38)
Gertrude Stein is considered one of the pioneers for radical modes of writ-
ing in literature (Perloff 1996 and others1). Her famous rival James Joyce, 
has been acknowledged to have brought the ‘stream of consciousness’-style 
to public awareness, though Stein claims to have done so before him. Stein’s 
literary development was independent from Joyce’s writings. (Hobhouse 
1975, Stein 1933). There is dispute about whether they ever met in person2,3. 
According to Stein’s contemporaries, she could not bear Joyce’s success: 
‘James Joyce and Gertrude Stein were the two pillars of the literary avant-garde in 
Paris, and Gertrude was extremely jealous of her rival. As Hemingway remembers, 
“If you brought up Joyce twice, you wouldn’t be invited back. It was like mention-
ing one general favourably to another general.” ‘ 
(Hobhouse 1975, p.101)
1 http://brbl-archive.library.yale.edu/exhibitions/cvvpw/gallery/steintoklas1.html
2 http://www.ericmetaxas.com/writing/humor/when-titans-clash-the-james-joycegertrude-stein-feud/
3 http://ernestmillerhemingway.blogspot.ch/2012/05/ernest-hemingway-meets-gertrude-stein.html
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to this comparison between literary strategies of Beckett and the German 
writer Ingeborg Bachmann, Joyce, Stein and Wittgenstein (Perloff 1996). Her 
essays offer further reading on this issue. The relationship to The Complete 
Dictionary is evident1; the words in the fragment of Beckett are not ‘proper’ 
English words from ordinary language, but ‘new’ words, unconventional 
letter-sequences as discussed in the preceding chapter. We are also reminded 
of the fragment in Joyce’s Finnegans Wake quoted in Louis Lüthi’s introduc-
tion to his work Basic Anna Livia Plurabelle, 2008/2011(see p.278).
 
 Words are language’s most essential devices, yet Roland Barthes ar-
gues with the French writer Paul Valéry that ‘one does not think words, one 
only thinks sentences’ (Barthes 1973/1975, p.50). What are sentences? 
 Barthes defines the word as ‘singular unit’ and the sentence as a 
‘logical, closed measure’(Barthes 1973/1975, p.33). Chomsky claims, that the 
sentence is ‘potentially infinite (infinitely catalysable), but practice always 
obliges the sentence to end’ (Barthes 1973/1975, p.50). In Searle’s argumen-
tation (see chapter What do you mean, p.151) we have already encountered a 
key-quote by Frege:
‘Nur im Zusammenhang von Saetzen bedeuten Worte etwas’, 2
(Frege 1884, p.73)
Wittgenstein referred to this relation between names in their context in his 
Philosophical Investigations, to refer again to the chess-analogy for naming 
(see preceding chapter and chapter Naming, p.125): 
‘For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a prepara-
tion for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game–any more 
than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: noth-
ing has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even got a name 
except in the language-game. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a 
word had meaning only as part of a sentence.’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, p.21) 
1 One can find all these ‘nonsense’ words in The Complete Dictionary.
2 ‘Only in the context of sentences words mean something.’  own translation from J.G.Frege (1884, p.73)
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From this perspective, Gertrude Stein not only acts as a key personality in 
the development of forms of autonomous language in literature, but also 
represents the origins of a new evaluation – and liberation! – of visual arts 
that continues until today. 
 Once more in this research, the borderlines between art disciplines 
(visual arts and literature, for instance) and entire fields of study (philosophy 
and the arts) appear to dissolve. Springing from the desire to classify words 
objectively (as Dante, Pound and others tried to, see preceding chapter, 
p.336) we must also recognise that all classification is but an approximation. 
We understand the term ‘cubist literature’ because we know how the word 
‘cubist’ is used for visual arts. We can transpose the experience we have of a 
word from other contexts. As Sapir observes correctly, we understand, ‘new’ 
notions by analogy, comparison and association. Yet we can stray from the 
‘strictly traditional lines’ (Sapir, 1921, p.37) much further than Sapir permit-
ted himself. The limits between categories and even disciplines are necessar-
ily permeable to allow the augmentation of meaning. Pound admonishes us 
to either intellectualise or mystify meaning. 
‘The term ‘meaning’ cannot be restricted to strictly intellectual or ‘coldly intellec-
tual’ significance. The how much you meant it, the how you feel about meaning it, 
can all be ‘put into language’.’ 
(Pound, 1934, p.48)
Pound concludes that apart from the choice of words, the author needs to 
accept individual responsibility for the syntactic form of his writing. Obvi-
ously, his severe criticism of literature production in ABC of Reading is root-
ed in a combination of respect for the mastery of language (and its rules) 
and the necessity of taking strong artistic liberty when it solely supports the 
autonomous expression of the work. 
‘A people that grows accustomed to sloppy writing is a people losing grip on its 
empire and on itself. And this looseness and blowsiness is not anything as simple 
and scandalous as abrupt and disordered syntax. It concerns the relation of expres-
sion to meaning. Abrupt and disordered syntax can be at times very honest, and an 
elaborately constructed sentence can be at times merely an elaborate camouflage.’ 
(Pound,1934, p.34) 
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Stein’s literature in particular is closely related to the movements in visual 
arts of the times. Her work Tender Buttons (1914) is regarded ‘cubist litera-
ture’ (The Stein Family, The Making of Modern Art, Lennard 2011), which she 
was able to develop in close and genuine contact with one of the inventors 
of cubist painting, Pablo Picasso. However Picasso did not approve of using 
this term in literature, as we know from Gertrude’s brother Leo Stein, who 
told Picasso that Gertrude was using words ‘cubistically’ (Hobhouse 1975, 
p.61) to which Picasso apparently responded: 
‘ “That sounds rather silly to me. With lines and colours one can make patterns, 
but if one doesn’t use words according to their meaning they aren’t words at all.“’ 
(Picasso quoted by Hobhouse 1975, p.61)
Despite Picasso’s statement, characterizing Stein’s writing as a form of pat-
tern is apt. Repetition creates meaning and even if this meaning escapes a 
one-dimensional interpretation or literal analysis, the strategy of creating 
patterns of meaning by using words and text liberates the word from its 
prior discursive duties outside poetry. Creating patterns with words became 
a common form of artistic expression in the early 20th century. Stein’s radi-
cal vision laid the way for a new relationship between writing and the visual 
arts. The booklet Ludwig & Gertrude supplementing this thesis pays tribute 
to this development: the words of Wittgenstein and Stein appear as sorted 
patterns liberated from the context of sentences.
 The importance of the Stein family (namely Gertrude and Leo Stein 
and their sister-in-law Sarah) as pioneers, if not inventors of what we call 
Modern Art today is an accepted fact. 
‘This is the story of four Americans in Paris, at the beginning of the 20th century: 
Leo, Gertrude, Michael Stein, and his wife Sarah. They were among the first to dis-
cover, understand and discover works by unknown artists named Matisse, Picasso 
and Juan Gris. The strange alchemy of their combined personalities contributed to 
the invention of what we now call Modern Art.’ 
(Lennard 2011)
Stein writes ‘cubist 
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vocabulary: 
‘She used, as always, extremely simple words, but so simple that the audience had 
to strain to listen until the context which gave meaning to those was made clear.’
(Hobhouse 1975, p.165)
We remember Wittgenstein’s philosophical writing, which also trusts or-
dinary language to display the meaning of an expression within a suitable 
context (Philosophical Investigations, 1953). 
 Stein was known to win over the most critical listeners, as her 
captivating voice and her physical presence left a permanent impression. Her 
speeches were more accessible than her writing, which lead to the legendary 
reply to a New York reporter, who asked: 
’ “Why  don’t you write the way you talk?”–“Why don’t you read the way I write?” ’ 
(Hobhouse 1975, p.158)
In Stein’s prose work we are confronted with the repetition of words or word 
groups in often lengthy sentences without any punctuation. Her refusal to 
use punctuation marks sprang from a conscious decision to demand in-
volvement from her readers: 
‘ “A comma by helping you along holding your coat for you and putting on your 
shoes keeps you from living your life as actively as you should lead it and to me (...) 
the use of them was positively degrading.” ‘ 
(Stein quoted by Hobhouse, 1975, p.156)
Contemporaries described her as a woman with a child-like nature, which 
is taken to be a reason for ‘the creation of what is perhaps her best-known 
literary form: the use of constant repetition and the constant participle to 
prolong in words the sense of the existing moment: Gertrude Stein’s famous 
“continuous present”. ’ (Hobhouse 1975, p.5). In the context of categoriza-
tion, selecting a category from Roland Barthes category for writers, Stein can 
be considered a word-fetishist (Barthes 1973, p.63). What effect does repeti-
tion1 deliver? Stein compares the repetition of a word with ‘caressing’ it. 
1 “It’s all repetition, Hemingway, all repetition, remember that.” Stein to Hemingway, Steve Newman in 
http://ernestmillerhemingway.blogspot.ch/2012/05/ernest-hemingway-meets-gertrude-stein.html 
accessed March 15 2013
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What did he possibly think about Gertrude Stein’s literary work? From 
biographical sources and Stein’s literary autobiography, we know that Pound 
and Stein did meet, although Ezra Pound, just like Joyce and Eliot ‘failed to 
impress her’ (Hobhouse 1975, p.107).
 Pound bases his poignant criticism of literature in the textbook-like 
approach in ABC of Reading on six categories of writers:
‘When you start searching for ‘pure elements’ in literature you will find that litera-
ture has been created by the following classes of persons:
1 Inventors. Men who found a new process, or whose extant work gives us the 
first known example of a process.
2 The Masters. Men who combined a number of such processes, and who used 
them as well as or better than their inventors.
3 The diluter. Men who came after the first two kinds of writer, and couldn’t do 
the job quite as well. 
4 Good writers without salient qualities. Men who are fortunate enough to be 
born when the literature of a given country is in good working order, or when 
some particular branch of writing is ‘healthy’. For example, men who wrote sonnets 
in Dante’s time, men who wrote short lyrics in Shakespeare’s time or several dec-
ades thereafter, or who wrote French novels and stories after Flaubert had shown 
them how.
5 Writers of belles-lettres. That is, men who didn’t really invent anything, but who 
specialized in some particular part of writing, who couldn’t be considered a ‘great 
men’ or authors who were trying to give a complete representation of life, or their 
epoch.
6 The starters of crazes.’
(Pound 1934, p.39-40)
This list is included for several reasons; first of all, Pound’s felicitous cat-
egories could also function as categories for contemporary artists today. 
Secondly, we wonder to which category Gertrude Stein belongs. Nowadays 
hindsight considers her an Inventor (1). For her role in the evaluation of 
what we call Modern Art1, she belongs to the sixth category: she has sup-
ported and produced the artistic Avant-garde (literally forward-looking). 
 Pound and Stein incidentally share the same mission. Stein’s mis-
sion was to explain ‘what literature is’ (Hobhouse 1975, p.158). Pound’s ABC 
of Reading dares to define what good literature is and offers tools to distin-
guish good literature from bad.  
 Also in the spoken word Stein had her own way. In the lectures she 
gave towards the end of her life, she was known to speak with her typical 
1 This term is capitalised because seen from a Steinian perspective, it marks a category or phenomenon 
in the perception of the artworks from the ‘Moderne’, an epoch started and stressed with the activities 
of the family Stein in Paris in the early 20th century. Modern Art is an epoch in the arts which is over, 
although many people mistakingly call contemporay art Modern Art today.
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One current hypothesis is that Stein challenges the Wittgensteinian lan-
guage-game in practice. The particular style of writing of both Stein and 
Wittgenstein struck many of their contemporaries as very peculiar. Al-
though their modes of writing do not resemble each other, there are striking 
parallels: both prefer simple vocabulary and the language of the everyday. 
Both have developed a technique of writing in (autonomous) paragraphs 
rather than in a stringent argumentative or narrative lines. Both have in-
sisted that no editor could possibly correct their writing to turn it into more 
conventional text. 
 It may be a minor point that even the letters they both received 
upon trying to publish their work echo the struggle of the proof-readers 
with the mutual lack of conventions. In the following letter of decline the 
publisher A.C.Fifield rejects and parodies Stein’s manuscripts: 
‘“Dear Madam,
I am only one, only one, only one. Only one being, one at the same time, not three, 
only one. Only one life to live, only sixty minutes in an hour. Only one pair of eyes. 
Only one brain. Only one being. Being only one, having only one pair of eyes, hav-
ing only one time, having only one life, I cannot read your M.S. three or four times. 
Not even one time. Only one look is enough. Hardly one copy would sell here. 
Hardly one. Hardly one.
Many thanks. I am returning the M.S. by registered post. Only one M.S. by one 
post.
Sincerely yours, A.C. Fifield”’ 
(Fifield quoted by Hobhouse 1975, p.72)
In Wittgenstein’s case, his close friend Engelmann received a copy of the 
Tractatus manuscript in 1919, enclosed with a friendly parody:
‘ “No writing between the lines!
1. Dear Mr Wittgenstein, I am very pleased to hear,
2. through your family, that you are well, I
3. hope that you do not take it badly that I have
4. not written to you for so long, but I had so
5. much to write that I preferred to leave it to
6. a reunion that I hope will be soon. But I must
7. now thank you with all my heart for your
8. manuscript, a copy of which I received some time
9. ago from your sister. I think I now, on the
10. whole, understand it, at least with me you have
11. entirely fulfilled your purpose of providing
12. somebody some enjoyment through the book; I am
13. certain of the truth of your thoughts and
14. discern their meaning. Best wishes, 
15. yours sincerely, Paul Engelmann” ’ 
(Engelmann quoted by Monk, 1990, p.162) 
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She wrote about poetry, names and repetition that: 
“Poetry is I say essentially a vocabulary [that is a list of nouns] just as prose is es-
sentially not.”(...) “Poetry is doing nothing but using losing refusing and pleasing 
and betraying and caressing nouns.” Nouns, or names, are at the heart of poetry, 
verbs are at the heart of prose; and loving and insisting and repeating the names 
are the natural result of the emotion which makes good poetry: “ (...) You can love 
a name and if you love a name then saying the name any number of times only 
makes you love it more, more violently more persistently more tormentedly.” 
(Stein quoted by Hobhouse 1975, pp.155-156) 
The act of repetition has lead to Stein’s most popular quote which has 
became a commonplace. These words were originally written as a circular 
sentence on a decorative plate for the wall. 
‘ “When I said A rose is a rose is a rose. (...) I made poetry and what did I do I 
caressed completely caressed and addressed a noun.” ‘ 
                     (Hobhouse 1975, pp.155-156)  
In her poetry we witness a high degree of association between words, often 
by sound and rhythm. The three methods available to ‘charge language with 
meaning’ mentioned by Pound (phanopoeia, melopoeia, logopoeia, Pound 
1934, p.63, in this thesis on p.347) have, it seems, been put into practice in 
Stein’s work. She was accused of disorderly syntax and her language skills 
were openly mistrusted by her critics (Hobhouse 1975, p.7). The special 
situation of her living in Paris, where she was ‘left alone with her English’ 
(Hobhouse 1975, p.50) heavily influenced the modus operandi with her na-
tive language. Hobhouse writes that: 
‘Gertrude was able to use the given privacy with her language to create sentences 
that would cease to function as normally living form and become, as in her later 
and most difficult writing, a series of new and vital associational objects.’ 
(Hobhouse 1975, p.50)
The catchword here is ‘living form’. We recognise this term from Wittgen-
stein’s idea of the ‘form of life’ (‘Lebensform’ in Wittgenstein 1953), which is 
central to his conception of the language-games we play. 
‘The word “language-game” is used here to emphasize the fact that the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or a form of life (...)’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #23
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However, repetition, self-contained association, contrast and surprise are 
good means of liberating words from their conventional narrative duty 
within a sentence. If words do not meet in sentences ordered by traditional 
syntax, they function in other ways: in clusters or clouds, in lists or para-
graphs. Even then, unless they are entirely scattered apart randomly, they do 
associate into ‘meaningful’ groups, simply by the association inherent within 
the reader’s mind. If words come together, they do make sense because we 
expect them to. Several movements in the 20th century have picked up and 
developed radical ideas ‘on the word’ as an autonomous entity in art and 
poetry. The Oulipo (the Ouvroir de litterature potentielle or “Workshop for 
Potential Literature”) and attached members and subgroups have advanced 
the use of rules and restrictions in literary production. Rule-following and 
language-games are fundamental to writers like Georges Perec. His famous 
novel A Void is written without ever using the letter ‘e’. In a review on the 
Oulipo Compendium (Matthews & Brotchie 2005) Paul Kane elaborates on 
the use of restrictions as creative procedures in a way that is essential to the 
conceptual artworks in this thesis:   
‘Consider for a moment, though, how it (or any other constraint, for that matter) 
works. It places a restriction on the expressions and phrases that can be used in a 
poem, and it determines to some extent what the poet is able to say. It makes the 
process of writing both more difficult — by short-circuiting habitual modes of 
self expression — and, paradoxical as it may seem, easier: certain decisions have 
already been made for the writer. A constraint confronts the writer with a puzzle to 
solve, not a blank page, and this can be strangely comforting.‘ (Kane 2006)1
In retrospect, it appears that the artistic practice implemented in this thesis 
is rooted in procedures known from the Oulipo. Many of my works have 
been executed following a strict formal constraint (The grass is Greener on 
the other side, Inventory, The Complete Dictionary, The Readingmachine and 
others). An apt example is the book work Theresa (2004), which tells a story 
written according to the dimensions of a cross-word grid fitting on a page. 
No word may exceed the width of the grid, no chapter is longer than one 
page and the typography was created for the piece.
1  www.themodernword.com/reviews/oulipo.html
Oulipo
Theresa
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Image 117
Tine Melzer: Theresa – Every new order causes disorder, 2004, A3 laserprint, 26 pages, 
silk screen, story written with constraints
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When language conventions and rules are broken and words and sentences 
are deliberately ‘out of order’, it must reflect the artistic intention of the au-
thor. Repetition, shifting letters, nonsensical games are strong methods for 
challenging and showing the limits of language.
 Unexpectedly and ironically, this research encountered ‘words 
out of order’ in a very literal way. The bibliographical reference to Edward 
Sapir’s work Language (1921), concerns the 1950’s edition. The other edi-
tion included in the list of references was digitally reprinted on demand by 
General Books Ltd. in 2011. But this book was totally out of order, the text 
was illegible: the sentences were corrupted, words and letters shifted and 
strange symbols appeared randomly throughout the paragraphs. What a pun 
on language-games that Sapir’s classic got subverted by an unaccountable 
bug in the digitally reprinted copy! The faulty version embodied a prank on 
language itself, played by the Optical Character Recognition software1. 
 Sapir’s ‘Language’ out of order echoed a reading-experience of a 
novel published in 2007. It was the detective novel Buchstabensuppe (‘al-
phabet soup’) by debutante Sebastian Schultz. The book launched a coopera-
tion with this author which proves significant at this stage of the research.  
It reflects major notions on dialogue, meeting, context and truth-values of 
language already discussed.
unconventional 
word orders
corrupted word 
order and misprint
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Image 118
reproduction of misprint: Sapir, Language 1921, General Books Ltd, faulty digital 
reprint 2011. p.6
1 In the colophon of the faulty copy (p.iv) it says: ‘We have recreated this book from the original using Opti-
cal Recognition software to keep the cost of this book as low as possible. Therefore, could you please forgive 
any spelling mistakes, missing or extraneaous characters that may have resulted from smudged or worn 
pages? When in doubt, please consult the original scanned books which may be available from our website 
www.general-books.net’
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36. ALPHABET SOUP
In 2007, Alumni Projects from the Rijksakademie van beeldende kunsten 
(Amsterdam) in cooperation with artist advisor Avis Newman invited me to 
present artistic projects and research work in a public event which touched 
upon the notions of truth in language and the authenticity of authorship. A 
record of this event has been published as documents 4 Tine Melzer: Dialog. 
The presentation began with the following personal anecdote: 
 ‘During the preparation of the presentation, I received the detective novel 
Buchstabensuppe by Sebastian Schultz as a present from the computer scientist 
Klaus Söllner. The stereotypical beginning about a detective named Miller was 
generic and boring, until after a few pages something curious happened: the text 
literally imploded. Letters in words were shifted, sentences were garbled and entire 
paragraphs made no sense any more. Enchanted by the ‘autonomy’ of the writing, I 
continued to read page after page – suddenly suspense-packed and full of admira-
tion for the unheard-of author Sebastian Schultz. This was a book I wish I had 
written myself. 
 But, in the course of reading pages of this ‘nonsense’ until the end, it turned out 
to be composed of  identical text fragments repeating, disguised in variation within 
the text layout. Having discovered the swindle – that it was not serious literature, 
but obviously merely embodied a blind-text one was not expected to read – my 
disappointment lead me to contact the author to cross-question him.’ 
Melzer/documents 2008, p.25
 In the phone conversation which followed an email exchange with 
his publisher, it turned out that Schultz was surprised to hear of someone 
who actually read the entire book and indignant to learn that his lazy trick 
was discovered. My criticism of his choice to copy-and-paste the text rather 
than typing it as a proper experiment in writing both surprised and  irri-
tated him, yet he agreed to accept my invitation to participate in the event 
for documents 4. We decided to develop a cooperation, which would reflect 
the issues at hand, mainly the notion of authorship and authenticity, play-
ing with the expectations of the audience and the concept of doing detective 
work. This cooperation was meant to be based on the issues of language 
as expressed in my previous artistic work and included both staging and 
secrecy.  
Melzer/documents 
4: Dialog
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Schultz: Buchstabensuppe 2007, cover 
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Schultz got officially invited to the presentation to defend his sloppy execu-
tion of a great idea. The inquisitive discussion about the responsibility of the 
artist, integrity of the means and matters of language-use was recorded and 
evaluated later on. Discussed were important subjects in language concern-
ing secrets, codes and the effects of being under a misapprehension. 
 The cooperation with Schultz culminated in the secret manipulation 
of the discussion by hiring a stand-in who spoke in place of Schultz. By that 
device, Schultz could sit anonymously in the audience and attack his own 
position vigorously. Only the double, Schultz and I knew of this conspiracy.  
 Although the conversation was improvised, I was astounded how 
unselfconscious and ingenuous the fake Schultz was in his role. Also physi-
cally, he lived up to my expectations of the author better than the authour 
himself: he was overweight, sweated heavily, spoke with a strong German 
accent and lisped a little. We had staged a simulacrum. 
 Simulacrum is a reoccurring term in philosophy, and is an expres-
sion to address a specific relationship between the original and its repre-
sentation, between the copy and the real. Plato explains a simulacrum in 
Sophist thought with the fact that Greek statues are designed with a propor-
tionally larger head in order to ‘look real’ from the audience’s point-of-view 
below. The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard interprets this term as a ne-
gation of reality (Simulacra and Simulation 1994), Deleuze sees simulacra as 
‘those systems in which different relates to different by means of difference 
itself. What is essential is that we find in these systems no prior identity, no 
internal resemblance.” ’ (Deleuze 1968). The term found a large audience 
in literature and film, namely with simulated realities such as The Truman 
Show by Peter Weir (Weir 1998) or pieces of magical realism by Argentinian 
writer Jorge Luis Borges (Borges 1964).
 In the cooperation with Schultz, an important aspect of this set-up 
was to leave the content-level of discourse between Schultz’ doubled posi-
tion and the audience entirely intact; despite the fact the special guest on 
stage was fake, the discussion about automatic writing, the narrative, words 
cooperation 
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Image-set 120
Schulz: Buchstabensuppe 2007, above: where text implodes on p.6/7, below: last page.
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Stribling,J., Aguayo, D., Krohn, M., : SCIgen, Rooter: A Methodology for the Typical Unification of Access Points 
and Redundancy, 2005, first page
Rooter: A Methodology for the Typical Uniﬁcation
of Access Points and Redundancy
Jeremy Stribling, Daniel Aguayo and Maxwell Krohn
ABSTRACT
Many physicists would agree that, had it not been for
congestion control, the evaluation of web browsers might never
have occurred. In fact, few hackers worldwide would disagree
with the essential uniﬁcation of voice-over-IP and public-
private key pair. In order to solve this riddle, we conﬁrm that
SMPs can be made stochastic, cacheable, and interposable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many scholars would agree that, had it not been for active
networks, the simulation of Lamport clocks might never have
occurred. The notion that end-users synchronize with the
investigation of Markov models is rarely outdated. A theo-
retical grand challenge in theory is the important uniﬁcation
of virtual machines and real-time theory. To what extent can
web browsers be constructed to achieve this purpose?
Certainly, the usual methods for the emulation of Smalltalk
that paved the way for the investigation of rasterization do
not apply in this area. In the opinions of many, despite the
fact that conventional wisdom states that this grand challenge
is continuously answered by the study of access points, we
believe that a different solution is necessary. It should be
noted that Rooter runs in Ω(log logn) time. Certainly, the
shortcoming of this type of solution, however, is that compilers
and superpages are mostly incompatible. Despite the fact that
similar methodologies visualize XML, we surmount this issue
without synthesizing distributed archetypes.
We question the need for digital-to-analog converters. It
should be noted that we allow DHCP to harness homoge-
neous epistemologies without the evaluation of evolutionary
programming [2], [12], [14]. Contrarily, the lookaside buffer
might not be the panacea that end-users expected. However,
this method is never considered confusing. Our approach
turns the knowledge-base communication sledgehammer into
a scalpel.
Our focus in our research is not on whether symmetric
encryption and expert systems are largely incompatible, but
rather on proposing new ﬂexible symmetries (Rooter). Indeed,
active networks and virtual machines have a long history of
collaborating in this manner. The basic tenet of this solution
is the reﬁnement of Scheme. The disadvantage of this type
of approach, however, is that public-private key pair and red-
black trees are rarely incompatible. The usual methods for the
visualization of RPCs do not apply in this area. Therefore, we
see no reason not to use electronic modalities to measure the
improvement of hierarchical databases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. For starters,
we motivate the need for ﬁber-optic cables. We place our
work in context with the prior work in this area. To ad-
dress this obstacle, we disprove that even though the much-
tauted autonomous algorithm for the construction of digital-
to-analog converters by Jones [10] is NP-complete, object-
oriented languages can be made signed, decentralized, and
signed. Along these same lines, to accomplish this mission, we
concentrate our efforts on showing that the famous ubiquitous
algorithm for the exploration of robots by Sato et al. runs in
Ω((n+ logn)) time [22]. In the end, we conclude.
II. ARCHITECTURE
Our research is principled. Consider the early methodology
by Martin and Smith; our model is similar, but will actually
overcome this grand challenge. Despite the fact that such
a claim at ﬁrst glance seems unexpected, it is buffetted by
previous work in the ﬁeld. Any signiﬁcant development of
secure theory will clearly require that the acclaimed real-
time algorithm for the reﬁnement of write-ahead logging by
Edward Feigenbaum et al. [15] is impossible; our application
is no different. This may or may not actually hold in reality.
We consider an application consisting of n access points.
Next, the model for our heuristic consists of four independent
components: simulated annealing, active networks, ﬂexible
modalities, and the study of reinforcement learning.
We consider an algorithm consisting of n semaphores.
Any unproven synthesis of introspective methodologies will
clearly require that the well-known reliable algorithm for the
investigation of randomized algorithms by Zheng is in Co-NP;
our application is no different. The question is, will Rooter
satisfy all of these assumptions? No.
Reality aside, we would like to deploy a methodology for
how Rooter might behave in theory. Furthermore, consider
the early architecture by Sato; our methodology is similar,
but will actually achieve this goal. despite the results by Ken
Thompson, we can disconﬁrm that expert systems can be made
amphibious, highly-available, and linear-time. See our prior
technical report [9] for details.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation of our approach is low-energy,
Bayesian, and introspective. Further, the 91 C ﬁles contains
about 8969 lines of SmallTalk. Rooter requires root access
in order to locate mobile communication. Despite the fact
that we have not yet optimized for complexity, this should be
simple once we ﬁnish designing the server daemon. Overall,
1 I owe this link to the Candian artist Paul Perry, who participated generously in this discussion as an artist 
advisor from the Rijksakdemie van beeldende kunsten.
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without meaning, mystery, jokes in language and so on was entirely ‘real’ 
and sincere. The discussion covered rule-following in language, repetition 
and the cliché of writing a book. The issues at hand were compared with 
examples from literature, psychology and the arts. These different perspec-
tives enabled a focus on phenomena of successful nonsense-writing, such 
as the storied Rooter paper1, which ‘put the cat among the pigeons’. The 
Rooter paper is a computer-generated paper which makes no sense, but 
got accepted (as an unreviewed paper) to the 2005 World Multiconference 
on Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics all the same, because it formally 
follows the cliché rules of academic articles. But the words and sentences in 
the Rooter paper do not connect to a coherent text and it communicates no 
literal meaning. The statement of this paper, however can be interpreted as a 
metaphorical or conceptual pun. In the context of this research, this paper’s 
story is a contemporary example for computer-programs applying rules for 
generating text. In this research, the fragment, vocabularies – such as the 
typical ‘academic’ jargon  – the role of key-words and the language-games 
which connect them are in focus. Looking for meaning in a sentence means 
trying to detect the language-game and the rules activated in it.  
 Searching for meaning in a conspiracy one finds several links to the 
motive of this research. Generally, language is thought to express a thought, 
knowledge or ‘states of affairs’ (Wittgenstein 1922). A conspiracy introduces 
the possibility of secrecy, and a falsifying facts using language. The Mystical 
is one of Wittgenstein’s culminative focus points. The possibility of covering 
and discovering truth by language is shared by Wittgenstein and Stein in 
their simple adoration of detective novels.
 The conversation published in the documents 4 edition as tran-
scribed text entitled Script also suggests a false ceiling as some contributions 
elaborate on the position of the audience being seduced to reveal a secret. 
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One says: ‘My association was with the role of the detective. Where was 
the real mystery? Was it possible to solve the mystery amongst the ‘soup of 
language’?’ and another: ‘Your book suggested that the reader was in the 
position of being a detective trying to find the truth of the story.’
 Also the parallel with Edgar Allan Poe’s famous short story The 
Purloined Letter (1845) is striking, because it words what went on in the 
event itself. The mystery was right in front of our eyes as the artist Avis New-
man explains, only realizing how apt her remark turned out to be after the 
conspiracy was made public: 
‘My thoughts turned to the Edgar Allen Poe story The Purloined Letter, which tells 
the story of how a detective logically deduces the hiding place of a stolen letter. 
Which in this case is in the most obvious place: in the letter rack above the fire-
place. The story spins around both the significance of the location and the secret 
contents; the letter could be a love letter. The theme explores the erotics of decep-
tion and who owns the truth.’ 
(Newman quoted in Melzer/documents 2008, p.27)
Observe how layered the meanings of this discourse become when we bear 
in mind that the statements shift meaning from one context of knowledge to 
another. Originally, my own experience when reading Schultz’ novel Alpha-
bet Soup was a deceit, because it conflicted with my personal idea about a 
‘good work’. My presupposition was that the book should have been written  
‘according to the rules’, namely my personal standards which involve typing 
an entire experimental book instead of just copy and pasting whole text 
paragraphs in order to save time.  Schultz cheated. Therefore in the discus-
sion, rule-following was also a core-issue. A participant in the discussion 
mentioned that 
‘We make rules all the time. We not only observe the interaction between Tine 
Melzer and Sebastian Schultz, and how we tracked the crime of repetition, but as 
creatures of language we also immediately respond by saying: ‘Oh! Are there rules 
being broken?’ We now see this for the first time, (...) but it seems as if we have 
made rules as to how to write this book ‘properly’. We always get trapped in our 
own systems.’ 
(Franck quoted in Melzer/documents 2008, p.30). 
Kripke, Searle: 
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In the language-games we play, we make rules all the time. An important 
subject in the analysis of Wittgenstein’s writing is this issue of rule-following. 
 The American philosopher Saul Kripke instigated a tradition of 
interpretation which focuses on rules and rule-following as the central topic 
in Wittgenstein (Kripke, 1972/1980). Obviously, Wittgenstein’s concept of 
the language-game and its analogous metaphor of the chess-game connect 
directly with the concept of rules in language. He reflects on grammatical 
rules and how arbitrary they are compared to other types of rules.
‘Why don’t I call cooking rules arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules 
of grammar arbitrary? Because ‘cooking’ is defined by its end (Zweck), whereas 
‘speaking’ is not. That is why the use of language is in a certain sense autonomous, 
whereas cooking and washing are not.’ 
(Wittgenstein, ed. G.E.M Anscombe, 1967, Zettel #320)
Rules are, for Wittgenstein, ‘provided by the syntax’ (Monk 1990, p.285). 
He reflects on different kinds of rules, which Searle later will distinguish as 
regulative and constitutive rules, also using the example of the chess-game 
(Searle 1969, p.33). 
‘Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior. Think, for example, 
of the rule “Drive on the right-hand side of the road.” (...) Such rules are regulative. 
They regulate antecedently existing forms of behavior. (...) Some rules  not only 
regulate but also constitute, or make possible, the form of activity that they regu-
late. The classic example is the rules of chess. (...) The rules of chess are not like the 
rules of driving. Rather, the very possibility of playing chess depends on there being 
rules of chess, because playing chess consists in acting in accordance with at least a 
certain sizable subset of the rules of chess. (...) Constitutive rules always have the 
same logical form, even in cases where the logical form is not obvious from the 
grammar of the sentences expressing the rule.’ 
(Searle 1999, p.123, my italics) 
For Searle, as for Kripke, rules are at the heart of language: 
‘Speaking a language is engaging in a (highly complex) rule-governed form of be-
havior. To learn and master a language is (inter alia) to learn and to have mastered 
these rules.’ 
(Searle 1969, p.12) 
368 369
Wittgenstein and 
Stein and rules
alphabet soup
The topic of rules alone brings forth a fascinating discussion, but one that 
diverges too far from the core of this research, which is why I will offer but 
a few concluding remarks on this issue. We can agree, that the rules of the 
game in language are not static nor untouchable; on the contrary, if ‘You set 
up a game and discover that two rules can, in certain cases, contradict one 
another. So what? 
‘What do we do in such a case? Very simple – we introduce a new rule and the 
conflict is resolved.’ 
(Wittgenstein quoted in Monk 1990, p.307) 
Some of these notions are collated in the conceptual work The Game 
(2005/2011, see p.377) which reduces the card game to the behavioural con-
ventions of context and body language, where we, the players, make up the 
rules ‘as we go along’ (Wittgenstein, 1953 #83, see this thesis p.379). It is this 
notion of rules of ordinary language users which resonates throughout the 
language-games exemplified by both Wittgenstein and Stein. Where rules 
are violated or conventions are broken, the ordinary language-users perk up 
their ears and become aware: deranged syntax and ignored standards reveal 
the plasticity of language – and its limits. Stein’s literature shows how poetry 
and prose are but vague classifications in the practice of demonstrating 
this plasticity in language. Wittgenstein’s remarks on the language-game in 
relation to rules positions us as practitioners of language and therefore fully 
authorised to form and renew our language. 
Wittgen/Stein 
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Stein: writing 
strategies from 
detective novels
37. DETECTIVE STORIES
The book Buchstabensuppe by Sebastian Schultz belongs to the genre of 
detective stories and brought the idea of enigma into focus. By enigmatic I 
mean which is hidden or coded, which is concealed in language. As dis-
cussed in the preceding chapter, the identification of the book as a prank 
rather than a serious piece of literature lead to a cooperation with Schultz. 
His book turns any alert reader into a detective, above and beyond the set 
rules of detective fiction which are pre-agreed with the reader. The detective 
work brought about the physical meeting with Schultz (see Meeting, p.197).
 A love of detective stories link Ludwig and Gertrude. Remarkably, 
the two protagonists Stein and Wittgenstein had a very similar taste for this 
kind of literature. In the speculation about their personal encounter we can 
identify one topic of total agreement which might have served as a subject 
of conversation if they had known about their shared fascination for both 
repeatedly declared to be genuinely fond of detective novels. Both major 
biographers – Monk for Wittgenstein and Hobhouse for Stein – have paid 
particular attention to recognizing this peculiar preference in their accounts. 
Stein discussed her liking for crime stories with fellow writers, like the crime 
writer Dashiell Hammitt. 
‘Detective novels were, she said, the only modern form of writing. They had none 
of the psychological nonsense which belongs to the nineteenth and not to the 
twentieth century. There was no interest in character and, oddly enough, no real 
interest in plot. (...)’ 
(Hobhouse 1975, p.177)
Detective novels play the language-game of knowing and not-knowing. The 
power of language in a crime novel technically lies in what remains unsaid, 
at what time, and by whom. Stein appreciated detective novels for their 
interest in detection. She considered them, according to Hobhouse, ‘inte-
rior works made for thinking and watching thoughts in the making. In fact, 
rather like her own writing.’  (Hobhouse 1975, p.177). 
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In her own literary work she played with instruments borrowed from the 
genre of crime novels; The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas (1933) especially 
makes use of elements from detective stories. First of all, the book simulates 
a narrative from the perspective of her partner Alice B. Toklas, which sets up 
a double bottom for the entire interpretation of the work. Secondly, by doing 
so, it plays with the expectation of the audience, who synchronises with the 
voice of Toklas instead of the ‘real’ author Stein (see chapter Auto/biography, 
p.208 and section simulacrum, p.355). Thirdly, the real identity of the author 
is revealed at the end of the book, which resembles the revelation of the 
solution to a riddle in detective novels. Stein appears as author and subject 
of the detective novel at the same time. A similar double-role is assigned 
to language when it is simultaneously subject and vehicle in philosophy of 
language. While Stein is known to have read many books throughout her 
life, from the classics up to contemporary works, she claimed in later years 
to read ‘one detective novel a day’ (Hobhouse, 1975, p.136). 
 Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is known to have selected his read-
ing material much more strictly. Apart from a few books he acknowledged 
to be highly significant for him and his thinking, he refused to read many of 
the standards of philosophy and literature (Monk 1990). Of course his fam-
ily background and his studies assured a solid basis of literary input, but we 
know that he held listening to music and practicing it in higher esteem than 
reading literature. Visitors allowed into Wittgenstein’s bare private rooms 
attest to the absence of philosophical reading material, but were ‘surprised 
to see (...) only neat piles of detective magazines.’ (Monk 1990, p.443). Ap-
parently, detective novels were reference material for ordinary language for 
Wittgenstein. In his lectures he was known to take examples from ordinary 
speech.
‘And when he quoted from literature, it was not from the great philosophical 
works, nor from the philosophical journal Mind, but from Street & Smith’s Detective 
Story Magazine. (...)‘ 
(Monk 1990, p.355) 
Wittgen/Stein: why 
detective novels?
detective stories
Wittgenstein was convinced that the misunderstandings in language re-
vealed themselves especially in this genre, from which he would quote frag-
ments to his students:
 ’The detective muses to himself: “A clock is a bewildering instrument at best: 
measuring a fragment of infinity: measuring something which does not exist per-
haps.” Wittgenstein told his class that is much more revealing and important when 
you find this sort of confusion in something said “in a silly detective story” than it 
is when you find it in something said “by a silly philosopher”.’ 
(Monk 1990, p.355) 
Wittgenstein was even known to have a favourite detective novel, written by 
Norbert Davis and first published under the title The Mouse in the Mountain, 
reissued in 1946 as Dead Little Rich Girl. Wittgenstein liked this novel so 
much he considered writing to thank its author. Davis died ‘unaware of his 
rare (probably unique) distinction in having written a book which Wittgen-
stein liked sufficiently to want to write a letter of thanks to its author.’ (Monk 
1990, p.529)
 Why of all things are detective novels their shared reading obses-
sion? Admittedly, this genre is not regarded as high-class literature, which 
makes this congruence so singular and fascinating. It brings together these 
two very different characters in an unexpected way: of all literary works they 
both cherished the detective story. Maybe the presence of the mystery, the 
secret and the desire for its solution lies at the root of this shared fascination. 
After all, detective novels create special conditions for language, where lan-
guage strategically withholds information, revealing it bit by bit according to 
the rules established by the genre. Perhaps experiencing this language-game 
of a different sort filled both Gertrude and Ludwig with satisfaction.
 Since working on this peculiar analogy, the notions of enigma and 
secret have become central topics of my artistic work in the past years. The 
following chapter is a brief display of significant visual works which all share 
the presence of a secret.
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Image 122
Davis: Dead Little Rich Girl, 1946, cover. First published entitled ‘The Mouse in the Mountain’.
38. SECRETS IN VISUAL WORKS
In this research on the detection of possible meeting points between Lud-
wig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein, practice-based works complement 
the research as visual chapters. Many works have been made especially in 
relation to the research-question within the years of research at University 
of Plymouth: Planetary Collegium from 2008 until now. Others stem from 
transdisciplinary work in philosophy and arts preparing this research. In 
one way or another, all selected works in the following augment on the writ-
ing up to this point and prepare for its conclusion.
 In 2011 an edition of the card game The Game was reissued after 
having produced the prototype in 2005. During this research, it became 
for me a simplified model for how ordinary language works. Its rule-based 
mechanisms activate human action, and The Game simplifies the Speech 
Act Theory and the complex notion of the language-game as introduced by 
Wittgenstein. 
‘Consider, for example, the activities we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-
games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all? – 
Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they would not be called 
‘games’!” but look and see whether there is something they all have in common. 
(...) Now pass to card-games: here you find many correspondences with the first 
group, but others get lost.’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, #66)
Furthermore during lectures on my artistic practice, this small work proved 
to be one of the most accessible and representative small works for audi-
ences unfamiliar with language-based – or rather: rule-based – visual 
art. The Game is an ideal conceptual art work about language-games and 
language itself, because it plays on existing conventions with minimal effort. 
Its appearance is that of a regular card-game, and at first glance it looks like 
a completely normal deck of cards. The peculiarity about it is that all sides of 
all cards of the set are identical, with the backside-pattern appearing on both 
sides of all cards. 
visual works 
implying a mystery
The Game
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Therefore the audience is puzzled; one moment they are potential players of 
a game they expect to know, the next moment they are left with questions 
about the rules of the game, and how to play such game at all. The equivo-
cal value of the cards provokes a sensation of doubt and incertitude. It is 
also often taken as a visual joke. The Game shares features with a joke, as it 
is hermetic, formal and equipped with a pun. ‘Making a joke’ is a language-
game (Wittgenstein 1953 # 23). A joke uses language conventions and rules. 
Searching for a joke online brings up a shallow result, which nevertheless 
displays complex mechanisms at work for understanding it. One needs to 
understand the words and the metaphorical meanings in ordinary language 
first, before one can see the pun.
secrets in visual works
Image 123
Melzer: The Game, 2005/2010, offset edition 
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The value of the cards and the fact that they are all equivalent, negates the 
hierarchy between them. After dealing the cards, the hands are identical for 
each player. This alters the normal conditions of playing a card game signifi-
cantly; most of all it focuses on the aspect of secret knowledge. It does this 
in a mirror-inverted movement: the mystery about the cards of the other 
players is eliminated, but, simultaneously, the enigma about the value of  the 
own cards remains. In other words, all players know from each other that 
they hold identical cards of the same unknowable value. 
Image 122a
www.graphicshunt.com/search/7/rock.htm, accessed May 2011
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Image 124
Melzer: The Game, 2005, video still
secrets in visual language
This conceptual card deck illuminates the fundamental conditions for lan-
guage to function between people. It stresses the flexibility of language:
‘(...) Und gibt es nicht auch den Fall, wo wir spielen und - ›make up the rules as we 
go along‹? Ja auch den, in welchem wir sie abändern - as we go along.’ 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, # 83
As Searle, Grice, Austin and Keller (see p.163) have pointed out, a number 
of conditions need to be fulfilled for communication and successful speech-
acts to happen. When we engage in a dialogue, we have mutual expectations 
towards the other and a certain degree of cooperation is required. We share 
certain expectations like the will to communicate, we share an operational 
language (or possibility of translation), conventions of language behaviour, 
codes and habits of speech. Paul Grice’s Maxims and Principles of Coopera-
tion (Grice 1975) sum up basic rules of this shared attitude.
  
Grice’s Principle
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Image 125
Melzer: Grice’s Principle, 2009, wood/metal, quote of Paul Grice’s Principle of Communication
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Searle’s distinction between regulative and constitutive rules (see p.369) 
define an issue evident in The Game. Constitutive mutually consensual 
rules are necessary for any game (like chess) to be established. Regulative 
rules (like the rules of the road) only operate well if the participants (i.e. the 
drivers on the road) know that the other also knows the rules and will use 
them. Constitutive rules establish a game which otherwise would not exist, 
while regulative rules apply an ordering principle to a context which also 
exists without any rules. Both kinds of rules are necessary for language and 
dialogue to take place. The Game tries to disclose these facets of language 
and rule-following, dialogue and mystery in a playful way. 
 Apart from it being a curious object with a number of implications, 
The Game can be played by anyone who is ready to rely on behavioural con-
ventions attached to card games. The way we put them down or pick them 
up, collect them or throw them on the table indicates the run of play. Wit-
nessing such a game as bystander can still reveal the performative, habitual 
aspects of language, just as when we try to understand, overhear and follow  
a conversation etc.1 
‘One learns the game by watching how others play it.’
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1953, #54 
 Similarly, the book-object Literal Metaphor (2004) plays with the 
impenetrability of a common object. This time, the manipulation lay in 
creating a book with two spines, so there is no way to access it. The content 
remains a secret, the reader is excluded. The work, again, could be consid-
ered a visual joke, as it plays on existing conventions and builds them into 
a pun. The object becomes a ‘useless’ copy of the standard form of a book, 
which it undermines at the same time by doubling the spine. Another layer 
of interpretation is added by the title of the book, which reads ‘LIT–MET’, 
a reference to the alphabetical order printed on the back of encyclopedias 
consisting of many volumes. 
1 The Game was conceived as a performance in 2011 and was documented as a short movie clip of two 
players in 2005 and again in 2012 at Perdu, Amsterdam and Museum Bärengasse, Zurich in 2013. See 
the DVD supplement of this thesis.
   
rules
Literal Metaphor
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The complete title Literal Metaphor (One Volume of the Impossible Library 
LIT–MET) feeds back on itself, as the impossible library and the hermetic 
book is as paradoxical as the term literal metaphor, which is embodied in 
the absurd and enigmatic object itself. 
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Image 126
Melzer: Literal Metaphor (One Volume of the Impossible Library LIT–MET),
second edition 2008 , bound by Seugling Amsterdam, first edition 2004
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Two other works which take language ‘literally’ were realised in the course 
of this research as a commission for the Irish Museum of Modern Art 
(IMMA, Dublin) for the exhibition What happens next is a secret in 2010. 
Again, playing on conventional forms, this time the point of departure was 
the omnipresence of regulative signs to order the movements of people. The 
effects of text in relation to a given architectural structure (doors, windows, 
walkways) were put to test. In the simple intervention It lies beyond this door 
(2009) a conventional wooden board with a metal plate displaying the sen-
tence ‘It lies beyond this door’ was mounted on different doors within the 
museum complex for the duration of the exhibition (January – April 2010). 
In this way, the visiting audience could see the work whenever the board 
was installed in a public area, while the staff members additionally could 
experience the sentence in various locations of the internal building areas. 
The promise inherent in the sentence travelled from door to door, marking 
various doors from a main entrance to a cabinet with cleaning supplies. 
 The work plays with the convention of creating expectation in 
order to evoke curiosity; furthermore its change in location redoubles this 
 
It lies beyond 
this door
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Images 127 a-b
Melzer: It lies beyond this door, 2010, Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin, photo: IMMA
designated ‘magic’ entrance. The desire of man to disclose a secret and the 
door as a metaphor for entering a mysterious is intensely evocative – and is 
the premise of many fairy tales as perhaps most famously, Alice in Wonder-
land (1856) written by the mathematician Charles Lutwidge Dogson, better 
known as Lewis Caroll.
 The other commissioned piece for IMMA again dealt with the 
existance of a secret quite literally. In front of a window facing the inner 
courtyard of the museum temporary wooden stairs were installed. Lead 
by curiosity, the visitors could climb the stairs and look into the window, 
which gave a view onto a tiny barely lit room with white walls. Mounted on 
the back wall, large grey letters said Please don’t tell anyone. The contrast 
between the seduction of the audience to peep through a window and the 
massive scale of the letters underlines the conflict between the desire to 
share (a secret) and the command not to pass it on. This work contrasts the 
instructive power of language with the command to remain silent. The sen-
tence points out a secret, which we know of but yet do not share. 
Please don’t tell 
anyone
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Image 128 a-b
Melzesr: Please don’t tell anyone, 2010, Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin, photo: IMMA
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The piece ‘Please don’t tell anyone’ pays homage to the important conceptual 
artist Bas Jan Ader1 and his work I am too sad to tell you1 (Ader 1971). Ader 
was a key figure in Dutch conceptual art in the 1970’s whose performative 
video works examined conditions of language in its profound puzzling regu-
lative and often paradoxical forms. Failure, the absurd and rule-following 
were the focus of the young artist whose disappearance at sea in 1975 cre-
ated a myth around his oeuvre posthumously.  
In the permanent installation HERE in a public space in the city of Nurem-
berg, the question which is raised could be: ‘What is or was here?’. The in-
stallation – a commission by a public secondary school (Sigmund Schuckert 
Gymnasium, Nuremberg) and supported by the city – consists of manipu-
lated pavement slabs inserted in the pavements, spread over fifty different 
locations throughout the entire urban agglomeration. Inserted in each slab 
is the word HIER (German for HERE) fabricated as solid plastic inlays. 
 On the one hand, the work celebrates the power of context-related 
meaning in language. The word here is a shifter (see chapters Shifting Names 
p.147, and Shifters’ Ode, p.154) and stages mechanisms of tautology1. At the 
same time, the passer-by notices, that the truth of the tautology is relative 
to the location he is in. In a day, one might pass several marks saying ‘here’, 
experiencing the transitoriness of one’s position in relation to one’s recol-
lection. On the other hand, this work has created its own mystery since its 
installation in 2003: the passer-by, as the random audience of the installation 
finds no indication of an explanation at the here-stones themselves. General-
ly, the concept of the work feeds on the lack of authorised information about 
the location of the set slabs; there has not been any official inauguration and 
no official information is given (i.e. by the city council or tourist offices) 
which would help to classify the experience of walking by here. The remain-
ing questions about the purpose of the slabs still generate an accumulation 
of responses.2 It is essential to the concept that the speculation grows around 
the work as their mysterious saws gather momentum.  
1 I’m too sad to tell you, Bas Jan Ader, 16mm, duration: 3 min 34 sec © 1971, Mary Sue Ader-Andersen 
2 Reading the word ‘here’ can be  considered a tautology, because it is always true that it is here.
Bas Jan Ader
HIER (here)
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Images 129 a-f
Melzer: HIER, 2003, permanent public installation at 50 locations, Nuremberg, pho-
tos: Allard van der Hoek
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Image 130
Melzer: HIER, 2003, permanent public installation at 50 locations, Nuremberg, photo: 
Allard van der Hoek
Image 131
Melzer: HIER, 2003, permanent public installation at 50 locations, Nuremberg, photo: 
Allard van der Hoek
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Other works also stem also from the use of shifters – which can host con-
fusion and mystery due to their capacity to shift meaning according to 
context and language user (see p.141). The undefined reference in the 
works Rufmord (2006) and The reason why I sold my house (2004) causes 
an uncanny sensation: in both text-installations the viewer experiences the 
repetition of a personal pronoun. Who does it refer to? 
 In Rufmord (German for calumny), the personal pronoun SIE (Ger-
man for she, they and the polite form You) is core to the syntax of each of 
four dozen short synonymous sentences for slander. Because the word SIE 
in German is plurivalent, the viewer may feel addressed personally as well. 
As the sentences are installed in random places in a private apartment, the 
audience is in the awkward position of discerning the sentences everywhere 
around them. The aspect of repetition and the reduced syntax echo the late 
writing of Stein; witnessing a language-game about reference, doubt and 
misunderstanding relates to Wittgenstein’s examples of language-games 
(Wittgenstein 1953). After all, the installation reveals elements of  suspicion 
in ordinary language and infers a secret (meaning) to be detected.
Rufmord 
(calumny)
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Image 132 a-d
Melzer: Rufmord (calumny),  # discriminate, # affront, # badmouth, # muzzle, 2006, 
photos: Allard van der Hoek
Image 132 e-f
Melzer: Rufmord (calumny),  # asperse, # degrade, 2006, photos: Allard van der Hoek
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Similarly, in the installation The reason why I sold my house, an uncom-
fortable experience is created by the repetition of the personal pronoun 
‘I’. It consists of a wall-installation of 4 by 12 meters, on one side standard 
example sentences isolated from English grammar books are re-edited and 
mounted to the wall as vinyl-lettering. On the other wall, the individual 
words of all phrases are sorted alphabetically and listed under specification 
of their grammatical functions. The initial inspiration for the work was Witt-
genstein’s concept of ‘forms of life’, his idea that one cannot look at language 
plainly and independent of the life forms and practices of the language-
users. Even though the sentences are merely supposed to be instruments for 
teaching grammar, they reveal practices and habits of humans. Furthermore 
we immediately interpret the assembled fragments as a narrative, the differ-
ent shifters designate one person saying ‘I’, who gives a sober report about 
leaving something behind. It goes without saying that the viewer of the piece 
reading ‘I’ momentarily identifies with the protagonist.  
The reason why I 
sold my house
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Image 133b
Melzer: The reason why I sold my house, 2004, Public Space with a Roof, Amsterdam
Image 133a
Melzer: The reason why I sold my house,  2004, Public Space with a Roof, Amsterdam
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The effects of displaying ambiguous text in public is even more arbitrary in 
the work Cheer Up Fellows II 1 realised together with Tudor Bratu in Ireland 
2009. This is a sequel to a collaboration with Philip van Wolputte and Tudor 
Bratu called Cheer Up Fellows I (published in newspaper NRC, see bibliogra-
phy). The work Cheer Up Fellows I was an installation of large silk screened 
text and image boards and wooden constructions located inside a protected 
monument in the old town of Utrecht, The Netherlands. The installation 
combined fragments from quotes, song lyrics and poems, which circle 
around notions of home, solitude and failure. The sources of the texts have 
not been given deliberately, as many of the fragments are part of the shared 
pool of popular culture. The images came mostly from the image archive of 
Bratu, which contains his own photographs as well as found images from 
archives like the Institute of Concrete Matter2 founded by photographer Paul 
Kooiker (ICM, Haarlem, NL). 
1 organised by Blue Episode Foundation, www.blueepisode.nl/pages/blue-episode/exhibitions/cheer-up-fellows.php. 
  We owe the title ‘Cheer Up Fellows’ to Kees Maas.
2 http://www.concretematter.com 
Cheer Up 
Fellows I
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Image 134b
Bratu & Melzer & Van Wolputte: Cheer Up Fellows I, installation view, 2009, Utrecht, NL
Image 134a
Bratu & Melzer & Van Wolputte: Cheer Up Fellows I, installation view, 2009, Utrecht, NL
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Image 135a
Bratu & Melzer: This is the moment, from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, Ireland
Image 135b
Bratu & Melzer: The happiest days of our lives, from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, Ireland
Two dozen short sentences were displayed as large text-boards which were 
placed as signposts throughout the city of Dublin and the surrounding 
country-side. The large series of photographs were conceived as research 
on the interaction between text and context; the installation of the same 
language fragments in different locations shows how the environment influ-
ences our interpretation of the meaning of the whole image. The sentences 
operate inside the landscape and city-sights as three-dimensional image-
manipulations, as ‘analogue Photoshop’. A photograph of a landscape with 
the actual signpost saying This is the moment, for example, reflects on the 
status of photography as elaborated by post-structuralist philosophers in the 
late 20th century (i.e. Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva and Barthes, the latter with 
his Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, 1981). The sentence ‘This is 
the moment’ subtitles the image, and its presence may suffocate the atmos-
phere of the pictured landscape. Some photographs suffer from literalness 
and lack of tension and others deliver a sense of mystery. Sometimes the 
image and the written text double each other. Once again, the shifters ‘this’, 
‘there’, ‘now’, again are devices for demonstrating the context-dependency of 
the language-games we play. This project is an excellent example of artistic 
research undertaken in the public sphere, where it becomes an ongoing and 
open-ended participatory experiment. The works in this chapter all share an 
affinity to riddles and language-games.  
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Image 135d
Bratu & Melzer: So be it (Smithfield), from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, Ireland
Image 135c
Bratu & Melzer: So be it (Wicklow), from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, Ireland
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Image 135e
Bratu & Melzer: Across the fields towards the road. Abarn in the distance, from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, 
Ireland
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Image 135g
Bratu & Melzer: There is none, from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, Ireland
Image 135f
Bratu & Melzer: Look to the South and smile, from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, Ireland
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Image 135h
Bratu & Melzer: Tomorrow came and went, from the series Cheer Up Fellows II, 2009, Ireland
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The question raised by the project I have changed my mind (2006) is: ‘What 
about?’. Often my visual work utilises a medium in order to subvert it with 
a carefully constructed text-layer. The following work investigates media 
which relate to public statements of personal opinion. Badges worn on 
clothes and flags both show the sentence I have changed my mind.
  A pin or badge is commonly used to express a personal opin-
ion; popular after the 1960’s, it was a means for the young to express their 
sympathy or rejection of political issues or support for a life-style (like Punk 
symbols or symbols against nuclear-power). It is still used for advertising in 
many campaigns. A person stating a change of opinion using a format made 
to advance a view by wearing that badge, creates confusion.
 A flag with the sentence I have changed my mind relates again to im-
ages in language, like sayings and proverbs. In German, the expression ‘Wie 
ein Fähnchen im Wind’ (literally translated: like a flag in the wind) means to 
be unsteady and opportunistic. 
I have changed 
my mind
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Image 136
Melzer: I have changed my mind, badge, offset edition, 2006, Iceland
secrets in visual works
    
Image 137b
Melzer: I have changed my mind, flag interventions, 2006, Iceland
Image 137a
Melzer: I have changed my mind, flag interventions, 2006, Iceland
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Image 137d
Melzer: I have changed my mind, flag interventions, 2006, Iceland
Image 137c
Melzer: I have changed my mind, flag interventions, 2006, Iceland
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Image 137f
Melzer: I have changed my mind, flag interventions, 2006, Iceland
Image 137e
Melzer: I have changed my mind, flag interventions, 2006, Iceland
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Image 138
Melzer: I have changed my mind, graffitto in Reykjavik 2006, Iceland
Image 137g
Melzer: I have changed my mind, flag interventions, incl. icelandic flag 2006, Iceland
This particular work evokes many more aspects which have to be neglected 
here, as it would deviate too much from the actual research. Originally it 
was designed to play on the conventions of public opinion in politics and the 
taboo of changing one’s mind as a public figure.  
 The badges were first introduced in 2006 in Iceland at times of gov-
ernment crisis relating to highly controversial contracts with international 
aluminium firms for power plants causing ecocide. This slogan expressed the 
hope of the non-governmental opposition that politicians would see reason 
after the devastating consequences for nature were published. In the specific 
context of Iceland, the flag with the same slogan was a reminder of the his-
tory of occupation by other countries over the past centuries. The historic 
connotation particularly echoed the economic dependency on the United 
States – before landing on the moon, NASA came to Iceland to test its 
equipment, including the flag for hoisting on the moon, in 1967. During this 
project I met some Icelanders from the older generation who commented 
on the flag as an after-image from the presence of the US. Their association 
expanded upon the possible meanings a small single-standing flag can have 
in Iceland. The documentation of the flag flying at over 60 different locations 
in the country creates an image of resistance, autonomy and independence. 
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Image 139
Visual note of Ken 
Mattingly (left) and 
Neil Armstrong 
(right) during a 
geology field trip 
in Iceland in 1967. 
Scanned by Ken 
Glover from Gene 
Simmon’s ‘On the 
Moon with Apollo 16 
- A Guidebook to the 
Descartes Region’.
http://next.nasa.gov/
alsj/a11/a11.s67-
33609.jpg, accessed 
December 8 2011. 
photo: Nadja Nie-
mann
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39. THE MYSTICAL
This last work shows once more, that the context (space and time) influences 
the reception and meaning of a visual work. The more context is gathered, 
either historical knowledge or cultural heritage, the more complex an in-
tervention or narrative becomes. In search for meaning we encounter signs, 
secrets and inconsistencies. The contemporary artist Graham Gussin played 
with the notion of the Mystical in his two screen installation Remote Viewer 
(2000/2001).
‘A remote viewer is a person trained to focus and hold his or her sub-conscious 
mind on a distant target that is normally shielded by time and space and record 
information about that distant person, place or event. The artist made a trip to 
Askja in Iceland and during this time a remote viewer attempted to trace/locate 
him without having any prior knowledge of the subject or his whereabouts.’1
Generally, image and text are speaking different languages. The author and 
expert on symbolism in fairy tales, Michael Köhlmeier, explained during 
a broadcast on radio station SRF 2 in 20132 that both text and image need 
some sort of translation in order to make sense. Today, he claimed, we have 
difficulty handling images directly, without translation into verbal language. 
‘Es ist für uns ungeheuer schwer heutzutage wirklich mit Bildern umzugehen, weil 
wir immer eine Übersetzungsleistung machen. Wir haben Bildern gegenüber eine 
Stellung wie Latein gegenüber. Wir denken niemals im Latein, sondern wir würden 
immer, immer über die Bande denken. [...] Wir denken bei den Bildern fast immer 
in der begrifflichen Übersetzung parallel.’
Michael Köhlmeier2
‘It is incredibly difficult for us nowadays to handle images, because we always 
conduct an act of translation. Our position towards image is comparable to our 
position towards Latin. We never think in Latin, but we always think via a transla-
tion. [...] When seeing images, we almost always think along parallel terms of 
verbal translation.’  
Michael Köhlmeier2 (my translation)
In conversations with Prof. Antonio Caronia he insistently mentioned a set 
of  ‘hidden assumptions’ in my research revolving around presuppositions 
about language. He suspected a close association between my approach and 
the notion of enigma and secrecy. Towards the end of the research he proved 
1 Gussin, G., 2001. Remote viewer. http://www.grahamgussin.co.uk/moving/remoteviewer.html. I owe this 
link to Jane Grant. 
2 http://www.srf.ch/sendungen/reflexe/maerchen-und-ihre-symbolsprache, January 18 2013, 10.03h, (16th 
min)
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to be right. Amongst other practice-based parts of this thesis and the reflec-
tion on Presence vs Absence (see p.213), this aspect of the mystical triggered 
the commission of a ghostwriter to imagine the meeting between Ludwig 
and Gertrude as a short story (see Evelyn Whitehead’s Country Club, p.223). 
 A ghostwriter is by definition a concealment. A ghostwriter oper-
ates in secret and in anonymity; revealing the contribution of a ghostwriter 
is a mystification of authorship itself. Ghostwriters are mystical, as the origin 
of the voice who is speaking is obscured.
 Admitting the assistance of a ghostwriter is an act of subversion, be-
cause it questions the autonomy of the author. The ghostwriter is the shadow 
of the author and now the shadow is brought to light. Barthes reflects on the 
subversive act of writing using the shadow-metaphor: 
‘The text needs a shadow: this shadow is a bit of ideology, a bit of representation, a 
bit of subject: ghosts, pockets, traces, necessary clouds: subversion must produce 
its own chiaroscuro.’ 
(Barthes 1973/1975, p.32)
Chiascuro is itself an oxymoron, conjoining the Latin roots for clear, bright 
(clarus) and dark, obscure (obscurus) in one expression. It signifies the visual 
phenomenon  where the contrasts between light and shadow lead to uneven 
patterns. This expression captures an important aspect of this research, as 
the methodology of this thesis is influenced by strategies for dealing with 
contrast: contrastive corpus linguistics, comparison of differences, analogy 
between extremes and transition between neighbouring fields.
 The ghostwritten text is the gateway for an investigative compari-
son between Wittgenstein and Stein. This imaginary meeting of Ludwig and 
Gertrude in language forms a framework for this research as it investigates 
the notion and mechanisms of mystery, the transition between saying and 
showing and modes of possible linguistic encounter. At this point, the dis-
cussed topics converge upon a location in language as a shared practice with 
approximate rules. The hybrid approach between philosophy and the arts 
produced a set of language-games presented to the audience as an invitation 
ghostwriter as 
concealment
Barthes: chiascuro
Wittgen/Stein 
meeting in 
language: transit 
zones
the mystical
408 409
to share and use the gathered knowledge in future multidisciplinary under-
takings. 
 Gertrude Stein’s writing re-rises ‘the question of an audience’ as 
a transitory zone between ‘the knower and the thing known, and between 
knowing and communicating that knowledge’, as rephrased by Hobhouse 
(1975 p.148). The appreciation for Stein’s public performances suggests that 
the very encounter between speaker (or writer) and audience facilitates this 
transitory practice. Communication relies on this possibility of language to 
unfold knowledge in speech and writing. 
 However, the relationship between speaker and audience is prob-
lematic as soon as conventions are neglected or magnified. The Austrian 
writer Peter Handke openly pays tribute to the importance of Wittgenstein’s 
thought in his work. In the play Kaspar (1968) Handke stages the confron-
tation of the language-games executed by an individual with the audience. 
In this piece, words and objects challenge each other and their meaning (in 
the Fregian sense of Bedeutung) gets shifted. The words and objects point 
at (bedeuten) their roles within language-games taking place (in German, 
the word for to point is deuten, the German word for meaning, Be-deutung, 
shows the etymological kinship of the two words). Perloff pointed out that 
Handke’s work can be considered more Foucaultian than Wittgenstein-
ian, because Handke is eager to show the manipulative power of language 
as institution (Perloff, 1996, notes, p.264) – was Handke familiar with 
Foucault’s work ‘Les mots et les choses’ (1970) published two years earlier? 
Still Handke clearly underlines words as the constitutive elements for liter-
ary reality. Handke argues that
‘It has not been properly understood that literature is made with words, not with 
things described by words... it is words that constitute the reality of literature.’  
(Handke 1972, quoted and translated by Perloff, 1996, notes p.263)
In visual and verbal language, secret denotes a hidden meaning. Our life-
forms (Wittgenstein 1953) and language habits enable us to face enigmas 
Stein: 
on audience
Handke: Kaspar
the Mystical
and hidden assumptions without doubting language itself. Secrets are part of 
the language-games we play. 
 The mystical, or the ethical, as Wittgenstein also called it, is the 
principal motive for his philosophical work, that which lies beyond lan-
guage (Wittgenstein 1922). At the same time, within reason, we can deal 
with the absence of language beyond language. The abyss surrounding 
language may frighten us (Blanchot, 1973/1992), but it does not paralyse 
all language activity. In the course of this research, one work of the French 
writer Maurice Blanchot has been most puzzling to me. Now, at the final 
section of this research, his work The Step not Beyond (1973/1992) sets the 
tone for the last steps towards the unsayable, the mystical, the realm beyond 
language’s reach. As I admitted earlier (Buchstabensuppe, p.362), to me, a 
text seldom manages to produce uncanny sensations. But the meanings of 
Blanchot’s sentences creep inwards silently as ghosts, unfolding their entire 
poetic sense with minimal material effort. The network of meanings which 
are held together by our habits in ordinary language gets perforated by the 
delicate shifts which order Blanchot’s sentences. Is it poetry? Is it philoso-
phy? Maurice Blanchot is the master of connecting the two, according to 
Wittgenstein’s claim, that philosophy, at best, is poetry (Janik & Toulmin, 
1996, p.126. see p.160 this thesis). In  Wittgenstein’s and Blanchot’s writing, 
the step beyond language is executed. 
 
Blanchot: 
The Step 
not Beyond
the Mystical
Image 140
Melzer: Too close, (2013). Quotes from Maurice Blanchot, textile ribbons.   
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Blanchot continues, that ‘beyond’ philosophy, fragmentary writing takes 
place and asks, what is ‘beyond’ art and quotes Nietzsche:
‘Nothing exists outside the whole.’
(Nietzsche quoted by Blanchot, 1973/1992, p.vii).
As Wittgenstein points out the unsayable is delimited by the sayable, Blan-
chot’s sentences appear as rocks laid bare for a moment as the turbulent cur-
rents of language pass over, about and through. We are reminded of Perloff ’s 
image of ’rocks which are emitted by the sentence to the eye’ (Perloff 1996; 
p.215, see thesis p.297). One metaphor in Blanchot’s writing for the fragment 
and the resistance to the totality of the language system is the archipelago 
(Blanchot 1963). Again, the rocks sticking out of the water’s surface are used 
to represent the solid bits of meaning in language. 
 On the edge of meaningful language – be it philosophy or poetry 
– we feel on the edge. The edge is a familiar metaphor in Wittgenstein’s 
work; he was, just like Blanchot, not afraid of using translucent concepts. 
We recall Wittgenstein’s analogy of a blurry photograph of a person as being 
like a ‘concept with blurred edges’ (Wittgenstein, 1951, #71), when trying to 
characterise the concept of a language-game. The analogy of an indistinct 
picture with a certain use of language already is a reference to the mystical: 
the lack of clarity and the missing information constitute the image and its 
corresponding concept.
 A mystery is difficult or impossible to explain. A mystical experi-
ence is symbolic and transcends human understanding. It escapes language. 
Blanchot suggests that one way to approach the mystical in language is to 
allow strategies that introduce multiplicity into writing – ‘the dialogue, the 
fragment, multiple typefaces – all forms of disruption, interruption and 
discontinuity’ (Blanchot, 1973/1992 p.v). Blanchot understood well the dual-
ity of language which connects and separates us simultaneously. We recall 
Mauthner’s analogy of language as an ocean, which simultaneously ‘joins 
and separates continents’ (Mauthner, in Janik & Toulmin, 1996). 
on the edge
the Mystical
Language does not equal communication (Chomsky, 2013). Language both 
facilitates and obstructs understanding or meetings. This is so, because 
language happens on many simultaneous levels, of which some are beyond 
consciousness (Chomsky 2013). Blanchot is aware of this and words it in a 
sober way:
‘ It’s always too late for us to meet.’
– ‘Too late, it’s true, because there is no right moment.’ 
Blanchot, 1973/1992 p.41
The mystical lies beyond language. It lies beyond our experience and beyond 
our consciousness. The limitations of language and the limits of the lan-
guage-games indicate merely the direction where we may find it. Wittgen-
stein was convinced, that the most essential things lay beyond language. 
 Language implies a farewell. For many years I have been trying to 
remember the origin of an idea, which I could not include in this disserta-
tion because it has been impossible for me to find the source of it. Never-
theless I will mention the idea, that according to this concept, life can be 
considered the production of one very long sentence. When the sentence 
ends, one ends. 
 In personal communication with Prof. Antonio Caronia the rela-
tionship between memory and language was often discussed. He pointed out 
to me several times, that there ‘is nothing as certain to destroy memory as 
memory itself ’. He explained, that the mechanisms which form memorised 
past events produce forms which supersede the recollection of the event 
itself. These forms may be images or anecdotes, which survive the memory 
they describe. 
 Earlier in this research, the mystification and idealization of the de-
ceased was discussed. At the end of this thesis, the fugitiveness of language 
mirrors the transience of life. Using language we are on a threshold. 
      
the end of 
language
the Mystical
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40. CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was that the philosophical work and the artwork 
should ply their role in forming the discussion equally. Both relate to the 
imaginary and both interrelate. Playfulness and language-games are at the 
heart of the entire work. Meanings were examined and shifted across thresh-
olds between verbal and visual language. Philosophical ideas and conceptual 
artworks were transposed upon each other. The artworks projected the con-
cepts from humanities and literature and linked them with the overall thesis 
of potential meetings in language. The potentiality of meetings as such, and 
all possible meetings between people, has been addressed with the badge 
This is how we meet (2010).
 The model case of a meeting between Wittgenstein and Stein has 
been explored in a transdisciplinary manner both with tools from philoso-
phy and visual arts. The complexity of the research subject has been tamed 
by strategies of collaboration. The performative aspects of ordinary language 
have been stressed and shown with instructions laying bare language-games. 
The instructive power of language and its autonomy as written text has been 
examined and displayed by typographic interventions throughout the thesis 
text.    
 Simplicity and restrictions have been productive methods for the 
presentation of often complex linguistic mechanisms. The heterogenous 
materials for this research have been processed by a reflective analysis, but 
their connection within the thesis has followed an interrelational network-
structure. Transposition, translation and transition have contrasted and con-
nected the specimen of language into a facetted collection of closely related 
texts. 
 The interlinking organization of the visual, practice-based work and 
the text-based work throughout the chapters supports the analogy between 
strategies from the arts and science. The titles of the autonomous works echo 
             
aims of research
transdisciplinarity
conclusion
this engagement. This is how we meet. Please don’t tell anyone. I have changed 
my mind. The reason why I sold my house. Calumny. Dictators. Readingma-
chine. The Grass is Greener on the Other Side. The Game. Inventory. I was not 
here. Dark White. The Twins look alike. The Complete Dictionary. 
 The titles of some chapters enhance this impression of playing with 
words incessantly: Words in and out of order. How to order a list? Figure 
of Speech. What’s in a name. You name it. What do you mean? Treasury of 
Words. Alphabet Soup. Detective Stories. 
 I called the thesis a journey into transdisciplinarity charged with the 
hope of drawing poetic conclusions as well as analytical ones. 
 The possible meeting of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gertrude Stein 
was prepared by gathering the facts for it as a possible physical reality. Later, 
issues of language such as order, form and rule-following were juxtaposed 
with relevant concepts from artistic practice. Gradually, the productive 
mechanism of restrictions came to the fore. Equally, the analogies between 
patterns of meaning in philosophical concepts, Avant-garde literature and 
conceptual artworks were demonstrated. 
 As a summary, this conclusion is in line with the overall methodol-
ogy of the research. That means, that an exemplary selection of the major 
elements of this thesis are reflected in the heterogenous material ‘language’. 
 The thesis ends here, but the research continues. The fascination 
which language exercises on me does not stop. Its mechanisms and failures 
will continue to excite me and hopefully inspire future artworks and articles. 
This prospect is the reason for also including practice-based works into this 
conclusion. 
 Apart from its interdisciplinarity, this thesis aimed to offer a text-
book-approach to the issues at stake. Its lay-out structure, the short chapters 
and the internal references maximise possible entrances to the labyrinthine 
subject. The methodology invites direct interaction with the theme, which  
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this fact is honoured by including contributions from other practitioners. 
It makes a complex subject accessible and offers several models as basis for 
collaboration with other disciplines. The thesis thus also can function as a 
bridge between scientific methodologies and poetic processes. 
 As a concluding example for the mechanisms which were discussed 
throughout, I want to offer a last contribution by the key figure Bertrand 
Russell. At the outset of the research, it was not clear that Russell would play 
the star role in the story of Ludwig Wittgenstein meeting Gertrude Stein. At 
the end of it, he proves to be an important example for links between artistic 
expression and philosophical work. Russell also connected political debate 
with his philosophical work. On these grounds I include a selection of Rus-
sell’s witty little work The Good Citizen’s Alphabet (1953) with drawings by 
Franziszka Themerson in this conclusion. 
Image-set 142
Visual note of Bertrand Russell: The Good Citizen’s Alphabet, (1953). With drawings by Franziszka Themerson. 
photo: Nadja Niemann
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1 A prime example of dealing with this doubt is discussed earlier in connection to collaborations as produc-
tive meachanisms. When we are two (or more) collaborators, we persevere. We continue for the other’s sake,  
if we might have lost courage ourselves. 
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conclusion
Sometimes, the creation of an artwork takes more courage than the produc-
tion of a written text, because it exists in a very complex network of possible 
contexts and interpretations. Artworks often pre-exist in a realm beyond 
language and beyond material execution. We all doubt before we say some-
thing1. 
 
Statements which we do not understand, can scare us. Meanings which 
remain obscure sometimes make us uncomfortable. Strange languages may 
make us feel alone. We prefer language to be the ocean that connects us with 
others, rather than separating us from each other (Mauthner in Janik & 
Toulmin 1996). Also artworks can leave us puzzled and with a sensation of 
solitude. Some of the displayed works aim at creating this sensation. Other 
works evoke a feeling of kinship and recognition in language and by this in 
the other. But language is inconsistent. Words and meanings change, we en-
counter Delphic statements and ambiguous interpretations. Philosophy and 
poetry, science and arts are embedded in language. Language is an activity. 
When we are engaged in language, we take part in a form of life (Wittgen-
stein). When we repeat a word, we caress it (Stein). This research forces us to 
see the vast potentiality of language, which may both scare and delight us. 
 Altogether, the work and this thesis, attempts to do both: revealing 
the inclusive and alienating sensations that language can evoke in us.
 You, the reader, might share some of these ambiguous sensations 
when reading the thesis and looking at the artistic contributions. Looking 
back to it some of it may seem like an enumeration of commonplaces in 
language. You might experience this summary as unsatisfactory, as it leaves 
us still with many unanswered questions on language and the medium-
language is so familiar. In retrospect it may be difficult to reconstruct which 
observations were formulated anew and yet already  known to us prior to 
reading this thesis. 
I am reminded of a statement by John Searle (1969) on the difficulty of cor-
rect formulation of what we know:
“There is also the general difficulty in correctly formulating knowledge that one 
has prior to and independent from any formulation; of converting knowing how 
into knowing that. We all know in one important sense what “cause”, “intend”, and 
“mean” mean, but it is not easy to state exactly what they mean.’ 
(Searle, Speech Acts,1969, p.14)
This also alludes to the question raised by Janik & Toulmin (1996), as they 
formulate their suspicion about how interesting it would be to know which 
questions Wittgenstein had in mind before he went to study with Russell 
in England. Just as the knowledge of a fact cannot be taken back, a state of 
pre-knowledge cannot be recuperated. Just as a secret is at one and the same 
time kept intact by keeping it, it is also kept alive by confiding it to someone. 
We experience the mystical effects of language when we approach its limits. 
Where logic loops, we loop in order to make sense of things beyond lan-
guage yet within its own constraints.
A Shared Vocabulary of Ludwig Wittgenstein & Gertrude Stein exists now, 
the possibilities of their meeting have been examined in history and lan-
guage. Simple devices around the notion of meeting have been put into 
practice, computational tools have been developed and shared with oth-
ers. A set of methods have been compiled to approach familiar riddles in 
language. Mechanisms of games, jokes and secrets have been engaged and 
transposed into artworks. Image and text met beyond illustration. The image 
of Wittgenstein to consider language a network of paths in a ‘labyrinth’ has 
been applied to the overall structure of the research. Image vocabularies and 
mechanisms of the language-game were examined. The terms subtext of objects 
and fictional biography have been developed.
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 Still, as at the outset of this thesis, I believe that language must be an 
utmost sapid subject to everyone. A former student of mine, Eva de Kleer, 
has expressed her kinship with some of the issues in this thesis with this text 
from 2009:
‘My father once told me that the maximum amount of books a person can read 
throughout his entire life, is about two thousand. But then one must read like a 
madman, daily without stopping. This addition made me pretty panicky as a child. 
I was anxious to die without having read my maximum amount of books and had 
a nightmare once in which all the bookcases in the house would throw themselves 
on top of me and smash me into little pieces. My parents ate books, they chewed 
them. My father read three or four books weekly. Not because he was hungry for 
the content (as I was) but because he liked it and maybe because he didn’t know 
what else to do with the time.’
(Eva de Kleer, 2009)
Such constraints will continue to spark future work. Altogether, the thesis 
invites future interaction with colleagues and may lead to a second genera-
tion of artistic contributions. This research can also function as a device for 
establishing contacts with anyone who wishes to collaborate on the subject 
of language. Until you contact me, I will collaborate more closely with ghost-
writers to examine creative effects of co-authorship and concealment.
 Many questions remain and their examination belongs perhaps to 
the realm of poetry: Do we master language or does language master us? 
Does language facilitate our thoughts or are they controlled by language? Is 
the language-game a game we play with language or is it a game language 
plays with us? 
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Stemle: A screenshot from the Google Spreadsheet, which shows the relative frequencies etc. 
(For contextualization see p.294)
https://docs.google.com/folder/d/0BxKPIPaKU6XxMjc0OTc3YzItNTM4MS00MjE1LTg4Y2MtNmRjYTNjMGU4Z
GJh/edit?docId=0AhKPIPaKU6XxdGpIemZraEFLYzhFOHVtR3pjbG1MZVE
This graph shows the quantity of quotes of the names selected in books through time, meaning quantity (y axis) 
of books published in X year (x axis). I owe this link to Denis Jaromil Roio.
http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=Stein%2CWittgenstein&year_start=1850&year_end=2008&corpu
s=15&smoothing=3&share=
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Contrastive Corpus Linguistics
CCL
ccl
contrastive apporach
CTMM
cognitive theory of metaphor and metonymy, Barcelona 2002
GS
Gertrude Stein
Investigations
Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein 1953
LAD
language aquisition devise, Chomsky  
LW
Ludwig Wittgenstein
O.E.D.
Oxford English Dictionary
SAE languages
standard average european languages, Whorf 
TCD
The Complete Dictionary
Tractatus
Tractatus Logic Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein 1922
POS
part-of-speech 
The main corpus of this thesis consists of 71 555 words, 
altogether 444908 characters
Keyword Density
 1. language 896 (4%)
 2. wittgenstein 434 (2%)
 3. words 380 (2%)
 4. work 285 (1%)
 5. word 219 (1%)
 6. stein 209 (1%)
 7. research 207 (1%)
 8. meaning 180 (1%)
 9. gertrude 121 (< 1%)
 10. meeting 112 (< 1%)
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSWORD COUNT AND KEY WORD DENSITY1
426 427
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Throughout the thesis, internal references are offered in brackets (p.42). This device links 
cross-references between related subjects and helps to navigate through the ‘labyrinth’ of language. 
It relates to hypertext and key word structures within language.
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ence New Media Art Education & Research 
2009, Forma, Milano. Text, amongst others, 
by Wu Ming 1, Francesco Monico, Pier Lu-
igi Capucci, Marco Canali. Paper You name 
it by Tine Melzer (p.56) about conventions 
of names and naming in ordinary language, 
identification and reference. Presentation of 
a project with Henk Groenendijk (compare 
Gray Magazine nr.5, 2009).
Experiencing Design
Behaving Media
Conciousness 
Reframed
Publication
Planetary Collegium, Munich, 2011
Content
Publication of selected papers at confer-
ence 10th Annual Planetary Collegium 
International Research Conference 2009, 
Macromedia Hochschule für Medien und 
Kommunikation, Munich.  Contributions 
by Roy Ascott, Derrick de Kerckhove, Pier 
Luigi Capucci, Prof.Dr.Jill Scott. 
 Paper Dialogue Design by Tine 
Melzer (p.106) about origins and conven-
tions of the terms dialogue and design and 
their relation to Wittgenstein’s ‘Meaning as 
use’ hypothesis.
Palace of Colours
Art@Work nr.5
Publication
Art@Work / BS group, Zurich, 2010 
Content
Commission for artistic intervention; 
documentation of the process and outcome 
of the project Palace of Colours. Interviews 
with employees of the BS group on colours, 
language and memory. Textinstallations 
and dicourse on the relationship(s) between 
language and colour names. Including the 
documentation of ‘Shifter’s Ode’. 
Texts by Alexander Troitzsch and Thomas 
Wüst, photos by Elisabeth Real and Lea 
Meienberg.
publications
A Propos D’écriture(s)
Caclb
Publication
klet & ko, Bruxelles, 2010
Content
Publication of postcard editions of the 
exhibited works in Maison de a Culture 
de Marche-en-Famenne (BE). Works – 
amongst others – by Sophie Calle, Annette 
Messager. Contribution by Tine Melzer I 
have changed my mind and Literal Meta-
phor.
What happens next 
is a secret
Irish Museum of 
Modern Art
Publication
IMMA, Dublin, 2010
Content
Publication for exhibition. Book object with 
two spines. Works by Tine Melzer Light at 
the Horizon, It lies beyond this door, Please 
don’t tell anyone.
Two Disciplines, 
One Cup
Experiments In Art 
And Research
Publication
Honours Program ART and RESEARCH , 
University of Amsterdam – Gerrit Rietveld 
Academy, 2010
Content
Texts and work documentation of the stu-
dents in Honours Program 2009-2010, who 
Tine Melzer was teaching as a visiting tutor. 
More publications of the same programmes 
and contributions as guest teacher 2009 
and  2011.
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Inventory
Kasper Andreasen 
& Tine Melzer
Publication
Johan Deumens, Haarlem/Rotterdam, 2008
ISBN978-90-73974-07-4
Content
Publication of the work cycle Inventory 
consisting graphic work, artist’s books, 
installations and archival material. What is 
the relationship between word and object, 
sign and drawing? What is our relationship 
with the things around us? 
Collaboration with Kasper Andreasen. 
Image contribution and Design: Louis Lüthi 
Text: Between Word and Thing by Ilse 
van Rijn and The Company of Things by 
Prof.Martin Stokhof.
The Archive – 
Speaking Of Images
Gray Magazine Nr5
Publication
Gerrit Rietveld Academy, Amsterdam, 2009
Content
Contributions, Presentations and Projects 
about collections, image-archiving and 
documentation. Archive of André Klein, 
Contributions by  – amongst others – Eric 
Wong, Johannes Schwartz, Ben Zegers. 
Contribution What’s in a Name by Henk 
Groenendijk and Tine Melzer. Together 
with 40 students a vocabulary with 
keywords and titles for 8000 images was 
established. The relationship between word 
(name) and image was examined.
 ‘there is no there there’
Gertrude Stein, Everybody’s Autobiography (1937, p. 289)
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Ludwig Wittgenstein & Gertrude Stein 
Meeting in language
A thesis submitted to the University of Plymouth
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Planetary Collegium
M-node
University of Plymouth, UK
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2014
Tine Melzer connects philosophy of language with her artistic practice.
For this multidisciplinary PhD-research she investigated possibilities of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein meeting Gertrude Stein with regard to ordinary
language use and artistic strategies.
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